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Population matters for climate change.
This book broadens and deepens understanding of a wide range 
of population-climate change linkages. Incorporating popula-
tion dynamics into research, policymaking and advocacy around 
climate change is critical for understanding the trajectory of 
global greenhouse gas emissions, for developing and implement-
ing adaptation plans and thus for global and national eff orts to 
curtail this threat. 
Substantial resources are being dedicated to research and policy 
eff orts to mitigate climate change and support adaptation to 
the current and future impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet 
the lack of consideration of population dynamics hampers the 
development of stronger, more eff ective solutions to the chal-
lenges climate change poses. The papers in this volume provide 
a substantive and methodological guide to the current state of 
knowledge on issues such as population growth and size and 
emissions; population vulnerability and adaptation linked to 
health, gender disparities and children; migration and urban-
ization; and the data and analytical needs for the next stages of 
policy-relevant research.
In 2010 and beyond, as the world develops and implements new 
climate-change strategies, and as the need for action heightens 
every day, this volume will help to ﬁ ll one of the most signiﬁ cant 
gaps in the global response to date.
Po
p
ulatio
n D
ynam
ics and
 C
lim
ate C
hange
Ed
ited
 b
y G
uzm
án, M
artine, M
cG
ranahan, Schensul and
 Taco
li
3 Endsleigh Street
London, England
WC1H 0DD
Tel: +44 (0)20 7388 2117
Fax: +44 (0)20 7388 2826
info@iied.org
www.iied.org
United Nations 
Population Fund
220 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017 USA
Tel:  +1 (212) 297 5000
Fax: +1 (212) 370 0201
E-mail: hq@unfpa.org
www.unfpa.org 
ISBN: 978-0-89714-919-8
Sales no: E.09.III.H.4
Population
Dynamics
and
Climate
Change
EDITED BY:
José Miguel Guzmán
George Martine
Gordon McGranahan
Daniel Schensul
Cecilia Tacoli
International 
Institute for
Environment and 
Development
ii POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Acknowledgements
This book is in part the product of an Expert Group Meeting on Population 
Dynamics and Climate Change held on 24-25 June 2009. This meeting was hosted 
by UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund, and IIED, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development, with the collaboration of 
UN-HABITAT and the Population Division of the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. Thanks to Rafael Tuts of UN-HABITAT and Hania 
Zlotnik of the Population Division for their partnership. This meeting was held 
as part of the UNFPA’s celebration of the 15th anniversary of the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD+15), and generous support 
was provided by Linda Demers and the ICPD+15 team. 
Many thanks to those who participated in the Expert Group Meeting, includ-
ing: Mozaharul Alam, Mahir Aliyev, Deborah Balk, Sheridan Bartlett, Philippe 
Boncour, Louise Carver, Heather D’Agnes, Hy Dao, Mamadou Diakhite, David 
Dodman, Achim Halpaap, Karen Hardee, Jorgelina Hardoy, Werner Haug, Lei-
wen Jiang, Ruth Kattamuri, Richard Kollodge, Sari Kovats, Kate Lee, Veronique 
Marx, Mark Montgomery, Youssef Nassef, Karen Newman, Cecilia Njenga, Brian 
O’Neill, Diego Palacios, William Pan, David Satterthwaite, Jana Simonova, Ronald 
Skeldon, Judith Stephenson, Raquel Szalachman, Richmond Tiemoko, Lucy 
Winchester and Hania Zlotnik. Results of the meeting, including abstracts, papers 
and presentations, are available at: www.unfpa.org/public/ccpd.
The editors would like to thank Phyllis Brachman for editorial work that signifi -
cantly improved each of the papers and the book as a whole. Madeleine Sacco 
provided invaluable administrative assistance.
DISCLAIMER
The papers in this book present different points of view on the links among popu-
lation dynamics, mitigation and adaptation. As such, the views expressed in these 
papers are complementary and even diverse and do not necessarily represent those 
of UNFPA or IIED. 
Cover Photo Credits:
2846 (cityscape): Carina Wint for UNFPA
2634 (woman with jug): Dima Gavrysh
Copyright © UNFPA and IIED, 2009
ISBN: 978-0-89714-919-8
UN sales number: E.09.III.H4
iiiCONTENT S
Contents
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
About the Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
  1 Population Dynamics and Policies in the Context of 
Global Climate Change  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
 George Martine
  2 Does Population Matter for Climate Change?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
 Hania Zlotnik
  3 The Implications of Population Growth and 
Urbanization for Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
 David Satterthwaite
  4 Urban Form, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Vulnerability . . . 64
 David Dodman
  5 Mapping Urban Settlements and the Risks of 
Climate Change in Africa, Asia and South America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
 Deborah Balk, Mark R. Montgomery, Gordon McGranahan, Donghwan Kim, 
Valentina Mara, Megan Todd, Thomas Buettner and Audrey Dorélien
  6 Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate 
Change in a Context of High Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
 Cecilia Tacoli
  7 Climate-related Disasters and Displacement: 
Homes for Lost Homes, Lands for Lost Lands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
 Scott Leckie 
  8 Children in the Context of Climate Change: 
A Large and Vulnerable Population  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
 Sheridan Bartlett
  9 Gender and Climate Change Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
 Gotelind Alber
10 Population, Climate and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
 Sari Kovats and Simon Lloyd
11 Population and Reproductive Health in National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for Climate Change. . . . . . 176
 Clive Mutunga and Karen Hardee
iv POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
12 The Use of Population Census Data for Environmental 
and Climate Change Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
 José Miguel Guzmán 
13 Understanding the Impacts of Climate Change: 
Linking Satellite and Other Spatial Data with Population Data  . . . . . . 206
 Deborah Balk, Mark Montgomery, Gordon McGranahan and Megan Todd
14 Population Data for Climate Change Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
 Hy Dao and Jaap van Woerden
Boxes
 9.1:  What Needs to be Done on the Ground to Address Gender 
Concerns Properly?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155
 9.2:  Dimensions of the Gender Impact Analysis for Transport Projects 
(brief version) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158
 12.1:  Using Population Data for Measuring the Impact of Disasters: 
The Case of the ECLAC Handbook for Estimating the Socio-economic and 
Environmental Effects of Disasters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202
Figures
 1.1:   Evolution of Population, GNP per Capita and CO2 Emissions, 
World, 1950-2000   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
 1.2:   Proportion of World Urban Growth, by Region, 2010-2050  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
 2.1:   Average Annual Rate of Change of World Population, 1760-2050    . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
 2.2:   World Population According to Two Different Scenarios, 1950-2300  . . . . . . . . . .33
 2.3:    Percentage Change in Donor Assistance for Family Planning 
Programmes Per Woman Aged 15-49, 1996-2006  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
 3.1:   Level of Urbanization of Countries plotted against Per Capita 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2e) for 2005   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
 5.1:   Combined UN and GRUMP Urban Data for Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai and Their Environs, China    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
 5.2:   Combined UN and GRUMP Urban Data for Southern Viet Nam  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85
 5.3:   Combined UN and GRUMP Urban Data for Bangladesh   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86
 5.4:   The World’s Drylands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
 5.5:   Population exposed in the LECZ: Medan, Indonesia 
(Total population of each administrative area)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
 5.6:   Vulnerability and the LECZ: Proportion Poor in Each Administrative Area . . . . . .93
 5.7:   Vulnerability and the LECZ: Number of Poor in Each Administrative Area . . . . . .94
 5.8:   Forecasts of City Population Growth Rates in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
 8.1:  Age Distribution of the World’s Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134
 8.2:  Age and Gender Distribution of Tsunami-related Deaths. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137
 10.1: Pathways by which Climate Change may affect Human Health  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166
 11.1:   Distribution of NAPAs Projects by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183
 11.2:   Priority Ranking of NAPAs Projects by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183
 13.1:   Frequency Distribution of Per Cent Poor in Each District, Viet Nam  . . . . . . . . . .208
 13.2:   Poor in Each District, Viet Nam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
 13.3:   Percent Poor, LECZ, and Urban Footprints, Viet Nam   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
 13.4:   Per Cent Poor and Number of Poor in Urban Areas, Viet Nam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211
 13.5:   Mismatch Example, LECZ and Per Cent Poor, Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214
 13.6:   Night-time Lights, Nigeria   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215
vCONTENT S
 14.1:   GDP and CO2 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .222
 14.2:   Population, Geneva, 2000, from Employment and Residential Data . . . . . . . . . . .224
 14.3:   Population Data Discrepancies between European and 
UN Data, Spain, 2000-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .226
 14.4:   Age-class Data Discrepancies between European and 
UN Data, Belgium, 2005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .228
 14.5:   Various Population Projections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .228
 14.6:   Population Exposure to a Flood, from GPW, GRUMP 
and LandScan Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229
 14.7:   Compilation of Hazard Data, South and Central America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231
 14.8:   Tracking Consumption, Production and Health Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233
 14.9:   Emissions during the Life-cycle of a T-shirt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .234
    Approaches for the Development of IPCC Global Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .236
Tables
 1.1:   Scenarios of Urban Land Use, 2010-2050, By Region, 
According to Two Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
 3.1:   Possible Drivers of Growing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
of the Urban Population in a City or in a Nation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
 3.2:   Share of the World’s Population Growth and CO2 Emissions Growth, 
1980–2005 and 1950–1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
 3.3:   Contributions to Population Growth and CO2 Emissions Growth 
by Per Capita Income Category, 1980-2005 and 1950-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
 4.1:   Average Density of Built-Up Areas (persons per km2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
 5.1:  Forecasts of climate change in drylands ecosystems   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88
 5.2:   Distribution of the Asian Urban Population and Land Area 
in the ECZ and Drylands, by Population Size Ranges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
 5.3:   Percentages of the Asian Urban Population and Land Area 
in the LECZ and Drylands, by Population Size Ranges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
 5.4:   Distribution and Percentages of the African Urban Population 
and Land Area in the LECZ and Drylands, by Population Size Ranges  . . . . . . . . . .91
 5.5:   Distribution and Percentages of the South American Urban Population 
and Land Area in the LECZ and Drylands, by Population Size Ranges  . . . . . . . . . .91
 5.6:  City Population Density in Persons per Square Kilometre, 
by Ecozone and City Population Size Ranges, All Regions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
 5.7:   Estimates of Poverty for Selected Countries, for Cities Located in 
and Outside the Low Elevation Coastal Zone, Various Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96
 5.8:  City Population Growth Rate Regressions, Pooled Results for Africa, 
Asia and South America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
 5.9:  City Population Growth Rate Regressions for Africa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98
 5.10:  City Population Growth Rate Regression Results for Asia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
 5.11:  City Population Growth Rate Regressions for South America   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100
 10.1:  Current State of Knowledge on the Impacts of Weather on Health Outcomes . .165
 11.1:   Analysis of NAPAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178
 12.1:   Number of Countries that included Selected Questions Related 
to Environment in Latin America, Census Rounds 1980, 1990 and 2000 . . . . . . .194
 12.2:   Selected indicators of Sustainable Development that can be Obtained Using 
Census Data and/or a Combination of Census Data and Other Sources . . . . . . .195
 13.1:   Estimates of Urban Poor at Risk of Coastal Hazards, Viet Nam  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210
 13.2:   Comparison of Spatial and Tabular Approaches to Estimating Urban Population 
Distribution: Population Density in the Urban Low-Elevation Coastal Zone . . .210
 13.3:   Resolution of Selected Spatial Data and Size of Average Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . .212
 14.1:   Requirements for Mitigation and Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
14.10:
vi POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Foreword
Climate change is already impacting populations and ecosystems around the globe 
and threatens to set back development efforts by decades, profoundly affecting us 
all. The defi ning challenge of the 21st century is to combine a rapid reduction in 
poverty and inequality with a rapid reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Meeting this challenge requires an understanding of how the size, structure and 
dynamics of human populations infl uence, and are infl uenced by, our changing 
climate.
In June 2009, UNFPA (the United Nations Population Fund) and IIED (the 
International Institute of Environment and Development), in collaboration with 
UN-HABITAT and the Population Division of the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, organized an Expert Group Meeting on Population 
Dynamics and Climate Change. This volume is a product of that meeting and of a 
broader research, policy and advocacy collaboration between UNFPA and IIED on 
issues of population and development.
In the coming years, the global community will build on the commitments de-
fi ned at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework on 
Climate Change Convention (COP15) both to forestall future climate change and 
to adapt to the current and future impacts that greenhouse gas emissions have al-
ready wrought. UNFPA and IIED are committed to strengthening data collection 
and research in the areas outlined in this volume and to supporting greater global, 
regional and national investment in collaborative work on the linkages between 
population dynamics and climate change. 
Signifi cant efforts and resources are being applied to the technological, infra-
structural and fi nancial challenges to fi nding solutions to climate change. Yet the 
need to focus on those who are most vulnerable to current and future impacts—
women, children, older persons and the poor in developing countries—remains 
pressing.  In working on how population dynamics are linked to emissions, vulner-
ability and resilience to climate change, UNFPA and IIED hope to contribute to 
the design and implementation of national policies supporting the well-being of 
present and future generations. 
Werner Haug Gordon McGranahan
Director, Technical Division Head, Human Settlements Group
UNFPA IIED
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1Introduction1
Population matters for climate change. Incorporating population dynamics into 
research, policymaking and advocacy around climate change is critical for under-
standing the trajectory of global greenhouse gas emissions and developing and 
implementing adaptation plans, and thus to global and national efforts to curtail 
this threat. The papers compiled in this volume attempt to broaden and deepen 
understanding across a wide range of population-climate change linkages. Taken 
together, they provide a substantive and methodological guide to the current state 
of knowledge on issues such as population growth and size and emissions, popula-
tion vulnerability and adaptation, migration and urbanization and the data and 
analytical needs for the next stages of policy-relevant research.
Population issues have historically been an important focal point in the debate 
about global environmental change in both policy and research circles. In the last 
15 years, climate change has risen to the top of the international environmental 
agenda. Unfortunately, this has coincided with population issues fading in the dis-
cussion. This has meant that the links between population dynamics and climate 
change are often ignored, resulting in incomplete assessments of the causes and 
consequences of climate change. Where population issues have remained at the 
forefront, attention has been limited to population size and growth.
For instance, in its projections to date, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) only incorporates global population size and growth into its emis-
sions projections, without disaggregating or differentiating between the emissions 
levels of different social or demographic groups. Assessments of the current and 
future impacts of climate change include detailed models of where sea level rise 
will occur, how precipitation patterns may change and what the consequences 
will be for agricultural production and infrastructure. Yet the questions of which 
populations will be affected, in what ways and how they can best adapt using the 
resources at their disposal are often missed. When population issues are discussed 
in policy and media reports related to climate change, it is frequently in the form 
of worried statements about the pace of population growth (particularly in the 
developing world) or the potential for massive climate-induced migration. 
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There is a clear need for a broader, more nuanced, evidence-based perspective on 
how consideration of population dynamics can inform climate change responses, 
including both mitigation and adaptation. On 24-25 June 2009, UNFPA (the 
United Nations Population Fund) and the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (IIED), in collaboration with UN-HABITAT and the Population 
Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
hosted an Expert Group Meeting on Population Dynamics and Climate Change 
for this purpose. The presentations and discussions at this meeting, by renowned 
population and climate-change experts, articulated the need for policymakers at 
the global, regional and country levels to incorporate population dynamics into 
their climate-change responses. Most of the papers in this volume are drawn 
from and build on the presentations made at that meeting. The remainder of this 
introduction summarizes the contributions, both consensus and contested, of the 
Expert Group Meeting and the papers in this volume and points to the way forward 
for integrating them into global and country-level climate-change responses. 
Population Dynamics and the Drivers of Climate Change
The fi rst two chapters provide overviews of the relationships between popula-
tion dynamics and climate change from two somewhat different perspectives. 
Both point to the challenge that continued population growth will pose. The fact 
that, according to the latest United Nations projections, the world’s population 
had reached 6.8 billion in July of 2009, and that it continues to grow by an addi-
tional 78 million people a year, is highly relevant to understanding environmental 
change. Barring natural or man-made cataclysms, world population will continue 
to grow in large numbers during the fi rst half of this century. According to the 
latest United Nations projection, world population could theoretically reach a 
high of 10.5 billion, or remain as low as 8.0 billion, by 2050. 
Still, the relationship between population size/growth and greenhouse gas emis-
sions is complex. In Chapter 1, George Martine situates the challenge of popula-
tion growth within the context of broader development trends, including changes 
in consumption and levels of urbanization. He warns against the temptation to 
view family planning programmes, and their potential for reducing population 
growth, as a panacea for mitigating climate change. He also points out that while 
urbanization is sometimes blamed for driving climate change, it can not only 
reduce population growth, but, if well planned, it can reduce the per capita 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with any given economic output. 
In Chapter 2, Hania Zlotnik emphasizes a very different risk: that the decline 
in international support for sexual and reproductive health services (SRH) has 
already resulted in an increase in unintended fertility, and that continued neglect 
could greatly amplify a range of population-related challenges, including climate-
change mitigation and adaptation. While these two chapters do refl ect some 
differences of opinion over the capacity of family planning programmes to low-
er fertility and eventually lower greenhouse gas emissions, taken together they 
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clearly demonstrate the importance of taking a balanced approach to issues of 
population dynamics and climate change. Family planning programmes should 
be treated neither as panacea or pariah. 
Moreover, as both David Satterthwaite in Chapter 3 and George Martine point 
out, changes in population growth among poor groups will have little impact on 
emissions even over the long term absent signifi cant poverty reduction. The per 
capita emissions of different individuals and population groups vary by orders 
of magnitude. When understanding and projecting emissions into the future, 
differences linked to population composition and distribution must be taken 
into account. And when projecting the impact of population stabilization on 
emissions, differences in consumption levels are of utmost importance. New 
modelling processes are incorporating variations by age and spatial distribution 
in order to better understand the contribution of different scenarios of future 
population growth to global emissions. It is also crucial to integrate differential 
consumption, as well as production, into these modelling exercises. 
Further, as David Satterthwaite argues, an understanding of how the situa-
tion will evolve in the face of fast-paced urbanization, particularly in Africa and 
Asia, requires a very careful analysis of what urbanization actually is and what it 
means for the production and consumption dynamics that link population and 
emissions. In order to understand how future population growth will reshape the 
landscape and the level of risk, it is important to develop models of city popula-
tion and spatial growth. Using currently available materials, it can be shown that 
one empirically powerful infl uence on city growth is urban fertility rates. A signifi -
cant fraction of urban fertility is either unintended or unwanted. This implies that 
efforts to reduce fertility through voluntary family planning programmes may 
ease the urban adaptation burden in the future. 
Development is essential to reduce poverty and inequality but, under present 
models, development will exacerbate global climate change (GCC). Countries cur-
rently considered ‘developed’ account for the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions 
to date, and, as countries ‘develop’, their per capita contributions increase. As a 
result, development itself has become a threat. This consequence of current de-
velopment models must be addressed urgently and effectively in a way that will 
benefi t the poor and not block their path to social and economic advancement 
or to environmental justice.  Indeed, combining a rapid reduction in poverty and 
inequality alongside a rapid reduction in the global emissions of greenhouse gases 
looks to be the defi ning challenge for the 21st century. 
In sum, provided poverty is addressed, and measures are taken to ensure that 
family planning programmes are used to enhance (and not to constrain) human 
rights and reproductive health, family planning can become an important and 
integral part of climate-change adaptation and, in the long run, mitigation. Im-
proved access to SRH (including family planning) within a rights perspective is 
essential for individual welfare and accelerates the stabilization of population 
growth. Family planning programmes have, in the past, contributed to declining 
population growth rates, and slower population growth in some countries has 
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bought more time to prepare adaptation plans for the coming impacts of climate 
change. Given the nature of demographic inertia, as well as the differences in 
development levels and consumption patterns, family planning programmes do 
not, however, provide a quick means of reducing emissions.
Urbanization 
Almost all population growth in the foreseeable future will occur in urban areas, 
mostly in developing countries. The linkages between population growth, urban 
population growth and emissions involve several multiplicative factors, each of 
which varies signifi cantly among population sub-groups within countries, across 
countries and over time. As David Dodman argues in Chapter 4, there is some evi-
dence of the links between urban density (compactness of form, absence of sprawl) 
and mitigation. Much depends on initiatives taken by mayors, community and 
neighbourhood organizations and other local leaders in relation to processes of 
urban growth and urban organization.
Urban centres not only concentrate a growing share of the people and activi-
ties driving climate change, but also the people and activities that must adapt to 
the consequences of climate change. Whereas the emission of greenhouse gases is 
spatially blind, in that the effects are the same no matter where in the world the 
emissions take place, the same is not true for the impacts of climate change, which 
tend to be localized. Thus, for example, the climate-related risks for a settlement 
located on a coastal delta are likely to be very different from those for a settlement 
in high-elevation drylands. In Chapter 5, Deborah Balk and colleagues draw upon 
a newly-assembled database on city population size for several thousand cities in 
the developing world  and employ a spatial analysis to assess their location, den-
sity and growth in relation to two ecozones likely to face distinct climate-related 
hazards: the low-elevation coastal zone and drylands. In addition, while the poor 
are not uniformly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, the intersection 
of geography and poverty is a major predictor of risk. The chapter also illustrates 
how more detailed information on poverty can be used to assess particular vulner-
abilities in specifi c cities. 
Migration
Migration is caused by a number of factors; environmental change is one that 
has existed for a long time, but it has been increasingly highlighted because of 
the current and future impacts of climate change. In Chapter 6, Cecilia Tacoli ar-
gues that while there are some legitimate concerns about climate-induced migra-
tion, alarmist predictions suggesting that such migration will be a major negative 
consequence of climate change are misleading. The scale of the impacts is highly 
uncertain, and migration is not inherently negative. Mobility will in all likelihood 
increase. Based on past experience however, short-distance and short-term move-
ments will predominate. These will be key elements in strategies of adaptation to 
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climate change, but the poorest will fi nd it diffi cult to move, and this should be at 
least as much of a concern for policymakers as the possibility that large numbers 
of people will migrate. 
In short, migration and mobility in the context of climate change need not be 
the problem, but can become part of the solution. For this to occur, however, poli-
cies need to accommodate and support migration and mobility by strengthening 
local governments and the institutions that can contribute to the reduction of 
cumulative vulnerabilities. Scott Leckie, in Chapter 7, argues for the need to de-
velop better legal frameworks to support people who are displaced by the impacts 
of climate change. 
Failure to support rural populations in adaptation will help produce crisis-
driven movements that increase the vulnerability of those forced to move, as they 
leave behind homes and assets and lose valuable social networks and family ties. 
In some countries, refugees fl eeing confl icts and disasters are a large part of the 
urban poor, and it can take them a long time to integrate into local communities 
and fi nd employment and shelter. Failure by national governments and interna-
tional agencies to recognize and support adaptation, including mobility and mi-
gration, for the poorest and most vulnerable households could result in forms of 
migration more damaging for both the migrants and the receiving communities.
Vulnerability
It is impossible to understand and reduce vulnerability without taking popula-
tion dynamics into account. From acute, climate-related events like storms and 
fl oods to long-term shifts in weather patterns and sea level patterns, the impacts 
only become clear through an understanding of who is at risk, what the risks are 
to people rather than just to places and how these risks vary within and across 
populations. Vulnerability is unevenly distributed between men and women and 
between the young, the middle aged and the elderly. Sheridan Bartlett, in Chapter 
8, reviews the specifi c vulnerabilities of children to climate change impacts and 
points out that children are not only a very large proportion of those who are most 
vulnerable, but also those for whom the effects of such vulnerability can extend 
over a very long term.  Gotelind Alber, in Chapter 9, examines how the impacts of 
climate change exacerbate gender disparities and argues that, to be effective, both 
adaptation and mitigation policies need to address underlying patterns of social 
inequality. 
Projecting vulnerability to the immediate and longer-term health impacts of cli-
mate change requires a holistic model that takes into account social, demographic, 
economic, political and other factors. In Chapter 10, Sari Kovats and Simon Lloyd 
review the wide range of health risks that climate change is likely to exacerbate and 
how climate change will increasingly infl uence the shape of health interventions. 
Chapter 11, by Clive Mutunga and Karen Hardee, examines the links between re-
productive health and adaptation through an assessment of the coverage of these 
issues in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs).
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As indicated in these and later chapters, it is clear that poverty is inextricably 
linked to climate change vulnerability: The impacts of climate change destabilize 
the livelihoods of the poor in particular, and poverty increases the challenges of 
adaptation in the context of sustainable development.
Data and Measurement
One of our foremost challenges in understanding the linkages between popula-
tion dynamics and climate change is in identifying, collecting and integrating 
data. United Nations agencies must advocate for responses that include the char-
acterization of population trends and support the data collection, research and 
analysis at the global and country levels necessary to ensure that those responses 
are evidence-based. José Miguel Guzmán, in Chapter 12, shows that census data 
provide an insuffi ciently utilized source of information for the analysis that will 
improve both mitigation and adaptation efforts. The 2010 round of censuses pro-
vides an exceptional opportunity to exploit the potential of this source of infor-
mation, but doing so will require urgent and effective efforts at the international 
and national levels. Encouraging and supporting the timely release of census data 
is an important role for global institutions.
Deborah Balk and her co-authors demonstrate in Chapter 13 that an essential 
ingredient in constructing the evidence base for urban adaptation is the availability 
of population and socio-economic data for fi nely disaggregated administrative 
and political units. These data provide a frame over which climate-related risk 
maps can be laid to produce estimates of the number of people, the percentage 
poor and numbers of the poor by jurisdiction and neighbourhood. The effort 
to assemble such data must begin with the processing of national censuses into 
small-area units. This should be conducted in a manner sensitive to ecosystem 
and other bio-geophysical parameters, with the drylands and low-elevation coastal 
zones serving as examples. It is also necessary to consider the utility of the most 
local analysis, given that many impacts of climate change are still in the future and 
urban areas undergo constant change. 
As Hy Dao and Jaap van Woerden point out in Chapter 14, United Nations sup-
port of improved data streams and technical assistance is essential to this kind of 
research. The authors also underscore the myriad challenges of defi nitional issues 
in climate-change analysis, including problems of scale—global, regional, national 
and community—defi nitions of coastlines, boundaries and expanses, omissions 
in the production and dissemination of data and measurement of consumption-
based versus supply-based emissions, among others. 
Incorporating Population Dynamics into 
Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Responses
Several points are of particular importance when assessing the links between pop-
ulation dynamics and climate change, some of which are addressed directly by 
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the papers in this volume. First, population size and growth matter for emissions 
projections over the long term, though the magnitude of the effect is diffi cult to 
estimate. This diffi culty is associated with many factors, in particular the com-
plex interrelationships among economic growth, production, consumption and 
population growth, and also because of the extent of the data needed for accurate 
modelling. Nonetheless, there is consensus in the scientifi c community, spurred 
by new modelling efforts that incorporate population structure, composition and 
distribution together with variations in consumption and production, that slow-
er population growth will lead to a decline in long-term emissions. These effects 
depend not just on the total of number of people, but also on age structure, house-
hold composition and spatial distribution. 
Second, there are many reasons to pursue a rights-based approach to reproduc-
tive health and decreasing fertility; the 1994 Programme of Action of the Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development describes these in detail. 
Better adaptation to the impacts of climate change is yet another reason, as 
addressed by Clive Mutunga and Karen Hardee in this volume. Family planning 
programmes can also be expected to help mitigate climate change in the long run, 
but it is important that governments not be given fi nancial incentives to achieve 
reductions in their countries’ population growth, given the risk of a return to the 
oppressive population targets and controls that several countries adopted in the 
past. Therefore, funding mechanisms for reproductive health should not be cou-
pled directly to emissions targets, though coupling them to adaptation is both 
appropriate and essential.
Third, there are many components of the link between population dynamics 
and climate change beyond population size and growth. As this volume shows, the 
issues of health, gender inequality, migration and displacement and urbanization 
all link population dynamics with climate change and need to be incorporated in 
planning and implementing global and country-level responses. These issues are 
particularly relevant in the development of adaptation plans, including in assess-
ing the costs of adaptation. 
At the country level, United Nations agencies acting together through the 
Delivering as One initiative, in concert with partners like IIED, can provide a new 
structure for engaging more effectively and holistically on climate change. Still, 
much work needs to be done to ensure coordination among agencies and with 
governments and partners from civil society. Both the Nairobi Work Programme 
on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change and the NAPAs pro-
vide additional entry points to integrating population dynamics into responses, 
since many of them recognize the associations between population growth and 
composition and vulnerability. 
Substantial resources are being dedicated to research and policy efforts to miti-
gate climate change and support adaptation to the current and future impacts of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet the lack of consideration of population dynamics 
hampers understanding and development of stronger, more effective solutions to 
the challenges climate change poses. In 2010 and beyond, as the world adjusts to 
a new climate-change agreement, and as the need for action heightens every day, it 
is our hope that this volume will help to address one of the most signifi cant gaps 
in the global response to this time.
Note
1 The editors wrote this introduction with contributions from participants in the Expert Group Meeting on 
Population Dynamics and Climate Change.
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9Population Dynamics and
Policies in the Context of
Global Climate Change
George Martine
Introduction
Interest in demographic dynamics and their interactions with other mediating 
factors on potential environmental threats is resurgent in the wake of increasing 
concern about climate change. Most discussions of this global menace include 
some mention of population processes, yet the treatment of these is frequently 
incomplete or incorrect. Attention is generally focused on population growth, 
widely portrayed as a major driver that could easily be reduced. ‘Urbanization’ 
is also repeatedly cited as an important driver of increasing emissions, but with-
out recognition of its potential contribution to mitigation. Signifi cant changes 
in population composition and their implications for mitigation and adaptation 
receive scant attention outside the demographic community. Simplistic assump-
tions about demographic trends and their impacts weaken emissions scenarios 
and lead to misleading policy suggestions.
This chapter will summarize some of the key issues involving the relation-
ship between global climate change and each of the three major components of 
demographic trends: growth, distribution and composition. Each of these sections 
will conclude with a brief discussion on implications for population policy. Given 
space limitations, this chapter will focus mainly on the interface between demo-
graphic processes and mitigation.1 
Perspectives on Population Growth and 
Environmental Change
Few panaceas generate as much popular backing in developed countries as the 
notion that: a) a reduction in population size and growth would go a long way 
towards solving the world’s major problems, including those related to climate 
change; and b) this reduction could be easily achieved through family planning 
programmes. Thousands of variations on this message—which has been dubbed 
“The Northern Perspective” (Hummel et al., 2009)—can easily be found in internet 
documents spanning a variety of substantive fi elds. 
1
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Despite the pressure of the Northern Perspective, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has downplayed the importance of population 
policy in mitigation and adaptation efforts—either because of apprehension about 
political repercussions in developing countries or from a failure to perceive its 
vital implications. Population projections constitute, implicitly or explicitly, the 
backbone of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios. The 2007 IPCC report 
repeatedly mentions ‘population’, but without getting into the specifi cs of ‘popu-
lation dynamics’ and, generally, with negative connotations (Metz et al., 2007).
There is thus a need for a more penetrating understanding and for a better bal-
ance in considering the role of demographic dynamics on Global Climate Change 
(GCC). The Northern Perspective overstates its case for population control, while 
the IPCC understates the signifi cance of demographic factors and policies. Viewed 
in perspective, this gap refl ects long-standing misapprehensions and discrepan-
cies concerning the actual signifi cance of population dynamics for environmental 
change. The population/environment debate has long been fraught with ideo-
logical overtones and substantive oversimplifi cations. A more discriminating look 
at the strengths and limits of population programmes, as well as a better under-
standing of other population dynamics, are needed in order to fi ll out the slate of 
population policies that are germane to global climate change.
Population growth, economic growth and GHG emissions
A population’s size and rate of growth fundamentally affects the dimension and 
gravity of environmental problems through efforts made by countries to achieve 
‘development’. In the current predominant mode of civilization, and under 
present technological and environmental control levels, both population and 
economic growth are threatening. If the per capita consumption levels of the 
demographically small and slow-growing developed countries were to be reached 
by some of the large and/or rapidly growing countries under the same technologi-
cal and environmental control conditions, the serious environmental problems 
of Planet Earth would inevitably take a quantum leap. As has repeatedly been 
demonstrated, many more planets would be needed to provide the resources that 
would allow the rest of the world to attain the same standard of living currently 
enjoyed by industrialized countries. 
World population experienced its fastest growth in history during the second 
half of the 20th century, swelling from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.1 billion in 2000, as 
shown in Figure 1.1. However, this increase was smaller than the growth in world 
GNPP during the same period and much smaller than the fourfold increase in 
carbon emissions. Global climate change in the 21st century will depend on the 
interaction of these three trajectories. 
The easiest to foresee is that in the domain of population: Demographic pro-
cesses have a built-in inertia that determines short- and mid-term outlooks more 
predictably than trends in the economic or environmental fi elds. Nevertheless, the 
art of population projection is not an easy one, and recent shifts in fertility-level 
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trends have made it even more capricious. Unexpected transformations have radi-
cally altered traditionally expected patterns, disrupted customary cleavages be-
tween groups of countries and altogether modifi ed our traditional understanding 
of demographic processes.2 
Over the previous half-century, most countries could easily be classifi ed into 
tidy compartments: Developed countries had high incomes and low fertility while 
poor and developing countries had low incomes and high fertility. These tradi-
tional (though somewhat misleading) categories linking development levels to 
population growth rates have lately become blurred. Widespread and unexpect-
edly rapid declines in birthrates have been registered in the developing world, in-
cluding much of Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Previous scenarios of 
‘population explosions’ are now restricted to most of sub-Saharan Africa plus a 
few other isolated countries (Afghanistan, Palestine, Timor Leste and Yemen) that 
still conform to the traditional mould of high fertility and high poverty.
On the other hand, the list of lowest-low fertility countries has shrunk notice-
ably in recent years (Myrskylä et al., 2009). Only Russia and the Eastern European 
countries continue to have low and declining below-replacement fertility. Contrary 
to all expectations, Northern Europeans are having more babies, with several coun-
tries now anticipating steady population growth through the middle of the century. 
Does this signal a regional rebound in fertility rates? Possibly, but not necessarily: A 
previous rebound was experienced in the Nordic countries where the total fertility 
rate rose from 1.7 in 1985 to 2.0 in 1990; however, by the end of that decade, fertility 
levels had fallen to 1.85 (Lutz et al., 2005, in Smil, 2008, p. 97). By contrast, in the 
United States—with by far the world’s largest economy and bloc of consumers—the 
combination of immigrant and native reproductive patterns has boosted vigorous 
fertility rates that are likely to remain high in the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, several developing countries now have the type of low fertility 
rates that until recently were found only in high-income countries. The Chinese 
Figure 1.1 Evolution of Population, GNP Per Capita and CO2 
      Emissions, World, 1950-2000
Sources: Population data from United Nations, 2008b; GNPP data from Maddison, 2004; and CO2 emissions 
from Marland et al., 2007. 
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decline has been well publicized, but Iran, among others, has experienced an even 
faster decline over recent decades. Brazil has attained fertility levels that are lower 
than those of France, thus well below replacement level. Conversely, a doubling of 
population is anticipated in the United States. 
In the midst of these diverse and confounding trends, aggregate world popula-
tion—the main focus of interest over the last 60 years—continues to increase, but 
at a decreasing rate and volume. The fastest annual rate of increase occurred in the 
1965-1970 period (2.02) and has been decreasing ever since. The largest annual 
increments in population occurred in the 1985-1990 period, when some 89 mil-
lion people were added every year. However, levels of absolute increases have also 
slowed. Overall, according to the latest United Nations projections, world popula-
tion reached 6.8 billion in July of 2009 and is currently increasing at a rate of 78 
million per year (United Nations, 2009, p. 11). The bottom line is that, barring 
natural or man-made cataclysms, world population will continue to grow in large 
numbers during the fi rst half of this century.
Policies in relation to population growth
Whatever one’s starting point, the threat to global environmental security posed 
by this vastly growing population simply cannot be dismissed. Practically any pos-
sible environmental challenge facing humankind today, from ozone depletion to 
waste disposal, is made more diffi cult by a larger population size. However, this 
broad perception is insuffi cient to characterize the actual infl uence of population 
dynamics on environmental outcomes in general and on climate change in par-
ticular. A more discriminating perspective needs to consider:
the limits of what can be achieved through efforts to reduce population  •
growth and size; 
the effect that such a reduction can have on mitigation of climate change;  •
the signifi cance of other ongoing demographic processes.  •
Importance and limitations of family planning programmes 
A large proportion of the world’s women still do not have access to the means 
that would allow them to have only the number of children they desire (UNFPA 
and Alan Guttmacher Institute, 2004). There is even a substantial gap between 
actual and desired family size among the fastest-growing demographic groups 
in developed countries. It is of considerable signifi cance that the 2.5 billion dif-
ference between the United Nations’ highest and lowest projections is the result 
of only a one child per woman difference in world fertility. That being the case, 
human-rights-based policies that empower women and address unmet needs 
for reproductive health services—whether in developed, developing or least de-
veloped countries—would have an important impact on reducing the rate of 
population growth and thus on the eventual size of world population. While 
giving people, especially women, more control over their lives, this would also 
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have critical longer-term impacts on climate change. In this light, everything 
possible should be done to provide women with the means to achieve their desired 
family size.
However, it should be clearly understood that addressing the issue of family 
planning needs effectively will not give humankind a reprieve from its obligation 
to face the more critical environmental challenges posed by the prevailing civiliza-
tion’s model of ‘development’. Both demographic and environmental outcomes 
are linked to development processes that occur within particular historical con-
texts. An exaggerated focus on a-historical simplifi cations that do not take into 
consideration the complexities of the 21st century development scenario, nor 
their different implications for distinctive social contexts, favours inadequate 
policy suggestions. 
Part of the reason that worldwide attention is increasingly focused on the popu-
lation question stems from its painless simplicity. Attacking environmental issues 
from a demographic standpoint seems immensely easier than trying to deal with the 
causes of global environmental damage that are rooted in our very model of civiliza-
tion. However, the two approaches cannot be expected to have comparable effects. 
Suggesting cutbacks in consumption when ‘happiness’ itself is predicated on having 
access to more goods is an extremely unpopular approach and threatens the very 
foundations of ‘progress’ and ‘well-being’ as they are defi ned today. By contrast, 
efforts to change ‘irrational’ and ‘obsolete’ reproductive patterns are ‘obviously’ 
much simpler. Common sense seems to indicate that people (especially poor peo-
ple) would be better off with fewer children, and, if they did have fewer offspring, 
both society and the environment would be better off. However, the results of this 
change could be considerably less incisive than generally expected. 
The actual magnitude of the impact that future fertility declines will have on 
the mitigation of climate change is far from being proportional to the number of 
people who are ‘not born’ under a scenario of rapid fertility decline. Enormous dif-
ferences in social organization and in consumption patterns between regions and 
social groups translate into highly differentiated impacts of additional numbers.
Moreover, the practical ability to ‘deal with the population problem’ through 
family planning programmes is overestimated. Under the threat of climate change, 
the traditional view of the population establishment—that fertility declines as a 
result of family planning programmes and that it is therefore urgent to intensify 
such programmes in high-growth countries—has made a resurgence. However, 
this perspective overlooks well-documented arguments that rapid reductions in 
fertility depend at least as much on speeding up economic development and social 
transformations, as well as on empowering women and meeting individual’s needs 
in sexual and reproductive health (see, for instance, Demeny, 1992 and 1994; Sen 
et al., 1994; Presser, 1997).
Over the last few centuries, population has grown rapidly as a result of some 
startling improvements in living conditions that generated a reduction in morta-
lity. By the same token, fertility has recently declined signifi cantly in most regions 
of the world in response to the profound socio-economic transformations asso-
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ciated with many different patterns of development. While spectacular declines 
in fertility have been facilitated by family planning programmes, such as those 
in China, Indonesia and Iran, underlying social transformations in each of these 
countries were also critical.3 
The comparably rapid decline of fertility in Brazil was not effectively sup-
ported by any large-scale family planning programme but was largely driven by 
social transformations—including urbanization—that prompted people to use any 
means at hand to limit the number of their offspring (Martine, 1996). Meanwhile, 
several other countries with large-scale family planning programmes spanning 
several decades have experienced very slow and deliberate fertility declines. Fertility 
has also decreased in some poor countries or regions having exceptional social and 
institutional structures, such as in Kerala, India, but this only reinforces the lesson 
that some minimal social improvements are essential in order to motivate people 
to have a smaller number of children (Martine et al., 1998).
In brief, family planning programmes alone, without some minimal social trans-
formation that motivates people to perceive that limiting fertility would yield some 
increment in well-being, and that empowers women to take control over their lives, 
are unlikely to reduce fertility rapidly. This is especially true in countries that still 
have a predominantly rural population. Throughout history, rural families have 
had more children in order to work the land. Practically all the least-developed 
countries still have a large majority of their population residing in rural areas, 
where family planning programmes are more diffi cult to implement and have un-
derstandably had a lesser impact—unless some form of coercion was applied. 
Given the association between development and fertility decline, even a reduc-
tion in population growth does not necessarily result in reduced consumption. 
Not to be overlooked here is the fact that when development—often quickened 
by urbanization—unfolds suffi ciently to motivate people to reduce their fertility, 
it inevitably increases their consumption levels as well. Thus, while it is clear that 
fertility decline is absolutely essential for sustainability in the long term, it is only 
the starting point for more effective measures addressing consumption.
In short, the Northern Perspective’s approach to mitigation through family plan-
ning has to be situated in the context of the world’s updated demographic profi le, 
as well as its stage of development. The timing and magnitude of the prob-
able effects of a fertility reduction on climate change will vary considerably 
according to the current demographic and development situation of each country. 
On the one hand, reducing fertility in poor and least-developed countries—where 
fertility levels are still invariably high—would bring important social benefi ts in 
the short run and, perhaps most important, help to decrease the vulnerability of 
these populations to the effects of climate change. However, since their consump-
tion levels and their impact on emissions are still comparatively low, a reduction 
in their population growth will not represent a major boost to global mitigation 
efforts in that time span. Moreover, the social transformations that are minimally 
necessary to motivate the adoption of family planning are likely to have an equally 
signifi cant but opposite impact on increased consumption. 
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In the medium and longer run, given the inertia of demographic processes (i.e., 
the fact that populations continue to grow long after they have reached replace-
ment fertility) and the hope that all countries will move quickly out of poverty 
and under-development, it is important for global mitigation efforts to achieve 
slower population growth now rather than later. Should they reach the recently 
successful development levels—and thus increased consumption—of such coun-
tries as China and India, having smaller populations will clearly be signifi cant for 
GCC over the longer range.
On the other hand, reducing fertility in developed countries would have a greater 
effect in the short term on reducing consumption and emissions than it would in 
poor countries. In purely logical terms, this is where a major fertility-reducing effort 
would seemingly have the greatest impact at this time. However, in practical terms, 
it would obviously be more diffi cult to attempt to limit fertility in this group of 
countries than it would be in poorer countries. With the glaring exception of the 
United States, most industrialized countries have actually found themselves obliged 
to make energetic efforts to increase their birth rates. Such policies, aimed at stimu-
lating fertility, are grounded in vital national interests inspired by demographic con-
cerns such as diminishing size, reduced labour force and population ageing, as well 
as in other less tangible issues related to national identity and sovereignty. Offi cial 
and popular reactions to news of increased birth rates in these countries have bor-
dered on the jubilant. Under these circumstances, it is hard to envision that great en-
thusiasm would be generated for fertility reduction efforts within these countries.   
Secondly, it must be observed that even rapid fertility declines would not 
quickly produce the stabilization or reduction of population sizes. Given the 
effects of demographic inertia, a country’s population continues to grow in 
absolute numbers for some decades after it has reached below-replacement fertil-
ity. Thus, China reached a below-replacement level of fertility in the early 1990s, 
but its population is expected to grow by an additional 320 million from that 
point on before it fi nally stabilizes and starts to decrease after 2035. Worldwide, 
the majority of population growth today is due less to current fertility patterns 
than to imbedded demographic inertia, that is, the result of the fertility and 
mortality patterns of previous generations. This inertia results in a time lag of 
several decades between the initial reduction in fertility levels and any population 
decline. It has been estimated that over half of world population growth dur-
ing the fi rst half of this century will be attributable to inertial factors (National 
Research Council, 2000). The contribution of inertial growth would be even larger 
if sub-Saharan countries were discounted from these calculations. 
Such sobering observations on the limitations of endeavours to achieve rapid 
population stabilization should not, however, dampen ever-greater efforts to em-
power women and to provide them with access to family planning services in the 
framework of high-quality reproductive health services. Even inertial growth could 
be reduced if age at marriage was postponed and the age at conception of the fi rst 
child was delayed (Bongaarts, 2007). However, these modifi cations in marital pat-
terns themselves require important cultural changes that may not be forthcoming.
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Thirdly, the limitations of the ‘demographic solution’ must be made clear. 
Sheer numbers do not tell the whole story. The world is already on the threshold 
of a major climactic threat, with or without population growth. Family planning 
simply does not have retroactive capabilities. Even if humankind failed to produce 
a single baby during the next generation, its quality of life on Planet Earth would 
still be endangered by climate change. The latest United Nations projections indi-
cate that the world could have as few as 7.96 billion people and as many as 10.46 
billion in 2050 (United Nations, 2009). No one would dispute the fact that this 
difference of 2.5 billion could greatly aggravate global environmental problems. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that a world population of 7.96 billion could actually 
infl ict greater damage on the global environment than one with 10.46 billion, if 
the former achieved the production and consumption patterns of industrialized 
countries. 
In short, efforts to limit fertility through family planning programmes, in the 
absence of some measure of development or social transformation, are not likely 
to work from a demographic standpoint. Without drastic changes in the produc-
tion and consumption patterns of our civilization, they would also not work from 
an environmental standpoint.
Urbanization and the Sustainable Use of Space 
As noted, public attention to demographic factors in environmental change has 
focused almost exclusively on population size and rate of growth. However, popu-
lation dynamics also involve the changing distribution of population over space, 
as well as its evolving composition over time. The spatial dimension of population 
and its relation to environmental dynamics warrants much greater attention than 
it has received so far. The battle for a sustainable environmental future is being 
waged primarily in the world’s cities where population, economic activity and 
environmental issues are increasingly concentrated. 
Contrary to standard belief, higher levels of urbanization can constitute a posi-
tive factor in dealing with population/environment problems. As observed in a 
recent issue of Science: “Cities themselves present both the problems and solutions 
to sustainability challenges of an increasingly urbanized world . . . large urban ag-
glomerations are fonts of human ingenuity and may require fewer resources on a 
per capita basis than smaller towns and cities or their rural counterparts” (Grimm 
et al., 2008, p. 756). Fulfi lling the potentialities of cities for long-term sustain-
ability, however, will require changes in approaches and policies. Local decisions 
have far-reaching effects, and, conversely, climatic or ecosystem changes may have 
a local impact. Poorly managed urban development can have destructive local and 
even global consequences.
By comparison to the increasing diversity in fertility patterns, the spatial dis-
tribution of population is marked by an inexorable and universal trend towards 
urban concentration. For the fi rst time in history, more than half of all human 
populations are now living in towns and cities. Even more important, at the 
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aggregate level, almost all population growth is occurring in cities: Population 
growth issues are thus primarily urban issues. The number of urban-dwellers will con-
tinue to rise quickly, reaching almost 6.2 billion people in 2050. About 95 per cent 
of this future growth will be concentrated in developing countries, especially in 
Africa and Asia (see Figure 1.2). These two lag far behind other continents in terms 
of urbanization levels, but the present and future growth in absolute numbers of 
urban people in these regions is massive and unprecedented.
Figure 1.2: Proportion of World Urban Growth, By Region, 
       2010-2050
Source: United Nations, 2008a.
This transformation will have enormous implications for climate change, given 
the increasing concentration and magnitude of economic production in urban 
localities, as well as the higher living standards that urbanites enjoy by compari-
son to rural populations. Urban concentration will also be critical for mitigation 
and adaptation efforts in view of the greater vulnerability of urban populations to 
some of the more hazardous consequences of GCC.
For the most part, however, the signifi cance of urbanization and urban growth 
for environmental change and, in particular, for climate change, has not been 
appropriately depicted. The IPCC 2007 report, for instance, refers to urban areas 
on several occasions, often in connection with ‘land-use change’, and generally in 
reference to their role in stressing environmental limits, generating problems in 
services and infrastructure, aggravating health, food or other social problems or 
otherwise contributing to climate change. The special vulnerability of urbanites, 
especially in low-lying coastal zones or urban slums, is also highlighted. But no-
where are the inherent advantages of urban areas for mitigation mentioned nor 
their potential advantages for adaptation.
The IPCC’s negative perspective on urbanization mirrors the dominant public 
and environmentalist perception, wherein cities are pictured as having an inor-
dinate ecological footprint and making decisive contributions to global climate 
change. Traditionally, environmentalists have taken a dim view of urbanization 
and city growth. From the inception of the modern environmental movement, 
concern with the preservation of nature has focused attention on rural areas. 
Africa
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North America
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“Ecologists shunned urban areas for most of the 20th century, with the result that 
ecological knowledge contributed little to solving urban environmental problems” 
(Grimm et al., 2008, p. 756).
Within this context, cities have generally been viewed primarily as the locus 
of the critical environmental problems generated by the production and con-
sumption patterns of modern civilization. Well-meaning approaches, such as the 
‘ecological footprint’ measurements—initially focused on cities—have served to 
increase environmental awareness but, in the process, have also reinforced the idea 
that cities are the world’s major environmental culprits, given the high concentra-
tion of energy use and industrial production in urban areas.
This stance is indeed commonplace today (see, for example, Dodman, 2009, p. 
186). It is generally acknowledged that the two most important anthropogenic 
activities associated with urbanization that impact climate involve changes in land 
use and the increase in greenhouse gases. The following section focuses on land-
use change; the relation between urbanization and GHG emissions is analysed in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
Land-use and land-cover change 
Land-use changes are considered a fi rst order climate forcing factor: Around 31 
per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions are reputed to arise from the land-use 
sector (Scherr and Sthapit, 2009, p. 32). Although the changes in land use brought 
about by urban growth are routinely cited as a major factor in the growth of GHG 
emissions, the actual level of this impact appears open to question. In principle, 
“[r]eplacing natural vegetation with roads and buildings often decreases the 
surface albedo and alters the local surface energy balance, increasing sensible heat 
fl ux and decreasing latent heat fl ux” (Kueppers et al., 2008, p. 251). Although this 
effect has been verifi ed with respect to local ‘Urban Heat Islands’ (UHI), the empir-
ical evidence linking urban land use to regional or global climate change does not 
appear to be robust.
Initially, it appears that most studies over a larger land area fi nd it diffi cult 
to distinguish the temperature impacts of urban land use from other land-use 
chan ges. One study estimated that land-use changes accounted for half of the 
observed reduction in the diurnal temperature range and an increase in mean 
air temperature of 0.27°C in the continental United States during the past cen-
tury (Kalnay and Cai, 2003, p. 528). Another study on temperature changes in the 
United States covering a span of 40 years (1960-1999) corroborated verifi able 
changes in temperature that are attributable to land-use changes, but failed to 
distinguish between the effects due to urban growth from those derived from 
agriculture and deforestation (Cai et al., 2004, p. 2). 
A study in the Zhujiang Delta of China did conclude that strong and uneven 
urban growth caused the land surface temperature to rise by 4.56°C in “the new-
ly urbanized part of the study area” (Qian et al., 2006); however, it is not clear 
whether this refers to a UHI or a regional effect. In the United States as a whole, 
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analyses of the impacts of urban land-cover change on climate change have ap-
parently not yielded signifi cant results—in the order of 0.006C/dec. and 0.015C/
dec. (Cai et al., 2004, p. 1). One recent study concluded that “. . . urban areas 
show a large warming second only to barren areas” (Kalnay et al., 2008, p. 7) 
while another found that “[c]onverting natural vegetation to urban land-cover 
produced less pronounced temperature effects in all models, with the magni-
tude of the effect dependent upon the preexisting vegetation type and urban 
parameterizations” (Kueppers et al., 2008, p. 250). Part of the reason for these 
low correlations, the latter authors explain, is simply the relatively smaller spatial 
extent of urban areas. 
In this light, it would seem critical to quantify the amount of land that is actu-
ally being converted to urban use.4 At present, this quantity is not yet as enormous 
as seems to be generally assumed; however, it is important to examine how massive 
urban growth could change that situation in the future. Much improved estimates 
on the dimensions of the Earth’s land area that is covered by urban localities are 
now available. These new sets of global databases on urban population and ex-
tent combine census data, satellite imagery and different methods of analysis in 
an integrated geospatial framework. Two of the best known recent studies based 
on such technologies can, for purposes of this chapter, be taken as the upper and 
lower limits of the area currently occupied by urban localities.
The Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) (CIESEN, n.d.) estimates 
that urban localities occupied, in the year 2000, a land area of 3.506.656 km². This 
corresponds to about 2.7 per cent of the Earth’s total land area, equivalent to less 
than half of Australia’s total.5 In light of current discussions among specialists, 
these fi gures can be considered as the upper limit of current estimates of urban 
land use.
The low estimate can be taken from a recent study commissioned by the World 
Bank (Angel et al., 2005). This focused only on cities having more than 100,000 
persons, and, within them, only on their built-up areas (i.e., excluding green areas and 
other interstitial spaces). Using a sample of 120 cities worldwide, this study es-
timated that cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants contained 2.3 billion of the 
estimated 2.84 billion urban inhabitants in the year 2000. These urban inhabit-
ants used up a total built-up space of 400,000 km² worldwide, equivalent to 0.3 
per cent of the Earth’s land area. 
Assuming that the total population living in urban localities having less than 
100,000 inhabitants (540 million) had an average density of 6,000 persons per 
square kilometre,6 they would occupy another 90,000 km². Under such assump-
tions, the total built-up land area in all urban localities around the world would 
amount to 490,000 km² (400,000 + 90,000), or an area slightly smaller than Spain 
and less than half of 1 per cent of the Earth’s total land area. 
In short, approximately half of the Earth’s population occupies an area 
equivalent to between 0.4 and 2.7 per cent of the Earth’s surface, with the larger 
number refl ecting all spaces within the perimeter of towns and cities and the 
smaller number measuring only the built-up areas of towns and cities. For present 
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purposes, the exact fi gure is not an issue here since any number within this range 
would not seem to represent, in itself, a critical threat to the Earth’s sustainability. 
Although human settlements have so far taken up a relatively small fraction 
of the Earth’s surface area, future land use has understandably raised some con-
cern. The aforementioned World Bank study (Angel et al., 2005) shows that urban 
land areas are growing faster than ever because of a combination of absolute in-
creases in numbers of people with a decreasing average density. The study observes 
that urban density in built-up areas has been declining for the past 200 years and 
that the reduction has been particularly rapid in recent years (Angel et al., 2005). 
This tendency towards declining density, combined with unprecedented absolute 
increases in the urban population, could greatly expand the land area of cities in 
the future. 
At present, cities in the developing world occupy less space per inhabitant 
than in developed countries. In both developing and industrialized countries, 
average densities of cities have been declining rapidly: at an annual rate of 
1.7 per cent over the last decade in developing countries and of 2.2 per cent 
in industrialized countries (Angel et al., 2005, pp. 1-2). Table 1.1 presents a 
scenario of urban land use between 2010 and 2050 under two assumptions: 
a) that urban density during that period would remain the same as it was in 
the GRUMP study (columns in blue); and b) that density would continue to 
decrease over those four decades at the same rate as it did during the 1990s in 
the World Bank study (last two columns). It is important to note that the urban 
land-use data which serves as a basis for these scenarios are those provided by 
the GRUMP analysis, that is, the estimate being considered here constitutes 
the upper limit of urban land use.
These numbers have to be taken as merely illustrative of broad tendencies 
within the bounds of the supplied scenarios, rather than as reliable projections. 
They do, however, serve to accentuate the fact that urban land use is likely to 
expand signifi cantly in those regions that are expected to undergo massive ur-
ban growth in coming decades, notably in South-Central and Western Asia, as 
well as in North America. Nevertheless, even under the assumption of increasing 
sprawl (last two columns in Table 1.1), the increase in the amount of land is not 
extraordinary, and the proportion of all land that is urban in 2050 would still be 
less than 5 per cent worldwide. Moreover, if one uses the defi nition proposed by 
the World Bank study, in which only built-up areas are considered ‘urban’, the 
proportion of all land utilized by urban localities would be less than 1 per cent 
in 2050 (not shown). 
Much could be done to lower these dimensions with urban planning that 
favours a more sustainable use of space. The good news is that most of the growth 
in Asia and Africa is still to come: This means that there is still an opportunity 
to make future growth more sustainable and more satisfying for the millions of 
poor people who will comprise this future urban boom. In order for this to hap-
pen, as has been argued recently by UNFPA (2007), policies and the orientation 
of planners with respect to inevitable urban growth must change radically. 
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Table 1.1: Scenarios of Urban Land Use, 2010-2050, By Region, 
      According to Two Assumptions
Region
Urban 
Land in 
2010 
(Sq km)
Urban 
Land 
as % 
of 
Total 
in 
2010
Urban 
Population 
in 2010 
(in 000s)
Projected 
Population 
Growth 
2010-
2050 
(in 000s)
Urban 
Land in 
2050* 
% of 
Total 
in 
2050* 
Urban 
Land in 
2050‡ 
% of 
Total 
in 
2050‡
Northern Africa 81,378 0.99 107,312 115,969 169,321 2.06 181,132 2.20
Sub-Saharan Africa 138,287 0.65 304,879 705,812 458,429 2.15 490,406 2.31
East Asia 401,045 3.53 757,180 421,689 624,395 5.50 667,949 5.88
South Central Asia 349,993 3.35 571,987 878,689 887,654 8.5 949,571 9.09
South Eastern Asia 96,874 2.17 286,579 275,001 189,834 4.25 203,076 4.55
West Asia 144,247 3.55 153,870 141,014 276,442 6.80 295,725 7.28
Eastern Europe 299,382 1.64 198,951 (21,732) 266,680 1.46 290,933 1.59
Europe (Remainder) 533,250 12.97 331,297 48,208 610,845 14.86 666,399 16.21
Latin America and 
Caribbean
526,991 2.59 471,177 211,374 763,404 3.75 816,654 4.01
Northern America 885,876 4.68 286,316 115,162 1,242,193 6.56 1,355,166 7.16
Oceania 49,211 0.58 25,059 12,188 73,146 0.86 79,798 0.94
WORLD 3,506,534 2.70 3,494,607 2,903,374 5,562,342 4.28 5,996,810 4.62
* Assumption 1: Land use per person will continue the same over the 2010-2050 period.
‡ Assumption 2: Land use per person will increase at rate of 1.7 per cent per decade in developing 
regions and 2.2 per cent in developed regions over the 2010-2050 period.
Sources: Current urban land use from CIESIN, n.d.; population projections from United Nations, 2008b.
Policy implications regarding urbanization and urban growth
The scale of urban growth that will be faced by the developing world in coming 
decades has no parallel in history. The world’s urban population will show an in-
crease of over 2.9 billion people between now and 2050, most of this in Asia and 
Africa. How, where and in what conditions such growth will occur will have a huge 
impact on poverty reduction as well as sustainability. 
Contrary to prevailing feeling, densely populated urban areas can become an 
important ally for long-term sustainability and, specifi cally, in efforts to mitigate 
GCC. Cities are the primary font of environmentally favourable technological in-
novations. If well designed and administered, the compactness and economies of 
scale of cities can reduce per capita costs and energy demand, while also minimiz-
ing pressures on surrounding land and natural resources. High-density agglom-
erations can also be useful in avoiding such problems as deforestation and loss 
of biodiversity, while generally helping to optimize the rational use of resources 
and the provision of cost-effective environmental services. Dispersion of existing 
population would, in most cases, exacerbate pressures on ecosystems. Moreover, 
urbanization itself is a powerful factor in fertility decline. Historically, fertility 
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decline has always occurred fi rst and quickest in cities, making urbanization a po-
tent ally in fertility reduction efforts. 
Longer-term urban sustainability depends on the ability of policymakers to 
take a broader view of the utilization of space and to link local developments 
with their global consequences. Developing and developed countries face dif-
ferent sets of challenges and opportunities. The one advantage that potentially 
benefi ts developing countries is that much of their urban growth is still to come, 
giving them the opportunity to make more sustainable use of space at lesser 
human and fi nancial cost. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, will 
require a radical change in the anti-urbanization stance taken by many develop-
ing country policymakers who still try to impede or slow urban growth rather 
than prepare ahead for it.
Mitigation and adaptation are affected by the physical location of the city and 
by the way in which it spreads. Disorderly spatial expansion of cities is the pattern 
that currently prevails. As aptly stated in the aforementioned World Bank study: 
The key issue facing public sector decision-makers—at the local, national and 
international levels—is not whether or not urban expansion will take place, but 
rather what is likely to be the scale of urban expansion and what needs to be done 
now to adequately prepare for it. . . . the message is quite clear—developing coun-
try cities should be making serious plans for urban expansion, including planning 
for where this expansion would be most easily accommodated, how infrastructure 
to accommodate and serve the projected expansion is to be provided and paid for, 
and how this can be done with minimum environmental impact (Angel et al., 
2005, pp. 91 and 95). 
The social and sustainable use of urban space would, in and of itself, make a 
signifi cant difference in the welfare of people and in environmental outcomes. 
Moving in that direction will require foresight to orient the use of urban land 
within an explicit concern for both social and environmental values. 
Moreover, the built environment will have to be re-conceptualized through 
urban planning in combination with architectural and engineering solutions. 
This would include, for instance, alternatives to mechanical air conditioning, 
e.g., through passive ventilation, building design, green roofs, more energy-
effi cient manufacturing techniques, renewable energy systems, better landfi ll 
management to capture GHG emissions and many other technological initia-
tives (Abriola et al., 2007). 
One specifi c aspect that requires much greater attention by policymakers in 
developing countries is attending to the land and housing needs of the poor, who 
constitute the largest social category (40 per cent) in developing country cities and 
make up an even larger segment of new urban growth. Their needs are rarely con-
sidered effectively in urban planning; this omission has severe implications, not 
only for urban poverty, but also for urban environmental outcomes and for the 
quality of life of the entire city population.
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Disregard for the land and housing needs of the poor affects both ecosystem 
services and the city’s ability to responsibly and effectively plan for sustainable 
growth. Given little choice, the poor sometimes occupy ecologically fragile areas 
and watersheds, thereby endangering the city’s water supply and other ecosystem 
services. The lack of access to water, sewage or solid waste management systems 
in informal settlements pollutes rivers and affects the appearance, air quality and 
health of the entire city. Deforestation and the occupation of steep slopes, urban 
fl oodplains and wetlands increase the probability of fl ood damage and landslides.
The lack of attention to the land and housing needs of the poor ultimately af-
fects the very ability of a city to attract investments, to create jobs and to generate a 
better fi nancial base for implementing improvements in the city. In short, attend-
ing to the land and housing needs of the urban poor not only has a direct impact 
on the reduction of poverty but also affects the city’s economic viability and thus 
its ability to implement climate-friendly policies.
The Relevance of Demographic Composition
Recent research has examined how changes and differences in population com-
position affect GHG emissions (see, for instance, Dalton et al., 2005). Jiang and 
Hardee (2009) recently provided a summary of some of the most important 
fi ndings of these studies, while criticizing climate models for considering only 
population size and growth. 
The literature summarized by Jiang and Hardee shows that: a) population 
groups of different demographic composition (developed vs. developing coun-
tries, small vs. large households, rural vs. urban areas and young vs. elderly) have 
signifi cantly different consumption and emission behaviours; and b) the propor-
tion of population groups with signifi cantly different consumption and emission 
behaviours changes importantly over time. Such fi ndings argue for a more disag-
gregated approach to demographic factors in order to measure the extent of their 
impacts on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (pp. 1-5). In brief, the 
authors suggest that considering only population size as the demographic variable 
in climate models (as in the IPCC report) leads to an underestimation of the real 
contribution of ‘population’ to climate change.
However, existing studies on the effect of household size are largely drawn from 
developed country experiences. Moreover, smaller households can be seen to be as 
much a part of ‘consumption’ as they are of ‘population’. They represent a choice 
in lifestyles and levels of comfort that lead to higher consumption. Thus, what this 
type of analysis actually does is explain why the responsibility of developed coun-
try populations is so much greater in GCC; not only do they normally consume 
more on a per capita basis, but they also have household arrangements that are 
conducive to even higher consumption. 
The impact of ageing is also shown by Jiang and Hardee to be important, but it 
is less consistent over time since it is affected by such things as alterations in the 
composition of the labour force, as well by technological changes and variations in 
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household composition. By contrast, the trend towards shrinking household size 
is associated with clear increases in consumption per capita, as is a rising propor-
tion of the population residing in urban areas.7  
This trend is particularly noticeable in developed countries. For instance, it has 
been observed that the population in the European Economic Area increased by 
5 per cent between 1980 and 1995, while the number of households increased by 
19 per cent (EEA, 2001). This means that average household size has decreased 
and emissions have increased, since small households consume more, on a per 
capita basis, than large ones because of greater residential land use, larger dwell-
ings, greater consumption of appliances and automobiles and thus of energy. 
Such changes will be even more meaningful in developing countries, where the 
bulk of world population and population growth is increasingly concentrated. 
Analysing the impacts of household change on consumption in different sectors 
of developing countries would thus appear to be a useful and largely untouched 
area for future research.
A review of data on ongoing changes in household composition in Brazil pro-
vides a glimpse of what may be in store in important segments of the developing 
world. The country has experienced a remarkable fertility decline, from a Total Fer-
tility Rate of 6 in the mid-1960s to well-below replacement level in the mid-2000s. 
In addition to rapid population ageing, Brazil is also experiencing important 
changes in household composition. According to its annual household surveys, 
Brazil had a total of 39.8 million occupied households in 1996 and 54.6 million in 
2006. Thus, while the population grew at an annual rate of 1.41 per cent during 
this period, the number of households grew at 3.21 per cent. In both the 1996 and 
2006 surveys, the most common household arrangement was that of a couple with 
children, but the number of these decreased from 59.7 per cent in 1996 to 51.6 
per cent in 2006 (Barros, 2009, p. 35-36).
The number of households in which both partners worked outside the home 
also increased signifi cantly in the interim, from 29.7 per cent in 1996 to 41.1 
per cent in 2006. A relatively new type of family arrangement, dubbed ‘the DINK 
family’ (Double Income, No Kids) in the United States, is also showing rapid 
growth in Brazil. The number of such households increased from 1.1 million in 
1996 to 2.1 million in 2006. Compared to other households, DINKs are consider-
ably younger, with 68 per cent of them headed by a person between the ages of 20 
and 39. By comparison, the corresponding proportion for households in that age 
group having one, two or three children is 90 per cent, 40 per cent and 23 per cent, 
respectively. Some of the DINK couples may eventually have children, but the 90 
per cent increase in the number of such young couples between 1996-2006—at a 
time when the Brazilian population was going through an ageing process—would 
suggest that a large proportion of these couples have indeed chosen to be child-
free, rather than temporarily childless (Barros, 2009, pp. 35-36). 
DINKs have a much higher income; on a per capita basis, it is at least 70 per cent 
higher than any other group. They are clearly at the apex of the country’s income 
distribution (Alves and Barros, 2009). For our purposes, it is particularly interest-
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ing to note that the consumer profi le of DINKs differs considerably from those 
of other families. In general, DINKS place more value on self-satisfaction and the 
realization of their current consumer and leisure appetites than in preparing the 
way for future generations (Barros, 2009, p. 14). 
The Brazilian DINKs also have higher education levels and more promising ca-
reers. Their housing conditions are superior to those of all other groups, in terms 
of access to water and sanitation and in terms of the number of rooms, as well as 
the number of bathrooms per person. They also have greater access to goods and 
services, including appliances, cell phones, computers and access to the internet. 
No data are available on ownership of automobiles, but the breakdown of expens-
es among different household arrangements indicates that DINKs spend a greater 
proportion of their income on leisure and transport than other groups (Barros, 
2009, pp. 42-47); such a distribution would seem to be compatible with higher 
automobile ownership.
In brief, these data would appear to indicate that the tendency to smaller house-
holds is already occurring in some of the large developing countries that have 
achieved very low fertility. Indeed, the same trends have also been observed in other
countries in Latin America (Rosero-Bixby, 2008) and in China (about.com, n.d.). 
The data also seem to show that the smaller household arrangements that spring 
up after a rapid fertility decline in developing countries are associated with higher 
consumption, and thus higher emissions, as has been observed in developed coun-
tries. The one positive environmental perspective that was noted in the Brazilian 
case was the fact that a much greater proportion of DINKs tends to live in apart-
ments rather than individual houses (Barros, 2009, p. 45). In principle at least, 
this pattern is compatible with reduced land use and energy effi ciency in edifi ces, 
materials and in such energy critical areas as cooling and heating systems—provided 
that a conscious planning effort is made in that direction. 
Changing population compositions and policy options
What kinds of population policies might be envisaged in relation to the effects 
of ageing and changing household composition? The demographic options with 
respect to ageing are as limited as they have been with respect to mortality: Any 
action that would affect increased life expectancy in a negative way is as objection-
able as suggesting that Malthusian controls will keep population down to manage-
able levels. Relevant policies here relate to health care improvements and making 
city infrastructure and services more friendly to an ageing population. Generally, 
urban areas offer a more favourable environment for actions that can contribute 
to a healthy and enjoyable ageing. Population concentration, with its advantages 
of scale and proximity, helps increase access to social services and to new technolo-
gies that can have signifi cant implications for their well-being. More than for any 
other group, urban planning and architecture will have to devise building arrange-
ments that attend to the special needs of the ageing while also intensifying energy 
effi ciency in buildings, transportation and other services. 
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As concerns household composition, the policies involved would seem to 
relate to the economic rather than the demographic domain. Paradoxically, 
smaller households result from fertility decline: Fertility reduction policies are obvi-
ously not the answer here since smaller households consume more. It would also be 
politically and socially inapt to suggest that people should have more children, 
or that they should live in multi-person households. In this sense, smaller house-
holds can more properly be viewed as part of the consumption cluster of driv-
ing factors, rather than of the demographic cluster. The same disaggregation that 
has been advocated when breaking down the infl uence of demographic factors on 
GHG emissions would also seem to be necessary when discussing where and how 
fertility reduction would affect global emissions.
Improving the relationship between smaller households and emissions would 
entail economic measures, as well as urban planning and architectural innova-
tions. Economic incentives, such as energy taxes, would help limit the environ-
mental consequences of smaller and more consumptive households living in larg-
er buildings, as well as promote the production of energy effi cient appliances and 
products. Innovative planning of urban spaces, allied with engineering advances 
and construction blueprints that benefi t energy effi ciency, will have to be devel-
oped. Moreover, one might contemplate increased environmental awareness rais-
ing and information on the environmental impacts of products. Be that as it may, 
the point is that, just as there are no acceptable demographic policies to counter-
act the increasing ageing of populations, it seems that little can be done—from 
a demographic standpoint—with relation to reduced household sizes except to 
prepare for new housing arrangements.
Conclusions
The scale and breadth of the well-publicized GCC threats demand positive and in-
terventionist measures capable of turning things around quickly. Intervening in 
population growth processes appears to be one such initiative. There are already too 
many of us exploiting our planet, and the prospect of adding on a few billion more 
is indeed alarming; even small differences in fertility have huge impacts in the long 
run. Energetic family planning campaigns thus seem to be a good way out for the 
world, as well as for those women and families burdened with undesired fertility. 
Unfortunately, this apparently simple solution has limitations for climate change. 
Family planning does not have retroactive effects, and the world will continue to 
have a massive environmental problem even without a single additional birth. The 
demographic effect of family planning is retarded by inertial factors that extend 
large population growth for decades beyond the initial fertility decline. Family plan-
ning thus does not produce immediate results. It requires prior social development 
to provide the motivation to use contraception effectively, but this same develop-
ment also stimulates consumption. Rapid declines of high fertility levels will thus 
have little impact on GCC in the short run. Even more problematic is the fact that 
economic growth in large and populous developing countries—whether or not they 
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have already attained low fertility—will ultimately be totally incompatible with the 
scale of current mitigation efforts under present standards.
In short, if the current resurgence of concern about population growth gener-
ates support for the basic right to good reproductive health care for all women, 
especially those who are unable to achieve their desired family size, then it consti-
tutes a most positive step for women’s empowerment, for social human welfare 
and for longer-term environmental outcomes. However, not even the most intense 
population control efforts will relieve humankind of the need to drastically 
redefi ne development, as well as to forge the pathways that will achieve new 
development models.
Insuffi cient attention has been paid to other demographic dynamics and 
their potential contribution to mitigation. Urban growth processes are cur-
rently at a critical stage, given the sheer numbers of people involved and the 
importance of cities in future global economic, social, demographic and envi-
ronmental scenarios. Long treated as prime offenders in environmental pro-
cesses, cities could actually play a key role in both mitigation and adaptation 
efforts. Countries in Asia and Africa that are undergoing rapid urban growth 
have an opportunity to make this process work for their own welfare as well as 
for global environmental well-being. Taking advantage of this opportunity will 
require radical changes in approaches and the adoption of effective and par-
ticipatory strategies to urban planning aimed at improving energy effi ciency, 
reducing emissions and providing adequate housing and living conditions for 
the poor.
Recent research demonstrates the need to discriminate between the impacts of 
different population groups when drawing up future scenarios. Advances made 
in the fi eld of population composition, however, are still skimming the tip of the 
iceberg, and further research is needed in order to understand how the impacts of 
ageing and different household structures will vary in countries at different levels 
of development and that have different patterns of social organization. Popula-
tion policies capable of adjusting to this changing and differentiated context have 
yet to be clearly defi ned.
Ultimately, the painful truth that humankind is loathe to face is that consump-
tion aspirations and practices will have to be seriously curtailed in order to re-
duce the threats of GCC. Stabilizing population growth, putting urbanization 
to work for mitigation, designing more energy-effi cient homes to accommodate 
new demographic compositions—all this is necessary and helpful, but insuffi cient. 
By many accounts, industrialized countries have already outstripped our planet’s 
capacity to withstand ‘development’ as we know it. Yet, developing countries are 
desperately trying to emulate the lifestyles and consumption practices of industri-
alized societies. Although, at the aggregate level, they still have a long way to go, 
they are already starting to make their own massive impact on GCC. Solving this 
conundrum will require redefi ning not only ‘development’ but also the strongly 
material content of modern-day ‘happiness’. Demystifying the ‘saviour’ ethos of 
important but partial solutions, such as those of the demographic domain, is a 
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necessary small step in refocusing the agenda and convincing world society to 
adopt the inevitable and crucially needed cultural changes.
Notes
1 An earlier version of some of the arguments made here appeared in a previous paper which broached both 
mitigation and adaptation (see: Martine and Guzman, 2009).
2 Unless otherwise noted, all data on population growth, fertility trends and population composition in this 
chapter are drawn from United Nations, 2009. Similarly, data on urbanization and urban growth are taken 
from United Nations, 2008b.
3 Even in the case of China, the impact of birth control measures is questionable. Amartya Sen, for instance, 
wrote: “What is also not clear is exactly how much extra reduction in birth rate China has, in fact, been 
able to achieve through these coercive methods. We have to bear in mind that China has had many social 
and economic attainments that are favourable to fertility reduction, including expansion of education in 
general and female education in particular, augmentation of health care, enhancement of employment 
opportunities for women, and recently, rapid economic development. . . . While China gets too much credit 
for its authoritarian measures, it gets far too little credit for other supportive policies it has followed that have 
helped to cut down the birth rate” (Sen, 1994, p. 22).
4 The following discussion of land use is based in part on Martine, 2008.
5 The denominator in this calculation (130,429,559 km2) is that used in the GRUMP data set, which omits 
small islands and other places that have no urban areas. Also, GRUMP’s land area is derived from the spatial 
boundary data, not the offi cial estimates, which in some places may be outdated.
6 This estimate is based on the study by Angel et al. (2005) which assumed an average density of 8,000 per km2 
in developing countries and 3,000 per km2 in industrialized countries.
7 Jiang and Hardee (2009) also illustrate how the understanding of vulnerability and approaches to adaptation 
could be strengthened with greater attention to demographic factors and changes. Here they emphasize the 
fact that rapid population growth is likely to occur among population groups—poor, urban and coastal—that 
are already highly vulnerable to climate-change impacts and in poor countries that cannot cope with their 
current population sizes.
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Does Population Matter
for Climate Change?
Hania Zlotnik1
Introduction
The interrelationships between population and climate change are far from 
straightforward. Although, at a basic level, the human population and its activities 
produce the greenhouse gases that are responsible for climate change, establish-
ing the extent to which population growth, changes in the spatial distribution of 
populations or changes in age or household composition have signifi cant effects 
on greenhouse-gas emissions net of other factors is diffi cult, given the associa-
tion currently observed between standards of living and population growth, with 
the populations of richer countries generally growing slowly if at all and those of 
lower-income countries still growing rapidly.
This chapter reviews global population trends and future prospects that must be 
borne in mind in assessing their implications for environmental sustainability, in gen-
eral, and climate change, in particular. It then considers to what extent population 
growth per se has been seen as having an impact on climate change and reviews the 
long history of the inclusion of population factors and, especially, population growth 
in the intergovernmental consideration of environmental sustainability in United 
Nations processes. This review indicates that the disregard of population factors in 
the current negotiations on climate change is an anomaly. However, as the last sec-
tion argues, there are a number of reasons for that anomaly, which are likely to keep 
population factors largely absent from the current climate change debate. Neverthe-
less, the future growth of world population is too relevant for the sustainability of 
development and as a factor in the mitigation of climate change for the international 
community to continue to ignore it. It is essential to take into account the lessons 
learned from four decades of population policy and active government engagement in 
enabling people to choose freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their chil-
dren and providing them with access to the information and means to do so. A serious 
effort is therefore needed to make the commitments entered into at the International 
Conference on Population and Development (IPCD), held Cairo in 1994, a reality.
Population Growth: Past and Future
Over the past 200 years, world population has increased from 1 billion to nearly 
7 billion. This unprecedented increase resulted mainly from the acceleration of 
2
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the population growth rate after 1920. As Figure 2.1 shows, the rate of growth 
hovered around 0.5 per cent per year during the 19th and early 20th centuries and 
then doubled to about 1 per cent per year during 1920-1940. During the 1940s, 
the disastrous effects of the Second World War caused the population growth rate 
to decline to 0.9 per cent annually, but it increased in the 1950s to an annual aver-
age of 1.8 per cent and peaked in the late 1960s at 2 per cent per year, a level that,  if 
sustained, would have led to a doubling of the population in just 30 years.
Figure 2.1. Average Annual Rate of Change of World Population,    
       1760-2050
Source: United Nations, 2009c.
In the event, the actual doubling time of the world’s population changed from 
123 years (from 1 billion in 1804 to 2 billion in 1927) to 47 years (from 2 billion 
in 1927 to 4 billion in 1974). Because of the rapid reduction of fertility that many 
developing countries experienced after 1970, the population growth rate has since 
declined, leading to a slightly longer doubling time in the future: 51 years, from 4 
billion in 1974 to the 8 billion expected in 2025. Nevertheless, today’s population 
growth rate is still more than double that prevailing during the 19th century (1.2 
per cent vs. 0.5 per cent) and, without further reductions in fertility, world popula-
tion could surpass 20 billion by the close of the 21st century.
To explore the implications of different fertility paths on future population 
growth, in 2002, the Population Division of the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat prepared long-range population 
projections based on different scenarios of future fertility. Those scenarios show 
that it would be possible to reach a nearly unchanging world population by the 
end of the 21st century, provided the populations of all countries maintained 
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below-replacement fertility levels for 100 years (at 1.85 children per woman) before 
returning to replacement level. That scenario, described as ‘medium’, produces a 
world population of 9.1 billion in 2100 and just under 9 billion in 2300 (United 
Nations, 2004).
Although the medium scenario suggests that attaining population stabiliza-
tion is within reach, the high scenario indicates that small deviations from the 
fertility path projected in the medium scenario can result in major differences in 
world population size (Figure 2.2). Thus, by assuming that fertility levels in the 
high scenario are 0.5 of a child above those projected in the medium scenario until 
2050 and between 0.25 and 0.30 of a child higher between 2050 and 2300, future 
world population will keep on growing, reaching 14 billion in 2100 and 36 billion 
by 2300 (United Nations, 2004).
Figure 2.2. World Population According to Two Different Scenarios,  
       1950-2300
Source: United Nations, 2009c.
Rapid Population Growth in Relation to Climate Change
Today, 47 per cent of the world’s population lives in countries where total ferti-
lity is already below replacement level, and just 9 per cent lives in countries where 
fertility levels are still 5 children per woman or higher (United Nations, 2009d). 
This situation has led most people to believe that population growth is no 
longer a problem to be reckoned with, and, because most high-income countries 
today have populations whose fertility has been below replacement level for two 
or three decades, population decline and rapid population ageing are their imme-
diate concerns. Consequently, donor governments, in particular, and the interna-
tional community, in general, are focusing less attention on the rapid population 
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growth that still characterizes a signifi cant number of developing countries, espe-
cially those with the lowest levels of per capita income. Data on donor funding for 
family planning indicates that in almost all developing countries such funding, 
expressed per woman of reproductive age, has declined between 1996 and 2006, 
often by at least 50 per cent (Figure 2.3).
At present, low rates of natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) charac-
terize most high-income countries, whereas low-income countries have both high 
rates of natural increase and generally high rates of population growth. This nega-
tive association between the speed of population growth and per capita income 
contrasts with the strong positive association that exists between income levels 
and the production of the greenhouse gases that cause climate change. Thus, as 
is well known, the countries that produce the lion’s share of greenhouse gases are 
those with high or rapidly increasing per capita incomes and whose populations 
are generally growing slowly, if at all. In contrast, countries in which the popula-
tion is still growing fast tend to have low per capita incomes, and their per capita 
emissions of greenhouse gases are also low. Furthermore, the evidence suggests 
that rapid population growth in low-income countries can, by itself, be a drag on 
economic growth (United Nations, 2009c), thus further contributing to keeping 
their per capita greenhouse gas emissions low. Consequently, the linkages between 
population growth and climate change are far from straightforward. In order to 
consider the potential impact of population growth on climate change, account 
must be taken of the interrelationships between population growth, economic 
development, energy use and deforestation, as well as on the impact of all these 
processes on global warming.
Complex models that take into account the effects not only of  population 
growth but also of changes in the age structure of populations and their distribu-
tion between urban and rural areas on economic productivity, economic growth 
and energy use indicate that population change, driven by changing fertility, can 
Figure 2.3 Percentage Change in Donor Assistance for Family 
      Planning Programmes per Woman Aged 15-49, 
      1996 to 2006
Source: United Nations, 2009c.
Per capita donor assistance increased
Per capita donor assistance decreased 
(by less than by 50 per cent)
Per capita donor assistance decreased
(by 50 per cent or more)
No data available or not applicable
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have a sizeable impact on the production of greenhouse gases. Full results of such 
models have not yet been published, but the preliminary results of scenarios to 
2100 show that maintaining a lower population growth rate, particularly in the 
rapidly growing economies of the developing world and in high-income countries, 
would by itself make a sizeable contribution to the reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions considered necessary to prevent dangerous global warming (O’Neill, 
forthcoming).
It is worth reviewing the assumptions regarding future population growth un-
derlying the scenarios of future greenhouse gas emissions developed by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000). For the A1 and B1 families 
of scenarios, the IPCC uses a population projection that combines low fertility 
with low mortality and migration. World population in that projection peaks at 
8.7 billion in 2050 and declines to 7.1 billion in 2100. The A2 family of scenarios 
is based on a high population projection where world population reaches 15 bil-
lion in 2100. The B2 family of scenarios uses a medium population projection 
in which world population reaches 9.4 billion in 2050 and rises to 10.4 billion in 
2100. Because each family of scenarios varies with respect to other assumptions 
about future economic development, comparing their outcomes does not allow 
an assessment of the effect that population growth per se would have on green-
house gas emissions. Furthermore, given that population and economic growth 
are interrelated, it would be unrealistic to model a future in which only popula-
tion growth varies from one scenario to the next. In fact, in setting assumptions 
about future economic growth, the IPCC acknowledges its interrelationships with 
population trends and therefore assigns the highest economic growth to the fam-
ily of scenarios with the slowest population growth (A1 with a growth rate of 2.9 
per cent per year and B1 with 2.5 per cent per year). 
The other two families of scenarios are assigned a medium level of econom-
ic growth (B2 with 2.2 per cent annually on average) or a low one (A2 with 1.3 
per cent annually on average). The fourth assessment report of the IPCC presents 
the results of the different scenarios with respect to their impact on climate change 
(IPCC, 2007). Those results are sobering, because they indicate that the impact on 
climate change is highest in the A2 scenario despite the low economic growth it 
embodies. Both the rapid population growth it incorporates and its assumption of 
slow technological change contribute to that result. Only one family of scenarios, 
denoted A1F1, which incorporates low population growth combined with contin-
ued high use of fossil fuels, produces worse effects on the climate than A2.
The stark reality is that a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions requires lower 
overall consumption of energy derived from fossil fuels. Hence, the more people 
there are on Earth, the more the per capita use of fossil fuels needs to decrease 
to attain safe emissions levels. Existing disparities in energy use stemming from 
sharp differences in per capita incomes add complexity to the argument, but do 
not invalidate the fact that current levels of population growth cannot continue 
over the long run without endangering the sustainability of the planet, particu-
larly if standards of living are to be improved for a growing population. 
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Population and the Environment in the United Nations: 
A Historical Perspective2
Consideration of the interrelationship between population trends and the envi-
ronment began with the founding of the United Nations. Those interrelationhips 
were the focus of the fi rst session of the United Nations Population Com mission 
(now the Commission on Population and Develop ment) held in 1947 (United 
Nations, 2001). At that time, the discussion was mostly framed in terms of whether 
the natural re sources needed to ensure that the large population growth expected 
over the next few decades would be compatible with economic development. The 
need to ensure adequate access to land for a growing rural population in order to 
maintain or increase agri cultural production was also a prominent focus of discus-
sion. In the 1950s, data on demo graphic and socio-economic trends in developing 
countries were scarce. Consequently, the fi rst studies on the relationship between 
population and the environment related mostly to the experience of developed 
countries and tended to focus on how socio-economic development shaped demo-
graphic trends by improving health and contributing to changing the norms on 
the number of children desired.
In the 1960s, awareness that global population growth was reaching very high 
and unprecedented levels raised concerns about overall environmental sustain-
ability. In response, the General Assembly decided to convene a United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (resolution 2398 [XXIII] of 3 December 
1968), noting that “rapidly increasing popula tion and accelerating urbanization” 
were accentuating the “continuing and accelerating impairment of the quality of 
the human environment”. A subsequent report of the Secretary-General (United 
Nations, 1969) cited the explosive growth of human populations as “fi rst among 
the portents of a crisis of worldwide scope concerning the relation between man 
and his environment” (United Nations, 2001).
Held in Stockholm in 1972, the conference adopted a Declaration (United 
Nations, 1973, ch. I) and an Action Plan for the Human Environment (ch. II). 
Those documents guided the activities of the United Nations system on envi-
ronmental issues during the 1970s and 1980s. Although population growth was 
recognized as a relevant factor in relation to the environment, and paragraph 5 of 
the Declaration stated that “the natural growth of population continuously pres-
ents problems for the preservation of the environment, and ade quate policies and 
measures should be adopted, as appropri ate, to face these problems”, it was left 
to the United Nations World Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974 to 
consider the issue of population and its consequences for the environment.
Late in 1973, an expert Symposium on Population, Resources and the Envi-
ronment was convened in preparation for the World Population Conference. The 
state of knowledge at the time did not yield strong conclusions about the inter-
relationships between population size and growth, on the one hand, and the envi-
ronment on the other, mainly because, as experts recognized, population was only 
one of the factors—and not necessarily the most important—causing resource and 
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environmental problems. At the conference itself, the debate refl ected profound 
divergences in the perception of the population-environment interactions among 
Member States, differences that continue to this day. As a result, the World Plan of 
Action adopted by the World Population Conference gave only cursory treatment 
to the interrelations between population and the environment.
In 1984, a second intergovernmental conference on population, the International 
Confer ence on Population, was held in Mexico City. The conference adopted rec-
ommendations for the further implementation of the World Population Plan of 
Action (United Nations 1984, ch. I, sect. B [III and IV]) which acknowledged the 
importance of environmental issues by calling for national development policies and 
international development strategies based on an integrated approach that would 
take into account the re lationships among population, resources, environment and 
development (recommendation 1). Furthermore, using language that would become 
the cornerstone of the development paradigm of the 1990s, the recommendations 
stipulated that the formulation of national population goals and policies should 
take into account the need for long-term environ mentally sustainable economic 
development (sect. B, para. 8). More specifi cally, the conference urged the govern-
ments of “countries in which there are imbalances between trends in population 
growth and resources and environmental requirements” to adopt and implement, 
“in the con text of overall development policies, . . specifi c policies, including pop-
ulation poli cies, that will contribute to redressing such imbal ances . . .” (United 
Nations, 1984, ch. I, sect. B [III, recommendation 4]). 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and De velopment, held in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992, was a milestone in the evolu tion of an international consen-
sus on the interrelations between population and the environment, based on the 
concept of ‘sustainable development’, defi ned by the report of the World Commis-
sion on Environment and Develop ment as devel opment that “meets the needs of 
the present without compro mising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (para. 1, United Nations, 1987, annex). Even more explic itly, the World 
Commission declared in its report that poverty, environmental degradation and 
population growth were inextricably related and that none of those problems 
could be successfully addressed in isolation. The Commission’s report noted that, 
in several regions of the world, rapid population growth had exceeded the avail-
able natural resources and was jeopardizing development possibilities. Moreover, 
the fact that curbs on population growth were necessary made it im perative to in-
tegrate population programmes into main stream development efforts. Although 
members of the World Commission remained divided on both the signifi cance 
of popula tion growth as a cause of environmental degradation and on concrete 
policy prescriptions, the prominence given to the is sue raised its visibility on the 
international agenda (United Nations, 2001). 
Infl uenced by the fi ndings of the commission, the Rio Decla ration on Environ-
ment and Development identifi ed population policies as an integral element of 
sus tainable development, and principle 8 of the Rio Declaration stated that “to 
achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States 
38 POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
should reduce and elimi nate unsustainable patterns of production and consump-
tion and promote appropriate demographic policies” (United Nations, 1993, 
resolution 1, annex I, principle 8). Furthermore, chapter 5 of Agenda 21 (United 
Nations, 1993, resolution 1, annex II) addressed demographic dynamics and sus-
tainability and noted that “the growth of world population and production com-
bined with unsustainable consumption patterns places in creasingly severe stress 
on the life-supporting capacities of our planet” (para. 5.3). 
These issues were revisited at the International Confer ence on Population and 
Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994. The central theme of the conference 
was to forge a balance among population, sustained economic growth and sustain-
able development. The Programme of Action adopted by the conference recognized 
“that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the en-
vironment are so closely interconnected that none of them can be considered in iso-
lation” (United Nations, 1995, ch. I, resolu tion 1, annex, para. 1.5) and acknowledged 
that population factors could sometimes be inhibitors of sustainable develop ment: 
“Demographic factors, combined with poverty and lack of access to resources in 
some areas, and excessive con sumption and wasteful production patterns in others, 
cause or exacerbate problems of environmental degradation and re source depletion 
and thus inhibit sustainable development” (para 3.25). Crucially, the Programme of 
Action noted that “slower population growth has in many countries bought more time 
to adjust to future population increases. This has increased those coun tries’ ability 
to attack poverty, protect and repair the environ ment, and build the base for future 
sustainable development. Even the difference of a single decade in the transition 
to sta bilization levels of fertility can have a considerable positive impact on quality 
of life” (para 3.14). 
In June 1997, when the General Assembly conducted the fi rst fi ve-year review of 
the implemen tation of Agenda 21, it concluded that, whereas many of the overall 
trends that impacted on sustainable development had become worse since 1992, 
population growth rates had continued to decline at the global level, and, if such 
trends continued, the stabilization of the world population could be reached 
during the 21st century. The Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 
adopted in 1997 (General Assembly resolution S-19/2, annex) affi rmed that: 
The impact of the relationship among economic growth, poverty, employment, 
environment and sustainable development has become a major concern. There 
is a need to recognize the critical linkages between demographic trends and fac-
tors and sustainable development. The current decline in population growth rates 
must be further promoted through national and international policies that pro-
mote economic development, social development, environmental protection, and 
poverty eradication, particularly the further expansion of basic education, with 
full and equal access for girls and women, and health care, including reproductive 
health care, covering both family planning and sexual health, consistent with the 
report of the International Conference on Population and Development (United 
Nations, 1997, para. 30).
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In 2000, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration (United Nations, 2000), which set a number of key development goals 
regarding, inter alia, the reduction of poverty and hunger, the attainment of uni-
versal basic education, the reduction of child and maternal mortality and the pro-
motion of gender equality. The Millennium Declaration also contained a section 
focusing on the protection of “our common environment” (sect. IV) but the issues 
highlighted in it did not include population growth. Nor was population growth 
mentioned in the outcome documents of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development held in Johannesburg in 2002, although the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation adopted by the Summit mentioned the crucial role that agricul-
ture plays in “addressing the needs of a growing population” (United Nations, 2002, 
para. 40). It also called for the strengthening of health systems in order to “address 
effectively, for all individuals of appropriate age, the promotion of healthy living, 
including their reproductive and sexual health, consistent with the commitments 
and outcomes of recent United Nations conferences and summits” (para. 54[j]).
In regard to the United Nations Climate Change Conference that will be held in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, the draft of the outcome document that is still un-
der negotiation makes no mention of population dynamics or population growth. 
Why Has Population Disappeared from the 
Environmental Debate?
A number of reasons can be given for the disappearance of population growth 
as an issue to be considered in fi nding ways to mitigate climate change. The fi rst 
reason was acknowledged in 1997 when the fi rst fi ve-year review of the implemen-
tation of Agenda 21 concluded that the declining trend in the global rate of popu-
lation growth was a success (United Nations, 1997). Since then, the continuing 
decline in the growth rate has not been conducive to eliciting the sense of urgency 
that was common among policymakers in the 1970s and 1980s, despite the fact 
that, because of population momentum, increasing numbers of people will have 
to be accommodated on the planet no matter how rapidly that rate falls. 
The second reason relates to the fact that two distinct trends are causing the 
reduction of the global growth rate: reductions in fertility, on the one hand, and 
increases in mortality in the countries most affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
on the other. As a result of the 1994 ICPD, policies and programmes related to 
fertility trends, as well as efforts to control the HIV/AIDS pandemic, have been 
subsumed under the class of actions aimed at improving reproductive and sexual 
health. Within that group, programmes for the prevention and treatment of HIV/
AIDS, which hardly existed in the early 1990s, have expanded markedly, absorb-
ing an ever increasing share of the available funding (United Nations, 2009a). It 
is partly for this reason that donor fi nancing for family planning has declined 
on a per capita basis and that the attention of the international community has 
shifted toward major health issues, including both the control of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and the reduction of maternal and child mortality.
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A third reason involves the key feature of the ICPD Programme of Action: 
the recognition by the international community of the existence of reproduc-
tive rights. Within the United Nations, the fi rst mention of a right related to 
human reproduction dates from 1968, when the International Conference on 
Human Rights adopted the Proclamation of Teheran in which the international 
community recognized that “parents have the basic human right to determine 
freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children” (United 
Nations, 1968, para. 16). The characterization of this basic human right was 
developed further in the Principles and Objectives of the World Population Plan 
of Action adopted by the World Population Conference in 1974, which states in 
paragraph 14(j) that  “[a]ll couples and individuals have the basic right to decide 
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the 
information, education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and in-
dividuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living 
and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community” (United 
Nations, 1975).
In addition, the World Population Plan of Action, which was the fi rst United 
Nations document to provide guidance to governments on how to develop popula-
tion policies, noted explicitly that those policies should conform to human rights, 
as stated in para. 17: “Countries which consider that their present or expected 
rates of population growth hamper their goals of promoting human welfare are 
invited, if they have not yet done so, to consider adopting population policies, 
within the framework of socio-economic development, which are consistent with 
basic human rights and national goals and values.”
Over the next two decades, as increasing numbers of countries formulated and 
implemented population policies, the recognition that successful policies had at 
their core a full respect for human rights was strengthened. The result was the 
characterization of reproductive rights that was adopted in 1994 by the ICPD, the 
main tenets of which are that:  
. . . reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized 
in national laws, international human rights documents and other consensus 
documents. These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and 
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of 
their children and to have the information and the means to do so, and the right to 
attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also includes the 
right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion 
and violence, as expressed in human rights documents. In the exercise of this right, 
they should take into account the needs of their living and future children and 
their responsibilities toward the community. The promotion of the responsible ex-
ercise of these rights for all people should be the fundamental basis for government- 
and community-supported policies and programmes in the area of reproductive 
health, including family planning. As part of their commitment, full attention 
should be given to the promotion of mutually respectful and equitable gender 
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relations and particularly to meeting the educational and service needs of adoles-
cents to enable them to deal in a positive and responsible way with their sexuality
. . . . (United Nations, 1995, para. 7.3).
The holistic approach to reproductive and sexual health implicit in the above 
and the explicit mention of the needs of adolescents were major steps forward, but 
they have contributed to weakening the focus of population policies on family 
planning. This outcome was not intended by the framers of the ICPD Programme 
of Action, which contains a full section on family planning. The “basis of action” 
presented in that section is well worth recalling because it distills the accumulated 
experience of three decades of family planning programmes: 
The aim of family-planning programmes must be to enable couples and 
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their 
children and to have the information and means to do so and to ensure 
informed choices and make available a full range of safe and effective methods. 
The success of population education and family-planning programmes in a 
variety of settings demonstrates that informed individuals everywhere can and 
will act responsibly in the light of their own needs and those of their families 
and communities. The principle of informed free choice is essential to the long-
term success of family-planning programmes. Any form of coercion has no part 
to play. In every society there are many social and economic incentives and 
disincentives that affect individual decisions about child-bearing and family 
size. Over the past century, many Governments have experimented with such 
schemes, including specifi c incentives and disincentives, in order to lower or 
raise fertility. Most such schemes have had only marginal impact on fertility 
and in some cases have been counterproductive. Governmental goals for family 
planning should be defi ned in terms of unmet needs for information and services. 
Demographic goals, while legitimately the subject of government development 
strategies, should not be imposed on family-planning providers in the form of 
targets or quotas for the recruitment of clients (para. 7.12).
To sum up, the third reason for the increasing invisibility of population issues 
in the environmental debate is the change of focus from family planning to the 
holistic approach implicit in reproductive health, coupled with certain legacies 
of what some people characterize as ‘the population control era’ in which gov-
ernments expected family planning programmes to meet explicit demographic 
goals and used incentives or disincentives to achieve those goals. The sensitivi-
ties surrounding these issues make them diffi cult to address in international 
negotiations, especially when, as in the case of negotiations on how to prevent 
climate change, many other challenging issues are yet to be settled. Furthermore, 
although population trends are likely to shape the future paths of greenhouse 
gas emissions in signifi cant ways, their effect is still far in the future even if the 
time to act is now.
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If Population Is Relevant for Climate Change, What Next? 
So, does population matter for climate change? This chapter has provided several 
reasons for the answer to be in the affi rmative, but, in a manner reminiscent of the 
fi rst United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the international 
community is likely to leave the debate on future population trends and how to 
shape them to the next international conference on population. In the meantime, 
there is still much to be done. Indeed, universal access to reproductive health, one 
of the key goals of the ICPD Programme of Action—echoed by the 2005 World 
Summit (United Nations, 2005) and now part of the framework of the Millen-
nium Development Goals—is still far from being achieved. Unmet need for family 
planning is signifi cant in many countries and particularly in the least-developed 
countries, where 23 per cent of women of reproductive age who are married or in 
a union have an unmet need for family planning (United Nations, 2009b). In the 
least-developed countries, only 24 per cent of those women use a modern method 
of contraception, whereas 60 per cent do so in the rest of the developing world. 
There is also a need to improve access to a full range of family planning methods 
in developing countries, since, in many, contraceptive use is heavily clustered in 
just one or two methods.
Experience has shown that the best decisions about family planning are those 
that people make for themselves, based on accurate information and a range of 
contraceptive options. People who make informed choices are better able to use 
family planning safely and effectively (Upadhyay, 2001). To enable people to make 
informed choices, governments can ensure that people have access to a full array 
of methods and eliminate unnecessary medical barriers to access. Governments 
can also develop communication programmes to convey the message that peo-
ple have a right to information about their health and can make family planning 
decisions for themselves, based on their own needs and desires. Communication 
programmes should also encourage people to visit family planning providers and 
prompt them to ask questions and express any concerns they may have. Managers 
of family planning programmes should make informed choice the norm in service 
delivery and ensure that service providers are trained to provide information with-
out interfering in the ability of clients to make decisions. Governments can take 
measures to ensure that a variety of methods are available through as many service 
delivery outlets as possible. Donors can support free choice by ensuring that fam-
ily planning programmes have adequate supplies of a wide array of contraceptive 
methods. All these actions are consistent with the guidance provided by the ICPD 
Programme of Action. There is ample experience to show that, with government 
commitment, the strategies and tools to ensure that people can exercise their re-
productive rights effectively can produce the population trends that will, over the 
medium and long term, contribute to ensuring the sustainability of life on the 
planet. Given the enormous challenges that achieving sustainability poses, there 
is no time to lose. 
43DOES POPULATION MATTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE?
Notes
1 The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect those of 
the United Nations.
2 This section draws extensively on Chapter I of United Nations, 2001.
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The Implications of 
Population Growth and 
Urbanization for
Climate Change
David Satterthwaite
Introduction
It has long been common for population growth to be blamed for a range of 
environmental problems, but for the usually far more damaging contributions of 
high consumption to be downplayed (Hartmann, 1998; Satterthwaite, 2003). This 
misconception is now being applied to climate change. Cities, or urbanization in 
general, are frequently blamed for human-induced greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and hence for climate change. The realities on both fronts are more complex. 
This chapter considers some of these complexities and tries to fi nd more precise 
ways to allocate responsibility.1
Achieving More Precision in Allocating Responsibility for 
Climate Change
Most of the growth in the world’s population is taking place in urban areas in 
low- and middle-income nations, and this is likely to continue (United Nations, 
2008). Thus, a concern for how the growth in the world’s population infl uences 
GHG emissions is largely a concern for how the growth in the urban population 
in low- and middle-income countries infl uences GHG emissions. An assessment 
of the contribution to climate change of urban centres or urbanization (growth 
in the proportion of a national population living in urban areas) or the growth 
in urban populations can be done either from the perspective of ‘where GHGs are 
produced’ (by assessing what proportion of GHGs emitted by human activities 
comes from within the boundaries of urban centres) or from the consumption 
perspective (assessing all the GHGs emitted as a result of the consumption and 
waste generation of urban populations no matter where they originated). Table 
3.1 lists the most likely sources of growing GHG emissions for any city or any 
nation’s urban population from these two perspectives. 
3
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Table 3.1: Possible Drivers of Growing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
      of the Urban Population in a City or in a Nation
From the perspective of where the GHGs are produced:
Sector  
What drives growing greenhouse 
gas emissions in urban areas?
What can moderate, stop or reduce 
this growth?
Energy supply Largely from fossil fuel power 
stations, resulting in a growth 
in electricity provision from high 
GHG-emitting sources; while many 
large fossil fuel power stations are 
located outside urban areas, the 
GHG emissions from the electricity 
used are usually allocated to these 
urban areas (see below).
A shift to less GHG-emitting power gen-
eration and distribution; incorporation 
of electricity-saving devices; an increase 
in the proportion of electricity gener-
ated from renewable energy sources and 
its integration into the grid.
Industry Growing levels of production; 
growing energy intensity in what is 
produced; increasing importance 
of industries producing goods, 
the fabrication of which entails 
large GHG emissions, e.g., motor 
vehicles.
A shift away from heavy industries and 
from industry in general to the service 
sector; increasing energy effi ciency 
within enterprises; capture of particular 
GHGs from waste streams.
Forestry
and 
agriculture
Many urban centres have considerable agricultural output and/or forested 
areas, mostly because of extended boundaries that encompass rural areas; 
from the production perspective, GHGs generated by deforestation and 
agriculture are assigned to rural areas.
Transport Growing use of private automo-
biles; increases in average fuel 
consumption of private automo-
biles; increased air travel (although 
this may not be allocated to urban 
areas).
Increasing the number of trips made on 
foot, by bicycle, on public transport; 
a decrease in the use of private 
automobiles and/or a decrease in their 
average fuel consumption (including 
the use of automobiles using alternative 
fuels); ensuring that urban expansion 
avoids high levels of private automobile 
dependence.
Residential/  
commercial  
buildings
Growth in the use of fossil fuels 
and/or growth in electricity use 
from fossil fuels for space heat-
ing and/or cooling, lighting and 
domestic appliances.
Cutting fossil fuel/electricity use, thus 
cutting GHG emissions from space 
heating (usually the largest user of 
fossil fuels in temperate climates) and 
lighting; much of this is relatively easy 
and has rapid paybacks.
Waste and 
wastewater
Growing volumes of solid and 
liquid wastes and of more 
energy-intensive waste.
Reducing volumes of wastes; waste 
management that captures GHGs.
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Sector
What drives growing greenhouse gas 
emissions in urban areas?
What can moderate, stop or reduce 
this growth?
Energy supply GHGs from energy supply/electricity 
now assigned to consumers, so GHG 
growth is driven by increasing energy 
use; consumers are also allocated the 
GHGs from the energy used to make 
and deliver the goods and services 
they consume. 
As with the production perspective, 
but also a greater focus on less con-
sumption among high consumption 
households; a shift to less GHG-
intensive consumption. 
Industry GHGs from industries and from the 
production of the materials they use 
no longer allocated to the enterprises 
that produce them, but rather to 
the fi nal consumers of the products; 
so again, GHG growth driven by 
increased consumption.
As in the production perspective, 
but with an extra concern to reduce 
the GHGs embedded in goods 
consumed by residents and to 
discourage consumption with 
high GHG emissions implications.
Forestry and 
agriculture 
GHGs from these no longer allocated 
to rural areas (where they are pro-
duced), but rather to the consumers of 
their products (many or most in urban 
areas); note that most commercial 
agriculture has become more energy 
intensive; also, the high GHG implica-
tions for preferred diets among higher-
income groups (including imported 
goods, high meat consumption, etc.).
Encouraging less fossil-fuel-intensive 
production and supply chains 
for food and forestry products; 
addressing the very substantial non-
CO2 GHG emissions from farming 
(including livestock); forestry and 
land-use management practices 
that contribute to reducing global 
warming.
Transport As in the production perspective; 
GHG emissions from fuel use by 
people travelling outside the urban 
areas in which they live are allocated 
to them, including air travel; also con-
cern for GHG emissions arising from 
investment in transport infrastructure.
As in the production perspective, but 
with a stronger focus on reducing 
air travel and a concern for lowering 
the GHG emissions implications 
of investments in transport 
infrastructure. 
Residential/ 
commercial  
buildings
As in the production perspective, 
but with the addition of GHG emis-
sions arising from construction and 
building maintenance (including the 
materials used to do so).
As in the production perspective, 
but with an added interest in reduc-
ing the CO2 emissions embedded 
in building materials, fi xtures and 
fi ttings.
Waste and 
wastewater
Large and often growing volumes of 
solid and liquid wastes which contrib-
ute to GHGs; these are allocated to the 
consumers who generate the waste, not 
to the waste or waste dump.
As in the production perspective, but 
with a new concern to reduce waste 
fl ows that arise from consumption 
in the city but contribute to GHGs 
outside its boundaries.
Public sector 
and 
governance
Conventional focus of urban govern-
ments on attracting new investment, 
allowing urban sprawl and heavy in-
vestment in roads, with little concern 
for promoting energy effi ciency and 
low GHG emissions.
Governance that encourages and 
supports all the above remedies; also, 
a strong focus on lowering GHG emis-
sions through better management of 
government-owned buildings and pub-
lic infrastructure and services, including 
a concern for reducing GHG emissions 
generated in constructing infrastructure 
and in the delivery of services.
From a consumption perspective:
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It is noticeable that all the drivers of the growing GHG emissions shown in 
Table 3.1 can occur (and often have taken place) in a national urban population 
or in a particular city not experiencing population growth. This is particularly the 
case if the consumption perspective is adopted. For instance, Greater London’s 
population was larger in 1941 than it is today, but the total GHG emissions gener-
ated by its population’s consumption are likely to have increased many times. 
From the production perspective, if energy intensive production is concen-
trated in cities, their average GHG emissions per person will increase (unless the 
production is served by electricity not generated from fossil fuels). This can mean 
that particular cities in low- and middle-income nations with heavy industry or 
fossil-fuelled power stations can have very high carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
per person. But in many nations, a considerable proportion of energy intensive 
production (for instance, mines and mineral processing) or fossil-fuelled electric-
ity generation takes place in rural areas or urban areas too small to be considered 
cities. Rural districts with such energy-intensive production can have per capita 
GHG emissions that are much higher than most cities—although most city GHG 
emissions inventories that use the production perspective2 use the consumption 
perspective with regard to electricity (wherein the emissions generated by the 
electricity used in the city are allocated to the city, not to the location where the 
electricity was generated). In addition, when comparisons for GHG emissions are 
made between rural and urban areas, where the high contribution of urban areas 
is stressed, generally, no consideration is given to emissions from agriculture and 
land-use changes in rural areas. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) suggests that the latter accounts for around 31 per cent of all human-
induced GHG emissions (Metz et al., 2008).
One obvious objection to using the production perspective is that a large pro-
portion of the products of rural-based mines, forests and agriculture, as well as 
land-use changes, are meant to serve the production or consumption needs in 
urban areas. Therefore it is misleading to allocate these to rural areas (or rural 
populations). But the real issue here is the inappropriateness of allocating respon-
sibility for GHG emissions to a nation as a whole (and by implication to that na-
tion’s entire population) or to urban areas in general or to particular cities (and 
by implication to all the urban population or to the populations of particular 
cities). Human-induced GHG emissions are not caused by ‘people’ in general, but 
by specifi c human activities by specifi c people or groups of people. It is not ‘urban 
populations’ in general that account for high private automobile use or high levels 
of air travel or high consumption lifestyles, but particular individuals or house-
holds (including many that live in rural areas). In order for any individual or household 
to contribute to global warming, they have to consume the goods and services that generate 
GHG emissions.
The dominant underlying cause of global warming is the consumption of goods 
and services that draw on resources for their fabrication, distribution (or provi-
sion), sale and use (and, for goods, disposal) resulting in the emission of GHGs. 
Of course, consideration also needs to be given to the (now heavily globalized) 
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production systems that serve this (and that also do so much to encourage high 
consumption). 
A signifi cant proportion of the world’s urban (and rural) populations have very 
low levels of GHG emissions because their use of fossil fuels and of the electri city 
generated by them—and the fossil-fuel input into the goods or services they con-
sume—is very low, and their consumption patterns contribute little or nothing to 
the generation of other GHG emissions. In many low-income nations, most rural 
and urban households do not have electricity, and thus no household appliances 
that use electricity.3 For low-income households in rural and urban areas in most 
of the lowest-income nations, recent Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) 
show that fuel use is still dominated by charcoal, fuelwood or organic wastes (e.g., 
dung). Where access to these is commercialized, as is likely in most urban centres, 
total fuel use among low-income populations will be low because fuel is expensive. 
If urban households are so constrained in their income levels that many family 
members are severely undernourished and can afford only one meal a day, it is 
unlikely that their consumption patterns are generating much GHGs. In addition, 
their fuel use may be largely or completely based on renewable resources, which 
means no net contribution to GHG emissions.4
Drawing on data for cooking fuel use and access to electricity for urban popula-
tions from recent DHSs,5 among the 44 nations for which data were available, 17 
had more than half of their urban populations relying primarily on non-fossil fuel 
for cooking. There were also 11 nations where more than half of urban households 
did not have access to electricity. But even when low-income households do shift 
to fossil-fuel-based energy sources—typically kerosene in low-income nations—
their consumption levels remain low. Low-income households in Delhi that rely 
on kerosene typically use 25–30 litres per month (Dhingra et al., 2008), which im-
plies CO2 emissions per person per year of around 0.15–0.2 tonnes (very small by 
global standards). Low-income urban households also use transport modes that 
produce no GHG emissions (walking, bicycling) or low GHG emissions (buses, 
mini-buses and trains, mostly used to more than full capacity). To give an illus-
tration of how low consumption levels are, in Kibera, Nairobi’s largest informal 
settlement (with around 600,000 inhabitants), a 1998 survey found that only 
18 per cent had electricity, only 7 per cent had a bicycle and only 1.5 per cent had 
a refrigerator; 31 per cent of all households surveyed had no radio, television or 
refrigerator (APHRC, 2002). 
When low-income urban-dwellers do obtain electricity, the few studies avail-
able suggest that consumption levels are often very low. For instance, among low-
income households in three Indian cities (Kulkarni and Krishnayya, 1994), just 
32–33 kilowatt hours per month were used (1/20th to 1/40th of the average per 
person in most high-income nations). A very considerable number of people (both 
rural and urban) may have zero or negative GHG emissions per person. Included 
among these are many low-income urban-dwellers whose livelihoods are based on 
reclaiming and re-using or recycling waste. The GHG emissions ‘saved’ from their 
work equals or exceeds the GHG emissions that their consumption causes. It may 
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also include tens of millions of small farmers able and willing to engage in sus-
tainable agriculture and in maintaining or increasing forests on their land. Thus, 
perhaps up to one sixth of the world’s population has incomes and consumption 
levels that are so low they are best not included in allocations of responsibility for 
GHG emissions.
The failure of more than 50 years of development to reduce the number of peo-
ple living in poverty (which also means failing to reduce the number with very low 
and inadequate consumption levels)6 suggests that a very considerable proportion 
of the world’s population will continue to live in extreme poverty and, in effect, 
contribute very little to future GHG emissions. Of course, how income distribu-
tion changes within urban (and rural) populations has very large implications for 
future GHG emissions. For instance, a household in Mumbai with an income of 
150,000 rupees a month (around U$3,125) is likely to contribute far more GHG 
emissions than  a pavement-dweller household.
Thus, the much-used formula of I = P*A*T (impact relating to population, af-
fl uence and technology) should be changed to I = C*A*T when applied to global 
warming impacts, with C being the number of consumers, not the number of 
people. In addition, it is neither fair nor accurate to suggest that either popula-
tion growth or urbanization necessarily causes increases in GHGs. This increase 
depends more on the form and levels of consumption among the growing popula-
tion or among the population that moves to urban areas (the immediate cause of 
urbanization). For example, many urban centres in sub-Saharan Africa and low-
income nations in Asia (including many with growing populations) are likely to 
have very low average GHG emissions per person—whether from the production 
perspective (they have very little or no industry and most of the population has 
very low fossil-fuel use within households or for transport) or the consumption 
perspective (with a very low proportion, or no, residents with high consumption 
lifestyles). This is not recognized, partly because there are no data available on 
their emissions, but note should be taken of the many nations whose average 
annual per capita CO2 emissions are below 0.2 tonnes (i.e., less than 1/200th that 
of the United States or Canada). In 2005, 13 nations had average CO2 emissions 
per person that were less than 0.1 tonnes. In contrast, as discussed in more detail 
below, there are nations with slow or no population growth and very small increases 
in urbanization levels where both total GHG emissions and GHG emissions per 
person have increased rapidly in recent decades. This would be even more the case 
if there were statistics for GHG emissions from a consumption perspective.
In addition, it is unfair to equate increases in GHG emissions per person among 
low-income populations (for example, from 0.1 to 0.5 tonnes of CO2e per person 
per year7) with comparable GHG increases among high-income populations (for 
instance, from 7.1 to 7.5 tonnes per person per year). The reduction in global emis-
sions needed to avoid dangerous climate change depends on achieving a particular 
global average for emissions per person—what is sometimes termed the ‘fair share’ 
level, generally set at around two tonnes of CO2e per person. Making provision for 
increases in GHG emissions for those people below the ‘fair share’ level so that they 
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can move out of what might be termed ‘energy poverty’ cannot be considered in the 
same light as increases in emissions from those already above the ‘fair share’ level. 
If what is stated above is accepted, the discussion of the links between popula-
tion and the causes of climate change (and, within this, the links between urban-
ization and the causes of climate change) is altered. Perhaps the most fundamen-
tal point is that increases in GHG emissions per person by people living below 
the global ‘fair share’ level should be treated differently from increases by people 
above it. Most of the nations with the most rapid growth in their national (and 
urban) populations have average GHG emissions per person far below the ‘fair 
share’ level. 
How Much Does Population Growth Coincide 
with the Growth in Greenhouse Gas Emissions?
It is worth considering in more depth the extent of the association between popu-
lation growth and the growth of GHG emissions. As noted, many of the nations 
with the most rapidly growing national and urban populations have very low levels 
of CO2 emissions per person and have experienced slow growth in these emissions, 
while many of the nations with the slowest growing national and urban popula-
tions have the highest levels of GHG emissions per person and have had a rapid 
growth in CO2 emissions per person. Between 1980 and 2005, some high-income 
nations had a slow growth in CO2 emissions per person because they already had 
very high per capita emissions. If data were available for the consumption perspec-
tive, it is likely that they would show that high-income nations have had a much 
greater growth in emissions per capita, and many low- and middle-income nations 
have had much less.
Looking fi rst at the nations with the highest and lowest CO2 emissions per per-
son, data are available for average CO2 emissions per person for 185 nations for 
1980 and 2005.8 These can be divided into fi ve sets of 37 nations each. All but ten 
of the 37 nations with the highest CO2 emissions per person in 2005 were high-
income nations (encompassing North America and much of Europe). Three small 
population, high-income Middle-East oil producers had the highest emissions 
(Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) and very high population growth 
rates (mostly from immigration). But generally, this group of high-emissions na-
tions had very low population growth rates between 1980 and 2005 (more than 
half had average population growth rates of less than 1 per cent a year for this 
period). Of the 37 nations with the lowest CO2 emissions per person, all were low-
income nations, and most (29) were in sub-Saharan Africa; 34 had population 
growth rates of more than 2 per cent a year; and nine had population growth rates 
of more than 3 per cent a year.
Thus, when considering how CO2 emissions per person change in relation to 
population growth, for the period 1980-2005, many of the nations with among the 
slowest population growth rates had among the fastest growth rates in CO2 emis-
sions, while many of the nations with among the fastest population growth rates had 
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among the slowest increases in CO2 emissions. The countries with low population 
growth and high CO2 emissions growth are mostly high-income or upper-middle 
income nations, most are in Europe or Asia, and all had very considerable economic 
success in the period 1980-2005; the high population growth, low emissions growth 
countries are mostly low-income nations, most are in sub-Saharan Africa, and many 
had little economic success during this period. Clearly, any consideration of changes 
in a nation’s CO2 emissions in the last few decades cannot be separated from a con-
sideration of economic changes that include the extent (or not) of economic growth 
and the sectors where this growth took place, as well as changes in incomes and how 
these were distributed within the national population. 
For China, the very rapid growth in production (much of it for export) from 
1980 to 2005 is an important contributor to its rapid growth in CO2 emissions. 
This is also likely to have been the case for South Korea and perhaps for Thailand. 
For several nations, including Chile, New Zealand, Portugal and South Korea, it 
is likely that the growth in per capita income and increases in incomes (and in 
consumption) that benefi ted a large part of their national populations are impor-
tant underpinnings for CO2 emissions growth—although this is not fully repre-
sented in the CO2 emissions fi gures for nations because the emissions embedded 
in imported goods are not taken into account. Perhaps the success of the tourist 
industry contributed to such emissions growth in some of the southern European 
nations (and perhaps Thailand); if these tourists were from other nations, within 
the consumption perspective, this growth would be allocated to the tourists.
For the group of nations with high population growth rates and low CO2 emis-
sions growth rates, almost all are low-income countries, and many are among the 
lowest-income nations in the world and among those that had the least economic 
growth between 1980 and 2005. Some are reported to have had a decline in CO2 
emissions between 1980 and 2005, for instance, Chad, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Liberia and Zambia.
Table 3.2 compares the different world regions with regard to their share of 
world population growth and CO2 emissions growth between 1980 and 2005 and 
between 1950 and 1980. The table highlights the fact that sub-Saharan Africa 
accounted for very little of the growth in CO2 emissions for both these periods 
(less than 3 per cent) but for 18.5 per cent of population growth between 1980 and 
2005 and 10.7 per cent between 1950 and 1980. In contrast, Northern America 
accounted for around 4 per cent of population growth for both periods but for 
20 per cent of the growth in CO2 emissions in 1950-1980 and 14 per cent of the 
growth in emissions in 1980-2005. This is despite the fact that, in 1950, CO2 emis-
sions per person in Northern America were already very high (much higher than 
in many high-income nations today). Table 3.2 also includes fi gures for the fi ve na-
tions with the largest increases in CO2 emissions. Note that China accounted for a 
much larger share of the increase in CO2 emissions than India, but with a smaller 
contribution to increases in population. Japan, South Korea and the United States 
contributed far more to increases in CO2 emissions than they contributed to 
increases in population. Note, too, that China and sub-Saharan Africa accounted 
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for similar proportions of the increase in the world’s population during the period 
1980-2005 (15.3 and 18.5 per cent), but China’s contribution to increased CO2 
emissions was nearly 20 times that of sub-Saharan Africa. 
At the risk of unnecessary repetition, it is the number of consumers (and their 
consumption levels) that drives increases in GHG emissions, not the number of 
people (while from a production perspective, it is more the nature and location of 
production). Europe’s share of CO2 emissions growth is negative because many 
European nations had lower emissions in 2005 than in 1980, but if data were avail-
able for a consumption perspective analysis, this might well be different—with 
much higher proportions of emissions attributed to wealthy European nations 
(or, more correctly, to their wealthier citizens).
Table 3.2: Share of the World’s Population Growth and CO2 
      Emissions Growth, 1980–2005 and 1950–1980
1980–2005 1950–1980
 
Share of 
population 
growth
(%)
Share 
of CO2 
emissions 
growth 
(%)
Share of 
population 
growth 
(%)
Share 
of CO2 
emissions 
growth 
(%)
Regions Africa, North 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
Africa, sub-Saharan 18.5 2.4 10.7 2.2
Asia 63.1 82.7 64.1 30.6
Europe 1.8 -12.6 7.6 39.7
Latin America and Caribbean 9.4 6.4 10.2 5.3
Northern America 4.0 13.9 4.4 19.9
Oceania 0.4 2.1 0.4 1.3
Nations China 15.3 44.5
United States 3.4 12.6
India 21.7 9.9
Korea, Republic of 0.5 3.7
Japan 0.5 3.6
Source: Derived from data from CAIT, 2009.
Table 3.3 shows the different contributions of nations to population growth 
and CO2 emissions, 1980 to 2005 and 1950 to 1980, when they are classifi ed by 
average per capita income levels. Nations classifi ed as low-income in 2005 contrib-
uted far more to global population growth between 1950 and 2005 than they did 
to CO2 emissions growth. Nations classifi ed as high-income in 2005 accounted for 
far more CO2 emissions growth than population growth. Again, if we shifted to 
a consumption-focused analysis, the contrasts between the nations contributing 
most to population growth and the nations contributing most to CO2 emissions 
growth would be even more dramatic.
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Table 3.3: Contributions to Population Growth and CO2 
      Emissions Growth by Per Capita Income Category, 
      1980-2005 and 1950-1980
1980–2005 1950–1980
Income category in 2005
Population 
growth 
(%)
CO2 
emissions
(%)
Population 
growth 
(%)
CO2 
emissions 
(%)
Low-income nations 52.1 12.8 36.0  5.6
Lower-middle income nations 35.7 53.2 47.1 39.7
Upper-middle income nations  5.0  5.0  5.7  9.6
High-income nations  7.2 29.1 11.2 45.1
Source: Derived from data from CAIT, 2009, and United Nations, 2008.
Population growth therefore can only be a signifi cant contributor to GHG 
emissions if the people that make up this growth enjoy levels of consumption that 
cause signifi cant levels of GHG emissions per person (or, from the production 
perspective, live in nations with a rapid increase in GHG-generating production). 
This, of course, has relevance not only for today but also for the future, in the 
lifetime contribution to GHG emissions of people born now. If most of the growth 
in the world’s population is among low-income households in low-income nations who never 
‘get out of poverty’, then there is and will be little connection between population growth and 
GHG emissions growth.
But even if a signifi cant proportion of the future increase in GHG emissions 
is from nations with rapid population growth, if the increase is in nations below 
the ‘fair share’ level for average per capita emissions, it cannot be judged as com-
parable to that in nations above that level. More to the point, a growth in GHG 
emissions per capita among those individuals or households below the ‘fair share’ 
level (whatever the wealth of that nation) should be considered as qualitatively dif-
ferent from any growth in GHG emissions per capita among individuals or house-
holds above the ‘fair share’ level. Of course, this is very diffi cult to address, in part 
because of limited data, in part because it is diffi cult to support needed consump-
tion increases among low-income groups while bringing down GHG emissions 
per person among groups above the ‘fair share’ level.
Perhaps the key issue to be gleaned from the above discussion is that far more 
attention needs to be given to changes in production and consumption within 
nations if we are to identify the main potential contributors to GHG emissions 
growth in the future. The main implications of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are to caution 
against any assumption that population growth necessarily causes increases in 
CO2 emissions. What is needed for any consideration of GHG emissions and pop-
ulation is a consideration of each nation’s changes in production, in incomes and 
their distribution and in consumption. Of course, this is linked to urbanization 
because urbanization is driven by the increasing proportion of GDP generated by 
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industry and services (most of which are located in urban areas) (Satterthwaite, 
2007), while the form that urbanization takes is much infl uenced by the spatial 
distribution of investments in industry and services and the social and spatial 
distribution of the incomes arising from these economic changes. Demographic 
changes will be important infl uences, not only in terms of changes in the number 
of people but also in terms of changes in age structure and household size (and 
how these infl uence consumption). 
This implies a need for caution against applying any generalization relating 
to climate change and population to ‘developing countries’ or even to particu-
lar regions (sub-Saharan Africa, for instance), because there will be such diversity 
between nations in almost all the factors that infl uence production and consump-
tion patterns, as well as in a nation’s possibilities to de-link CO2 emissions from 
growing production and consumption (as in, for example, a nation that can draw 
on hydroelectricity for a signifi cant proportion of demand for electricity).
 
Urbanization and Climate Change
As noted, cities (or urbanization in general) are often held responsible for climate 
change. Sometimes this is based on estimates that seem to have no supporting evi-
dence. This can be seen in the much-cited suggestion that cities account for 80 per 
cent of all GHG emissions worldwide. Actually, only around 35 per cent of the world’s 
GHGs are emitted within city boundaries, although city populations account for a 
higher proportion of emissions if they are allocated to consumers (Satter thwaite, 
2008). In other instances, the blame seems to be based on an assumption that 
urbanization brings higher GHG emissions—see, for instance, the assumption that 
per capita emissions in urban areas are higher than those in rural areas because of the 
“. . . big differences in productive and consumptive behaviours between rural and 
urban populations” (Jiang and Hardee 2009, p. 9). But this is certainly not always 
the case. With regard to consumption levels, in many nations, a large proportion of 
high-income, high-consumption households live in rural areas and are likely to have 
higher average GHG emissions per person or per household than urban-dwellers 
with comparable incomes—for instance, because of larger, less energy effi cient homes 
and the greater use of (or, indeed, dependence on) private automobiles in rural areas. 
This explains in part why New York, London and Barcelona have much lower average 
GHG emissions per person than the national averages of the United States, United 
Kingdom or Spain, respectively (Chapter 4). This might be considered a phenomenon 
that is only common in high-income nations, but it is likely that a signifi cant and of-
ten growing proportion of the high-income population in low- and middle-income 
nations now live outside urban boundaries. And, as already discussed, when viewing 
the energy use of low-income urban-dwellers in many low-income nations, it is not 
clear that their consumption patterns generate more GHG emissions than their 
rural counterparts. 
Since most of the world’s growth in population in the next few decades is 
likely to be in urban areas in low- and middle-income nations, the link between 
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population growth and GHG emissions will be much infl uenced by the GHG emis-
sions implications of urbanization in these countries. Urbanization can be viewed 
as one of the most serious ‘problems’ causing climate change in that, in general, 
the more urbanized a nation, the higher the GHG emissions per person. But it can 
also be viewed as a key part of the ‘solution’ in that it provides the basis for de-
linking high standards of living/quality of life from high GHG emissions per per-
son. In the limited range of cities for which GHG emissions inventories have been 
undertaken, there are very large differences in per capita emissions among cities 
with high living standards. For instance, Barcelona, widely considered a city with 
a high quality of life, has one fi fth of the GHG emissions per person of many cities 
in the United States. New York City has one third to one half of the GHG emis-
sions per person of many other United States cities (Chapter 4). Many of the most 
desirable and expensive residential areas in or close to city centres in Europe have 
residential areas that are or can be made very energy effi cient (typically terraces 
with three-to-six storey buildings), and settlement patterns and public transport 
systems that allow most trips to be made on foot, by bicycle or on public transport. 
Indeed, one of the drivers of urbanization is the economic advantages that close 
proximity provides for a great range of enterprises.
With regard to the impacts of climate change, urban areas can be seen as pre-
senting one of the most serious ‘problems’, as they concentrate people and their 
assets, industries and infrastructure in ways that increase risk and vulnerability—
and many cities and smaller urban centres are in locations that climate change is 
making (or will make) particularly hazardous (Bicknell et al., 2009). Conversely, 
urban areas can be viewed as having large potential advantages in building resil-
ience to climate change impacts—i.e., in the economies of scale and proximity that 
they present for key protective infrastructure and services and for risk-reducing 
governance innovations to reduce risk and vulnerability, for instance, through 
partnerships between government agencies and civil society groups (Bicknell et 
al., 2009). It is also generally easier in urban than in rural areas to organize a rapid 
response to approaching extreme weather events that are judged serious enough 
to warrant moving many people temporarily from their homes.
Figure 3.1 shows the level of urbanization of selected nations plotted against per 
capita GHG emissions for 2005 (in CO2e) based on the production perspective. The 
fi gure shows few surprises. In general, the more urbanized the nation, the higher 
the GHG emissions per person, although with considerable variations in emission 
levels per person for nations with comparable urbanization levels. Also, the wealth-
ier the nation, the higher the GHG emissions per capita, although also with very 
considerable variations in GHG emissions per capita for nations with comparable 
levels of urbanization, and very considerable variations in levels of urbanization for 
nations with comparable GHG emissions per capita. Most low-income nations have 
less than half of their population in urban areas, and many have less than a quarter; 
many have per capita GHG emissions below 0.2 tonnes a year and very few above 2.5 
tonnes a year. Of course, part of the large variations in GHG emissions per capita 
between nations with comparable levels of urbanization may be explained by the 
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different criteria used to defi ne urban populations or urban places. But note that 
all of the upper-middle and high-income nations and many of the lower-middle 
income nations had GHG emissions per person above the ‘fair share’ level, with 
the United States and Canada having more than 10 times that level. 
So, is urbanization a driver of climate change? It is generally assumed that it 
is, but urbanization cannot be the ‘driver’ in that it is itself propelled mainly by 
economic and political change. In almost all low- and middle-income nations, 
urbanization in the last few decades has been driven by investment patterns that 
have increased the proportion of production in industry and services (mostly 
located in urban areas) thereby increasing the proportion of the economically 
active population working in those industries and services. Increasing levels of 
Figure 3.1: Level of Urbanization of Countries plotted against   
       Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2e) for 2005 
Note: The small blue diamonds represent low-income nations, the small white diamonds lower-
middle income nations, the black triangles upper-middle income nations and the large blue squares 
high-income nations. These fi gures include not only CO2, but also the other greenhouse gases 
included in the Kyoto Protocol, and their contributions to global warming are converted into CO2e. 
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urbanization therefore track the increasing proportions of GDP generated by 
industry and services and the growing proportions of the workforce employed 
therein (Satterthwaite, 2007). This strong association between growing levels 
of urbanization and changing investment/production patterns was less evident 
in many nations in Asia and Africa in earlier decades, around the time of the 
achievement of political independence, especially in countries where the rights 
of the population to live and/or work in urban areas had been controlled by the 
colonial government. Thus, much urbanization just pre- or post-independence 
resulted from the movement of individuals or households to urban centres that 
previously controlled their rights to live or work there, as well as from the building 
of the institutional infrastructure that is part of a nation-state. Here, then, political 
change was a major infl uence on increasing urbanization levels.9
From the production perspective, what drives the growth in GHG emissions in 
low-income and most lower-middle-income nations is the increasing use of fossil 
fuels in industries and services (and, usually, electricity generation). This is related 
to urbanization in the extent to which such production is within urban bound-
aries. For example, it is likely that the rapid growth in GHG emissions in cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai is driven in large part by the very great expansion 
in manufacturing (Dhakal, 2004). Low-income nations that have little or no eco-
nomic growth probably have little or no growth in GHGs in their urban areas, just 
as they generally have little or no increase in their urbanization levels (Potts, 2009). 
But for low- and middle-income nations that become wealthier (which also means 
becoming more urbanized), the location of consumers and the changes in their 
consumption behaviour become increasingly important contributors to GHG 
emissions. For instance, it can be assumed that,  in India, it is generally urban areas 
with heavy industry that have the highest GHG emissions per person, but in par-
ticularly successful cities such as Delhi, Mumbai, Pune and Bangalore, GHG emis-
sions per person may be increasingly driven by the consumption patterns of their 
higher-income groups (although this will only become fully apparent if city-based 
GHG emissions inventories can be done from the consumption perspective).
As noted already, in successful nations or successful cities, it is common for 
a growing proportion of middle- and upper-income households to live outside 
the city boundaries, in small urban centres or rural areas. In high-income nations 
there are also many manufacturing and service enterprises that are located in rural 
areas. But here, the division between rural and urban in terms of employment and 
access to infrastructure and services has disappeared; in effect, virtually all rural 
areas are ‘urban’ in that almost all of the population does not work in primary 
activities (including farming, forestry and fi shing) and almost all enjoy levels of in-
frastructure and services that were previously only associated with urban locales. 
Thus, in high-income nations, there can be a large increase in per capita GHG 
emissions and very little or no increase in urbanization levels.
If the real driver of climate change is increasing consumption,10 how can a more 
accurate understanding of the links between urbanization and climate change be 
achieved? It is known that allocating responsibility for GHG emissions through 
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average per capita emissions fi gures for nations is misleading for at least two 
reasons. The fi rst is that these fi gures are based on where GHGs are emitted and 
not on what caused them to be emitted. If GHG emissions were allocated to the 
location of the consumers whose consumption was the root cause of these emis-
sions, it would considerably increase the GHG emissions per person in most high-
income nations (and cities) and considerably decrease the GHG emissions per 
person in nations (and cities) that were successful exporters of consumer goods 
(especially those with high GHG emissions caused by their manufacture and trans-
port to markets). The second is that it is very misleading to discuss responsibility 
for GHG emissions per person using national averages because of the very large 
differences in per capita emissions within each nation between the highest-income 
and lowest-income groups—perhaps a 100-fold or more difference between GHG 
emissions per person if the wealthiest 1 per cent and the poorest 1 per cent in 
many nations could be compared. As noted earlier, a proportion of the lowest-
income households in rural and urban areas in many nations may not even have 
any net contribution to GHG emissions.
In summary, the real drivers of GHG emissions growth are high consumption 
and rapid growth in consumption, not population (or rapid population growth) 
or urbanization. If it was possible to assess GHG emissions by the consumption 
and lifestyles of households, it is likely that the very rich would have GHG emis-
sions per person that were thousands of times greater than those of large sections 
of the poorest groups. If mapped on the whole world’s population, irrespective 
of which nation they lived in, a fi gure would be produced that is similar to the 
‘champagne glass’ used by the United Nations Development Programme’s Human 
Development Report in 1992 to highlight global inequality in incomes, where the 
world’s richest 20 per cent of the population receive at least 150 times the income 
of the poorest 20 per cent (UNDP, 1992).   
Conclusions
It is not correct to suggest that it is the increase in population that drives the growth 
in GHG emissions, when the lifetime contribution to GHG emissions of a person 
added to the world’s population varies by a factor of more than 1,000, depending 
on the circumstances into which he or she is born and his or her life possibilities 
and choices. It is not the growth in the number of people, but rather the growth in 
the number of consumers and the GHG implications of their consumption pat-
terns that are the issue. In theory (leaving aside the diffi culties in measurement), 
responsibility for GHG emissions should be with individuals and households and 
should be based on the GHG implications of their consumption, and not with na-
tions (or cities) based on GHG inventories from the production perspective. From 
the consumption perspective, the 20 per cent of the world’s population with the 
highest consumption levels is likely to account for more than 80 per cent of all 
human-induced GHG emissions and an even higher proportion of historical con-
tributions. In considering how to reduce emissions globally, far more attention 
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should be directed to reducing this group’s GHG emissions. And, as responsibili-
ties for addressing this are allocated to national and local governments (with city 
governments having particularly important roles), consideration should be given 
to the distribution among nations of this 20 per cent of the world’s population 
(obviously most, but certainly not all, in high-income nations).
To obtain the much-needed rapid decrease in GHG emissions globally, there is 
an obvious need to focus on rapidly changing the consumption patterns of pres-
ent (and future) consumers with above ‘fair share’ GHG emissions. With regard to 
development, the priority within energy policy is to support those living in ‘energy 
poverty’ (and its very serious health consequences) in moving to cleaner, more con-
venient fuels and in accessing electricity. While this will increase GHG emissions, 
it can nonetheless be achieved at emissions per person far below the ‘fair share’ 
level. It is only the high current and historical contributions of wealthy people’s 
consumption to GHGs in the atmosphere that make the modest increa ses sought 
by low-income groups appear to be a problem.
This emphasis on allocating GHG emissions to consumers does not invalidate 
emissions inventories for cities based on the production perspective, as these serve 
to highlight particular sectors or activities with high GHG emissions and the high 
potential for reducing these. And as noted earlier, this production perspective 
has aspects of the consumption perspective, including GHG emissions linked to 
household energy use and transport (and usually also to electricity generation). 
There is now work under way to develop a common methodology for undertaking 
GHG emissions inventories that includes the consumption perspective, although 
this needs to be careful to subtract from city GHG emissions inventories the GHGs 
emitted in the production of goods that are exported from the city. Many of the 
key technologies for reducing GHG emissions, such as photovoltaic cells, wind-
mills and motor vehicles with much reduced GHG emissions implications, will 
be produced in cities, and it would be misleading to allocate the GHG emissions 
used in their fabrication to these cities while the places in which they are used are 
credited with lower GHG emissions. 
How the link between population growth and climate change is understood 
infl uences policy on sexual and reproductive health. Leaving aside the extreme 
positions—on one side, those opposing the provision of sexual and reproductive 
health services, including family planning; on the other, those demanding large re-
ductions in population numbers as the only possibility for a ‘sustainable’ future—
there is agreement on everyone’s right to and need for good quality, accessible and 
affordable sexual and reproductive health services that include family planning. 
There is also a shared abhorrence for past coercive ‘population control’ measures. 
But beyond this, there are important differences.11
One is the different emphasis within development programmes between those 
who stress above all the need for more funding for family planning and those 
who stress the need for far more effective development programmes (that include 
good quality housing with good provision for water, sanitation, drainage, schools 
and health care and also greater legal protection for low-income groups and more 
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possibilities for them to infl uence policies and hold government accountable). Of 
course, this focus on development includes support for family planning—but only 
recognizing this as one part of a good health care system and considering that un-
intended pregnancies are not simply the result of a lack of family planning but also 
of “. . . entrenched, gendered power dynamics at work within households, commu-
nities and nations worldwide” (Hartmann, 2008). A second difference is the stress 
on where investment in promoting behaviour change is needed, from those who 
emphasize the need for media campaigns to increase awareness of contraception 
and to foster a desire to use it, to those who stress the need for campaigns to “. . . 
challenge the overconsumption logic of global capitalism”(Hartmann, 2008) and 
its GHG implications. 
It is the demographic changes associated with affl uence or of increasingly 
affl uent individuals, households and societies that are the most important 
demographic causes of the human-induced GHGs already present in the atmo-
sphere and the most important drivers of their growth. From the consumption 
perspective, this is associated with urbanization only when an increasing pro-
portion of consumption takes place in urban areas—which is only partly the case 
in high-income nations and perhaps in some middle-income nations (or areas 
within them) as well. And it is mostly in (responsibly governed) urban areas that 
it is possible to de-link a high quality of life from high GHG emissions per per-
son. Whether or not population growth contributes to GHG emissions depends 
on the consumption patterns of those who make up this population growth.
Of course, from the perspective of adaptation to climate change, the critical 
issue in low- and middle-income nations is to reduce risks, with particular 
attention to doing so for vulnerable populations. But this has very strong com-
plementarities with a successful development agenda and with the components 
noted above. There is an important ‘population’ component, in that it includes 
a high priority for ensuring that all individuals have good quality, affordable 
and easily accessible sexual and reproductive health services, within a larger 
commitment to ensuring other health care services, good environmental health, 
secure homes and adequate incomes. But this would not necessarily reduce 
GHG emissions.12
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Notes
1 This is a condensed version of the paper of the same name published in Environment and Urbanization 21(2).
2 This is often labelled the ‘production’ perspective, but this implies that it is linked solely to what is produced 
when it also includes part of the consumption perspective—for instance, in fossil fuels used for transport and 
for heating buildings.
3 Apart, of course, from those appliances, such as radios, that can be powered by batteries.
4 It might be assumed that the use of fuelwood and charcoal by urban populations contributes to deforestation 
and thus to global warming, but detailed studies in the late 1980s showed that this assumption was not true 
in most instances (Arnold et al., 2006: Leach and Mearns, 1989).  
5 Drawn from STATcompiler at http://www.statcompiler.com/, accessed June 15th 2009.
6 Using the US$1 a day poverty line, urban poverty appears to have decreased in many nations, but this poverty 
line is known to greatly understate the scale and depth of urban poverty because in many urban contexts, 
especially in successful cities in low- and middle-income nations, the costs of food and non-food needs 
(including rent for housing, payments for water and sanitation, school fees and costs for household energy, 
transport and health care) are much higher than US$1 a day (see: Satterthwaite, 2004). 
7 CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalent emission) is a measure of emissions where other greenhouse gases (such as 
methane) have been added to carbon dioxide emissions, with adjustments made for the differences in their 
global warming potential for a given time horizon.
8 This drew data from CAIT, 2009.
9 The infl uences of economic and political change on urbanization and how they and their relative importance 
have changed in low- and middle-income countries is discussed in more depth and detail in Satterthwaite, 
2007.
10 Including the embedded energy in buildings and infrastructure.
11 See the discussion on population and climate change by a range of authors in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
2008. 
12 The GHG emissions implications of directly meeting such needs would not be substantial and are unlikely to 
drive low-income nations into having per capita emissions above the ‘fair share’ level; however, if it is assumed 
that such needs are met by trickle down from economic growth, the GHG emissions implications would be 
far more serious.
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Urban Form, 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Climate Vulnerability
David Dodman
Introduction
This chapter presents an analytical review of the interaction among urban density, 
climate change and sea level rise. It focuses on two main themes: (1) the interac-
tion between urban density and the generation of greenhouse gases and how this 
affects mitigation strategies; and (2) the consequences of climate change on urban 
settlements of varying population densities and how this affects adaptation strat-
egies. Throughout, there is a recognition that changing population densities—and 
broader demographic issues—in urban centres can both affect and be affected by 
global environmental change.
First, as is already well known, climate change is caused by the emission of green-
house gases, primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels. Greenhouse-gas-emitting 
activities are distributed in a spatially uneven manner. On the global scale, the 20 
per cent of the world’s population living in high-income countries account for 46.4 
per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, while the 80 per cent of the world’s 
population living in low- and middle-income countries account for the remaining 
53.6 per cent. The United States and Canada alone account for 19.4 per cent of glob-
al greenhouse gas emissions, while all of South Asia accounts for 13.1 per cent and 
all of Africa just 7.8 per cent (Rogner et al., 2007). This chapter therefore examines 
the implications of different urban densities for the emission of greenhouse gases 
(particularly, although not exclusively, in high-income countries) and the implica-
tions of this for global climate change. The relationships among the form, density, 
economy and society within cities are explored in order to assess whether particular 
spatial patterns can have a positive or negative effect on the emission of greenhouse 
gases and, consequently, on climate change. 
Secondly, it is increasingly accepted that the effects of climate change will also 
be distributed unevenly. High urban densities can both contribute to and reduce 
the vulnerability of human populations. If populations are concentrated in vulner-
able locations, without proper infrastructure or institutional frameworks, density 
can increase risk. However, if effective means can be found for supporting dense 
populations in safe locations with suitable infrastructural and institutional frame-
works, a viable alternative to living on marginal and unsafe sites can be provided, 
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particularly for the urban poor. Other aspects of demography, such as the gender 
and age composition of a population, also affect vulnerability. This chapter there-
fore examines patterns of urban density and vulnerability (parti cularly, although 
not exclusively, in low- and middle-income countries) and the inter-relationships 
between the two. Specifi cally, it examines case studies of high-population densi-
ties that increase exposure to the effects of climate change and vulnerability and 
case studies of high-population densities that can be seen to reduce risk. If well-
managed, the increasing concentration of population in urban centres can result 
in a reduction in vulnerability to the direct and indirect impacts of climate change; 
if poorly managed, it can mean increasing levels of risk for large sections of the 
urban population. 
These processes do not occur in isolation and cannot be separated from broader 
demographic, economic and social transformations. This chapter therefore ap-
proaches the interaction between climate change and urban density in a holistic 
manner that can identify appropriate, context-specifi c and policy-relevant recom-
mendations. The analysis provided will help to strengthen capacity at the national 
and local levels to understand and deal effectively with urbanization in the face of 
the challenges posed by climate change.
Approaching Urban Density
Views of urban density have tended to be starkly polarized. Low-density cities are 
seen either to enable individual freedom and spacious living or to be a profl igate 
and wasteful use of space and resources. Dense urban populations are considered 
to be indicative of claustrophobic squalor, poverty and deprivation, or of diversity 
and community. On the one hand, Ebenezer Howard’s protests against urban over-
crowding are still invoked: Howard argued that “[i]t is well nigh universally agreed 
by men of all parties . . . that it is deeply to be deplored that the people should 
continue to stream into the already overcrowded cities” (Howard, 1996, p. 346). 
On the other hand, Jane Jacobs’ (1996) passionate defense of urban life in The Death 
and Life of Great American Cities is still taken as a mantra, particularly for those in the 
intellectual movement of ‘new urbanism’ who are opposed to the growth patterns 
of suburban sprawl and restrictive residential enclaves. For this latter group, low 
urban densities—frequently associated with the process of suburbanization—are 
often characterized as urban sprawl. 
Both the defi nition and the effects of urban sprawl are widely debated. Fren-
kel and Ashkenazi (2008) identify fi ve different systems for measuring sprawl—
growth rates, density, spatial geometry, accessibility and aesthetic measures—with 
settlement patterns identifi ed as sprawl when they meet one measure but not 
neces sarily any of the others. Urban sprawl is often associated with a variety of 
social problems including “social isolation and obesity; asthma and global warm-
ing; fl ooding and erosion; the demise of small farms; extinction of wildlife and the 
unbalancing of nature” (Gottdiener and Budd, 2005, p. 148). In contrast, some 
planners see sprawl as inevitable or harmless, arguing that it maximizes the overall 
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welfare of society as an outcome of free-market decision-making, provides easy ac-
cess to open space and results in lower crime rates (Frenkel and Ashkenazi, 2008). 
But in many respects, the use of the term ‘sprawl’ has negative connotations and 
may serve to close spaces for discussion and negotiation. There is a clear need to 
move beyond these kinds of polarized positions and—as proposed later in this 
chapter—to accept a more nuanced view of the advantages and disadvantages of 
particular urban forms and levels of density. 
In low- and middle-income countries, the related process of peri-urbanization 
is increasing. In the peri-urban interface, the boundaries between the ‘urban’ 
and the ‘rural’ are continually being renegotiated and, rather than being clearly 
defi ned, are characterized by transition zones. These interfaces are affected by 
some of the most serious problems of urbanization, including intense pressures on 
resources, slum formation, lack of adequate services such as water and sanitation, 
poor planning and degradation of farmland. They are of particular signifi cance 
in low- and middle-income countries, where planning regulations may be weak or 
weakly enforced and therefore result in areas with complex patterns of land tenure 
and land use (McGregor et al., 2006; Tacoli, 2006). Although peri-urban areas pro-
vide a variety of activities and services for urban centres, they are generally beyond 
or between the legal and administrative boundaries of these cities, with the result 
that the process of urbanization can be unplanned and informal with frequent 
struggles over land use. 
The relationship between urban population density and the environment in its 
broader sense is further complicated by the spatial displacement of environmental 
costs. Although it is often argued that denser urban settlements make more effi -
cient use of land and other resources, at least some of this can be attributed to their 
‘ecological footprints’ outside the spatial boundaries of the city (Wacker nagel and 
Rees, 1995; Wackernagel et al., 2006). This displacement of environmental costs 
is particularly relevant to climate change when ‘consumption-based’ rather than 
‘production-based’ measures of greenhouse gas generation are utilized. Many 
cities in North America and Europe are service-oriented rather than production-
oriented, yet traditional mechanisms for identifying the source of greenhouse gas 
emissions allocates these to the location of production, rather than to the location 
of the consumption of the fi nished product (Bai, 2007). 
At its simplest, urban density is measured by dividing a given population by a 
given area. The widely varying defi nitions of the spatial extent of urban areas lead 
to a great deal of diffi culty in generating comparable statistics for different towns 
and cities. Dividing the population of a metropolitan area by the administrative 
areas contained within its offi cial boundaries is a highly unreliable measure—
particularly for comparisons—because the density will vary according to the defi -
nition of these boundaries (Angel et al., 2005). In addition, standard measures of 
density are calculated over an entire land area, without taking into account the 
levels of connectivity. For example, the gradual transformation of the urban form 
of Curitiba, Brazil, from a predominantly radial-circular form to a more linear 
pattern of development has reduced the city’s overall density, yet it has facilitated 
67URBAN FORM, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE VULNERABILIT Y
the development of a more rapid and effective public transportation system and 
produced various other social and environmental benefi ts. 
At the global level, however, there is strong evidence that urban densities have 
generally been declining over the past two centuries (UNFPA, 2007). Perhaps 
the most detailed and compelling assessment of this phenomenon is provided 
by a recent World Bank report (Angel et al., 2005). This report used a method of 
measuring the density of the built-up area (as defi ned through satellite imagery) 
rather than the administrative area of cities, and applied this to a total of 3,943 
cities with populations greater than 100,000. These cities had a total population 
of 2.3 billion people: 1.7 billion in ‘developing’ countries and 0.6 billion in ‘indus-
trialized’ countries. According to the report, the average density of cities in indus-
trialized countries in 2000 was 2,835 people per km2, declining from 3,545 people/
km2 in 1990, with an annual change of -2.2 per cent. In developing countries, the 
average urban population density in 2000 was 8,050 people/km2, declining from 
9,560 people/km2 in 1990, with an annual change of -1.7 per cent. Alternatively, 
these fi gures can be expressed as the average built-up area per person: 125m2 in 
developing country cities and 355m2 in industrialized country cities. 
Table 4.1: Average Density of Built-up Areas (persons per km2)
1990 2000
Less-developed Countries
Industrialized Countries
9,560
3,545
8,050
2,835
East Asia and the Pacifi c
Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean
Northern Africa
Other Developed Countries
South and Central Asia
South-East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Asia
15,380
5,270
6,955
10,010
2,790
17,980
25,360
9,470
6,410
9,350
4,345
6,785
9,250
2,300
13,720
16,495
6,630
5,820
Low Income
Lower-middle Income
Upper-middle Income
High Income 
15,340
12,245
6,370
3,565
11,850
8,820
5,930
2,855
Source: Adapted from Angel et al., 2005.
This trend of reduced urban densities is likely to continue into the future. It is 
estimated that the total population of cities in developing countries will double 
between 2000 and 2030, but their built-up areas will triple (from approxi mately 
200,000 km2 to approximately 600,000 km2); in industrialized countries, the 
urban population will increase by approximately 20 per cent, while their built-up 
areas will increase 2.5 times (from approximately 200,000 km2 to approximately 
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500,000 km2). The agglomerated fi gures for industrialized and developing coun-
tries conceal a great deal of regional variation (see Table 4.1). In 2000, South-East 
Asian cities were almost four times as densely populated as European cities, and 
almost eight times as densely populated as those in ‘Other Developed Countries’ 
(including North America and Australasia). These fi gures can also be disaggre-
gated by income levels: Cities in low income countries are more than four times as 
densely populated as cities in high-income countries.
In summary, the average density of built-up areas in all cities, in all regions 
and of all population sizes is decreasing. As has been shown, however, this is a 
highly uneven process. Larger cities tend to exhibit higher densities than smaller 
cities (McGranahan et al., 2007), and these fi gures do not capture the variations 
in density that exist within cities. Although the density for any given urban area 
as a whole may be declining, there are still likely to be pockets of extremely high 
density, and these are likely to be associated with low-income residential areas. 
The following sections of this chapter assess the relationship between these pat-
terns of urban density and the different aspects of climate change in a greater level 
of detail. 
Urban Density and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Urban form and urban spatial organization can have a wide variety of implica-
tions for a city’s greenhouse gas emissions. The high concentrations of people and 
economic activities in urban areas can lead to ‘economies’ of scale, proximity and 
agglomeration that can have a positive impact on energy use and associated emis-
sions, and the proximity of homes and businesses can encourage walking, cycling 
and the use of mass transport in place of private motor vehicles (Satterthwaite, 
1999). Some researchers suggest that each doubling of average neighbourhood 
density is associated with a 20-40 per cent decrease in per-household vehicle use 
and a corresponding decline in emissions (Gottdiener and Budd, 2005, p. 153). 
Newman and Kenworthy (1989), for example, suggested that gasoline use per cap-
ita declines with urban density (although they acknowledged that the correlation 
weakens once GDP per capita is taken into account), and Brown and Southworth 
(2008, p. 653) argue that “by the middle of the century the combination of green 
buildings and smart growth could deliver the deeper reductions that many believe 
are needed to mitigate climate change”. 
Yet cities have often been blamed for generating most of the world’s greenhouse 
gas emissions and for contributing disproportionately to global climate change. 
Referring specifi cally to climate change, the Executive Director of the United 
Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-HABITAT) has stated that cities are 
“responsible for 75 percent of global energy consumption and 80 percent of green-
house gas emissions”; while the Clinton Foundation suggests that cities contrib-
ute “approximately 75 percent of all heat-trapping greenhouse gas emissions to 
our atmosphere, while only comprising 2 percent of land mass” (For references to 
these and similar quotations, and a detailed critique, see Satterthwaite, 2008). At 
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the same time, detailed analyses of urban greenhouse gas emissions for individual
cities suggest that, per capita, urban residents tend to generate a substantially 
smaller volume of carbon emissions than residents elsewhere in the same coun-
try (Dodman, 2009). Indeed, per capita emissions in New York City are only 29.7 
per cent of those in the United States as a whole (PlaNYC, 2007); those in London 
are just over half of the British average (Mayor of London, 2007); those in Rio de 
Janeiro are only 28.0 per cent of those of Brazil as a whole (Dubeux and La Rovere, 
2007); and those in Barcelona are only 33.9 per cent of those of Spain as a whole 
(Baldasano et al., 1999). These relatively low levels of emissions are infl uenced by 
a variety of factors—including the density of buildings, the average dwelling unit 
size and the extent of public transportation—several of which are linked directly 
to patterns of urban density. 
Dense urban settlements can therefore be seen to enable lifestyles that reduce 
per capita greenhouse gas emissions through the concentration of services that 
lessens the need to travel long distances, the (generally) better provision of public 
transportation networks and the constraints on the size of residential dwellings 
imposed by the scarcity and high cost of land. Yet conscious strategies to increase 
urban density may or may not have a positive effect on greenhouse gas emissions 
and other environmental impacts. Many of the world’s most densely populated 
cities in South, Central and South-East Asia suffer severely from overcrowding, 
and reducing urban density would meet a great many broader social, environmen-
tal and developmental needs. High urban densities can cause localized climatic 
effects such as increased local temperatures (Coutts et al., 2007). In addition, a 
variety of vulnerabilities to climate change are exacerbated by density: Coastal 
location, exposure to the urban heat-island effect, high levels of outdoor and in-
door air pollution and poor sanitation are associated with areas of high popula-
tion density in less-developed-country cities (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 
2007). However, there are clear opportunities for simultaneously improving health 
and cutting GHG emissions through policies related to transport systems, urban 
planning, building regulations and household energy supply. 
Conversely, some of the apparent climate change mitigation benefi ts of high 
urban densities in industrialized countries may be a consequence of the spatial 
displacement of greenhouse–gas-generating activities to other locations within 
the same country or internationally. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions—or 
addressing climate change mitigation—can only be meaningfully achieved through 
a process of reducing both direct and indirect emissions. 
Policy implications: Density and ‘climate friendly cities’
Although the relationship between urban density and greenhouse gas emissions 
is complex, there are certain lessons that can be identifi ed as relevant for urban 
policy. These do not amount to wholesale recommendations in favour of den-
sifi cation, but rather look at strategically assessing population distribution in a 
manner that contributes to broader goals of climate change mitigation. Encour-
aging densifi cation at an aggregate scale—within administrative boundaries, for 
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example—risks neglecting the important environmental and social roles played by 
gardens and open spaces. It is also worth considering the different housing needs 
for individuals at different stages of life and reconsidering the notion of ‘housing 
for life’ that has been prevalent in many national housing policies (Minerva LSE, 
2004). In this regard, dense settlement patterns may meet the needs of certain 
groups within society, but not others. 
In general, however, density does provide the potential for access to and use 
of public transportation—when designed to meet the needs of users. A report by 
Minerva LSE (2004) shows a “positive link between higher-density areas and lev-
els of public-transport access across London, which is refl ected in the decisions 
that people make about how to get to work” (p. 4). It further concludes that “on 
balance, people will use public transport where it is available, especially in high 
den sity, centrally located areas”. This case study of London also shows how high 
density areas can accommodate both deprived and affl uent communities, in which 
there is a shared willingness to live in economically successful parts of the British 
capital at high densities. People appear to ‘trade off ’ more space in their homes for 
other qualities, such as personal and property safety, the upkeep of the area and 
proximity to shops and amenities. 
Access to public transportation need not imply high density, as shown by the 
concepts of ‘transit-oriented development’ and ‘transit villages’ pioneered in Cali-
fornia (California Department of Transportation, 2002). They are characterized 
by moderate- to high-density housing within easy walking distance of major tran-
sit stops. Similar processes can be facilitated in low- and middle-income nations 
through the development of bus rapid transit systems. These are most effi cient in 
servicing densely populated linear developments, which contain a large number 
of urban residents who live within walking distances of the main trunk routes. 
The fi rst comprehensive example of this type of development began in Curitiba, 
Brazil, in the mid-1970s; Curitiba now has an integrated public transport system 
focused on fi ve main ‘axes’ that is used by two thirds of the city’s population (Rabi-
novitch, 1992). More recently, the TransMilenio public transportation system was 
developed in Bogotá, Colombia (Héron, 2006). It is also based on a trunk-route 
system with feeder services, which does not necessarily imply consistently high 
urban densities. However, it has been successful at meeting the needs of the 80 per 
cent of the city’s population who are dependent on public transportation, includ-
ing the 53 per cent who are defi ned as living in poverty. 
These examples from North and South America show that innovative think-
ing in relation to the planning of transportation infrastructure can meet both 
environmental and social needs. Localized areas of relatively high densities are re-
quired to generate greater effi ciencies in the use of public transportation, but this 
can be consistent with meeting a variety of other demands from urban residents. 
Of course, the precise form that these transportation networks—and other urban 
networks (for supplying electricity, water, etc.)—should take requires detailed local 
study. Overall, however, density is one of several factors that affect energy use—
and by extension greenhouse gas emissions—in towns and cities. Addressing these 
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issues requires ongoing analysis of urban processes, rather than simply taking a 
snapshot of urban form at a particular moment in time. 
Urban Density and Climate Change Vulnerability
A second major interrelationship between population density and climate change is 
in patterns of density and vulnerability. Densely populated urban areas—especially 
in low- and middle-income countries—are particularly vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change. Where there are dense concentrations of households and economic 
activities, the effects of climate change can impinge on large numbers of people and 
have a major impact on urban economies—even if they affect only relatively small 
land areas. However, if appropriate infrastructure is developed in areas that are less 
likely to be infl uenced by climate change, an opportunity to build large-scale resil-
ience could be provided in a relatively cost-effective manner.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment 
Report of 2007 unequivocally states that the earth’s climate system has been under-
going warming over the last 50 years. Projections of future global average surface 
warming (for the decade 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999) range from 1.1° to 6.4°C, 
whilst sea level rise is predicted at 18 to 59cm (IPCC, 2007). Mean temperatures 
are likely to increase, mean precipitation will fl uctuate and mean sea level will rise; 
extreme rainfall events and tropical cyclones are likely to be more frequent and in-
tense, leading to more frequent fl ooding (both riverine and storm surge). Climate 
change is likely to exacerbate many of the risks faced by low-income urban residents: 
The IPCC states that “poor communities can be especially vulnerable, in particu-
lar those concentrated in relatively high-risk areas” (Wilbanks et al., 2007, p. 359). 
Urban areas in low- and middle-income nations already house a large percentage 
of the people and economic activities most at risk from climate change, including 
extreme weather events and sea level rise, and this proportion is increasing. 
The main impacts of climate change on urban areas, at least in the next few 
decades, are likely to be increased levels of risk from existing hazards. For poorer 
groups, these will include direct impacts such as more frequent and more hazardous 
fl oods; less direct impacts such as reduced availability of freshwater for many cities 
that may limit the supplies available to poorer groups; and indirect impacts such 
as the effects of climate-change-related weather events that increase food prices or 
damage poorer households’ asset bases (Dodman and Satterthwaite, 2008). 
Urban population density, climate change and disasters
The dense concentration of urban populations can increase susceptibility to the di-
sasters that are likely to become more frequent and more intense as a result of climate 
change. Economies, livelihoods, physical infrastructure and social structures are all 
important components of urban systems and are vulnerable to disasters and climate 
risk in different ways.  However, far more is known about the environment of risk (the 
factors leading to vulnerability) than of the risk impact (the number of deaths and 
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serious injuries and the damage to property and livelihoods when disasters occur). But 
the (limited) available evidence suggests that the number of serious injuries and deaths 
from disasters in urban areas has been growing in most low- and middle-income nations 
(UN-HABITAT, 2007). 
Dense urban populations in high-income nations take for granted a web of insti-
tutions, infrastructure, services and regulations that protect them from disasters—
including extreme weather, fl oods, fi res and technological accidents. Many of the 
measures to protect against these involve services that also supply everyday needs, 
including health care services integrated with emergency services and sewer and 
drainage systems that meet daily requirements but that can also cope with storms. 
Almost everyone lives and works in buildings that meet health and safety regula-
tions and that are served by infrastructure designed to cope with extreme weather. 
The police, armed services, health services and fi re services, if or when needed, pro-
vide early warning systems and ensure rapid emergency responses. Consequently, 
extreme weather events rarely cause a large loss of life or serious injury. Although 
occasionally such events cause serious property damage, the economic cost is 
reduced for most property owners by property and possessions insurance. In 
contrast, only a very small proportion of urban centres in low- and middle-income 
nations have a comparable web of institutions, infrastructure, services and regula-
tions, although there are very large variations among such centres in the extent 
of provision and coverage. The proportion of the population in cities that lives 
in legal homes built according to appropriate building regulations varies widely, 
as does the proportion of the population living in homes adequately served by 
sanitation, wastewater removal and storm drains (Hardoy et al., 2001). 
However, the fact that disasters often have a disproportionate impact on areas 
of high population density does not necessarily mean that density itself is to blame 
for increasing vulnerability. Rather, it is the fact that inadequate institutions and 
lack of infrastructure are often concentrated in areas where there are also high 
population densities of low-income urban residents. In and of itself, reducing den-
sity is not a solution to reducing vulnerability to climate-change-related disasters: 
after all, many poor, dispersed, rural populations also suffer horrendously from 
climatic and other disasters. Instead, reducing vulnerability to climate change in 
high density urban settlements requires the provision of adequate infrastructure 
and services. Given the necessary political will and fi nancial resources, this can be 
achieved relatively economically in dense settlements, as any improvements made 
can benefi t a large number of people. 
Low-income groups often have no choice but to settle on already densely popu-
lated marginal land, as no other suitable land is available. Because of this, one 
particularly important response to urban climate change vulnerability is to make 
adequate and appropriately located land available to low-income urban groups. 
This approach has been implemented successfully in the city of Manizales in 
Colombia, which has managed to avoid rapidly growing low-income populations 
settling on dangerous sites (Velásquez, 2005). The population of Mani zales was 
growing rapidly, with high levels of spontaneous settlement in areas at risk from 
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fl oods and landslides. Local authorities, universities, non-governmental organiza-
tions and communities worked together to develop programmes aimed not only 
at reducing risk, but also at improving the living standards of the poor. House-
holds were moved off the most dangerous sites and re-housed nearby. Most of 
the former housing sites were converted into eco-parks with strong environmen-
tal education components. A similar approach was implemented in the city of 
Ilo in Peru (Díaz Palacios and Miranda, 2005). Although the city’s population 
increased fi vefold between 1960 and 2000, there have been no land invasions or 
occupations of risk-prone areas by poor groups, because local authorities have 
implemented programmes (such as the acquisition of an urban-expansion area) to 
accommodate this growth and to support the poor in their efforts to achieve 
decent housing. At the same time, improvements were made in water supply, sani-
tation, electricity provision, waste collection and the provision of public space. 
Similar interventions—with a strong focus on providing safe and accessible land 
for high density housing for the urban poor—are required to reduce climate change 
vulnerability in densely populated towns and cities around the world. 
Urban population density, climate change and health
Climate change is also likely to affect human health in urban centres. This is of 
particular concern in the Least Developed Countries, which already experience a 
high burden of climate-sensitive diseases. Many of these health risks are exacerba ted 
in densely populated urban areas. In addition to the direct mortality effects of 
more frequent and extreme weather events, climate change will also affect human 
health through changes in vector-borne disease transmission, increased malnutri-
tion due to declining food yields and increases in diarrhoeal diseases from changes 
in water quality and water availability. This is a highly inequitable situation, as 
those who are at greatest risk are also those who have contributed the least to 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate change is likely to result in more frequent and intense heat waves. 
In cities, these are exacerbated by the urban heat-island effect as a result of 
lower evaporative cooling and increased heat storage in roads and buildings, 
which can make temperatures 5-11ºC warmer than in surrounding areas. Heat 
waves can have dramatic impacts on human health: The European heat wave of 
August 2003 caused excess mortality of over 35,000 people (Campbell-Lendrum 
and Corvalán, 2007). Heat waves can result in signifi cant deleterious economic 
effects due to decreased productivity and the additional cost of climate-control 
within buildings, as well as generating ‘knock-on’ environmental effects, such as 
air pollution and increased greenhouse gas emissions if these cooling needs are 
met with electricity generated from fossil fuels (Satterthwaite et al., 2007). There is 
also some evidence that the combined effects of heat stress and air pollution may 
be greater than the apparent additive effect of these two stresses (Patz and Balbus, 
2003). The effects of heat stress are distributed unevenly within urban popula-
tions, with elderly persons being especially vulnerable. 
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As noted, densely populated urban areas may become increasingly vulnerable to 
vector-borne diseases due to climate change, as shifting climate patterns extend the 
range of certain vectors. In general, the higher rates of person-to-person contact 
in dense urban settlements can help to spread infectious diseases more quickly. 
Rapid unplanned urbanization can produce breeding sites for mosquitoes, high 
human population densities can provide a large pool of susceptible individuals, 
and higher temperatures can cause an increase in high absolute humidity that can 
also extend the species’ range (Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán, 2007). Diseases 
spread in this way include dengue fever, malaria and fi lariasis. However, although 
climate change is likely to result in the expansion of malaria-carrying mosquitoes 
to some new locations, it is likely to cause the contraction of this range in other 
areas (Confalonieri et al., 2007).
But the effects of climate change on human health in densely populated urban 
settlements are not insurmountable. Indeed, although the current burden of climate-
sensitive disease is highest among the urban poor, it is not the rapid development, 
size and density of cities that are the main determinants of vulnerability, but rather 
the increased populations living in hazard zones, fl ood plains, coastal hazard risk 
zones and unstable hillsides vulnerable to landslides. In the next few decades, good 
environmental and public health services should be able to cope with any increase in 
climate-change-related health risks—whether caused by heat waves or reduced fresh-
water availability or greater risks from communicable diseases. However, providing 
these services requires fi rm commitments to build the necessary infrastructure on 
the part of municipal and national governments, as well as on the mobilization of 
appropriate fi nancial resources to facilitate this. 
In Durban, South Africa, the eThekwini Municipality identifi es human health 
as a key component of its ‘Headline Climate Change Adaptation Strategy’ (Rob-
erts, 2008). This strategy recognizes that the municipal government will have 
to respond to greater risks of heat-related deaths and illnesses, extreme weather 
(particularly the vulnerability of sewage networks and informal settlements to 
fl ooding), potentially reduced air quality and the impacts of changes in precipi-
tation, temperature, humidity and salinity on water quality and vector-borne 
diseases. It also recognizes the need for public education, to develop commu-
nity responses, to ensure that electricity supplies can cope with peaks, to pro-
mote more shade provision and increased water effi ciency, to develop an extreme-
climate public early-warning system and to facilitate research and training on 
environmental health. 
Policy implications: Maintaining density whilst reducing vulnerability
As was clearly shown in the fi rst sections of this chapter, de-densifi cation of urban 
areas can lead to increasing greenhouse gas emissions—particularly related to the 
additional energy required for transportation. A particular challenge for urban 
planners and managers in low- and middle-income nations is to improve the qual-
ity of housing—and thereby increase resilience—for low-income urban residents 
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living in inadequate shelter (meeting adaptation needs), whilst maintaining gen-
erally high density levels (meeting mitigation needs). What is certain, however, is 
that attempts at preventing urban growth by discouraging rural-urban migration 
with tactics such as evicting squatters and denying them services are futile, coun-
ter-productive and violate people’s rights (UNFPA, 2007).
There are various strategies for improving slum settlements, including through 
investments by individuals and households and upgrading driven by commu nity-
neighbourhood investment and by external programmes. However, indivi duals and 
households cannot address the need for infrastructure at the scale of the neigh-
bourhood (water pipes, sewers and drains, paved roads and paths, electricity, social 
services), and the most successful upgrading involves a combination of community/
resident organizations and government agencies acting to address these issues. 
In many cases, as shown in the examples below, this approach can maintain densi-
ties whilst reducing vulnerability.
In Thailand, the Baan Mankong process constitutes a national approach to up-
grading and providing secure tenure (Boonyabancha, 2005). In some cases, slum up-
grading actually increases densifi cation: In Charoenchai Nimitmai, the re-blocking 
process accommodated new residents as a means of reducing land costs. Technical 
solutions that facilitate maintaining density while also improving resilience can in-
clude in situ improvement, re-blocking, land-sharing and nearby relocation. How-
ever, Boonyabancha concluded (p. 39) that “fi nding technical solutions . . . is the easy 
part”. The broader lessons learned from the Baan Mankong process are related to 
the importance of citywide programmes in which urban poor organizations are fully 
involved; the importance of horizontal linkages between peer groups in the city; and 
the importance of enhancing the ‘belonging’ of urban poor groups. 
In Namibia, progressive policies for slum upgrading involved reducing the 
offi cial national minimum plot standard, thereby expanding the legal op-
tions for increasing densities (Mitlin and Muller, 2004). Instead of a minimum 
standard of 300m2, the option was provided for serviced plots of 180m2 with 
communal water points and gravel roads. Frameworks were also provided that 
facilitated group purchase or lease of communally serviced land and smaller 
plot sizes, meaning that families can live legally while upgrading services as and 
when this can be afforded.
An additional aspect of slum upgrading and densifi cation that needs to be 
addressed is the design of low-income housing. Nnaggenda-Musana (2008) sug-
gests that most ‘low-cost’ housing design proposals are little more than smaller 
versions of higher income housing designs, resulting in sprawling low-cost hous-
ing that leads to longer travel distances for low-income urban residents and 
increased costs for the provision of services and infrastructure. Longer travel 
distances increase both emissions and cost problems. New house types for low-
income households can reduce infrastructure and transport costs while at the 
same time preventing encroachment on agricultural land. In addition, architects 
have rarely learned from the strategies used by urban poor households to keep 
their buildings as comfortable as possible in a range of climate scenarios; Jabeen 
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(2009) shows some of the strategies used by households in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
to keep indoor temperatures relatively cool, even when outdoor temperatures are 
particularly hot. 
Conclusion
Urban areas, particularly in low- and middle-income nations, face a variety of chal-
lenges. Perhaps the most striking is the tension between meeting the twin demands 
of generating urban economic growth and meeting the needs of low-income ur-
ban residents (Parnell and Robinson, 2006; Pieterse, 2008). These issues are related 
to a variety of climate change challenges as well, particularly in regard to ensuring 
that urban growth occurs in a ‘climate friendly’ manner and that urban hous-
ing and infrastructure are ‘climate proof ’. Deeper consideration of demographic 
issues and their implications for mitigation and adaptation can help to resolve 
these tensions. 
This chapter has examined the relationship between urban density and climate 
change, and has considered this relationship from the perspectives of both mitiga-
tion and adaptation to climate change. Future patterns of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and the consequent climate change will be driven substantially by the activi-
ties now taking place in urban areas; similarly, the ways in which climate change 
impacts the lives and livelihoods of more than half of the world’s population will 
also be mediated through actions that are taken—or not taken—in towns and 
cities. It is clear that there is no ‘ideal size’ for urban settlements—indeed, 
“different sizes and shapes of cities imply different geographical advantages” 
(Batty, 2008, p. 771). In addition, there is no ideal density for cities and towns—
instead, broader issues of urban form and structure are equally or more important. 
There is also a complex series of interactions among urban density, economic 
status and greenhouse gas emissions. The residents of the densely populated cities 
of low- and middle-income countries are generally wealthier than residents of the 
hinterlands, yet they are far less wealthy than residents of the less densely populated 
cities in high-income countries. This illustrates that the relationship between urban 
density and greenhouse gas emissions is not straightforward: In low-income coun-
tries, residents of denser settlements are likely to have higher per capita emissions 
as a function of their greater wealth than residents of surrounding areas, whereas in 
high-income countries, residents of denser settlements are likely to have lower per 
capita emissions than residents of surrounding areas as a result of smaller housing 
units and greater use of public transportation systems. 
In relation to the impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change (and other 
environmental hazards), density has another set of effects. The extremely high 
population densities of many urban areas in low- and middle-income countries 
contribute to environmental health problems and may concentrate risk in particu-
larly vulnerable locations, and any potential sustainability gains from even greater 
densifi cation are likely to be limited. Indeed, “under these circumstances the merits 
of urban densifi cation postulated for developed country cities seem far less 
convincing in the context of developing countries” (Burgess, 2000, p. 15). 
77URBAN FORM, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE VULNERABILIT Y
In summary, density is one of several major components affecting the ways 
in which urban areas will both infl uence and be affected by a changing climate. 
Adop ting ‘increasing densifi cation’ as a strategy without assessing other fac-
tors such as the distribution of employment opportunities and the nature of 
transportation systems is not likely to provide lasting sustainability or resilience 
benefi ts. Yet, in association with a wider awareness of urban form and process, 
well-planned, effectively-managed and densely-settled towns and cities can help 
to limit greenhouse gas emissions and facilitate resilience to the challenges of 
climate change. 
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Introduction
United Nations forecasts of urban population growth suggest that over the quarter-
century from 2000 to 2025, low- and middle-income countries will see a net in-
crease of some 1.6 billion people in their cities and towns, a quantity that vastly 
outnumbers the expected rural population increase in these countries and which 
dwarfs all anticipated growth in high-income countries (United Nations, 2008). 
In the 25 years after 2025, the United Nations foresees the addition of another 1.7 
billion urban-dwellers to the populations of low- and middle-income countries, 
with the rural populations of these countries forecast to be on the decline. Where, 
precisely, will this massive urban growth take place? Is it likely to be located in the 
regions of poor countries that appear to be environmentally secure or in regions 
likely to feel the brunt of climate-related change in the coming decades?
This chapter documents the current locations of urban-dwellers in Africa, Asia 
and South America in relation to two of the ecologically delineated zones that are 
expected to experience the full force of climate change: the low-elevation coastal 
zones and the arid regions known to ecologists as drylands. Low-lying cities and 
towns near the coast will most probably face increased risks from storm surges and 
fl ooding; those in drylands are expected to experience increased water stress and 
episodes of extreme heat. Climate-related hazards will present multiple threats to 
human health, as described in more detail in Chapter 10. The risks are likely to be 
especially severe in the cities and towns where private and public incomes are low 
and protective infrastructure is lacking.
To assess the risks that global climate change presents for urban-dwellers in 
poor countries, it is obviously of vital importance to know enough about the 
locations of people who will be exposed to these hazards and for the most vulner-
able among them to be identifi ed and given priority. Planning for improvements 
in urban drainage, sanitation and water supply requires both spatial and popula-
tion data, as do forecasts of where urban fertility and migration will augment the 
populations of towns and cities in the path of risk. National economic strategists 
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need to be made aware of the implications of locating special economic zones and 
promoting coastal development in what will become environmentally risky sites. 
Until recently, however, the data needed to create a global map of the populations 
exposed to climate-related risks had not been drawn together.
The essential ingredients for such a map have been assembled over the course 
of a large-scale collaborative effort involving the United Nations Population Di-
vision, the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP), housed at the Socio-
economic Data Applications Center at Columbia University’s Earth Institute, 
and researchers based at the City University of New York and the Population 
Council. For every low- and middle-income country, population data can now be 
mapped according to the most fi nely-disaggregated administrative units that the 
research team could obtain. For cities with a population of 100,000 and above, 
information on population growth over time has been drawn from the most re-
cent version of the United Nations Population Division’s cities database (United 
Nations, 2008). The reach of the data has been extended to include hundreds of 
additional observations on small cities and towns (accounting for a signifi cant 
percentage of all urban residents), which were collected in the 2008–2009 up-
date of GRUMP (SEDAC, 2008; Balk, 2009). Each urban settlement in the com-
bined data set is located in spatial terms by latitude and longitude coordinates, 
and also by an overlay indicating the spatial extent of the urban agglomeration, 
which is derived from remotely-sensed satellite imagery (Elvidge et al., 1997; Balk 
et al., 2005; Small et al., 2005). With their locations having been pinpointed, it 
becomes possible to determine whether all or part of city and town populations 
are situated in the low-elevation and drylands ecozones. To assess the likely pace 
of urban growth in these zones, the United Nations’ city time-series are used, 
supplemented by a large collection of demographic surveys covering the period 
from the mid-1970s to the present. The latter supply additional information on 
urban fertility and mortality rates.2 
In an earlier analysis, McGranahan et al. (2007) showed how data such as these 
could be combined to estimate the number of rural- and urban-dwellers worldwide 
who live in coastal areas within 10 metres of sea level—the low-elevation coastal 
zone (LECZ)—an elevation that is above the currently predicted rise in sea levels 
but which often lies within the reach of cyclones, storm surges and other indirect 
impacts of sea level rise. With the benefi t of several additional years of data col-
lection, it is now possible to refi ne the coastal zone analysis and extend it to cover 
urban residents of the drylands ecosystems, whose total population substantially 
exceeds that of coastal zones.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the fi rst section the 
health implications of climate-related hazards in low-lying coastal areas and dry-
lands are reviewed. In the second, the GRUMP data are employed to calculate 
the numbers of urban-dwellers who currently live in areas where these hazards 
are likely to be pronounced. For selected countries, data from the World Bank’s 
Small-Area Poverty Mapping project are used to identify where the communities 
of the urban poor are located in relation to the LECZ. Next, to indicate how urban 
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exposure and vulnerability are likely to be reshaped by future population growth, 
estimates and forecasts of city population growth rates are presented by ecozone 
for the major regions of the developing world, in this case using the city time-
series provided by the United Nations. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of how such information could advance the efforts of cities and towns to adapt to 
climate change.
Urban Risks in Low-elevation Coastal Zones and Drylands
Because seaward hazards are forecast to increase in number and intensity as 
climate change takes hold, and coastal areas are disproportionately urban, it is 
especially important to quantify the exposure of urban residents in low-elevation 
coastal zones, and to understand the likely implications for their health. The other 
vulnerable ecosystem—drylands—contains (globally) far larger populations than 
found in the LECZs. Much of the discussion of climate change for drylands has 
focused on the rural implications—but what will it mean to be an urban resident 
of the drylands?
The low-elevation coastal zone
According to current forecasts, sea levels will gradually but inexorably rise 
over the coming decades, placing large coastal urban populations under threat 
around the globe. Alley et al. (2007) foresee increases of 0.2 to 0.6 metres in sea 
level by 2100, a development that will be accompanied by more intense typhoons 
and hurricanes, storm surges and periods of exceptionally high precipitation. 
Many of Asia’s largest cities are located in coastal areas that have long been 
cyclone-prone. Mumbai saw massive fl oods in 2005, as did Karachi in 2007 
(Kovats and Akhtar, 2008; The World Bank, 2008). Storm surges and fl ooding also 
present a threat in coastal African cities (e.g., Port Harcourt, Nigeria, and Mom-
basa, Kenya3) and in Latin America (e.g., Caracas, Venezuela, and Florianópolis, 
Brazil4). As explained in Chapter 10, a coastal fl ood model used with the climate 
scenarios developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
suggests that the populations of the areas at risk, and the income levels of these 
populations, are critical factors in determining the health consequences of such 
extreme-weather events.
Urban fl ooding risks in developing countries stem from a number of factors: im-
permeable surfaces that prevent water from being absorbed and cause rapid run- 
off; the general scarcity of parks and other green spaces to absorb such fl ows; rudi-
mentary drainage systems that are often clogged by waste and which, in any case, 
are quickly overloaded with water; and the ill-advised development of marshlands 
and other natural buffers. When fl ooding occurs, faecal matter and other hazardous 
materials contaminate fl ood waters and spill into open wells, elevating the risks of 
water-borne, respiratory and skin diseases (Ahern et al., 2005; Kovats and Akhtar, 
2008). The urban poor are often more exposed than others to these environmental 
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hazards, because the only housing they can afford tends to be located in environ-
mentally riskier areas, the housing itself affords less protection and their mobility 
is more constrained. The poor are likely to experience further indirect damage as 
a result of the loss of their homes, population displacement and the disruption of 
livelihoods and networks of social support (Hardoy and Pandiella, 2009).5
Kovats and Akhtar (2008, p. 169) detail some of the fl ood-related health risks: 
increases in cholera, cryptosporidiosis, typhoid fever and diarrhoeal diseases. They 
describe increases in cases of leptospirosis after the Mumbai fl oods of 2000, 2001 
and 2005, but caution that the excess risks of this disease due to fl ooding are hard 
to quantify without better baseline data. They also note the problem of water con-
taminated by chemicals, heavy metals and other hazardous substances, especially 
for those who live near industrial areas.
Figures 5.1–5.3 map the location of cities and large towns in relation to the low-
elevation zone for several important metropolitan regions. Figure 5.1 presents a 
broad-scale overview of the the low-elevation zone of China near Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shanghai. This is a region in which China’s extraordinarily successful growth strat-
egy has perhaps overly concentrated population and production, without (it seems) 
due consideration of the upcoming environmental risks. Figure 5.2 shows how the 
low-elevation zone bisects Ho Chi Minh City in southern Viet Nam, and Figure 5.3 
depicts the cities and towns in the low-lying coastal regions of Bangladesh.
Drylands
The principal characteristics of drylands are succinctly summarized by Safriel et 
al. (2005, p. 651) as follows: “Drylands are characterized by low, unpredictable, 
and erratic precipitation. The expected annual rainfall typically occurs in a limited 
number of intensive, highly erosive storms.” Figure 5.4 depicts drylands ecosys-
tems around the world. Safriel et al. (2005, p. 626) estimate that this ecosystem 
covers 41 per cent of the Earth’s surface and provides a home to some 2 billion 
people. Developing countries account for about 72 per cent of the land area and 
some 87-93 per cent of the population of the drylands (the range depends on how 
the former Soviet republics are classifi ed). McGrahanan et al. (2005) estimate that 
about 45 per cent of the population of this ecozone is urban.
Water shortages are already apparent in drylands ecosystems. There is an es-
timated 1,300 cubic metres of water available per person per year, well below the 
2,000 cubic metre threshold considered suffi cient for human well-being and sus-
tainable development (Safriel et al., 2005, pp. 625, 632). Even for regions such as 
East Africa where climate scientists foresee increases in precipitation (Table 5.1), 
the rise in temperature is expected to cancel out the effects of greater rainfall, and, 
as a result, in some regions the frequency of rainy season failure will increase (Com-
mission on Climate Change and Development, 2008). In the dryland areas where 
rivers are currently fed by glacier melt, the fl ows from this source will eventually 
decrease as the glaciers shrink, rendering fl ows in some rivers seasonal (Kovats and 
Akhtar, 2008). Cities dependent on these sources of water—such as in the Andes 
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and in the areas fed by the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers—will eventually need 
to fi nd alternatives.
Although many discussions of water stress leave the impression that increasing 
stress in drylands ecosystems already explains why so many of the urban poor fi nd 
it diffi cult to secure access to water, the mechanisms by which this is posited to oc-
cur need scrutiny. McGranahan (2002) fi nds surprisingly little empirical evidence 
indicating that national water scarcity directly translates into a lack of access for 
the urban poor. Cross-national statistics, for instance, fail to confi rm this com-
mon view: On the contrary, in a regression analysis of access to water for urban 
Figure 5.1: Combined UN and GRUMP Urban Data for Beijing, 
        Tianjin, Shanghai and Their Environs, China
Note: Low-elevation coastal zone depicted in medium blue shading. Urban areas shown as points of 
light or patches of yellow or brown.
Source: McGranahan et al., 2007.
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(and rural) populations as a whole, with national income per capita included as an 
explanatory factor along with the per capita renewable freshwater resources avail-
able nationally, per capita income exhibited a strong positive association with ac-
cess whereas the quantity of water resources available per capita displayed a weak 
and unexpectedly negative association. Evidence from more detailed, within-city 
case studies is also mixed. Summarizing, McGranahan (2002, p. 4) writes, “There 
is considerable case-specifi c evidence of cities with plentiful water resources where 
poor households do not have adequate access to affordable water, and cities with 
scarce water resources where poor households are comparatively well served.”
Similarly, if in the future dryland cities increasingly turn to water conservation 
and demand management measures, it is far from obvious that this will automati-
cally bring benefi ts to the urban poor. As McGranahan (2002, p. 4) cautions:
Figure 5.2: Combined UN and GRUMP Urban Data for 
        Southern Viet Nam
Note: Inset shows the low-elevation coastal zone intersecting Ho Chi Minh city. Low elevation coastal 
zone depicted in blue. Urban areas shown as points or patches of light shading. Detailed administra-
tive boundaries indicated in light shading. 
Data source: CIESIN, 2008.
Viet Nam
Ho Chi Minh City
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Figure 5.3: Combined UN and GRUMP Urban Data for Bangladesh
Note: LECZ layer has been made semi-transparent to show the underlaying layers. Thus, the blue color is not uniform.
Note: Low-elevation coastal zone shown in medium blue shading. Urban areas shown as points or 
patches of light shading. 
Data source: CIESIN, 2008.
Urban Extents, by Population Size, 2000
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It is often assumed that water saved in one part of an urban water system will 
be transferred to meet the basic needs of deprived residents in another part of the 
city (or town). . . . [But] fi rst, even if demand management reduces supply prob-
lems within the piped water system, the households with the most serious water 
problems are typically unconnected, and getting them adequate water is likely to 
require infrastructural improvements. Second, the reason they are unconnected is 
likely to be because their needs are not economically or politically infl uential, and 
freeing up water within the piped water system is unlikely to change this. Third, if 
conservation is being promoted in response to water supply problems, then there 
are likely to be competing demands for the saved water, and quite possibly a need 
to reduce water withdrawals. In short, it is extremely unrealistic to assume that 
water saving measures will yield water for the currently deprived, unless this is 
made an explicit and effective part of a broader water strategy.
Thus, for example, if the governmental response to increasing water scarcity 
was to invest in a carefully regulated piped water system that reached all urban-
dwellers, the most vulnerable residents could actually benefi t. Alternatively, if the 
response involved placing greater restrictions on access to the existing piped water 
system, the most vulnerable residents would almost certainly suffer the most. 
However straight-forward the linkages between national water stress and the 
access of the urban poor may at fi rst appear to be, there are multiple intervening 
social, political, economic and technical factors that complicate the situation and 
make it diffi cult to anticipate the consequences for the poor.
Water stress in drylands ecosystems has important implications that reach 
beyond access to drinking water. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a number of 
cities have become dependent on hydropower for much of their electricity (Showers, 
Figure 5.4: The World’s Drylands
Source: Commission on Climate Change and Development, 2008. 
Hyper Arid
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2002; Muller, 2007). As Showers (2002, p. 639) described it, hydroelectric power 
is “a major source of electricity for 26 countries from the Sahel to southern 
Africa, and a secondary source for a further 13. . . . Hydroelectric dams are, however, 
vulnerable to drought when river fl ows are reduced. Cities and towns in countries 
from a wide range of climates were affected by drought induced power shortages 
in the 1980s and 1990s.”  Furthermore, “[i]n several nations urban areas receive 
electricity from hydropower dams beyond their national boundaries. .  .  . National 
drought emergencies, therefore, can have regional urban repercussions. Lomé and 
Cotonou suffered when interior Ghana’s drought reduced power generation at 
the Akosombo Dam” (Showers 2002, p. 643).
Safriel et al. (2005) discuss other likely impacts of climate change in drylands 
ecosystems, including reductions in water quality and a higher frequency of dry 
spells that may drive farmers to make greater use of irrigation: “Since sea level rise 
induced by global warming will affect coastal drylands through salt-water intru-
sion into coastal groundwater, the reduced water quality in already overpumped 
aquifers will further impair primary production of irrigated croplands” (p. 650). 
The productivity consequences may have the effect of increasing the costs of pro-
duction in agriculture, which may, in turn, cause prices to rise, reduce employment 
and earnings and possibly encourage both circular and longer-term migration to 
urban areas (Muller, 2007; Adamo and de Sherbinin, 2008).
New Data: Mapping Populations at Risk
Focusing on drylands and the low-elevation coastal zone, Table 5.2 shows the 
distribution of urban population by city-size ranges in Asia, and Table 5.3 
expresses these data by showing the percentage of all Asian urban-dwellers 
in a given city-size range who live in these zones.6 Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present 
the fi gures for Africa and South America. These tables show that drylands are 
home to about half of Africa’s urban residents irrespective of city size and, in 
the important case of India, even greater percentages—ranging from 54 to 67 
per cent. In South America and China, however, much lower percentages of all 
Table 5.1: Forecasts of Climate Change in Drylands Ecosystems 
 Median Median  Projected Projected Projected
 projected projected frequency frequency frequency
 temperature precipitation  of extreme of extreme of extreme
 increase increase   warm  wet dry
Region (°C) (%) years (%) years (%) years (%)
West Africa 3.3 +2 100 22 
East Africa 3.2 +7 100 30 1
Southern Sahara 3.4 -4 100 4 13
Southern Europe 3.6 -6 100 
Mediterranean 3.5 -12 100 46
Central Asia 3.7 -3 100 12
Southern Asia 3.3 +11 100 39 3
Source: Adapted from Commission on Climate Change and Development, 2008. See original for further notes and 
discussion of agreement among climate models.
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urban-dwellers-live in drylands. For all of the regions considered here, signifi cant 
numbers and percentages of urban residents live in the LECZ, although the 
fi gures are lower than for the drylands. Among all urbanites residing in cities of 
1 million or more, the percentages in the LECZ range from 9.7 per cent in South 
America to 26.6 per cent in China.
Urban population density
The density of the urban population, especially in coastal areas, has important 
implications for the costs of climate-change adaptation, as well as for mitigation 
strategies to reduce emissions. Denser cities may (depending on many factors, 
including the quality of urban governance and management) economize on the 
use of scarce resources, including those of ecozones both within and near the city, 
and may produce fewer climate-damaging emissions. To a degree, density lowers 
the per-resident cost of providing water supply, drainage, sanitation and other 
infrastructure essential to urban adaptation. However, denser cities also present 
governments with health and management challenges, especially in large cities 
that lack adequate infrastructure (Dodman, 2008).
For a subset of  data in which geographic units can be fi nely disaggregated 
(in terms of the number and geographic size of the city’s administrative units) 
Table 5.2: Distribution of the Asian Urban Population and Land Area 
      in the LECZ and Drylands, by Population Size Ranges 
 Number All Ecozones Drylands LECZ
City Population of Cities Population Area Population Area Population Area
All Asia
Under 100,000 10,582 341,000 446,295 142,000 219,204 27,200 28,753
100,000–500,000 1,470 301,000 279,866 122,000 141,552 37,000 26,061
500,000–1 million 180 124,000 94,797 48,500 46,348 15,700 8,689
1 million+ 200 722,000 327,318 229,000 128,032 174,000 59,873
India
Under 100,000 2,845 77,100 113,396 51,700 76,986 2,839 3,733
100,000–500,000 300 59,300 53,033 38,300 33,703 4,473 2,898
500,000–1 million 33 22,200 13,785 13,100 7,005 896 699
1 million+ 37 126,000 41,800 68,500 24,355 29,400 4,321
China
Under 100,000 5,711 198,000 167,796 58,000 54,829 15,700 11,040
100,000–500,000 690 141,000 81,895 40,300 30,713 15,300 6,803
500,000–1 million 81 56,400 29,438 13,100 9,502 8,406 3,164
1 million+ 76 221,000 80,575 60,000 26,700 58,700 19,198
Asia Other Than
 India and China
Under 100,000 2,026 65,900 165,102 32,300 87,389 8,661 13,980
100,000–500,000 480 100,700 144,938 43,400 77,137 17,227 16,361
500,000–1 million 66 45,400 51,574 22,300 29,841 6,398 4,827
1 million+ 87 375,000 204,943 100,500 76,977 85,900 36,354
Note: Based on size and area in 2000, estimated using GRUMP methods.
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densities in the LECZ and the non-LECZ portions of the city can be compared. 
The GRUMP-based estimates indicate that population density is markedly higher 
in LECZ cities (Table 5.6). In Africa and Asia, LECZ cities, and the portions of 
such cities actually in the LECZ, exhibit substantially higher population densi-
ties. In South America, cities located (wholly or in part) in the LECZ are more 
densely populated than other cities, but, for cities that are only partly in the low-
elevation zone, there is not much within-city difference in density evident between 
the LECZ and non-LECZ areas. The average density of these cities exceeds that 
of dryland cities and cities in other zones. Is the greater density of the LECZ due 
mainly to the presence of large cities in this zone?  The bottom panel of Table 
5.6 suggests otherwise. For cities both above and below 1 million persons, urban 
population density is greatest in the LECZ. Indeed, for cities having land outside 
the low-elevation zone, population densities in the non-LECZ areas are generally 
lower than densities in the zone.
Poverty: Looking Closer at Vulnerability
There is every reason to think that the urban poor are, and will continue to be, 
more vulnerable to climate change than other urban residents. The data needed 
to quantify such poverty-related vulnerabilities, however, are not yet available in 
Table 5.3: Percentages of the Asian Urban Population and Land Area 
                 in the LECZ and Drylands, by Population Size Ranges 
 Drylands LECZ
City Population Population Area Population Area
All Asia
Under 100,000 41.6 49.1 8.0 6.4
100,000–500,000 40.6 50.6 12.3 9.3
500,000–1 million 39.2 48.9 12.7 9.2
1 million+ 31.7 39.1 24.1 18.3
India
Under 100,000 67.1 67.9 3.7 3.3
100,000–500,000 64.5 63.6 7.5 5.5
500,000–1 million 59.1 50.8 4.0 5.1
1 million+ 54.2 58.3 23.2 10.3
China
Under 100,000 29.3 32.7 8.0 6.6
100,000–500,000 28.5 37.5 10.8 8.3
500,000–1 million 23.2 32.3 14.9 10.7
1 million+ 27.2 33.1 26.6 23.8
Asia Other Than
 India and China
Under 100,000 49.0 52.9 13.1 8.5
100,000–500,000 43.1 53.2 17.1 11.3
500,000–1 million 49.1 57.9 14.1 9.4
1 million+ 26.8 37.6 22.9 17.7
Note: Based on size and area in 2000, estimated using GRUMP methods.
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a spatially-specifi c form on a global basis. To highlight the potential that would 
be inherent in such data, another large-scale, spatially-specifi c exercise is used: 
the World Bank’s Small-Area Poverty Mapping project (Elbers et al., 2003, 2005; 
Muñiz, et al. 2008).
To set the stage, Figure 5.5 depicts the GRUMP data available for Medan, 
Indonesia’s third largest city, located on the northern coast of Sumatra. The 
fi gure shows the low-elevation coastal zone in cross-hatching; underneath can 
be seen the administrative units whose population sizes are indicated by shading 
Table 5.4: Distribution and Percentages of the African Urban 
                Population and Land Area in the LECZ and Drylands, 
                by Population Size Ranges
 Number All Ecozones Drylands LECZ
City Population of Cities Population Area Population Area Population Area
Under 100,000 3,247 61,800 123,359 29,800 67,017 3,820 5,042
100,000–500,000 301 61,400 58,417 27,800 28,854 6,870 4,695
500,000–1 million 32 22,100 13,050 10,700 7,107 3,531 1,788
1 million+ 42 130,000 56,985 61,700 28,686 17,300 4,787
 Drylands LECZ
City Population Population Area Population Area
Under 100,000 48.3 54.3 6.2 4.1
100,000–500,000 45.3 49.4 11.2 8.0
500,000–1 million 48.4 54.5 16.0 13.7
1 million+ 47.5 50.3 13.3 8.4
Note: Based on size and area in 2000, estimated using GRUMP methods.
Table 5.5: Distribution and Percentages of the South American 
                 Urban Population and Land Area in the LECZ and 
                 Drylands, by Population Size Ranges 
 Number All Ecozones Drylands LECZ
City Population of Cities Population Area Population Area Population Area
Under 100,000 2,739 45,000 170,998 12,300 49,244 2,055 7,179
100,000–500,000 198 40,200 68,926 14,300 28,964 2,890 4,974
500,000–1 million 28 19,900 23,257 6,220 6,627 1,946 1,956
1 million+ 34 111,000 71,677 25,500 20,234 10,800 5,844
 Drylands LECZ
City Population Population Area Population Area
Under 100,000 27.4 28.8 4.6 4.2
100,000–500,000 35.6 42.0 7.2 7.2
500,000–1 million 31.2 28.5 9.8 8.4
1 million+ 22.9 28.2 9.7 8.2
Note: Based on size and area in 2000, estimated using GRUMP methods.
Percentage of Population and Land Area
Percentage of Population and Land Area
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(darker shades represent larger populations). The outlined areas are the GRUMP 
urban extents as identifi ed through satellite imagery. This assemblage of data gives 
a detailed picture of the population exposed to coastal risks, but it does not 
distinguish residents according to their levels of income, an important factor in 
Figure 5.5: Population exposed in the LECZ: Medan, Indonesia 
       (Total population of each administrative area)
Source: Columbia University’s Global Rural–Urban Mapping Project.
 Population (2000)
0
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Table 5.6: City Population Density in Persons per Square Kilometre, 
 by Ecozone and City Population Size Ranges, All Regions, 
 Medan, Indonesia
 Cities Outside LECZ Cities Fully or Partly in LECZ
Region Density LECZ Density Other Density
Africa 620 2,406 1,680
Asia 1,473 1,827 1,525
South America 661 1,079 1,003
 Cities Under 1 Million Cities Over 1 Million
 Cities Cities Fully or Cities Cities Fully or Partly in LECZ
 Outside Partly in LECZ Outside 
 LECZ LECZ Other  LECZ LECZ Other
Region  Density Density Density Density Density Density
Africa 542 1,274 872 2,705 4,294 2,960
Asia 1,313 1,463 1,136 2,413 3,518 3,125
South America 560 805 678 1,251 1,665 1,676
Note: Figures are for cities that intersect more than one administrative area; cities contained within a 
single administrative area are omitted.
Low-elevation Coastal Zone (blue hatching)
Red outlines indicate urban extents
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determining whether they have suffi cient resources (e.g., housing well-enough 
constructed to withstand at least moderate fl ooding and storm surges) to fend off 
climate-related risks. 
To shed light on the issue of vulnerability, Figure 5.6 draws the poverty data into 
the picture. Shown here (in the shading of the administrative areas) is the propor-
tion of Medan’s residents who live below the all-Indonesia poverty line.7 Darker 
colours indicate higher proportions of the  poor. Maps such as this can provide use-
ful guidance to policymakers and planners needing to make decisions about where 
to allocate scarce urban adaptation resources and intervention efforts. Figure 5.7 
presents an alternative view, depicting the total numbers of urban poor exposed to 
risk, which may be the more salient aspect of vulnerability for disaster preparedness 
and response agencies, non-governmental organizations and planners.
For countries whose administrative data are fi nely-enough disaggregated, it is pos-
sible to explore whether there is greater poverty in the low-elevation zones than out-
side them. As with the population density calculations given above, the percentage 
and number of poor urban-dwellers in the LECZ portion of cities having any land 
in that zone are estimated, making comparisons with poverty in the portions of the 
city lying outside the zone, as well as with poverty rates and counts in cities situated 
outside the LECZ altogether. Table 5.7 presents the results for the seven countries 
providing spatial data at a resolution high enough to support intra-urban analysis: 
Cambodia, Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, Panama, South Africa and Viet Nam.8
Figure 5.6: Vulnerability and the LECZ: Proportion Poor in Each 
       Administrative Area, Medan, Indonesia
Source: GRUMP and the World Bank’s Small-Area Poverty Mapping Project.
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Low-elevation Coastal Zone (blue hatching)
Red outlines indicate urban extents
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No single message emerges from this analysis; rather, what is striking is the 
heterogeneity across countries in the association between poverty and the LECZ. 
In Viet Nam, for example, more than 2 million poor city-dwellers live in the 
LECZ, and poverty rates are highest in the LECZ portion of these cities. In the 
Vietnamese cities with any LECZ land, 28 per cent of the LECZ population is 
poor compared to 20 per cent of the non-LECZ population. However, the pover-
ty rate in the non-LECZ cities is similar to that of the LECZ portion of the LECZ 
cities, although the non-LECZ cities do not hold nearly as many poor residents 
in total. The situation is quite different in Honduras and South Africa, where 
the highest rates of urban poverty (and the greatest numbers of poor) are found 
outside the coastal zone. In Indonesia, however, the proportion of the poor dif-
fers little according to LECZ, with 3.2 million urban poor living in the LECZ and 
another 4.5 million in the non-LECZ portion of the LECZ cities. To judge from 
the seven countries in this small sample, the LECZ is not, with any consistency, 
home to more of the urban poor. Nor do its administrative units tend to have 
higher poverty percentages. It is clear that estimates of vulnerability couched in 
terms of percentages of the poor population must be supplemented with esti-
mates of the total number of poor people. These are very different metrics, and, 
if the examples explored here are any guide, they are likely to lead to different 
priority rankings for targeting interventions.
Figure 5.7: Vulnerability and the LECZ: Number of Poor in 
       Each Administrative Area, Medan, Indonesia
Source: GRUMP and the World Bank’s Small-Area Poverty Mapping Project.
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Forecasting City Population Growth
This chapter has shown how urban settlements are currently distributed accord-
ing to ecological zone, but will these patterns be substantially reshaped as cities 
and towns continue to grow? To generate forecasts of city population growth, the 
city time-series supplied by the United Nations can be used. Ideally the forecasting 
exercise would also project changes in the spatial extent of cities; unfortunately, 
scientifi cally defensible estimates of spatial change are not yet available for a suf-
fi ciently large sample of cities. (As the Landsat archives come fully into the pub-
lic domain, possibilities for a large-scale analysis of spatial growth will emerge.) 
Where population growth is concerned, however, the elements are on hand for a 
detailed analysis. Some illustrative results are presented here.
Estimated regression models of city population growth rates from 1950–2007 
have been developed for cities in Africa, Asia and South America. This analysis 
is based on the United Nations Population Division’s longitudinal database of 
city population, which has been assembled mainly for cities with populations of 
100,000 and above. Because the spatial extent of cities can be defi ned in different 
ways—in terms of the city proper, the urban agglomeration or even metropolitan 
regions— and the defi nition adopted in the data can change from one point in 
time to the next even for a given city, controls for city defi nitions must be intro-
duced in this analysis. The important role of fertility as a driver of city population 
growth must also be recognized, and, in this analysis, use is made of the United 
Nations estimates of national fertility (the national total fertility rate, or TFR), as 
well as its estimates of child mortality (Q5, the proportion of children dying be-
fore their fi fth birthday). The specifi cation also reserves a place for otherwise un-
measured, city- specifi c features, which are embedded in a time-invariant random 
or fi xed effect in the regression’s disturbance term. The infl uence of the ecozone 
on city growth can be estimated in the ordinary least squares (OLS) and random-
effects models, but because ecozone is a time-invariant feature, its infl uence on 
city growth cannot be estimated using fi xed-effect modelling techniques.
Tables 5.8–5.11 present the results from one such modelling exercise, fi rst for 
all cities pooled across regions, and then separately for cities in each of the three 
regions. Some important results are common to all three regions. In particular, 
fertility rates display a strong positive effect on city growth rates irrespective of 
region, with the coeffi cients for South America being the largest. Even in Africa, 
however, the fertility coeffi cients suggest that a 1-child drop in the total fertility 
rate is associated with a decline of 0.395–0.490 percentage points in city popula-
tion growth rates. This is a quantitatively important effect. Child mortality rates 
show the expected negative sign in the pooled results in the regions of Asia and 
South America, but not in Africa. Across regions, larger cities tend to grow more 
slowly than do cities with populations under 100,000 (the omitted category in the 
regression specifi cation). Controls for changes in the statistical concept for which 
city population is recorded—city proper, agglomeration, etc. (including whether 
the concept was unknown)—make a statistically signifi cant difference as a group 
(results not shown), but the details are complicated.
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Where ecozones are concerned, some differences emerge by region along the 
lines suggested earlier. In Asia, city growth in the LECZ is signifi cantly faster than 
in the benchmark zone (other coastal), but no signifi cant effect can be detected 
in either Africa or South America. City growth in the drylands ecosystem is in-
signifi cantly different from the benchmark zone in all three regions. At least for 
these two important ecozones, therefore, there is nothing in the results to indicate 
that, outside Asia, cities in climate-sensitive locations tend to grow faster than 
elsewhere. The LECZ result for Asia is therefore something of a special case, albeit 
for a region whose total urban population is enormous.
Figure 5.8 summarizes the forecasts of city population growth rates in Asia, dis-
tinguishing between cities situated in the LECZ and those outside this zone. The 
median growth forecast is shown, accompanied by the upper and lower quartiles 
(using the results of the random-effects regression). Although the population 
growth rates of LECZ cities in Asia are initially somewhat higher than those of 
non-LECZ cities, both types of cities are projected to experience slower growth 
in the future—mainly due to projected lower fertility rates, which the regressions 
demonstrate are powerful, if often-overlooked, infl uences on city growth rates. 
Eventually, according to these forecasts, a convergence is to be anticipated between 
the LECZ and non-LECZ city growth rates in this region of the developing world. 
Conclusions
The precision of climate science data and models continues to improve, and more 
detailed estimates are becoming available on the spatial distribution of climate-
related hazards. At the moment, however, far less data-gathering and modelling 
are underway in the social sciences to document exposure and vulnerability on a 
spatially-specifi c basis.9 This chapter has taken a modest step toward assembling 
the requisite population and socio-economic data. Using recently mapped infor-
mation on the populations of cities and towns in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
 Percentage Poor 
   
  Cities Cities Fully or 
  Outside Partly in LECZ 
  LECZ   
  All LECZ 
Country Year Residents Residents Others 
Cambodia 1998 31.36% 36.67% 33.50% 
Ecuador 2001 55.57% 50.44% 50.06% 
Honduras 2001 78.29% 70.21% 70.02% 
Indonesia 2000 23.23% 21.96% 22.01% 
Panama 2000 46.53% 46.20% 45.01% 
South Africa 1996 45.19% 17.16% 18.65% 
Viet Nam 1999 27.60% 27.97% 20.32% 
Table 5.7: 
Estimates of Poverty 
for Selected Countries, 
for Cities Located in 
and Outside the Low-
elevation Coastal Zone, 
Various Years
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Number of Poor Number of
  1 km cells observed
Cities Cities Fully or Partly in LECZ Cities Cities Fully or Partly in
Outside  Outside LECZ
LECZ  LECZ 
All LECZ  All LECZ 
Residents Residents Others Residents Residents Others
128,347 29,540 107,999 36 13 9
1,277,348 291,947 361,388 73 35 33
642,154 28,859 41,404 71 14 13
4,810,857 3,240,764 4,535,325 403 299 229
41,516 38,420 283,851 30 17 16
2,555,721 59,730 1,037,184 622 29 28
342,030 2,112,987 413,623 79 131 36
Table 5.8: City Population Growth Rate Regressions, Pooled Results 
      for Africa, Asia and South America 
 OLS Random-Effects Fixed-Effects
National TFR 0.652 0.685 0.775
 (19.80) (19.83) (15.61)
National Q5 -0.005 -0.006 -0.011
 (-6.68) (-7.73) (-9.47)
Cultivated 0.166 0.218 
 (1.31) (1.53) 
Dryland -0.294 -0.290 
 (-4.36) (-3.71) 
Forest 0.073 0.056 
 (0.99) (0.66) 
InlandWater 0.400 0.426 
 (5.90) (5.45) 
Mountain 0.310 0.315 
 (4.60) (4.06) 
LECZ 0.128 0.090 
 (1.75) (1.05) 
100,000 – 500,000 -0.901 -0.982 -1.614
 (-11.58) (-12.11) (-13.89)
500,000 – 1 million -1.085 -1.360 -3.115
 (-7.37) (-8.86) (-13.76)
Over 1 million -1.453 -1.723 -4.060
 (-9.13) (-9.79) (-13.08)
Constant 1.412 1.437 2.667
 (6.58) (6.04) (9.27)
o-u 0.978 
 (21.09) 
o-e  3.035 
 (128.14) 
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Controls for city defi nition included, but coeffi cients are not 
shown. 
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simple maps have been compiled of urban settlements in both the low-elevation 
coastal zone and the drylands of these world regions. The climate and bio-physical 
sciences suggest that the hazards expected to materialize in these zones will be sub-
stantially different; and, as has been seen in the demographic analysis presented 
in this chapter, the settlement patterns in these zones are also quite different.
In the low-elevation zone, exposure to fl ooding and other extreme weather 
events will depend not only on the settlement patterns that are evident today, but 
also on how urban populations and their arrangement across risk zones change 
in the future. In Asia, where a large share of the world’s urban population growth 
is currently taking place, the cities in the low-elevation zone have grown faster to 
date than have those outside the zone. To explore the longer-term prospects, pre-
liminary city population growth forecasts have been presented which suggest that 
rates of city growth are likely to decline as fertility rates decline, indicating that cit-
ies in the LECZ will eventually come to grow at about the same rates as elsewhere. 
Of course, the data and methods used to produce such forecasts need to be devel-
oped in much more depth. In particular, a way will need to be found to adjust the 
forecasts to incorporate migration, which is largely induced by spatial differences 
Table 5.9: City Population Growth Rate Regressions for Africa 
 OLS Random-Effects Fixed-Effects
National TFR 0.490 0.490 0.395
 (5.80) (5.83) (3.40)
National Q5 0.004 0.004 0.003
 (2.27) (2.28) (1.00)
Cultivated 0.446 0.446 
 (2.04) (2.05) 
Dryland -0.294 -0.294 
 (-1.68) (-1.69) 
Forest -0.133 -0.133 
 (-0.76) (-0.77) 
InlandWater 0.530 0.530 
 (3.34) (3.35) 
Mountain 0.549 0.549 
 (3.19) (3.20) 
LECZ 0.059 0.059 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
100,000 - 500,000 -1.065 -1.065 -1.905
 (-4.94) (-4.96) (-5.76)
500,000 - 1 million -1.698 -1.698 -4.052
 (-3.26) (-3.28) (-5.69)
Over 1 million -2.644 -2.644 -6.254
 (-4.40) (-4.42) (-6.45)
Constant 1.421 1.421 3.213
 (2.40) (2.41) (3.78)
o-u 0.000 
 (.) 
o-e   3.964 
 (74.40) 
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Controls for city defi nition included, but coeffi cients are not 
shown. 
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in real standards of living. Historically, the lower transport costs of trade provided 
by the LECZ have proven to be a powerful force attracting migrant labour and 
capital. In China and elsewhere, it remains to be seen whether climate change will 
introduce risks that offset the economic logic that has driven coastal development 
for millennia. Here, as elsewhere, the adaptation policies and investments adopted 
by national and local governments will have a key role in shaping urban growth.
In drylands, climate change will be manifested in complex ways, but it seems 
probable that, in many places, the net effect will be to increase water stress. The 
consequences are diffi cult to foresee, and, as with coastal settlement, will depend 
in part on how people and their governments respond to scarcity. The drylands 
occupy substantially more land overall than the LECZ, and, although popula-
tion densities are generally lower, a larger share of urban-dwellers live in drylands 
than in the low-elevation zone. There is also considerable variation in the dryland 
shares according to region. Preliminary city growth estimates indicate that, in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, dryland city populations are growing neither 
signifi cantly faster nor signifi cantly slower than in other zones. This fi nding, 
however, will need to be revisited as data and methods improve.
Table 5.10: City Population Growth Rate Regression Results for Asia 
 OLS Random-Effects Fixed-Effects
Over 1 million -2.644 -2.644 -6.254
National TFR 0.601 0.650 0.929
 (14.09) (14.44) (13.68)
National Q5 -0.008 -0.009 -0.019
 (-8.32) (-9.15) (-12.76)
Cultivated -0.303 -0.223 
 (-1.40) (-0.92) 
Dryland 0.055 0.040 
 (0.59) (0.38) 
Forest -0.057 -0.013 
 (-0.63) (-0.13) 
InlandWater 0.473 0.491 
 (5.38) (4.96) 
Mountain 0.392 0.345 
 (4.59) (3.59) 
LECZ 0.303 0.263 
 (3.16) (2.42) 
100,000 - 500,000 -0.858 -0.927 -1.540
 (-9.04) (-9.39) (-10.62)
500,000 - 1 million -1.137 -1.359 -3.029
 (-6.89) (-7.87) (-11.33)
Over 1 million -1.481 -1.680 -3.780
 (-8.39) (-8.66) (-10.28)
Constant 2.097 2.041 2.689
 (6.72) (5.96) (7.33)
o-u 0.814 
 (12.80) 
o-e   2.849 
 (95.40) 
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Controls for city defi nition included, but coeffi cients are not 
shown. 
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If urban climate adaptation plans are to be effective, they will need to be in-
formed by evidence that is spatially-specifi c, whether on the populations exposed 
to risk or on the spatial patterns of these risks. As climate change approaches, 
more must be learned about the demographic and socio-economic characteris-
tics of the urban and rural populations who will be affected by it, with migration 
behaviour, age and educational distributions, the quality and durability of hous-
ing and measures of poverty all being of high priority. The 2010 round of national 
censuses will shortly be fi elded, and the opportunity must be seized to process 
these census data and map them in the fi ne spatial and jurisdictional detail need-
ed for adaptation planning. To be sure, there are technical diffi culties in putting 
census data into a geographic information system; in some countries, no doubt, 
disagreements over jurisdictional boundaries will need resolution. But once the 
spatial frame is established, it will provide an organizing framework for all man-
ner of demographic, economic, social and physical data. Maps compel attention: 
They give national and local authorities and researchers a familiar place to start 
in documenting vulnerabilities at the fi nely disaggregated spatial scales needed 
Table 5.11: City Population Growth Rate Regressions for 
                   South America 
 OLS Random-Effects Fixed-Effects
National TFR 0.853 0.964 1.118
 (9.32) (9.88) (9.42)
National Q5 -0.002 -0.005 -0.012
 (-0.56) (-1.67) (-2.94)
Cultivated 0.189 0.242 
 (0.72) (0.62) 
Dryland -0.025 -0.087 
 (-0.20) (-0.46) 
Forest 0.142 0.148 
 (0.78) (0.52) 
InlandWater 0.294 0.328 
 (2.59) (1.86) 
Mountain -0.232 -0.255 
 (-2.07) (-1.48) 
LECZ -0.167 -0.181 
 (-1.32) (-0.93) 
100,000 - 500,000 -0.800 -0.897 -1.091
 (-6.33) (-6.95) (-7.15)
500,000 - 1 million -0.785 -1.061 -1.588
 (-2.83) (-3.78) (-4.69)
Over 1 million -1.193 -1.348 -1.964
 (-3.91) (-3.83) (-4.13)
Constant 0.773 0.723 1.454
 (2.16) (1.50) (4.07)
o-u 1.224 
 (17.01) 
o-e   1.833 
 (53.46) 
Note: Z-statistics in parentheses. Controls for city defi nition included, but coeffi cients are not 
shown. 
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Figure 5.8: Forecasts of City Population Growth Rates in Asia 
        
LECZ Growth Forecasts:
Non-LECZ Forecasts:
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for effective intervention; and they can be expected to invigorate thinking about 
climate change at the local, regional and national levels, providing poor countries 
with a voice in the global conversation on climate change adaptation.
Notes
1 The authors would like to thank the members of the research team: S. Chandrasekhar and Sandra Baptista 
made signifi cant contributions to earlier drafts of this paper, which were presented at the IIED/UNFPA 
meeting in London in June 2009 and at the World Bank Urban Research Symposium in Marseille, France, in 
June 2009. The work was funded by a grant from UNFPA to IIED and by the United States National Institutes 
of Child Health and Development award R21 HD054846 to the City University of New York, the Population 
Council and Columbia University.
2 The authors are in the process of adding migration data from these surveys and other sources. The challenges 
of integrating satellite with such population data are discussed in Chapter 13.
3 See: Douglas et al., 2008, and Awuor et al., 2008.
4 See: Hardoy and Pandiella, 2009.
5 For further discussion of urban exposure and vulnerabilities, see: Campbell-Lendrum and Woodruff (2006); 
UNDP (2004); Campbell-Lendrum and Corvalán (2007).
6 The tables are based on GRUMP estimates of the population of urban agglomerations circa 2000; they report 
the number of such agglomerations that are detected via the night-time lights. Note that the LECZ and 
drylands are not mutually exclusive; a given city can be located in both zones.
7 An urban poverty line would be preferable, in that urban poverty lines (sometimes) take into account urban-
specifi c costs of living that are not considered in the national poverty lines. See: Montgomery et al., 2003, and 
Muñiz et al., 2008.
8  Of the poverty mapping efforts conducted in over fi fty countries, fewer than half have been made available as 
spatially-coded datasets (Muñiz et al., 2008).
9  For more on the data issues involved, see Chapter 13.
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Crisis or Adaptation? 
Migration and Climate Change 
in a Context of High Mobility
Cecilia Tacoli
Introduction
The impact of climate change on population distribution and mobility is attracting 
growing interest and fuelling heated debate. Figures that are frequently cited 
estimate that, by 2050, the number of people forced to move primarily because 
of climate change will range between 200 million and 1 billion.1 Underlying these 
predictions is the view that migration refl ects a failure to adapt to changes in the 
physical environment and that migrants are a relatively undifferentiated group 
all making similar emergency responses and moving to random destinations, 
including international ones. This is somehow at odds with the more nuanced 
view of migration as a key adaptive response to socio-economic, cultural and 
environmental change. From this perspective, the specifi c characte ristics of migrant 
fl ows—duration, destination and composition—are essential to understanding their 
impact on sending and destination areas and to developing appropriate policies. 
It is likely that both extreme weather events (storms, fl oods, heat waves) and 
changes in mean temperatures, precipitation and sea levels will in many cases 
contribute to increasing levels of mobility. However, there are inherent diffi cul-
ties in predicting with any precision how climate change will impact on popula-
tion distribution and movement. This is partly because of the relatively high level 
of uncertainty about the specifi c effects of climate change, and partly because of 
the lack of comprehensive data on migration fl ows, especially movements within 
national boundaries, in particular, for low-income countries that are likely to be 
most affected by climate change (Kniveton et al., 2008). Better information is im-
portant to formulate appropriate policy responses at the global level and at the 
local and national levels. 
At the same time, policies that build on existing strategies to support adapta-
tion to climate change are among the most likely to succeed. There is growing evi-
dence suggesting that mobility, along with income diversifi cation, is an important 
stra tegy to reduce vulnerability to environmental and non-environmental risks, 
including economic shocks and social marginalization. In many cases, mobility 
not only increases resilience but also enables individuals and households to ac-
cumulate assets. As such, it will probably play an increasingly crucial role in ad-
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aptation to climate change. Policies that support and accommodate mobility and 
migration are important for both adaptation and the achievement of broad-
er development goals. However, in most cases, migration is still seen by many 
government and international agency staff as disruptive and requiring control 
and restrictive measures. The key argument of this chapter is that what is needed 
urgently is a radical change in perceptions of migration, as well as a better under-
standing of the role that local and national institutions need to play in making 
mobility a part of the solution rather than the problem. 
The Context: Policymakers’ Perceptions of Migration 
There is a real risk that alarmist predictions of climate-change-induced migra-
tion will result in inappropriate policies that will do little to protect the rights of 
those most vulnerable to climate change (GECHS, 2008; Piguet, 2008). This is not 
surprising: As noted, migration is generally perceived as problematic, and most 
policies try to infl uence the volume, direction and types of movement rather than 
accommodate fl ows and support migrants. 
Environmental factors affect patterns of migration and mobility within a 
broader context of important changes in population distribution. Perhaps the 
most widely acknowledged transformation is urbanization: It is estimated that, 
since 2008, half of the world’s population is estimated to live in urban centres, and 
over 90 per cent of the world’s population growth in the coming decades is expect-
ed to be in urban areas (United Nations, 2008b). This, of course, does not mean 
that all regions have similar levels or rates of urbanization. Moreover, while there 
is a strong statistical association between urbanization and economic growth,2 the 
scale of urban poverty in many low-income countries is growing rapidly; in many 
middle-income nations, the rate now exceeds rural poverty (Tacoli et al., 2008).  
Rural-urban migration is often held responsible for the growth of urban pop-
ulations and urban poverty. There is, however, little evidence to support such 
claims. According to available United Nations estimates, in the majority of the 
world’s countries, natural population increase (the net excess of births over deaths 
in urban areas) makes a larger contribution than the combined effects of rural-
urban migration and reclassifi cation of settlements from rural to urban (United 
Nations, 2008a).3 Moreover, in most countries, rural migrants are not the majority 
of the urban poor (Montgomery et al., 2004), nor are they the only residents of 
low-income informal settlements (Tacoli et al., 2008). In addition, nations with 
the largest contributions of rural-to-urban migration to urban population growth 
are often the wealthiest or those with the most rapid economic growth.
Nevertheless, for most governments in low- and middle-income nations, mi-
gration has become a key policy issue and is perceived as a growing problem. A 
review of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers of countries across Africa shows the 
depth of negative perceptions of migration, which is seen as putting pressure on 
urban areas, promoting the spread of crime and HIV/AIDS, stimulating land 
degradation and contributing to both urban and rural poverty (Black et al., 2006). 
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Between 1996 and 2003, the proportion of governments in low- and middle-income 
countries that implemented policies to infl uence internal migration grew from 51 
to 73 per cent (United Nations, 2004). Most of these measures have had little suc-
cess, however, and have often resulted in increasing hardships for the urban poor 
(UNFPA, 2007; United Nations, 2008a). They also overlooked the fact that most 
migrants do better than those who remain in rural areas and that their remittances 
are an important component of the budgets of rural households. Plans intended 
to tackle the possible impacts of climate change on population distribution need 
to take into account a policy context that does not generally recognize or support 
the positive potential of migration. 
Despite the importance of urbanization, it is misleading to assume that rural-
urban migration is the predominant direction of movement within countries. To a 
large extent, the direction of migration fl ows refl ects a country’s level of urbaniza-
tion (the proportion of its population residing in areas classifi ed as urban) and the 
nature of its economic base. Rural-rural migration is prevalent in agriculture-based 
economies, such as in many low-income African nations, while urban-urban move-
ment is more important in regions with high levels of urbanization, such as much of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Rural-urban migration tends to be high in areas 
with high levels of economic growth and expanding industry and service sectors, but 
even in countries such as India and Viet Nam, rural-rural migration fl ows are also 
large. In Viet Nam, 37 per cent of the migration captured by the 1999 census was 
among rural areas, compared to 26 per cent among urban centres, 10 per cent from 
urban to rural areas and 27 per cent rural to urban. In India, 38 per cent of recent 
migrants were estimated to move among rural areas (Skeldon, 2003). Rural-rural 
migration tends to be dominated by the poorest groups, who often do not have the 
skills, fi nancial capital or social networks to move to urban centres.   
It is also misleading to assume that migration from poor to rich countries is 
the predominant form of movement. International migration only accounts for 
a small proportion of all movement and much of it is within regions rather than 
towards high-income countries. At the global level, however, it is often assumed 
that climate-change-related migration will be across borders, and from poor to 
rich countries. Given the contradictory stances toward international migration 
in destination countries—where the acknowledged need for migrant labour often 
goes hand in hand with attempts to curtail arrivals, especially from low-income 
countries—it is not surprising that the prospect of millions of climate refugees 
landing on the shores of rich countries is seen with alarm. In March 2008, the 
European Union High Representative for foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, 
warned that “such migration may increase confl ict in transit and destination areas. 
Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure” (Solana, 2008). 
Climate Change Migrants: The Debate and the Evidence
The relationship between climate change and migration has been rightly de-
fi ned as “complex and unpredictable” (Brown, 2008), and the scarcity of reliable 
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evidence on the topic has contributed to the heated and highly politicized 
discussion on the potential existence of environmental refugees, as well as pre-
dictions on their numbers. The term ‘environmental refugee’—people forced to 
move because of environmental degradation resulting from climate change—was 
fi rst formally used in the 1970s and was heavily infl uenced by the neo-Malthusian 
assumption that population growth would lead to migration and confl ict caused 
by resource scarcity. Such views were not supported by evidence, and environmen-
tal pressure as a fundamental cause of migration was generally downplayed until 
recently, when increased attention to the impacts of climate change refuelled the 
debate (Massey et al., 2007; Morrissey, 2009; Zolberg, 2001). 
The most frequently cited fi gure predicts that, by 2050, there could be as many 
as 200 million environmental refugees (Myers, 2005; Stern Review Team, 2006). It 
is surprising that this has become an unquestioned orthodoxy, especially among 
natural scientists concerned with climate change, in view of the widespread criti-
cisms of both the fi gure and its conceptual underpinnings, and perhaps even more 
so given the growing consensus on the importance of multiple and overlapping 
causes of most migration fl ows, including economic, social and political factors 
(Castles, 2002; GECHS, 2008; Hugo, 2008; Morrissey, 2009; Piguet, 2008). This 
recognition is refl ected in the changing focus of the reports of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) from an earlier emphasis on human mi-
gration to the current stress on population vulnerability and capacities to adapt to 
climate change (Raleigh et al., 2008).
The key problem with the concept of environmental refugees is the implicit 
assumption that there is a direct causal link between environmental change and 
migration. The fi gure proposed is an estimate of the numbers of people at risk—
that is, of the populations living in areas most likely to be affected by the negative 
impacts of climate change—rather than the number of people who are in fact likely 
to move (Castles, 2002). This over-simplifi ed view is based on ‘common sense’ rather 
than on an understanding of the complex relationship between environmental 
change (and perceptions of it) and human agency, which includes adaptation that 
reduces the need to move away from affected areas, as well as the multiple factors 
that affect migration decisions. It also overlooks the fact that migration requires 
fi nancial resources and social support, both of which may decline with climate 
change, thus resulting in a reduction, rather than an increase, in the number of 
people able to move. 
 There is also little evidence that people who have already been exposed to envi-
ronmental degradation actually do move in the ways and numbers predicted by the 
environmental refugees’ model. New research and reviews of existing information 
(for example, Brown, 2008; Hugo, 2008; Morrissey, 2009; Piguet, 2008; Raleigh et 
al., 2008) are building a clearer picture of how climate change may affect migration. 
Predicting future climate change, however, is inherently uncertain. For example, 
while global warming in the 21st century will be more intense in Africa than in the 
rest of the world (with average temperature rise 1.5 times greater than at the global 
level), the results of rainfall projections remain uncertain, and no conclusions can be 
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drawn for West Africa (ECOWAS/SWAC, 2008). This clearly makes understanding 
and predicting the impacts of climate change on human societies extremely diffi cult, 
especially the long-term impacts that can be mediated by adaptive capacities. With 
this in mind, the best approximation—with all its limitations—is to use the experi-
ences of past and current events as analogous to climate-change-induced drought, 
desertifi cation and land degradation, extreme weather events such as fl oods and 
hurricanes and, obviously to a much lesser extent, sea level rise. 
Drought, desertifi cation and land degradation 
Freshwater availability is predicted to decrease and to affect between 75 and 250 
million people in Africa by 2020, and up to a billion people in Asia by 2050 (IPCC, 
2007). These fi gures represent the number of people living (or, more often, esti-
mated to live) in areas at risk, but not necessarily those directly affected by wa-
ter shortages. It is important to note that water stress does not necessarily imply 
inadequate access to water for domestic purposes, especially for urban house-
holds. Statistically, households in countries facing water stress are no more likely 
than those in other countries to lack access to improved water supplies. There 
is also considerable case-specifi c evidence of cities with plentiful water resources 
where poor households do not have adequate access to affordable water and cities 
with scarce water resources where poor households are comparatively well served 
(McGranahan, 2002). Decreases in rainfall can, however, affect people in economic 
terms, for example, through a decline in agricultural productivity, and thus be a 
contributing factor to mobility. 
The links between drought, desertifi cation and migration are complex, and much 
of the existing literature draws on analogies with the drylands areas of Africa, where 
climatic fl uctuations, as well as widespread mobility, have always been a defi ning 
feature. Research in northern Mali in the late 1990s found that up to 80 per cent 
of households interviewed had at least one migrant member, but this high level of 
mobility was related more to the pursuit of economic opportunities and the need 
to diversify income sources than a direct consequence of desertifi cation and land 
degradation (GRAD, 2001). In the same region, the drought of 1983-1985 affected 
local migration patterns, with an increase in temporary and short-distance move-
ment and a decrease in long-term, intercontinental movement (Findley, 1994). 
Recent research in Burkina Faso suggests that a decrease in rainfall increases 
rural-rural temporary migration; on the other hand, migration to urban centres and 
abroad, which entails higher costs, is more likely to take place after normal rainfall 
periods and is infl uenced by migrants’ education, the existence of social networks 
and access to transport and roads (Henry et al., 2004). These fi ndings mirror those 
of research in other contexts: In Nepal, land degradation and environmental deteri-
oration lead mainly to local movements, although the better educated tend to move 
to urban centres farther away (Massey et al., 2007). 
These overall patterns also vary depending on individual and household cir-
cumstances. Gender is an important variable determined by the locally prevailing 
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gender relations and divisions of labour. Hence, since marriage is their main rea-
son to move, women in the Sahel are less likely than men to engage in short-term 
movement (Henry et al., 2004). In Nepal, where women have primary responsibil-
ity for agricultural production, they are signifi cantly less likely than men to move 
to distant destinations (Massey et al., 2007). The migration patterns of wealthier, 
better educated and better socially connected groups seem to be rela tively unaf-
fected by environmental degradation. Younger, landless households with few 
dependents are more likely to move permanently than those who own land and 
property in the affected area (Massey et al., 2007; McLeman and Smit, 2004). How-
ever, impoverished groups with limited resources to invest in migration are less 
likely to move, and their ability to cope will be increasingly determined by the 
availability of locally based opportunities for income diversifi cation.  
The impacts of slow-onset climate change are also more likely to affect politi-
cally and economically marginalized groups, especially where local institutions 
are unable to mediate growing competition for resources. Pastoralist groups have 
long developed strategies to cope with unpredictable environments, and mobility 
of families or parts of families for pastoral production, including seasonal trans-
humance and travel to markets, is a key element of such strategies. However, de-
creasing rainfalls and more frequent droughts will put more pressure on pasto-
ral resources, pushing pastoralists further away from their traditional migra tory 
routes. It is often thought that this, in turn, will increase confl ict between nomadic 
pastoralists and sedentary farming communities over dwindling resources, and 
Darfur is often cited as an example. However, in this case—and probably in many 
others—confl ict is the result of a combination of environmental pressures and 
the breakdown of traditional social structures and well-established local media-
tion and dispute resolution mechanisms (Edwards, 2008). Throughout drylands 
Africa, years of political and economic marginalization of pastoralist groups, inap-
propriate development policies constraining mobility, much lower access to basic 
services than national averages and limited opportunities for income diversifi cation 
have been important factors in the propensity of pastoralists to migrate to urban 
centres (Hesse and Cotula, 2006; Oxfam International, 2008). Changes in traditio nal 
migratory routes and migration to seek alternative livelihoods are valid responses to 
changing environmental contexts, and both need to be better supported. 
Extreme weather events 
In many cases, fl oods and hurricanes, especially when accompanied by landslides, 
force people to leave their homes and move to other areas. Displaced people are 
often extremely vulnerable, and, in most cases, experience shows that they return 
as soon as possible to reconstruct their homes and livelihoods (Perch-Nielsen and 
Bättig, 2005; Piguet, 2008; Raleigh et al., 2008). Extreme events only become di-
sasters when they affect populations with high levels of vulnerability. Repeated 
events and limited access to government and non-governmental support systems 
are important factors in increasing risk. This is not only the case for low- and 
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lower-middle income countries: Poor communities in New Orleans, for example, 
were much more affected by Hurricane Katrina than wealthier groups, partly be-
cause of the location and conditions of their houses, and partly because of lack of 
insurance. As a result, poor groups were the majority of permanent out-migrants 
from the city (Morrissey, 2009). In contrast, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in 2004, out-migration was limited, and mass migration never occurred. 
This is attributed to a variety of factors, not least of which is the rapid humani-
tarian response and the substantial mobilization of diaspora groups to support 
victims at home (Naik et al., 2007). Similarly, a study of the impact of the 14 April 
2004 tornado in Bangladesh found that it had little if any consequences on out-
migration from the affected areas, as aid and recovery packages were distributed 
rapidly and fairly, and the event itself was perceived as exceptional and unlikely to 
occur again (Paul, 2005). 
The importance of effective coping strategies by communities and governments 
is illustrated by the different impacts of two natural disasters. After the Kobe earth-
quake in Japan in 1995, 300,000 people were displaced, but, within three months, 
only 50,000 had not returned home; in contrast, many of the people displaced by 
the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991 were still in temporary 
camps or squatter settlements after several years (Castles, 2002). 
Sea level rise
Sea level rise is a long-term, gradual process of inundation and is also a contribu-
tor to the severity of storm surges and fl ooding. This makes it a major threat for 
the inhabitants of small island states, especially those with low elevation above 
sea level, and also for those living in fl ood plains close to the sea or tidal rivers or 
those living in cyclone-prone coastal zones. Over 600 million people (10 per cent 
of the world’s population) are estimated to live in coastal zones with an elevation 
of up to 10 metres (about 2 per cent of the world’s land area). Of these, 360 mil-
lion live in urban areas (13 per cent of the world’s urban population), and about 
247 million live in low-income countries (McGranahan et al., 2007).  Obviously, 
the actual number at risk from sea level rise and storm surges over the next few 
decades is probably smaller than this, but there are no reliable fi gures for the num-
bers or proportions of people living in coastal areas lower than 10 metres above 
sea level. Whether migration will be the main response to sea level rise will depend 
on the capacity of communities and governments to respond with a range of op-
tions, such as increased protection infrastructure, the modifi cation of land use 
and construction technologies and managed retreat from highly vulnerable areas 
(Perch-Nielsen, 2004). Ironically, some of the areas most at risk are also major mi-
grant destinations since they offer better economic opportunities through their 
concentration of industry and services. Measures to support a more decentralized 
pattern of urbanization and industrialization would help reduce the numbers of 
people living in areas at risk and, at the same time, reduce regional inequalities 
that are a root cause of migration.
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In summary, research on contexts that offer similarities to the situations pre-
dicted for the impacts of climate change suggest that environmental degradation 
does not inevitably result in migration. Where it does, it is likely that movement 
is predominantly short term, as in the case of extreme weather events and natural 
disasters, and short-distance, as in the case of drought and land degradation. In 
the case of rising sea levels, much less can be inferred from past experience, and 
the number of people forced to move will depend on adaptation initiatives as well 
as on wider national planning strategies. The signifi cance of non-environmental 
factors in migration, the uncertainty of the extent of changes in rainfall patterns 
and tropical cyclone/hurricane/typhoon frequency and strength as a consequence 
of climate change, and the fact that predictions only go as far as the next 50 years, 
are serious limitations for any realistic long-term assessment of the link between 
climate change and migration. At the same time, however, there are clear pointers 
to the need to understand migration as one in a range of strategies that indivi-
duals and households can use to adapt to climate change.
Income Diversifi cation and Circular Mobility as an 
Adaptive Response to Slow-onset Climate Change
The prevalence of short-distance, circular migration as a result of land degradation 
and desertifi cation, especially in areas relying primarily on rainfed agriculture, is 
effectively a form of income diversifi cation that may involve the same activity—
farming—in other locations, or temporarily engaging in non-farm activities, 
especially when less labour is required in the fi elds. Household members may also 
move to urban centres, especially where there is demand for migrant labour, and 
send home remittances on a regular basis. It can be expected that, based on existing 
patterns and trends, such income diversifi cation will become an increasingly 
important element of adaptation to slow-onset climate change. 
There is little research that directly explores the impact of environmental fac-
tors on income diversifi cation and mobility. However, there is much evidence 
showing that these interrelated strategies are substantial elements of the liveli-
hoods of both rural and urban populations. In China, for example, a 1994 sur-
vey by the Ministry of Agriculture suggested that non-farm incomes and internal 
transfers from rural migrants to urban centres were about to overtake earnings 
from agriculture in rural household budgets (Deshingkar, 2006). In India, remit-
tances accounted for about one third of the annual incomes of poor and land-
less rural households (Deshingkar, 2006). Earnings from non-farm activities were 
also substantial and were estimated to account for between 30 and 50 per cent 
of rural households’ incomes in Africa, reaching as much as 80-90 per cent in 
Southern Africa, about 60 per cent in Asia (Ellis, 1998) and around 40 per cent 
in Latin America (Reardon et al., 2001). In Bangladesh, between 1987/1988 and 
1999/2000, income from agriculture declined from 59 to 44 per cent of rural 
households’ budgets, while income from trade, services and remittances grew 
from 35 to 49 per cent (Afsar, 2003). 
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Remittances and earnings from non-farm activities have proved to play a major 
role in fi nancing innovation and intensifi cation of farming in Africa (Tiffen, 2003) 
and in Asia (Hoang et al., 2005; Hoang et al., 2008). On the one hand, income 
diversifi cation provides the capital needed to invest in agricultural production—
inputs, infrastructure and sometimes waged labour. On the other hand, income 
diversifi cation also provides the safety net that enables farmers to take the risks 
inherent in changing long-held practices. As such, it is an essential element of ag-
ricultural adaptation to climate change. 
The extent of temporary, circular and seasonal migration that often underpins 
income diversifi cation is usually underestimated. In part, this is because these 
movements tend to elude national statistics and census data. However, estimates 
suggest that the numbers involved are striking. In Thailand, one third of all inter-
nal migration in the early 1990s was estimated to consist of temporary movement 
to Bangkok’s metropolitan region during the dry season, when labour demand for 
agricultural work decreases (Guest, 1998). In India, an estimated 20 million peo-
ple migrate temporarily each year (Deshingkar, 2006).  Most of this movement is 
between rural drought-prone regions to rural areas of irrigated agriculture which 
require seasonal labour. There are, however, signs that the combination of agri-
cultural mechanization and demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the 
construction sector is re-orienting migrants towards urban centres and non-farm 
occupations. In northern Bihar, for example, temporary movement to urban cen-
tres has grown from 3 per cent of the total in 1983 to about 24 per cent in 2000 
(Deshingkar, 2006). 
The preference for urban destinations supports the view that increasing numbers 
of short-term migrants opt for employment in non-farm activities. In Burkina Faso, 
circular movement involving returning to home areas within two years is especially 
high among those engaging in cross-border migration but also applies to rural-
urban migrants and, to a lesser extent, rural-rural migrants (Henry et al., 2004). In 
Viet Nam’s Red River Delta, it is increasingly common for farmers to move to urban 
centres to work in the construction sector for a few months every year and then 
return to their villages (Hoang et al., 2005). In China, in 1999, about 60 per cent of 
registered migrants in the industrial and construction hubs in the coastal region 
had lived in their current place of residence for less than one year, and only between 
15 and 30 per cent intended to settle there permanently (Zhu, 2003). 
In urban centres in Africa, research shows that both wealthy and poorer groups 
tend to invest in property in rural areas, often their home villages, as a safety net 
against economic and political crises (Kruger, 1998; Smit, 1998). Recognizing 
these investments and ensuring that both short- and long-term migrants retain 
rights in their home areas is important, especially for the groups most vulnerable 
to loss of property and incomes. The current economic downturn is showing just 
how important this is: In February 2009, the Chinese Government estimated that 
20 million, or 15.3 per cent of its rural-urban migrant workers, had been forced 
to return to the countryside because of job losses linked to the global economic 
downturn (Xinhua News, 2009). Rural safety nets also proved to be critical for 
113CRISIS  OR ADAPTATION? MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN A CONTEXT OF HIGH MOBILIT Y
urban residents in many African countries during the 1990s and have certainly 
facilitated return urban-rural movements (Jamal and Weeks, 1988; Potts and 
Mutambirwa, 1998). 
Employment insecurity, the high cost of living and often unsafe and insecure 
accommodation in urban centres arguably act as contributing factors to circu-
lar migration and combine with environmental degradation in home areas in in-
creasing people’s mobility. The spatial distribution of economic opportunity will, 
however, remain the key determinant of migration directions, as well as a primary 
focus for policy action.
 
Accommodating and Supporting Mobility: 
Small Urban Centres and Institutions
Since climate stress almost invariably overlaps with socio-economic, political and 
cultural factors in determining migration duration, direction and composition, 
these other factors need to be integrated in adaptation policies. Moreover, agri-
cultural adaptation initiatives should not assume that they ought to contribute 
to reducing out-migration—especially rural-urban migration—as there is ample 
evidence to show that rural development usually has little effect on migration 
and, where it does, it tends to encourage rural-urban migration (Beauchemin and 
Bocquier, 2004; Deshingkar, 2004; Henry et al., 2004; Hoang et al., 2008; Massey 
et al., 2007). This does not mean that rural development should not be a priority, 
especially when the majority of the population lives in rural areas. Broader agri-
cultural and rural development, and specifi c climate change adaptation actions 
to support these, should not be linked to the reduction of migration. Changing 
opportunities in urban centres as a result of economic downturns are more likely 
to affect migration patterns, as is currently the case. 
Environmental degradation will in all probability contribute to the growing 
need to ensure access to non-farm economic activities, either locally or involv-
ing some level of mobility. In many cases, local small towns or large villages are 
where these activities are concentrated. Indeed, the potential role of small and 
intermediate urban centres in economic growth, poverty reduction and, more 
recently, adaptation to the impacts of climate variability has been attracting the 
attention of policymakers since the 1960s. Small towns in agricultural areas are 
especially important for the livelihoods of the poorest groups, who are often 
landless and without the means to migrate to larger cities, by providing access 
to non-farm activities that require limited skills and capital (Hoang et al., 2008). 
They also play an important role in the provision of basic services such as health 
and education to their own population and to that of the surrounding rural 
area. This is likely to become increasingly important because of slow-onset cli-
mate change and the increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme events. 
Moreover, small and intermediate urban centres are essential components of na-
tional policies that aim to achieve a more decentralized pattern of urbanization 
across regions—and this is especially important in view of the concentration of 
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large cities in low elevation coastal zones that are vulnerable to sea level rise 
(McGranahan et al., 2007).   
Many of the policies instituted for small-town and regional development since 
the 1960s, however, have had very limited success, partly because of their top-
down nature that neglected the importance of local characteristics and partly be-
cause they overlooked the critical importance of national macroeconomic policies 
in local development (Satterthwaite and Tacoli, 2003). Hence, while small towns 
can play a crucial role in adaptation to climate change, this can only be achieved 
within a broader approach to development and poverty reduction. Local small 
and microenterprises—in most cases the backbone of small towns’ economies and 
where low-income groups are concentrated—need access to markets, outside capi-
tal resources and technical knowledge. As important market nodes for agricul-
tural production, small town traders are essential for smallholder farmers; how-
ever, they cannot replace access to the land, credit and inputs that enable family 
farmers to respond to changes in demand (Satterthwaite and Tacoli, 2003). Per-
haps most important, local governments in small towns in too many cases lack the 
capacity, resources and support from higher-level government. 
One area where local governments in small towns need to improve their capa-
city is in the provision of services to migrants and the protection of their rights. 
Poor migrants in smaller urban centres can be more disadvantaged than migrants 
in the large cities because of the limited existence of the civil society organizations 
that can support their interests. Hence, migrants are often paid less by their em-
ployers than non-migrants, partly because they may not be aware of the prevail-
ing wages and they are usually not members of workers’ unions and associations 
(Deshingkar et al., forthcoming). In many instances, their willingness to accept 
lower wages may put them at odds with non-migrants, resulting in further mar-
ginalization and increased exposure to occupational health hazards (Hasan and 
Raza, 2009). They are also less likely to be able to access public services that re-
quire registration with local authorities, such as ration cards in India. At the same 
time, they are often registered on voters’ lists and are manipulated by local politi-
cians who do not represent their needs and priorities (Deshingkar et al., forthcom-
ing). Overall, however, whether in large cities or in small towns, poor temporary 
migrants share many of the vulnerabilities of the urban poor. Perhaps the main 
difference is that they tend to be even less visible and therefore have even less 
political representation and voice. 
Conclusions
Predicting the impact of climate change on population distribution and move-
ment is fraught with diffi culties. However, it seems unlikely that the alarmist 
predictions of hundreds of millions of environmental refugees will translate into 
reality. What is more likely is that the current trends of high mobility, linked to 
income diversifi cation, will continue and intensify. Past experiences suggest that 
short-distance and short-term movements will probably increase, with the very 
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poor and vulnerable in many cases unable to move. Underlying these trends is the 
growing need for the diversifi cation of income sources and the spatially unequal 
distribution of economic opportunities. The centrality of both of these issues to 
adaptation initiatives cannot be over-emphasized. What is also necessary is a radi-
cal change in the perceptions of migration. Most migration management policies 
try to infl uence the volume, direction and types of population movement. How-
ever, policies might more usefully aim at accommodating the changes in migra-
tion patterns that result from environmental degradation, economic growth or 
crisis and other, wider transformations. This seems to be an essential element of 
adaptation to climate change and other development goals.
Notes
1 The 200 million fi gure is from Norman Myers (2005); the 1 billion fi gure is from Christian Aid (2007).
2 There is also a strong statistical association between urbanization and increases in the proportion of GDP 
generated by industry and services and the proportion of the labour force working in these sectors.
3 There are exceptions, and these include some of the most populous countries in the world, notably China and 
Indonesia (United Nations, 2008a).
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Climate-related Disasters 
and Displacement: 
Homes for Lost Homes, 
Lands for Lost Lands
Scott Leckie 
Introduction
Everyone working in the fi eld of climate change knows full well that it will lead to 
mass displacement. No one, however, knows how large the scale of this eventual 
displacement will be. Whether 150-200 million people are eventually displaced by 
climate change, as is most commonly asserted, or if one billion lose their homes, 
lands and, most important, their fi nancial assets, as several prominent non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have predicted in worst case scenarios, or 
even if only several million face the reality of forced climate migration, it is clear 
that displacement caused by climate change will have severe and long-lasting 
repercussions on human rights, security and land use (Brown, 2008). 
If a human rights approach—as opposed to a purely humanitarian or oth-
er approach—is taken towards this question, then what is needed in the fi rst 
instance are laws and policies that, in effect, ensure houses for lost houses and 
land for lost land. Anything short of that will fail the human rights litmus test. 
Viewing forced climate displacement as a human rights issue—grounded as this 
is within the international human rights regime as the principle of the inherent 
dignity of the human person—forces us to take a more caring, practical and concrete 
perspective on the measures required to adapt to the displacement caused by 
climate change. This is because a human rights approach to this serious matter 
implies above all that each and every single person who is forced from his or her 
home, land or property must have a remedy available which respects, protects 
and, if necessary, fulfi ls his/her rights as recognized under international human 
rights law. For there to be a sense of climate justice, climate-displaced persons 
need to be ensured a home for a home and land for land. This is the basic mes-
sage that needs to be sent to all states, all intergovernmental organizations and 
all people of good will the world over. 
Fortunately, the human rights dimensions of climate change are receiving ever 
greater attention. The United Nations Human Rights Council has issued studies 
on this question. Governments heavily affected by climate change, in particular, 
Kiribati, the Maldives and Tuvalu, have led the way in raising the human rights 
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elements of climate change to the higher echelons of international policymaking, 
and a growing number of civil society groups are playing an ever more direct role 
within the context of climate change in a myriad of ways (Displacement Solutions, 
2009). 
The consequences of climate change can affect the full spectrum of civil, cul-
tural, economic, political and social rights, including the right to life, the right 
to water, the right to freedom of expression, the right to health, the right to food, 
the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to political participation, the 
right to information, the right to be free from discrimination, the right to equal 
treatment, the right to security of the person and a host of other rights. These 
rights should have a direct bearing on a wide cross-section of climate change 
decisions made by governments, which in turn will determine the consequences 
of these decisions and how the impact of climate change will be experienced by 
individual rights-holders (Displacement Solutions, 2009). 
If the focus is solely on the displacement dimensions of climate change, a vari ety 
of rights can be found within the international human rights legal code that are 
particularly relevant to the discussion of climate-change-induced displacement. 
These are far more extensive than is commonly assumed and include:
The right to adequate housing and rights in housing; •
The right to security of tenure; •
The right not to be arbitrarily evicted; •
The right to land and rights in land; •
The right to property and the peaceful enjoyment of possessions; •
The right to privacy and respect for the home; •
The right to security of the person; •
The right to housing, land and property (HLP) restitution/compensation fol- •
lowing forced displacement;
The right to freedom of movement and to choose one’s residence. •
When all of the entitlements and obligations inherent within this bundle of 
HLP rights are taken together, it is apparent that people everywhere are meant to 
be able to live safely and securely on a piece of land, to reside in an adequate and 
affordable home with access to all basic services and to feel safe in the knowledge 
that these attributes of a full life will be fully respected, protected and fulfi lled. 
The normative framework enshrining these rights is considerable and is con-
stantly evolving and ever expanding. Combining the sentiments of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and a range of other treaties, 
together with a vast array of equally important instruments and interpretive stan-
dards, such as the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing, General 
Comment No. 7 on Forced Evictions and General Comment No. 15 on the Right 
to Water and the UN’s Guiding Principles on the Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, the UN “Pinheiro” Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for 
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Refugees and Displaced Persons of 2005 and many others, leads to a very consi-
derable body of international human rights laws and standards which can be 
used by governments to build the legal, policy and institutional frameworks 
required to ensure that any rights related to climate change will be upheld, 
particularly those involving durable solutions to displacement. 
Thus, as far as human rights laws go, there is a reasonably strong basis from 
which to demand positive and well-planned actions by states and others to de-
velop the means necessary to protect and secure all of these rights for climate-
displaced persons. However, when the performance of states and the international 
community over the past 60 years of the human rights experiment is considered, 
and when the voices of the hundreds of millions of rights-holders throughout 
the world who remain as far as ever from enjoying their legitimate HLP rights are 
heard, it can be quickly surmised that solving the HLP consequences of climate 
change is going to be far from a simple task. Indeed, the prospects of achieving 
this are truly daunting and will require leadership, commitment and creativity 
the likes of which the world has all too rarely seen in recent decades. This is where 
the necessity of adaptation and human rights must converge and together build a 
stronger and more vibrant response than has been witnessed to date. 
Indeed, the people of the world’s 191 nations already face a severe, massive and 
dramatic global housing crisis. Well over one billion people—one in every six hu-
man beings alive today—spend their lives in one of the more than 200,000 slums 
that dot every corner of the planet. If recent predictions hold true, as they almost 
surely will, two billion or more slum-dwellers can be expected by 2030. This crisis 
does not bode well for the displacement to come as a result of climate change. If 
governments, which already have legal obligations to ensure access to adequate 
and affordable housing for everyone, have all too often failed in achieving these 
objectives, and if ordinary citizens in Egypt, India, Botswana, Dili, Belgrade, 
Detroit and elsewhere are increasingly less likely to be able to afford safe, secure 
and decent homes in accordance with their rights, how can it possibly be expect-
ed that things will suddenly improve for climate-change forced migrants, simply 
because the nature of their displacement and their misery may be of a different, 
more environmentally-based source? 
Beyond the current global housing crisis—which policymakers, states, the 
United Nations and the donor community continue, in most respects, effectively 
to ignore—it must be noted that the mass of humanity who have faced forced 
displacement in past decades—caused by confl ict, by investor greed, by poorly 
planned development, by disasters, earthquakes, fl oods, tsunamis and more—have 
lost their homes and lands due to these events. Sadly, far too few have seen either 
their rights respected or a slow, gradual improvement in their housing and living 
conditions once the circumstances leading to their displacement have ended or 
been altered. This must be remembered and placed at the forefront of human-
rights-based strategies to address the displacement dimensions of climate change. 
Whether as a result of dam displacement in China, confl ict displacement in 
Sri Lanka, Iraq or Bosnia, discriminatory displacement by Israel or tsunami 
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displacement in Aceh, the track record of most countries in treating victims of 
displacement as rights-holders, in particular HLP rights-holders, is very poor. 
There are, of course, some positive highlights, for instance, the increasing rec-
ognition of the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their original 
homes and the realization by growing numbers of international agencies that dis-
placement (often labelled as involuntary resettlement) should be a last policy op-
tion rather than the fi rst one. But overall, the situation and the perspectives taken 
by too many important and powerful actors remain alarming and constitute yet 
another serious obstacle which must be taken into account in developing rights-
based responses to the displacement caused by climate change. 
Building Housing, Land and Property Rights into the 
Package of Solutions for Climate-induced Displacement
The human rights dimensions of climate change have, indeed, been increasingly 
recognized and, to a very small degree, acted upon. What has not yet happened, 
however—with the exception of several valiant efforts that will be described be-
low—is the development of detailed, well-resourced and concerted efforts to fi nd 
sustainable, rights-based solutions to all of the various types of displacement that 
are being, and will be, caused by climate change. Given this reality, the questions 
must be asked: What are the real HLP options for those who are forcibly displaced 
by climate change in coming years? Can an effective rights-based response to 
climate-change-induced displacement be encouraged so that it generates solutions 
to the emerging crisis that show humanity’s best sides?
The answer to the latter question is a solid ‘yes’, and to develop such responses 
there fi rst must be an understanding that not all types of displacement caused 
by climate change will necessarily have the same consequences. In fact, there are 
at least fi ve different types of climate-induced displacement, each of which will 
require different remedies. In the most general of terms, displacement due to 
climate change is likely to manifest in fi ve primary ways:
Temporary Displacement: People who for generally short periods of time are tem-
porarily displaced due to a climate event such as a hurricane, fl ood, storm surge or 
tsunami but who are able to return to their homes once the event has ceased.
Permanent Local Displacement: People who are displaced locally but on a per-
manent basis due to irreversible changes to their living environment, in particu-
lar sea level rise, coastal inundation and the lack of clean water, and increasingly 
frequent storm surges. This form of displacement implies that localized displace-
ment solutions will be available to this group of forced migrants, such as provid-
ing higher ground in the same locality.
Permanent Internal Displacement: People who are displaced inside the border 
of their country, but far enough away from their places of original residence that 
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return is unlikely or impossible. This would involve, for example, a family dis-
placed from one region of a country to another region in the country, for instance, 
from a coastline to an inland town or city.
Permanent Regional Displacement: People for whom displacement solutions 
within their own countries are non-existent or inaccessible and who migrate to 
nearby countries willing to offer permanent protection. This would include, for 
instance, a citizen of Vanuatu or Kiribati migrating on a permanent basis to New 
Zealand.
Permanent Inter-continental Displacement: People for whom no national or 
regional displacement solutions are available, and who are able to receive the pro-
tection of another state on another continent, such as a Maldivian who migrates 
to London. 
Each of these fi ve categories, of course, has different policy and legal implica-
tions for governments, the people concerned and the international agencies tasked 
with assisting climate-change forced migrants to fi nd durable solutions to their 
plight. Such responses, which can perhaps most usefully be understood in terms 
of short- and long-term options, have very important ramifi cations for those af-
fected and for those involved in ameliorating the displacement crisis caused by 
climate change. Short-term policy responses, of course, would be similar to those 
already in place following many confl icts and disasters and would consist largely 
of shelter programmes, forced migrant camps and settlements and other short-
term measures. These, in turn, would need to be augmented by local adaptation 
measures that preclude similar displacement in the future, e.g., by raising the fl oor 
levels of homes, etc. Long-term policy responses would be grounded more compre-
hensively within an HLP rights framework and would involve remedies such as the 
provision of alternative homes and lands, compensation and access to new liveli-
hoods, among other policy measures, and should be based on the lessons learned 
from previous efforts at permanent resettlement. Problematically, the record of 
treatment faced thus far by those who have arguably already been displaced due 
to climate change does not bode particularly well for the millions yet to be dis-
placed. As has often and appropriately been reiterated, it is not the poor who are 
the fi rst to migrate from situations of crisis. Rather, the poor are most likely  to be 
the most vulnerable victims of climate displacement, given their frequent inabil-
ity to migrate in the event this becomes necessary due to the fi nancial and other 
constraints they may face. The poor are always the ones left behind. Will this be 
allowed to occur again in the context of climate change?
Of the most well-known cases of what are seen as climate-change-induced 
displacements—including the Carteret and other atolls (Tasman, Mortlock and 
Nugeria) in Papua New Guinea, Lateu village in Vanuatu, Shishmaref and other 
villages in Alaska (United States) and Lohachara Island in the Hooghly River in 
India—none have thus far been very successful in resettling those displaced, and, 
124 POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
in all instances, many of the human rights of those affected are clearly not subject 
to full compliance. If there was ever a warning, it is in the consequences now faced 
by those already displaced due to climate change. Resources are sorely lacking, 
governmental and international agency responses thus far have been exceedingly 
weak, and, clearly, a sense of resignation is widely apparent within the institutions 
that could actually do something positive for climate-displaced persons.
At the same time, work is emerging in countries that is, at last, beginning to 
highlight the displacement dimensions of climate change and the solutions re-
quired to deal with it. Some of this work is truly extraordinary and worthy of all 
types of support—fi nancial, political, solidarity and moral. Several of the more in-
teresting developments along these lines include the following initiatives in Papua 
New Guinea, Tuvalu and Bangladesh: 
The Integrated Carterets Relocation Programme of Tulele Peisa 
(Papua New Guinea) and the Bougainville Resettlement Initiative
The work of the group Tulele Peisa (“Riding the Waves on Our Own”) in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) is truly path breaking and worthy of close inspection by 
anyone concerned with fi nding solutions for climate-displaced persons (see the 
Tulele Peisa website: www.tulelpeisa.org). Led by the dynamic Ursula Rakova 
from the Carteret Islands, Tulele Peisa has set out to fi nd permanent housing, 
land and property solutions for the 3,000-strong population of the Carterets 
on nearby Bougainville Island. When the national Government of PNG and 
the Autonomous Provincial Government of Bougainville decided several years 
ago to resettle those from the Carterets and other atolls on Bougainville, many 
expected the relevant governmental bodies to effectively manage this process, 
including the identifi cation and allocation of suffi cient land on Bougainville to 
resettle those fl eeing their atolls. After a frustrating period of inaction—which 
included the still unexplained non-expenditure of 2m Kina (+/- US$670,000) 
that had been allocated for these purposes under the national PNG budget—
Tulele Peisa was founded with a view to actually fi nding HLP solutions for those 
to be displaced. 
Working against the odds and with very limited fi nancial resources, Tulele Peisa 
thus far has been able to amass some 300 acres of land on Bougainville, most of 
which has been donated by the Catholic Church for the purpose of resettling a 
portion of the Carteret Islanders. More land is obviously needed, but an important 
start has been made in developing the methods required to provide sustainable 
HLP solutions to the atoll dwellers. Displacement Solutions (DS) has been work-
ing closely with Tulele Peisa since 2008 and, through its Bougainville Resettlement 
Initiative, has been seeking funds to support the work of the organization. DS 
was also involved in putting together the components of what would have been 
the largest land purchase to date for the exclusive purpose of resettling climate-
displaced persons. Working with one of the main private landowners on Bougain-
ville, DS put in place a plan to assist in the sale of some 7,000 acres of private land 
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to the Autonomous Government of Bougainville on the condition that the land—
once it re-entered the public domain—would be set aside for the resettlement of 
the Carteret, Tasman, Mortlock and Nugeria Islanders. (A detailed description of 
this process is available at the DS at work section of the website: www.displace-
mentsolutions.org.) Suffi ce it to say, neither local nor national government funds 
were forthcoming, despite the allocation of monies within the budget that could 
have been used for this purpose, and the private land was then sold to a foreign 
developer who plans to use the land for tourism and possibly agriculture. While it 
is still hoped that the developer will set aside a portion of the land for use by atoll 
dwellers, it is clear that a golden opportunity for fi nding land solutions for some 
of the fi rst climate-displaced persons was lost. 
Nevertheless, despite this and other setbacks, Tulele Peisa continues to work 
diligently on behalf of the Carteret Islanders to fi nd viable land and livelihood 
options for them on Bougainville. With more than 96 per cent of Bougainville 
still under customary land ownership, fi nding available land for the purpose of 
resettlement has proven extremely challenging.
What to do about the people of Tuvalu?
As is well known, few of the countries worst affected by climate change are under 
as dire a threat as Tuvalu (McAdam and Loughry, 2009). Unlike the atoll dwellers 
in PNG, who at least can be resettled on Bougainville (which, of course, is within 
the same country as the atolls), and a similar but less promising situation in Kiri-
bati which, according to the government offi cial responsible for climate change 
adaptation, sees its largest atoll of Kiritimati as “our version of Bougainville as far 
as resettlement is concerned”, Tuvalu’s 10,000 inhabitants have no such domes-
tic options available to them. It is becoming increasingly clear that third-country 
resettlement is in all likelihood the only viable alternative available to the popula-
tion. At the moment, however, neither Australia nor New Zealand has expressed a 
willingness to integrate the entire population of Tuvalu into their own terri tories, 
although both countries have in place immigration programmes for a small num-
ber of Tuvaluans each year. 
The land loss situation in Tuvalu is so dire, in fact, that the Prime Minister, 
Apisai Ielemia, issued a formal request to the Government of Australia in 2008 to 
cede to Tuvalu a small piece of territory for the purpose of re-establishing Tuvalu 
on a minute portion of what is now Australian territory. Needless to say, Australia 
was hesitant to support this request. But in response to the Federal Government’s 
reluctance, and in an act of remarkable islander solidarity, representatives from 
the Torres Strait Islands in the north of Australia unoffi cially offered Tuvalu use 
of one of its islands to re-establish itself there. Could this be an option for Tuvalu 
or other islanders as things move from bad to worse?
There may be hope yet, given that Australia took in well over 200,000 immi-
grants from around the world in 2008, clearly proving the capacity of the regional 
superpower to incorporate large numbers of new arrivals every year. The recently 
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developed Pacifi c labour programme in Australia is seen by many as a precur-
sor to a larger plan down the road. This programme entitles a small number of 
Pacifi c Islanders to work in Australia within the agricultural sector and will bring 
ever larger numbers of Tuvaluans to its shores. At another level, in June 2009, a 
detailed presentation will be made in Brisbane, Australia, by a leading Tuvaluan 
policy analyst advocating the full-scale resettlement of the inhabitants of Tuvalu 
to Australia; details of this plan, however, are not yet available. Many options are 
under discussion now, but nothing is yet clear about the future of Tuvalu as a 
nation and the collective future of its citizens. Countries often come to the aid 
of other countries when they are illegally occupied or otherwise under existential 
threat. Will nations come to the aid of Tuvalu and secure its sovereignty or will the 
states of the world let one of their own drown forever beneath the sea? 
Bangladesh: the Climate Refugee Alliance
Although the Pacifi c and Indian Ocean island nations receive the lion’s share of 
attention in discussions about climate change and displacement, no country will 
actually be harder hit in terms of pure population numbers than Bangladesh. 
Already severely affected by land scarcity, overcrowding and ever-growing slums, 
Bangladesh has begun to witness climate-induced displacement across much of 
its coastline. The recent emergence of the Climate Refugee Alliance, a grouping 
of affected communities assisted by the Coastal Resource Centre, is a hopeful 
sign that more concrete moves are under way to fi nd viable HLP options for those 
most heavily affected. Among other things, the Alliance has pressured the Govern-
ment to set aside state land for the exclusive purpose of resettling what are being 
labeled ‘climate refugees’. The Alliance has begun to address questions of land pur-
chase and acquisition and the development of community land trusts which may 
hold promise for the millions who will be displaced due to the multiple effects of 
climate change. Things do, however, appear to be going from bad to worse in the 
affected areas, as this e-mail message from Mohammed Abu Musa of the Coastal 
Resource Centre sent on 29 May 2009 clearly indicates:
There is increasing infl ux of climate refugees in Khulna city. We assume that sev-
eral thousand have already reached the city in the last 3 days (26-28 May ‘09). 
Room rent in slums and low cost houses has been increased by 50% and all avail-
able space has been booked in advance by the relatives (living in the city) of the 
people stranded in tidal saline water. We fear that the extreme poor will not be 
able to get any room.
Four Practical Recommendations for Consideration
If permanent climate-induced displacement takes place without suffi cient global 
attention, state intervention and the resources required to address it properly, the 
impact of climate change will be far worse than anyone could possibly wish. Not 
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only will the impact upon local economies be dramatic, but severe asset losses, 
combined with dramatic increases in the world’s slum and urban populations, the 
loss of life and livelihood, health declines and severe crises within the HLP sector 
will all contribute to making the problems worse long before they become better. 
As a start, it must be noted that the typical costs associated with involuntary re-
settlement in development contexts will apply, and that these are very expensive 
and equally resource-intensive. As much as resettlement efforts have often failed 
over the past decades, the situation is likely to be even worse as a result of climate 
change. What then can be done to improve the human rights prospects of those 
affected by climate change, and what specifi c areas of concern demand greater 
attention by citizens, states and the international community? While the list of 
possible actions is long, the following four areas require attention in the near term 
in order to build the capacity to better address the human rights implications of 
climate change:
1. The need for adequate domestic institutional frameworks to protect the 
rights of climate-displaced persons
When speaking about the rights of those displaced by climate change, it is fi rst 
necessary to clarify which public institutions within affected countries are legally, 
or at least politically, responsible for resolving their plight. In determining this, 
forced migrants can reasonably be expected to ask several very straightforward 
questions:
Where do I turn for assistance? On which door do I knock for relief  •
and remedy?
What rights do I have to a new home or new land? •
How long will I be homeless? •
What laws and rules are in place to ensure the enforcement of my rights? •
Am I entitled to compensation or reparations? •
In far too few countries—in fact, in virtually none—can these and related ques-
tions easily, adequately and quickly be answered by public authorities. This is not 
to condemn, but rather to simply point out that good planning, good institutional 
frameworks, good laws and good policies are all required for successful adaptation 
to current and future climate change challenges. Human rights law and the grow-
ing number of judicial decisions on HLP rights, in particular, show that planning—
that seemingly most innocuous dimension of governance—is, in fact, one of the 
most important roles any responsible government can play in taking HLP and 
other rights seriously. In fact, it could be argued quite convincingly that adherence 
to the most important human rights treaties, laws and principles obliges states 
to plan appropriately. Indeed, human rights laws require states not only to plan, 
but to carefully diagnose domestic human rights challenges, to develop laws and 
policies adequate to address these and to ensure that remedies of various sorts are 
available to individuals and communities unable to enjoy, or who are prevented 
from enjoying, the full array of human rights protections. 
128 POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
2. The need for adequate international institutional frameworks to protect the 
rights of climate-displaced persons
The painful lack of a specifi c international institutional framework with a rec-
ognized mandate to protect the rights of climate-displaced persons has been the 
subject of a growing global debate on how to ensure that forced migrants no lon-
ger fall through the cracks of the international protection and/or humanitarian 
regimes. Some have suggested that the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol be structurally revised with a view to expanding the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) mandate to include assistance to and protection of 
climate-displaced persons. Extending the coverage provided within the Refugee 
Convention, however, is far from assured, and there is considerable reluctance both 
within UNHCR and, in particular, from the donors that support it to make the 
giant institutional leap towards providing structural assistance to climate-
displaced persons. At the same time, would it truly be wiser to attempt to build 
a new global institution to be in charge of climate migrants rather than to 
allow other existing international organizations concerned with migration or 
other issues—but which do not necessarily ground their work in human rights 
norms—to bear responsibility for the huge and long-term tasks associated with 
protecting the basic rights of climate-displaced persons? The answer is ‘no’.
Rather, the time has come for states and UNHCR to begin systematically 
to examine the implications of incorporating these issues into both their legal 
mandates and their day-to-day operations. In doing so, UNHCR would surely work 
closely with states, other United Nations and international organizations and 
with NGOs and the migrants themselves in pursuing solutions that are grounded 
deeply in the spirit and letter of human rights. And yet while there is surely some 
support both within UNHCR and outside the organization for doing so, convinc-
ing donors and the leadership of UNHCR to embrace these challenges will be a 
major under taking, which by no means is assured of success. If the history of the 
involvement of UNHCR in issues of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is any-
thing to go by, it could takes years before climate-displaced persons fi nd a home 
within the organization, and a delay such as this simply will not do. UNHCR is 
the right institution to protect climate-displaced persons, but to do so it must act 
now, together with donors, to broaden its mandate in a rapid and fully resourced 
manner. Changing the 1951 UN Refugee Convention might not work, but 
suggesting a new Protocol to the Convention may well yield results. 
3. Facilitating the evolution of international law
Another useful step that should be pursued is the development of a comprehensive 
international standard on the rights of climate-displaced persons. Several recent 
initiatives have made important contributions to the thinking required to adopt 
a new standard. The Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC (South Asian Asso-
ciation for Regional Cooperation) Summit called for adaptation initiatives and 
programmes; cooperation and early forecasting, warning and monitoring; and 
sharing of knowledge on the consequences of climate change in order to pursue 
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climate-resilient development in South Asia. In a more targeted manner, the Malé 
Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, adopted on 14 
November 2007, makes frequent reference to human rights principles, including 
the fundamental right to an environment capable of supporting human society 
and the full enjoyment of human rights. This Declaration urges participants at 
the Bali Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change to pay greater attention to the human dimension of climate change. It 
also seeks the increased engagement of the UN Offi ce of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on climate change issues. 
One important outcome of the increased attention to the human rights impli-
cations of climate change would be the adoption of a new international standard 
on these issues. Texts developed in recent years—the Malé Declaration, among oth-
ers—provide a useful starting point for further work in this regard. Such a standard, 
or perhaps even a composite group of standards which together would constitute 
international principles on the relationship of climate change and human rights, 
could, if formulated properly, be of considerable assistance to national govern-
ments seeking guidance on addressing these challenges, as well as to the interna-
tional community and individual rights-holders in determining where rights and 
responsibilities begin. It would be equally important to determine precisely what 
form such a new standard might take. Some have suggested simply amending the 
Refugee Convention. Others have proposed additional options including treaties 
and other binding law. The experience of the past decade, as it relates to the treat-
ment of all displacement issues by the international community, at least as far as 
new standards are concerned, clearly shows that there has been an overwhelming 
preference for developing new soft law standards (guidelines, guiding principles, 
basic principles, general comments and so forth) rather than entrenching rights 
of this nature—which in many respects are HLP rights—into new binding treaties. 
For instance, with regard to the question of internal displacement—which is very 
relevant to the climate change debate—the importance of the UN’s Guiding Prin-
ciples on the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (1998), the UN “Pinheiro” 
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons (2005) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Operational Guidelines 
on Human Rights and Natural Disasters (2006) is apparent, but none are as legally 
strong as proponents of the rights of IDPs may wish. At the same time, it must be 
reiterated that these and similar texts do achieve results that are greater than their 
drafters may have ever envisaged.
Understanding this, therefore, two routes of action could be chosen. One could 
be the creation of a new standard, similar to those adopted during the past ten years. 
This process can be achieved reasonably rapidly without the type of resour ces and 
political anxiety that so often accompanies the treaty-making process. In fact, achiev-
ing recognition of such a standard—perhaps called the UN’s Human Rights Guidelines 
On Climate Change—could be quite fast, and, if the resources and interest are appar-
ent, there would be no reason why such a standard could not be approved either at 
the next climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009 or by the UN General Assembly or 
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UN Human Rights Council even sooner than that. A second option, a new treaty, 
certainly could also be a possibility, though this would demand time, effort and 
resources of a signifi cantly higher order.
4. The land challenge: Land banking and expropriation as fundamental 
domestic remedies
Finally, governments throughout the world should be encouraged to review pu blic 
land holdings and domestic legislation as they relate to questions of expropria-
tion of land for public purposes. It is widely agreed that climate-change-induced 
displacement, among other things, will put immense pressure on cities and the 
slums that surround them. Indeed, without appropriate adaptation measures, the 
world’s slums will grow at a far faster rate and, in turn, create health, social, econom-
ic and other crises far worse than many would now predict. To assist in reducing 
these pressures, governments everywhere should begin identifying unused land for 
possible future use to resettle people and their communities should this become 
necessary. This is a complex issue with innumerable dimensions, but few govern-
ments are structurally unable to at least begin the land identifi cation process as a 
part of the planning process related to the challenges of climate change. 
In summary, when people are threatened with the loss of their homes, lands 
and properties due to climate change, there is a need to be realistic and to 
acknowledge that this is not solely about circumstances such as those facing 
the Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu and other small island states. Indeed, only a small 
fraction of likely future displacement will occur in small island states, and, even 
here, perhaps less than one million people will require permanent regional or 
inter-continental resettlement. This is a tragedy for all of those islanders who 
lose their homes, but it is a tragedy of a scale that can be managed sustainably 
and within a human rights framework.
The vast majority of eventual displacement due to climate change is set to 
occur along vulnerable coastlines in some of the world’s poorest countries and in 
inland areas that are increasingly made inhospitable due to steadily worsening 
climate events such as droughts, fl oods and storms. None of this in any way detracts, 
of course, from the fact that small island nations remain—under human rights laws—
responsible for securing the rights (including HLP rights) of all citizens and lawful 
residents within their territories, up to the maximum of their available resources, and 
that the international community, in turn, has responsibilities to protect when states are 
no longer willing or capable of protecting basic rights, including HLP rights. 
What is unique and particularly tragic with respect to small island nations is the 
unimaginable prospect not only of displacement on a massive scale, but the possi-
bility that entire nations may become completely incapable of sustaining popula-
tions, and, in some dire instances, may eventually cease to exist all together. This 
is surely one of humanity’s greatest tragedies, a preventable wrong which simply 
must affect all the world’s citizens.  Using the power of human rights to fi nd hous-
ing, land and property solutions in all countries affected by climate change is one 
means by which this challenge can most effectively be met. 
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Children in the Context 
of Climate Change:
A Large and
Vulnerable Population 
Sheridan Bartlett
Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that low-income countries and poor communities 
worldwide are most seriously at risk from the probable impacts of climate change. 
This is not because climate change will necessarily be more extreme in these places 
(although this will often be the case1), but because people, their enterprises and the 
places they occupy are so much more vulnerable in the context of poverty. These 
people are less well served by protective infrastructure and services, less able to adapt 
and prepare for extreme weather events and are often more dependent on local cli-
mate-sensitive resources. In urban areas especially, poor people frequently occupy 
the most risk-prone areas. Among these vulnerable populations, children, and, par-
ticularly, very young children, are especially at risk for a number of reasons, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. The fact that children in poor countries and 
communities also tend to make up a very large part of the population only serves 
to heighten the concern. In order to be most effective, measures taken to adapt to 
climate change must take into account the disproportionate and often different 
ways in which children can be affected, bearing in mind not only their substantial 
presence and their vulnerability, but also their potential resilience, with adequate 
support, and their capacity to contribute actively to adaptation measures.
Background
Despite the rapid global decline in fertility over recent decades, which has occurred 
even in most low-income countries, a very high proportion of the population in 
these countries still consists of children and adolescents (Figure 8.1).2
In high-income countries, people under 18 make up about 20 per cent of the 
population. In many of the low-income countries most exposed and most vul-
nerable to climate change, they are closer to half the population (for instance, 42 
per cent in Bangladesh, 51 per cent in Nigeria and 57 per cent in Uganda). Even 
more to the point is the proportion of highly vulnerable children under fi ve—they 
make up between 10 and 20 per cent of the population in countries more likely to be 
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seriously  affected (for instance, 11 per cent in India, 12 per cent in Bangladesh, 17 
per cent in Mozambique and Nigeria and 21 per cent in Uganda). In higher-income 
countries, the proportion of under-fi ves is closer to 4 or 5 per cent (UNICEF, 2007).
This lopsided distribution is most apparent in sub-Saharan Africa, where over 
40 per cent of the population is under 15. Here, as well as in North Africa, the 
Middle East and in many parts of Asia, the largest sector of the population is 
under fi ve years of age. This is despite under-fi ve mortality rates that continue to 
exceed 100 per thousand live births in some countries. 
Within countries, differences in distribution also exist, and, again, it is often 
the poorest communities that have the highest proportion of children. For in-
stance, National Family Health Survey data show an average of four children per 
woman among Delhi’s poor compared to 2 per woman among the city’s non-poor 
(UHRC, 2006). 
The child population is expected to grow more slowly over coming decades 
than the population as a whole, and, in many parts of the world, it is expected 
to decline in number. But in those places where the proportions of children are 
already highest, the absolute number of children is expected to continue to grow. 
Over the coming decades, increasing numbers of these children will live in urban 
areas, often in the informal settlements and hazard-prone parts of cities which 
are frequently the only places where land can be found. Especially in the context 
of rapid urbanization, these settlements can be among the most vulnerable to ex-
treme weather events (Parry et al., 2007). It is diffi cult to generalize about how 
urban age structures are changed by migration, since this depends, for instance, 
Figure 8.1: Age Distribution of the World’s Population
Source: United Nations, 2005.
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on the nature of the migration, whether it is temporary, seasonal or long term and 
whether migrants move individually or as families. But high levels of in-migration 
often increase the proportion of young adults and thus can lead to increased birth 
rates (although rural migrants’ fertility rates tend to decline once in the urban 
areas). A city’s age structure may also be infl uenced by substantial out-migration 
by older groups as they return to ‘home’ villages or towns.
What does all this mean in the context of climate change? In the broadest 
and most simplifi ed terms, it means that the populations most vulnerable to 
the likely challenges posed by climate change are also those with the highest 
concentrations of children in need of care, and with the lowest ratio of caregivers 
and bread winners to children. This reality arguably increases the vulnerability 
of these populations in a rather dramatic way. Larger numbers of young children 
add to the burdens simply by virtue of their age and need for care. In addition, in 
the context of many of the risks posed by climate change, their needs are likely 
to intensify, since their stage of development leaves them especially vulnerable to 
many of the hazards. Children who become ill, malnourished, injured or psycho-
logically affected by disasters, famines, displacement or deepening poverty will 
increase the challenges faced by their families and communities. With appro-
priate support, children can be extraordinarily resilient to shocks and stresses, 
but in extreme situations that affect many people, these supports may not be 
reliably available. 
This is not the only reality posed by high concentrations of children, however. 
Young children unquestionably need care. Older children and adolescents need 
care, too, but they also can, and often do, contribute to their households and 
communities in a range of ways. It is easy to overlook their energy, ingenuity and 
eagerness to be involved in meaningful ways. Ten- to 18-year-olds are a substantial 
part of the population, especially in low-income countries and communities. But 
in terms of formal planning for adaptation and preparedness, they are a resource 
that is too seldom recognized and drawn upon. 
Given these very basic realities, policy and planning for adaptation in the face 
of climate change needs to be based, among other things, on an understanding of 
the particular vulnerabilities of children, both girls and  boys. It is also important 
to understand how resilient children can be and how productive and proactive in 
responding to challenges in their lives. Adaptation, in these terms, means consid-
ering how to strengthen and support the capacity of children and adolescents to 
cope with the full range of risks and adversity associated with climate change, as 
well as that of the families and communities on which they depend. 
Understanding the Impacts of Climate Change 
on Children
Children, especially young children, are in a stage of rapid development and are 
less well equipped on many fronts to deal with deprivation and stress (Engle et 
al., 1996). Their more rapid metabolisms, immature organs and nervous systems, 
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developing cognition, limited experience and behavioural characteristics all con-
tribute to their vulnerability. Their exposure to various risks is also more likely to 
have long-term repercussions than for adults. 
Almost all the disproportionate implications for children are intensifi ed by 
poverty and the diffi cult choices low-income households must make as they adapt 
to more challenging conditions. Events that might have little or no effect on chil-
dren in high-income countries and communities can have critical implications 
for children living in poverty. The likelihood of poor develop mental outcomes is 
considered to increase cumulatively with the number of risks they face, whether 
physiological or psychological.3 Children on the edge, like families on the edge, 
have fewer assets—in every sense of the word— to draw on and are more likely to 
be adversely affected by the various challenges imposed by climate change. At the 
same time, it is important to recognize that relating risks to outcomes for children 
is not a simple matter of accounting. Many variables come into play, including the 
meanings that events have for people, and these variables can relate to one another 
in complex ways. Children driven into work by their families’ increasing poverty, 
for instance, may be academically disadvantaged, but they may also feel a sense 
of pride and achievement in their capacity to contribute that could boost their 
confi dence and resilience (Boyden, forthcoming). 
There has been little hard research on the impacts of climate change on chil-
dren. Even where more general impacts are projected, fi gures are seldom disag-
gregated by age or sex. But the fact is that, in large part, the challenges associated 
with climate change will intensify existing diffi culties, not present an entirely 
new set of conditions. This can legitimately be extrapolated from existing knowl-
edge on environmental health, disaster responses, household coping strategies, 
the effects of poverty on children, children’s resilience and the benefi cial effects 
of their participation in various efforts. These all contribute to a picture of the 
implications for children and adolescents of extreme events, as well as more 
gradual changes, and of the adaptations that are likely to be made.
Health and survival
The disproportionate health burden for children of challenging environmental 
conditions is well documented. According to a conservative estimate, children un-
der 14 are 44 per cent more likely to die because of environmental factors than 
the population at large. The same gap exists for morbidity, and it increases greatly 
when the potential loss of healthy life years is considered (Prüss-Üstün and Corva-
lán, 2006). The greater burden, especially for the youngest children, then, is not a 
minor matter of degree, and it is likely to be exacerbated in many places by climate 
change. 
Mortality in extreme events: In low-income countries, the loss of life during such 
extreme events as fl ooding, high winds and landslides is shown repeatedly to be 
disproportionately high among children, women and the elderly, especially among 
137CHILDREN IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  A LARGE AND VULNERABLE POPULATION 
the poor. A study of fl ood-related mortalities in Nepal, for instance, found that 
the death rate for children aged two to nine was more than double that of adults, 
and pre-school girls were fi ve times more likely to die than adult men. The risk 
for poor households was six times that of higher-income households (Pradhan 
et al., 2007).
The distribution of deaths related to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami followed a 
similar pattern, as shown in Figure 8.2 (Nishikiori et al., 2006). Although the tsu-
nami was not related to climate change, it can still provide insight into patterns of 
death during an extreme event. The higher mortality rates for girls and women have 
been related to the fact that they are more often responsible for small children, a fact 
which may limit their mobility. The loss of these primary caregivers can leave surviv-
ing children and families still more vulnerable (Nishikiori et al., 2006).
In slower onset disasters such as droughts and famines, mortality rates are also 
much higher for young children. Situations are commonly defi ned as emergen-
cies when crude mortality is 1/10,000/day and under-fi ve mortality is double that 
(Sphere Project, 2004). Although the higher rate for young children is not unrea-
sonable, given average under-fi ve mortality rates in low-income countries (UNICEF, 
2007), it nevertheless highlights a grim reality: High mortality rates for young chil-
dren, which would be unthinkable in high-income countries, are routinely accepted 
as a baseline indicator of normality in low-income nations. And, while overall death 
rates for young children continue to drop in most parts of the world due to im-
proved health care, immunization rates and environmental conditions, for many 
of the children most at risk from the biggest killers—diarrhoeal and respiratory dis-
eases, malaria and malnutrition—the situation is likely to worsen with some of the 
effects of climate change. 
Figure 8.2: Age and Gender Distribution of Tsunami-related Deaths 
Source: Nishikiori , et al., 2006. 
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Water and sanitation-related illnesses: Children under fi ve are the main victims 
(80 per cent globally) of sanitation-related illnesses (diarrhoeal disease, primarily) 
because of their less-developed immunity and because their play behaviour can 
bring them into contact with pathogens. These illnesses also results in higher levels 
of malnutrition and increased vulnerability to other diseases , with effects on overall 
development. During heavy or prolonged rains, blocked drains and fl ooded latrines 
can make contamination diffi cult to avoid, increasing the incidence of diarrhoeal ill-
ness in children.4 Where the incidence and duration of rainstorms increase because 
of climate change, these conditions will become more prevalent. Contamination 
of water supplies is also a risk during droughts. After extreme events, diarrhoeal 
illnesses related to breakdowns in sanitation can take more lives than the initial 
disaster (WHO, n.d.).
Malnutrition: Malnutrition results from food shortages (as a result of reduced 
rainfall, other changes affecting agriculture and interruptions in supplies dur-
ing sudden acute events), but it is also closely tied to unsanitary conditions and 
to children’s general state of health. Even when there is enough food available, 
the calorie intake of small children in dirty surroundings may go in large part 
towards fi ghting off infection (Solomon et al., 1993). When children are mal-
nourished, their vulnerability to infection is greatly increased, and a vicious cy-
cle results (Lechtig and Doyle, 1996). A chronically malnourished two- or three-
year-old may be at a permanent disadvantage, becoming both physically and 
mentally stunted (Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). Children in Africa born 
in drought years, for example, are signifi cantly more likely to be malnourished 
or stunted (UNDP, 2007). Research in Zimbabwe found that children who had 
been in the critical 12- to 24-month age group during a drought in the ear-
ly 1980s were, in adolescence, an average of 2.3 inches shorter than the mean 
(Alderman et al., 2004). 
It is important not to underestimate the long-term implications of the mal-
nourishment that may accompany climate change—not only for the children in-
volved, but also for their families and for society at large. Malnourishment can 
lead to physical stunting, but also to mental stunting and diminished poten-
tial over a lifetime. In the case of the Zimbabwean children in the research just 
cited, their estimated potential loss in lifetime earnings was calculated to be 14 per 
cent. If children are basically healthy and well fed, catch-up growth will happen 
quickly once recovery is under way. But if children are already undernourished, 
they are less likely to withstand the stress of an extreme event either in terms of 
their imme diate response or their long-term development. Infants are at particu-
lar risk. Stresses related to a crisis may affect mothers’ breast milk production; at 
the same time, breast-milk substitutes present a serious health risk in unsanitary 
environments (Caldwell, 1996; IFE Core Group, 2006). Malnutrition appears to 
be a greater risk among children of displaced families,5 which may be related to 
the poor levels of sanitation in many temporary shelters as well as to the effects of 
displacement on household coping strategies. 
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Malaria and other tropical diseases: Warmer average temperatures are expanding 
the areas where many tropical diseases can occur, with children most often the 
victims (Bunyavanich et al., 2003; Ligon, 2006; Kovats and Akhtar, 2008). In many 
locations, the most serious threat is malaria. Up to half the world’s population is 
now considered to be at risk, an increase of 10 per cent in the last decade (Breman 
et al., 2004). More than 90 per cent of the burden is in Africa, where 65 per cent 
of mortality is among children under fi ve (Breman et al., 2004). Malaria also in-
creases the severity of other diseases, thereby more than doubling overall mortality 
for young children (Snow et al., 2004). There is growing evidence, too, of its impact for 
child development more generally. This potential effect can result directly from the 
insult to the brain during acute episodes of malaria, but it can also be related to 
the effects of anaemia, repeated illness and the under-nutrition associated with 
the disease (Holding and Snow, 2001).
Heat stress: Along with the elderly, young children are at highest risk from heat 
stress: Children sweat less and have more surface area relative to body mass (By-
tomski and Squire, 2003; Lam, 2007). Research in São Paulo found that for every 
degree increase above 20°C, there was a 2.6 per cent increase in overall mortality 
in children under 15 (the same increase as for those over 65) (Gouveia, 2003). 
Risks for younger children are even higher. Those in poor urban areas may be 
at highest risk because of the ‘Urban Heat Island’ effect, high levels of conges-
tion and little open space and vegetation (Kovats and Akhtar, 2008). Higher 
temperatures can also increase the risk of disease. In Peru, for instance, over a six-year 
study, hospital admissions of young children for diarrhoea increased by 8 per 
cent with every degree centigrade increase above the normal average temperature 
(Checkley et al., 2000).
Injury: Injury rates are related to challenging conditions, overcrowding, chaotic 
environments and higher levels of preoccupation on the part of adults (Berger 
and Mohan, 1996)—all factors commonly experienced in the post-disaster period, 
as well as in the context of gradually worsening conditions. Children, because of 
their size and developmental immaturity, are particularly susceptible and are more 
likely to experience serious and long-term effects (for example, from burns, bro-
ken bones and head injuries) because of their size and physiological immaturity 
(Bartlett, 2002).
Quality of care: Despite their considerably greater vulnerability to a range of health 
hazards, with adequate care and support, young children can thrive even in dif-
fi cult conditions. However, as conditions become more challenging to health, so 
do the burdens faced by caregivers, especially in groups where there are large con-
centrations of small children. These problems are seldom faced one at a time—risk 
factors generally exist in clusters. Overstretched and exhausted caregivers are more 
likely to leave children unsupervised and to cut corners in all the chores that are 
necessary for healthy living.
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Children’s learning and competence
For some children in some places, the added challenges brought about by climate 
change could contribute to an erosion of both their mental capacity and their 
opportunities for learning and growth. The early years are the most critical time 
for brain development, which can be shaped by a range of environmental factors 
(Wohlwill and Heft, 1987). Good health is crucial for cognitive development: 
Sick or malnourished children lack the energy to be active learners (Grantham-
McGregor et al., 2007). Abundant research relates lower cognitive capacity and 
performance to under-nutrition, intestinal parasites, diarrhoeal diseases and ma-
laria, as well as to maternal health and nutrition during pregnancy and maternal 
stress both during and after pregnancy. 
Learning also depends on supportive social and physical environments and 
oppor tunities to master and build on new skills. Mental growth and development 
does not just happen to children; it is a feedback process that requires their active 
involvement (Walker et al., 2007). They need access to social interaction and to 
safe, varied and stimulating surroundings for play, which support their develop-
ment as capable problem solvers and responsive social beings (Walker et al., 2007). 
When supportive environments and routines break down, so do opportunities for 
engagement and learning. 
For older children and adolescents, opportunities for purposeful, goal-directed 
activities and engagement in the world are primary avenues for the achievement 
of competence.6 When people are displaced, or when routines are disrupted, both 
formal and informal opportunities for learning can become constrained. After 
extreme weather events, for instance, schools may be destroyed, damaged, shut 
down or taken over as emergency shelters for weeks or even months.7 Conditions 
for displaced children may also make it diffi cult to do homework, increasing the 
likelihood of dropout (INEE, 2004). Children may also be pulled out of school 
when households experience shocks; either the funds are not available or children 
are needed to help out the family. 
At the same time, it should be recognized that numerous opportunities for 
learning and engagement exist within the context of adversity if children are given 
the space and support to be productively involved.
Coping with adversity
Much of the research and programming responding to the impact of extreme 
events for children have focused on their vulnerability to trauma. This approach 
has been criticized by many as a Western construct with questionable validity for 
other cultural realities (Batniji, et al., 2006; Boyden and Mann, 2005). As Engle 
and colleagues (1996) point out, the expectation of negative outcomes in these 
situations can unwittingly become part of the problem. Much of what is defi ned 
as symptomatic of pathology (such as bedwetting, regression to younger behav-
iour, anger or depression) may also be construed as a normal reaction to abnormal 
conditions. Frequently, it is the aftermath of a traumatic event and the deprivations 
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and humiliations of a slow recovery process (rather than the initial event) that 
children and families themselves report as being the most stressful and debilita-
ting (Becklund et al., 2005). 
Levels of psychological vulnerability and resilience depend on numerous factors, 
including children’s health and internal strengths, household dynamics and levels 
of social support, as well as the way experiences are perceived and interpreted (Boy-
den and Mann, 2005). Children who have experienced success and approval in their 
lives are more likely to adapt well to adversity than those who have suffered rejection 
and failure. Poverty and social status can have an adverse effect in this regard. 
Without question, the losses, hardships and uncertainties surrounding stress-
ful events can have high costs for children. Especially in low-income countries, 
children may end up orphaned or separated from family as a result of disaster. Ex-
tended family or other community members can provide a secure alternative, but 
even these bonds can be frayed to the breaking point, and extra children can be-
come a target for mistreatment (Tolfree, 2005). Even when families remain intact, 
however, picking up the pieces can be extremely challenging. Basic requirements 
may be hard to obtain, livelihoods may have disappeared, relief may be inequitably 
distributed and community life and social supports may have collapsed.
Increased levels of irritability, withdrawal and family confl ict are not unusual 
after extreme events (or even with gradually worsening conditions). Displacement 
and life in emergency or transitional housing have also been noted to lead to an 
erosion of the social controls that normally regulate behaviour within households 
and communities. Overcrowding, chaotic conditions, lack of privacy and the 
collapse of regular routines can contribute to anger, frustration and violence 
(Gururaja, 2000). In emergency camps, after the tsunami, adolescent girls, espe-
cially, reported sexual harassment and abuse (Fisher, 2005). High levels of stress 
for adults can have serious implications for children of all ages, contributing to 
neglect or to more punitive responses. Increased rates of child abuse have long 
been associated with such factors as parental depression, increased poverty, loss of 
property or a breakdown in social supports. For instance, in the six months after a 
hurricane in the United States, rates of infl icted head injury to children under two 
were found to have increased fi ve-fold (Keenan et al., 2004). 
The synergistic and cumulative effects of such physical and social stressors 
can affect children’s development on all fronts. As the numbers of longer-term 
displaced people grow, and huge numbers of people are temporarily displaced on 
a regular basis by ‘small’ weather events, these dysfunctional environments can 
become the setting within which more and more children spend their early years. 
In one small settlement in Tamil Nadu, for instance, residents spend increasing 
amounts of time each year camped on a road near their settlement, waiting for wa-
ter levels to recede to the point where they can re-enter and repair their mud-fi lled 
homes. In Kathmandu, Nepal, small children are routinely sent off to live with 
rural relatives during the monsoon each year, as water levels rise and sewage backs 
up into their riverside shanties. Older children and adults stay on, camped under 
plastic, unable to leave school or the jobs on which they depend.8
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Even these less extreme events, seldom registered as ‘disasters’, can create havoc 
in families’ lives. Repeated adversity can result in a signifi cant loss of assets, reduc-
ing the capacity to prepare for and adapt to other events and deepening poverty to 
a level beyond which many households can reasonably cope. When this happens, 
children may feel the brunt of it. Recent research from Bangladesh, for instance, 
shows that when there are not enough calories available within a household to 
meet the requirements of all members, children are the most likely to be short-
changed (Cockburn et al., forthcoming). During hard times, children can become 
an asset that is drawn on to maintain the stability of the household (Mitik and 
DeKaluwe, forthcoming). They may be pulled from school to work or take care of 
siblings. Some children may be considered more ‘expendable’ than others (Engle 
et al., 1996). Many of Mumbai’s young prostitutes are from poor rural villages in 
Nepal, where inadequate crop yields lead families to sacrifi ce one child so others 
may survive.9
Again, though, it is misleading to think of children simply as victims and not 
to appreciate the level of emotional resilience and competency that they can bring 
to adversity. There are numerous accounts of their hardiness and resourceful-
ness in the face of both extreme events and everyday diffi culties (Hestyanti, 2006; 
Boyden, 2003). Children may, in fact, be more fl exible than adults in their capac-
ity to adapt to extreme situations. It is easy to forget that many children, even in 
‘normal’ times, function competently in adult roles, running households, caring 
for younger children, handling jobs and negotiating a variety of complex realities. 
This level of responsibility may be less than ideal for children, but this should 
not diminish the respect they deserve for their capacity to manage challenging 
conditions. Children’s capacity to cope well in very diffi cult situations has been 
attributed to their own active engagement, opportunities for problem solving and 
for interactions with peers (Boyden and Mann, 2005), as well as to the presence of 
at least one consistently supportive adult in their lives (Engle et al., 1996; Werner 
and Smith, 1992).
Implications for Adaptation
In seeking to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience in the face of the various 
hazards and risks associated with climate change, how can the many concerns for 
children of different ages be adequately addressed without completely overwhelm-
ing any agenda?  
In every aspect of adaptation—protection, preparation, relief and rebuilding—
and at every level of response (community, local government, non-governmental 
organizations [NGOs], international agencies, etc.), some basic concerns need to 
be taken into account in order to respond effectively to children. These responses 
must be based on an adequate knowledge of children’s lives and experiences and 
the challenges faced by their caregivers, and the concerns must be integrated into 
planning, decision-making and action, not treated as add-ons after the fact. It is 
critical, among other things, to recognize the implications of the actual numbers of 
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children in different age groups in any population. In places with very large numbers 
of young children relative to caregivers and other adults, the ability of the commu-
nity to provide adequate care in the context of unusual adversity may be underesti-
mated. Conversely, where responses are expected to involve the active participation 
of community members, there may also not be an understanding of the confl icting 
responsibilities of many adults. On the other hand, older children can play a real role 
in effective adaptation efforts, and this should be thoughtfully capitalized on. 
Measures should include:
Ensuring children’s optimal health and nutrition: •  Ensuring children’s health 
through adequate nutrition, preventive care and environmental health mea-
sures is a potent form of risk reduction. The overall impact of an event will be 
defi ned in part by children’s pre-existing levels of health—and there are im-
plications for both the urgency and the effectiveness of responses.  Food aid 
and supports for health are vital after crises, but when health is already com-
promised by malnutrition or illness, children are more likely to suffer long-
term damage from extreme events and worsening conditions and also to be a 
drain on families’ capacity to cope. Where extreme events or food shortages 
are likely, longer-term nutritional and health programmes are critical protec-
tion and preparation measures and are more effective than humanitarian aid 
after the fact for children’s long term recovery and well-being. A concern for 
children’s health is also a compelling additional reason for local governments 
to tackle environmental sanitation problems in underserved areas as part of 
their preparation for extreme events.
 
Strengthening families’ capacity to cope:  • All adaptive measures should ideally 
enhance the capacity of households to come through periods of shock with 
minimal upheaval. But supporting family coping strategies takes on broader 
meaning when children are an explicit part of the equation. There should be 
a focus on the capacity of families to manage hardship without compromis-
ing the well-being of their children and a recognition of the time that may be 
necessary to respond to what may be intensifi ed needs on the part of chil-
dren. NGOs, for example, might build child-impact assessments into their 
microcredit activities, ensuring that loan repayments do not compromise 
children’s nutrition; a health-care system might allocate more of its resources 
to mental health supports; emergency response planning could include the 
provision of temporary child care, so that parents can have some hours each 
day to focus on recovery without worrying about their young children.
Maintaining, restoring and enriching children’s routines, networks and activities: •  
Children rely on their daily routines and activities for stability and optimal 
development. Other functions, more critical to survival, will inevitably be pri-
oritized in extreme situations (food, health, livelihoods). But in the course 
of addressing these, it is important not to compromise children’s spaces, 
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activities, networks and opportunities for gaining competence (for instance, 
by ensuring wherever possible that emergency camps not be set up for months 
at a time in schools and that safe spaces for play be a priority even right after 
extreme events.)  Mann (2000) has pointed out that restoring a sense of nor-
malcy for children also extends to reinstating the chores they are accustomed 
to perform, so that their sense of pride and self-respect remains intact. 
Respecting children’s capacities; supporting their active involvement: •  On a related 
front, the chance to solve problems, contribute and take action is known to 
be a potent protective force for children in adversity. Repeated experience also 
demonstrates how capable children are of looking critically at local problems 
and coming up with creative solutions that may not have occurred to adults 
(Hart, 1997; Chawla, 2001). Every day, in communities around the world, 
children and adolescents do their share to keep their households afl oat and 
functioning. Many observers are critical of children’s involvement in activi-
ties that may affect the time they can give to school and study. Certainly there 
is the potential for undermining education and even for serious exploitation. 
But the fact is that, for many children, balancing the demands of school 
with help for the family stimulates their self-reliance, self-respect and overall 
capacities (Boyden, forthcoming). The contribution of children and young 
people is also a potential community asset that is too seldom tapped in 
the formal process of development and adaptation. There are numerous 
precedents for effective action in disaster risk reduction, preparedness and 
rebuilding. In the course of local risk assessment and monitoring, for in-
stance, children’s extensive knowledge of their own neighbourhoods can 
be invaluable; children can also be involved along with adults in critiquing 
and modifying plans for relocated housing and community space, since they 
inevitably point to concerns that adults overlook (Bartlett and Iltus, 2007).
Conclusions
There are many vulnerable populations in the context of climate change—the poor, 
the elderly, pregnant women, those in particularly hazardous locations. Children 
are not unique in this respect. However, they constitute an extremely large per-
centage of those who are most vulnerable, and the implications, especially for the 
youngest children, can be long term. If responses to the impacts of climate change 
fail to take into account the particular vulnerabilities (as well as capacities) of chil-
dren at different ages, measures for prevention and adaptation may prove to be 
inadequate in critical ways and may even result in additional stresses for young 
minds and bodies.  
Addressing these concerns for children may appear to be an unrealistic burden, 
adding unduly to the need for time and resources in the face of so many other com-
pelling priorities. Fortunately, there are strong synergies between what children 
need and the adaptations required to reduce or respond to more general risks. For 
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instance, the most useful measures to protect children’s health—such as adequate 
drainage, waste removal and proper sanitation—are also fundamental in reducing 
risks from potential disasters. Providing support to adults so that they are better 
able to address their children’s needs leaves them better equipped to work collab-
oratively on reducing risks, preparing for disasters and rebuilding their lives after 
a crisis. Ensuring that children continue to have opportunities to play, learn and 
take an active role in fi nding solutions will prepare them to be citizens who can 
continue to address the problems faced by their communities and by the planet. 
It has generally been found that neighbourhoods and cities that work better for 
children also tend to work better for everyone else, and this principle undoubtedly 
applies to the adaptations that are necessitated by climate change as well.
Notes
1 It is worth noting that most of the locations that currently face the most extreme weather events (e.g., in 
regard to cyclones/hurricanes/typhoons, heat waves, heavy rainfall and droughts) are in low- and middle-
income nations; also, a high proportion of the world’s population within the low elevation coastal zone are in 
those countries.
2 Population fi gures and projections are drawn primarily from PRB, 2008. 
3 See, for instance: Evans and English, 2002; also see: Werner and Smith, 1992, for classic research exploring 
resilience longitudinally in a cohort of children in Hawaii.
4 See, for instance: Moraes et al., 2003. 
5 See, for instance: Jayatissa et al., 2006; and Barrios et al., 2000.  
6 See for instance: Chawla and Heft, 2002.
7  See, for instance: Diagne, 2007. 
8 Author’s personal communications with residents in Tamil Nadu and Kathmandu.
9 See website: http://www.speakout.org.za/about/child/child_childprostitution.htm, last accessed 5 September 
2009. 
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Gender and Climate
Change Policy
Gotelind Alber
Introduction
This chapter describes how the various aspects of discrimination against women 
are linked to climate change, in relation to both adaptation and mitigation. Based 
on a rapid assessment of the fl aws of international climate policy in terms of gen-
der, guidelines are provided on how to address the gender dimension. 
It is widely accepted that women are among the groups most vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change. After years of ignoring gender issues, talking about 
‘systems’ rather than people1 and about power plants rather than consumption, 
the international climate negotiations are now starting to take up this issue. In the 
current negotiating text of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) women are mentioned several times, 
for example:
In providing support, priority [shall] [should] be given to: . . . Particularly 
vulnerable populations, groups and communities, especially the poor, women, 
children, the elderly, indigenous peoples, minorities and those suffering from 
disability (UNFCCC, 2009b, p. 53).
However, if the underlying reasons for women’s (and men’s) specifi c vulnera-
bilities are not analysed and addressed properly, the results will be merely rhetori-
cal. For a rough overview, the main factors and forms of discrimination against 
women are given below. The specifi c vulnerabilities of men are not included, since 
these still need to be better analysed.
Gender Inequality and Vulnerability to the Impacts of 
Climate Change
One of the main factors of gender inequality is the gender division of labour. A dis-
proportionate share of unpaid care work and other unpaid labour falls on women. 
Time-use studies show that, in all countries, women spend considerably more 
time in unpaid work than do men. In rural India, for example, women’s unpaid 
work amounts to more than 36 hours and their paid work some nine hours a 
week, while men spend 41 hours for paid work and only three-and-a-half hours 
9
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for unpaid labour (Central Statistical Organisation of India, 2000). In developing 
countries, a considerable part of women’s unpaid work revolves around natural 
resources: collecting fuel and water, subsistence agriculture and gathering food 
and fodder in forests. In South Africa today, for instance, many women spend two 
hours to collect fuel and about one hour to collect water (Statistics South Africa, 
2001). As climate change reduces crop yields and the availability of wood and in-
creases water scarcity, these natural resource-dependent activities will be severely 
affected.
Even if women have a full-time job—even in forerunner countries in gender 
equality such as Sweden—the extra time women spend on unpaid domestic work 
is several hours per week. The ratio between unpaid and paid labour for Swedish 
women is 1.15, while for men it is 0.56 (Statistics Sweden, 2008). 
The impacts of climate change are likely to increase the unpaid work burden 
of women, due, for example, to longer walking distances to collect water and fuel-
wood, additional care for the sick and elderly and food insecurity.2 These tasks are 
likely to be carried out at the expense of education or income-generating activities. 
Smallholders are affected the most in relative terms. Many of these women do not 
have alternatives for income generation, and, with increases in food prices and 
declines in subsistence production, food insecurity may lead to precarious situa-
tions. Moreover, many women, in particular those in female-headed households, 
cannot avoid the impacts because of their family responsibilities. 
It should be noted that the gender division of labour leads to constraints for 
women in industrialized countries, as well, at least to a certain degree. For exam-
ple, the time required for family care may increase worldwide with greater climate 
variability, since the sick and elderly will need more care.
Another underlying reason for women’s higher vulnerability is the difference in 
incomes and economic resources for women and men. Though repeatedly cited, the state-
ment that “70 per cent of the world’s poor are women” must be considered a myth, 
for no evidence has yet been provided (see, e.g., Chant, 2006). However, it is indisput-
able that the proportion of women among the poor is substantially higher than for 
men and, in general, that women’s level of wealth is dramatically lower. The expan-
sion of female-headed households, a trend in both industrialized and developing 
countries, may add to the ‘feminization of poverty’, while, for others, the uneven 
distribution of income within the household, due to imbalances in power relation-
ships, might lead to hidden forms of female poverty (Chant, 2006).
A major factor is the pay gap that exists all over the world in varying degrees. 
Women are paid less for the same work, and this gap seems to be persisting. In 
Australia, for example, the ratio of female to male income started to level out dur-
ing the 1980s, but, during the 1990s, the ratio fell again until it reached early 1980 
levels (Stilwell and Argyrous, 2002).
In addition, the gender segregation in occupations leads to lower incomes for 
women who usually work in jobs that are less valued and lower salaried, for in-
stance, in the service and care sectors. Recent data from the European Commis-
sion, for example, show that young women still tend to choose these ‘female’ oc-
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cupations, while their share of engineering, manufacturing and construction jobs 
is less than 25 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). Consequently, women 
will benefi t less from job opportunities created through investments in renewable 
energy, one of the main pillars of many countries’ mitigation strategies.
Even more worrying in terms of vulnerability is the huge gender gap in assets, 
including fi nancial assets, land and real property. One of the underlying reasons 
for this gap is the insecurity over, or even the denial of, land and inheritance rights, 
whether this is based on formal legal restrictions or customary rights or the lack 
of enforcement of legal provisions for equality. For example, in Pakistan, in 2001, 
women owned less than 3 per cent of the plots, even though, in most cases, legal 
regulations allowed them to own land (ICRW, 2005).  With respect to other assets:
Women are less likely than men to own almost every type of asset. The median 
value of assets held by women is almost always lower than that of their male coun-
terparts. A smaller percent of women own stocks, bonds, and other fi nancial as-
sets compared to men. Women are also less likely to hold retirement accounts and 
a woman’s pension is typically smaller than a man’s (Jaggar, 2008).
Furthermore, women’s access to markets and credit is limited. According to 
an analysis of some countries, they received less than 10 per cent of loans of male 
smallholders (FAO, 2001).
As a consequence, due to their paucity of resources, women have fewer options 
for coping with or avoiding the impacts of climate change. Again, this holds true 
for women in both developing and industrialized countries. However, for women 
in the Global South, situations that threaten survival are more likely to occur. 
Moreover, their informal rights to resources could disappear in times of scar cer 
land resources as there is likely to be increased competition over the control of 
land.
A third factor is differences in power and the lack of representation and participa-
tion of women in public and private decision-making bodies. In national parlia-
ments, less than 20 per cent of the members are women (PARLINE, 2009), and, 
in national governments, the picture is similar. For instance, in  countries of the 
European Union (EU), 26 per cent of senior ministers are women (European Com-
mission, 2009). Even in Sweden, the share of women among legislators, senior 
offi cials and managers is only about one third. At the local level, contrary to com-
mon opinion, the situation is no better, as the bias is in a similar range: Only some 
20 per cent of city councillors and less than 10 per cent of mayors are female.3 
In most fi elds, even if they hold a majority of the jobs, as they do in education, 
the air gets thinner for women at higher levels of the hierarchy. For example, in 
Europe, less than one third of business leaders are female, while in the highest 
decision-making bodies of the largest companies, the share goes down to about 
10 per cent (European Commission, 2009). In energy companies, a core area for 
climate change policies, the percentage of women tends to be even lower, with, for 
instance, a proportion of 4 per cent at the executive level in Germany. 
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It is therefore not surprising that women are also underrepresented among 
dele gates of Parties attending the United Nations climate sessions. During the last 
years, their share varied between 25 and 30 per cent, while women’s proportion 
among heads of delegations was substantially lower with a quite large fl uctuation 
(GenderCC, 2009a). As for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the gen-
der balance seems to be less skewed (except for those of business groups), as can 
be seen, for example, from the number of postings in relevant list services (see: 
Eyzaguirre, 2007). Currently, efforts are being made among environmental NGOs 
to establish an equitable gender balance in working groups and committees. 
Would the outcome be different if more women were involved? There are some 
indications that other, and more ambitious, policies would receive increased at-
tention, for example, a massive increase in renewable energy sources and far-reach-
ing, strong measures to reduce over-consumption. In particular, there is evidence 
from surveys in various countries that women are less willing than men to accept 
risky technologies such as nuclear power and ocean fertilization.4  When it comes 
to implementing climate policy at the community level, it is incontestable that the 
increased involvement of women would help to better take their specifi c vulner-
abilities, and that of their entire families, into consideration.5 
Other consequences of cultural patterns and social roles which discriminate against 
women largely vary from country to country and include constraints on access 
to information and education and restrictions on personal, social and econom-
ic activities outside the home. It has been repeatedly reported that early warn-
ings,— for example, fl ood warnings in Bangladesh, — have not reached women 
or have not been understood by them. Moreover, both during and, in particular, 
after disasters, women are exposed to sexual harassment and violence, especially 
young women and girls, and especially in temporary shelters and refugee camps. 
Although some cultural patterns lead to higher risks for men, such as expecta-
tions of heroism—for instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Central 
America—in most cases, women might be more at risk, and there is heavily cited 
evidence that women are subject to more fatalities during fl oods, heat waves and 
post-disaster diffi culties. Based on an analysis of some 4,600 natural disasters over a 
20-year time span, Neumayer et al. (2007) provided evidence for a stronger decrease 
in the life expectancy of women than that of men due to these disasters. Biological 
differences could not explain the gender gap; rather the socio-economic status of 
women and social norms related to gender were found to be decisive factors.
However, in addition to gender-related causes, sex-related factors stemming from 
biological differences add to greater vulnerability. These include reproductive health 
issues, for instance, the need for sanitation during menstruation and after giving 
birth, constrained mobility during pregnancy and higher nutritional needs during 
lactation. Women seem to be more sensitive to heat stress, and this was a factor lead-
ing to a higher mortality for women during the 2003 heat wave in Europe, with the 
highest mortality rate among elderly women (Pirard et al., 2005).
Eventually, the cumulative impact of these factors—gender divisions of la-
bour, income inequalities, power relations and culturally specifi c gender norms 
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and roles—will result in a larger number of women severely affected by the im-
pacts of climate change and in a greater vulnerability for individual women 
and fewer options and capacities to cope with climate variability. Secondary 
effects might be seen in specifi c patterns of migration, for example, male out-
migration, leaving women and the rest of their families behind in an even more 
precarious situation. In the long run, due to the increased work burden of wom-
en for family care and livelihoods, they may have even less time for involvement 
and participation in community affairs, and girls may suffer from lower school 
enrolment and reduced educational opportunities, thus consolidating and 
aggravating the discrimination against women. As stated in the Human Develop-
ment Report 2007/2008:
The trade-offs forced upon people by climate shocks reinforce and perpetuate 
wider inequalities based on income, gender and other disparities (UNDP, 2007, 
p. 86).
Gender and Adaptation to Climate Change 
Some of these factors have now been acknowledged in international negotiations, 
though not necessarily to their full extent. Responses and remedies, however, are 
still in their infancy, and gender is far from being addressed properly and spe-
cifi cally. This can be seen in the the National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPAs) that the least-developed countries (LDCs) are required to set up in order 
to identify priority activities and receive funding. 
NAPAs are expected to organize a national and/or subnational consultative 
process, guided, among other principles, by sustainable development and gender 
equality (UNFCCC, 2002, p. 9). However, no further guidance is given on how 
to operationalize these criteria, for instance, by providing methodologies for 
vulnerability assessments that are suited to detect gender bias and gender-specifi c 
vulnerabilities. 
A quick scan of available NAPAs (UNFCCC, 2009a) reveals that gender issues 
are not explicitly addressed and included when it comes to prioritizing adapta-
tion projects. ‘Gender’ is mainly understood as the participation of ministries 
in charge of equal opportunity or women’s organizations in the consultations, 
however, without holding separate consultations with women. Only Tuvalu 
was striving for a better overall gender balance. Consultations were held at vari-
ous levels and efforts were made in selecting participants and in monitoring to 
achieve a balanced representation.
A number of countries have included gender equality or women’s empower-
ment into their list of criteria, and, in some plans (the Bangladesh, Guinea-Bissau, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Niger and Uganda NAPAs), women were identifi ed as the most 
vulnerable group. While most countries held consultations at the national level, 
only Samoa used a method to identify vulnerability at the community level, ap-
plying the “Community Vulnerability and Adaptation Tool” (Samoa, 2005, p. 62). 
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Among other stakeholders, women’s councils or women’s committees and youth 
groups were involved in the workshops.
In most NAPA processes, however, gender was hardly mentioned during the 
elaboration and prioritization of projects, and only a very few projects were left 
that specifi cally addressed women’s concerns. For instance, in the Burundi NAPA, 
women’s empowerment rated low among various other criteria, such as sustainable 
environmental management, cost, capacity for adaptation and fighting poverty. In 
other countries, projects that survived the selection process included a specifi c 
action for female-headed households among a package of other action measures 
(Eritrea; the number of female-headed households is reported to amount to 30 
per cent in some areas); empowerment of women through access to microfi nance 
in order to diversify earning potential (Malawi); and sensitization and awareness-
raising campaigns on climate-change impacts on women related to the three 
conventions on biodiversity, desertifi cation and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Sierra Leone).
Of course, women will benefi t from many of the projects, but it appears that 
NAPAs fail to address both gender aspects as a whole and the specifi c vulnera-
bilities of women in a comprehensive way. Bangladesh, in its NAPA, has ranked 
“poverty reduction and security of livelihoods with a gender perspective . . . as the 
most important set of criteria for prioritization of adaptation needs and activities” 
(Government of Bangladesh, 2005). However, gender experts point out that there 
is neither a gender concern in the programmes prioritized in the NAPA, nor is 
there an analysis of the differential vulnerability in  the National Climate Change 
Action Strategy undertaken by the Government (Neelormi, 2009). The examples 
provided by Neelormi (2009) demonstrate that there is a wealth of measures that 
would respond to women’s and girls’ specifi c vulnerabilities and, moreover, would 
benefi t men and boys, too (see Box 9.1). Although these can be simple, straightfor-
ward measures, they do not receive proper attention, simply because men do not 
suffer to the degree that women do, for example, from a lack of proper sanitation 
facilities. 
In the meantime, the Climate Change Cell, under the Department of Environ-
ment, Ministry of Forest and Environment, commissioned a team to carry out a 
study on gender and climate change in Bangladesh (Ahmed et al., 2007). It is still 
unknown to what degree the Government will incorporate the fi ndings into their 
strategy. 
Furthermore, Neelormi (2009) identifi es the most relevant policies and docu-
ments with the potential to address climate change in Bangladesh, all of which 
would need to undergo a gender analysis in order to incorporate the gender dimen-
sion: National Water Policy, National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty 
Reduction, Standing Orders on Disasters, Environmental Policy and Implemen-
tation Programme, National Agriculture Policy, National Seed Policy, National 
Land-Use Policy, National Forest Policy, National Fish Policy, National Policy 
for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation 1998, Coastal Zone Policy and National 
Tourism Policy. 
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Box 9.1: What Needs to be Done on the Ground to Address 
    Gender Concerns Properly?
The Case of Cyclones
Concerns related to the women: 
Economic and social insecurity due to the destruction of houses; •
Food insecurity because of damaged crops and loss of livestock; •
Higher death rate for women, because many do not use cyclone shelters  •
since they do not provide security for women, the stairs are too high for 
women with children, sanitation is inadequate;
Warning information is not disseminated in a timely manner to women, and  •
most women are unaware of the meanings of different warning signals.
Measures to be taken for adaptation:
Adequate number of cyclone shelters to be provided, especially in  •
cyclone-prone areas;
Strengthening of security in the cyclone centres; •
Major improvement of sanitation systems in the cyclone shelters; •
Women should be made to understand the warning system, and timely  •
dissemination is also necessary;
Government should rehabilitate the actual victims by creating  •
employment opportunities and by helping in reconstruction efforts.
National policy:
The National Five-Year Strategic Plan for the Comprehensive Disaster  •
Management Programme (2004-2008) envisages bringing a paradigm 
shift in disaster management from conventional response and relief 
practices to a more comprehensive, risk-reduction culture. The plan 
incorporates programmes to strengthen the capacity of the Bangladesh 
disaster management system in order to reduce unacceptable risk and 
improve response and recovery management at all levels.
Barriers to policy implementation:
The main barrier is lack of governance: Corruption, defective adminis- •
trative structures, lack of accountability and transparency are the root-
level constraints of policy implementation.
Recommended response measures:
Improvement in the management of cyclone shelters; •
Increase in the number of cyclone shelters according to population; •
Timely dissemination of information about cyclones to women through  •
effective media;
Supply adequate tools for early warning; •
Strengthen local-level capacity in handling massive cyclones; •
Raise awareness about the entire community’s right to shelter. •
Source: Abridged extract from Neelormi, 2009. Note: Similar analyses for the other most important hazards 
in Bangladesh (drought, fl ood, salinity, fl ash fl ooding and water logging) are provided in this briefi ng paper.
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It is obvious that an integrated climate policy, addressing both adaptation 
and mitigation, would be even broader in its cross-cutting character. Here, the 
main challenge of gendering climate policy is becoming apparent: Both gender 
issues and climate change require mainstreaming, and, consequently, ‘double-
mainstreaming’ is needed to integrate climate into all relevant sector policies and 
day-to-day administrative procedures, while simultaneously integrating gender 
aspects at all stages.
Squaring the Mainstreaming Circle
Has mainstreaming worked so far? Gender mainstreaming—understood as inte-
grating equality between women and men into all policies and activities and into 
every stage of policymaking—was adopted in 1996 as offi cial European Commis-
sion policy to promote equality between women and men6 shortly after the Beijing 
Platform for Action introduced gender mainstreaming. Whereas the mainstream-
ing approach is working fairly well for social policies, it is actually not fully imple-
mented in the Commission’s research activities and policies, and it is completely 
absent in environment and energy policies. This does not come as a surprise, since 
these are policy areas where the gender aspects are not often obvious and thus 
need careful analysis. Women are under-represented in these areas, anyway, mak-
ing things even worse if the gender aspects are not explored. 
As for the climate policy of industrialized countries, the response to the cur-
rent economic crisis demonstrates that mainstreaming of climate considerations 
has not been achieved at all. Counterproductive subsidies benefi ting harmful fos-
sil fuel industries and the call for massive economic growth to counterbalance 
increasing national debts are mushrooming. The vast potential for emissions 
reductions from energy effi ciency, which would require consideration of climate 
issues for any investment, still remains untapped. 
International climate policy has not even given a signal that mainstreaming ef-
forts would be more useful than merely relying on singular projects, either for cli-
mate policy itself or for gendering it. It is diffi cult to anticipate whether the fact 
that climate policies are not yet fully established will make them more open to the 
inclusion of gender issues, or if an effort of double mainstreaming would end up in 
an attempt to square the circle. In any case, fi rst steps at the international level are 
urgently required: to acknowledge the need for mainstreaming, draw from national 
and even local experience and build capacity on gender and climate mainstreaming. 
Making Use of What is Already There
There is a wealth of proven and tested methods and tools to address gender issues 
that are either suited for or can be adapted to climate policy. For instance, the Gen-
der and Disaster Network (GDN) has developed “Gender Equality in Disasters: Six 
Principles for Engendered Relief and Reconstruction” (2009), which highlights, 
inter alia, that gender analysis is imperative and that actions must rely on women 
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in grassroots organizations, building on their capacities and knowledge of the spe-
cifi c contexts, without, however, increasing their work burden. The observation of 
such rules, and the application of the related methods and tools offered by GDN 
and other networks, such as the Gender and Water Alliance,7 would make the oft-
quoted slogan “women are powerful agents of change” a reality. This would also 
build on the existing coping strategies of women to address climate variability and 
disaster, by, for example, switching to drought resistant crops, using traditional 
medicine and health care and organizing collective action. Methods and tools are 
available from development policy or other policy fi elds that can easily be adapted 
to suit climate policy purposes, such as Gender Impact Assessments and Gender 
Budgeting. 
An interesting tool for a Gender Impact Assessment of transport has been pro-
posed by Spitzner et al. (2007) (see Box 9.2). It is unique in its far-reaching ap-
proach, addressing both the above-mentioned factors of discrimination and the 
deeply rooted underlying causes such as androcentrism and symbolic order, thus 
contributing to bringing about more in-depth change. It can easily be translated 
to sectors other than transport and can in principle be used for policies and other 
measures, as well.
A further important fi eld of action in terms of gender is women’s access to in-
formation, education and capacity building. Article 6 of the UNFCCC (United 
Nations, 1992) covers this, requiring parties to promote and facilitate public 
awareness and participation, education and training. Although this is a key area 
for both adaptation and mitigation, the efforts under Article 6 play only a minor 
role in the international process and have not yet been gendered. Such activities 
are fi rst steps, providing entry points to reducing vulnerability, and are a prerequi-
site for meaningful contributions.
Reaching women and men requires awareness of their different roles, atti-
tudes, preferences and skills. There are no neutral means of communication, since 
neglecting gender differences might lead to exclusion or at least to less effective 
communication. Therefore, outreach and other activities related to Article 6 re-
quire awareness on gender and diversity and need to include gender (and social) 
differences in all phases of planning and implementation.
Gender-sensitive communication refers to the contents and topics that are to 
be transmitted, and whether they meet the needs of women and men, taking into 
account, for example, differences in education or even illiteracy. Moreover, it needs 
appropriate media and communications channels and gender-sensitive and inclu-
sive language and design. Eventually, it should also contribute to overcoming the 
limitations of gender roles and to avoiding gender stereotypes. 
However, as yet all these rules, guidelines, resources and tools seem to be un-
known by climate policymakers. GenderCC is seeking to address this gap and 
is currently preparing a “Toolkit for Decision-Makers” that is intended to shed 
light on existing methodologies that are useful for exploring, and addressing, the 
gender dimension of adaptation, mitigation and fi nancing (GenderCC, 2009b). 
But more needs to be done to bring gender from rhetoric to implementation, for 
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Box 9.2: Dimensions of the Gender Impact Analysis for 
    Transport Projects (brief version)
1. Care economy: Does the project take a balanced view, compared with 
other economic sectors, of the mobility requirements of the care economy, for 
which women, because of the role assigned to them, bear a disproportionately 
large share of responsibility (while too little responsibility is borne by men), for 
example, by reducing the time taken, time horizons, physical and social ap-
propriateness of transport between the home and place of work and everyday 
shopping facilities, the location of the workplace, self-determined social 
contacts, family members, schools, medical health centres, etc., and not place 
too much importance on the traffi c requirements of the work economy, which 
is the main concern of men (transport between the home as a place that is free 
from work and places of gainful employment, business commuters)?
2. Resources: Do the fi nancial resources and measures of a project benefi t 
women to the same extent as men? Does the project lead to a more balanced 
distribution of public space and public money between men and women? Is 
economic development required which takes as much account of the interests 
and priorities of women as of those of men?
3. Androcentrism: Does the project promote the view in institutions and situ-
ations relevant to the decision-making process that male lifestyles and ways 
of thinking are central and the norm while women’s lifestyles and thought 
patterns are seen as a deviation and hence as ‘other’, ‘specifi c’ and ‘an 
exception to the rule’? Does the project support the need to revise previous 
generalizations of the male perspective and their claim to ‘objectivity’ or ‘gen-
eral usefulness’ or contribute to their institutional enshrinement (revision/
adjustment of conventional methods, defi nitions, procedures, criteria, etc.)?
4. Gender composition: To what extent does the project contribute to 
giving women and gender-mainstreaming representatives greater infl uence 
in the design, planning and decision-making processes? What contribu-
tion does the project make to increasing the share of women and gender-
mainstreaming issues in important positions?
5. Symbolic order: Does the project create or reinforce symbols which enhance 
the importance of women or do pejorative symbols weaken or undermine it 
completely? Does the project stabilize a gender-biased allocation of duties or 
rights or does it promote individualization opportunities for women and men 
sharing the duties? 
6. Harassment: Does the project contribute to reducing male harassment 
and the exploitation of women? Does it contribute to making this the object 
of political, public, infrastructural or entrepreneurial problem solving? Does 
it contribute to relieving women of threats, restrictions and sanctions?
Source: Adapted from Spitzner, 2007.
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example, a workshop within the offi cial United Nations climate agenda that deals 
with the implementation of gender mainstreaming in climate policy. In any case, 
these efforts should not be narrowed down to adaptation; they need to cover all 
issues under debate.
Gender and Mitigation
As for core issues of the climate negotiations other than adaptation—mitigation, 
technology transfer and fi nancing—the gender dimension is completely absent. How-
ever, gender roles and division of labour, access to and control over resources as well 
as gendered attitudes and consumption patterns are also very likely to play a role in 
mitigation. A few examples to illustrate the gender and mitigation link follow.
Even the causes of climate change have a gender dimension. Since emissions are 
linked to consumption, and men’s higher incomes allow for more consumption, 
it is plausible to come to the conclusion that greenhouse gas emissions generated 
by men might be higher. A detailed study showed that this estimation is true for 
one-person households in European countries, regardless of age, social status and 
absolute income levels. The carbon footprint of men, calculated from their expen-
ditures in different consumption categories, was signifi cantly higher than that of 
women, primarily because of car use (Carlsson-Kanyama and Räty, 2008). 
It is particularly in the transport sector that gender differences are the most vis-
ible, be it the preferences when purchasing a vehicle—in Germany, men pay atten-
tion to comfort, design, technical innovations and branding, and women to costs, 
fuel consumption and environmental acceptability—or be it the intensity of car 
use or the disposition to switch to less carbon-intensive transport modes (BMU, 
2007, 2008; LeasePlan 2008). Moreover, the care work done by women has impacts 
on their mobility patterns, creating the need for gender-sensitive transport plan-
ning (see Box 9.2). 
If climate policy is focusing on fi scal instruments such as taxation and emissions 
trading, both eventually leading to higher energy prices, economically disadvan-
taged groups are penalized, directly and also indirectly since most of them, as ten-
ants, have less options to save energy than house owners. Today already, energy costs 
make up a disproportionally high share of poor households’ expenditures since they 
often live in rented apartments lacking reasonable energy effi ciency standards. 
Signifi cant gender differences in attitudes towards climate policies and mea-
sures can be observed in many countries.8 In general, women are more concerned 
about the environment and about climate change which fi ts very well into their 
greater risk awareness, and they tend to favour changes in consumption patterns 
and life styles rather than technological approaches.
Not only climate policies and measures, but also their impacts may involve gen-
der aspects. For example, in the businesses that benefi t from climate policy, such 
as construction and the production and installation of low-carbon technologies, 
women hold a minority of jobs. In Germany, where renewable energy sources are 
a booming sector due to the favourable national policy framework, the average 
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percentage of female workers in renewable energy companies is some 25 per cent, 
and, in vocational training, it is only slightly higher (Wissenschaftsladen Bonn, 
2007).  Among energy advisers, women’s share is less than 20 per cent. On top 
of the gender bias in job opportunities, this underrepresentation might lead to a 
neglect of women’s needs for adequate information, and will in any case constrain 
their participation in decision-making and implementation in the energy sector. 
From these brief examples, it can be concluded that gender mainstreaming and 
the application of adequate instruments for analysis and participation should be 
a part of mitigation policies and measures, as well as those for adaptation. This 
could, for instance, in some cases mean that regulation would be preferred to mar-
ket-based instruments, in order to avoid disadvantages for women due to their 
lower incomes and limited access to markets.
Conclusions 
It should be noted that improving the participation of women in climate policy 
and the endorsement of the strategy of gender mainstreaming would only be a 
fi rst step in integrating gender equality issues. In order to achieve gender justice 
within climate justice, societal structures and patterns that perpetuate injustices 
have to be addressed. As noted: 
[t]he challenges of climate change and gender injustice resemble each other—they 
require whole system change: not just gender mainstreaming but transforming 
gender relations and societal structures. Not just technical amendments to reduce 
emissions, but real mitigation through awareness and change of unsustainable 
life-styles and the current ideology and practice of unlimited economic growth. 
Not the perpetuation of the current division of resources and labour but a respon-
sible cooperative approach to achieving sustainable and equitable societies (LIFE 
and GenderCC, 2009).
Finally, the question is how all this is related to population issues, except for 
the fact that “babies come from ladies.”9 Two main lines of argument are put for-
ward to support addressing these issues in international climate policy: First, it is 
evident that emissions will inevitably rise with the growing population. However, 
the size of the effect is disputed as population growth in the developing world is 
occurring primarily in countries with very low per capita emissions. Second, there 
is a large unmet need for family planning (WHO, 2009), and some advocates hope 
to revive the attention of donors if this is connected to climate change. 
But as long as industrialized nations do not demonstrate that they are willing 
and capable of achieving deep emissions cuts, initiating a discussion on popula-
tion within the international climate negotiations seems to be neither adequate 
from an ethical point of view, nor wise from a tactical perspective. Moreover, in 
consideration of the performance of the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, 
the prospect of climate policymakers’ designing a population control mechanism 
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would simply be frightening. After all, due to its character of causes and impacts, 
climate change is linked to nearly every policy domain. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that there is a primacy of climate policy in the sense that all 
other policy fi elds should be subsumed and addressed under climate policy. 
Instead, sustainable development, including aspects of well-being and welfare, 
equity and justice, is still the overarching issue. 
Notes
1 See, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCCs) defi nition of vulnerability in the 
Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001): 
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate 
change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and 
rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. (2001, 
p. 6). 
2 See, for instance, the article by F. Denton (2002) in Oxfam’s journal, Gender, Development and Climate Change, 
which was one of the fi rst publications to present gender and climate change to a wider audience.
3 See the website of United Cities and Local Governments: http://www.cities-localgovernments.org, accessed 1 
September 2009.
4 See, for example: Finucane et al., 2000; Kiljunen, 2008; European Commission, 2007; and BMU, 2008.
5 See, for example: Chattopadhyay et al. (2004), who present evidence for the different priorities of local female 
policymakers compared to mainstream male-dominated policies. 
6 See the European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=421&langId=en, accessed 
7 October 2009.
7 See the GWA website: www.genderandwater.org, last accessed 4 October 2009.
8 See, for example: BMU, 2008.
9 Faith and hope and charity / one for you and one for me / money doesn’t grow on trees / but babies come from ladies (Fun 
Boy Three, 1982). This might sound fl ippant, but it does point out the common notion that population 
issues are primarily women’s issues. Women’s needs are for access to reproductive health and contraceptives, 
but these should not be mingled with population issues.
References
Ahmed, A. U., et al. 2007. “Climate Change, Gender and Special Vulnerable Groups in Bangladesh.” Draft Final 
Report. Dhaka: BASTOB - Initiative for People’s Self-Development and Center for Global Change (CGC).
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. 2005. National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). 
Dhaka: Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.
Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU). 2007. Umweltbewusstsein in 
Deutschland, Vertiefungsstudie. Berlin: BMU.
______. 2008. Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland. Berlin: BMU.
Carlsson-Kanyama, A., and R. Räty. 2008. “Kvinnor, män och energi; makt produktion och användning.” FOI 
Report. No. FOI-R- 2513-SE. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
Chant, S. 2006. “Re-visiting the ‘Feminisation of Poverty’ and the UNDP Gender Indices: What Case for a Gendered 
Poverty Index?” LSE Gender Institute Working Paper. No. 18. London: London School of Economics and 
Political Science.
Central Statistical Organisation of India. 2000. Time Use Study. Delhi: Central Statistical Organisation of India, 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
162 POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Chattopadhyay, R., and E. Dufl o. 2004. “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment 
in India.” Econometrica 72(5): 1409-1443. 
Denton, F. 2002. “Climate Change Vulnerability, Impacts, and Adaptation: Why Does Gender Matter?” Gender 
and Development 10(12): 10-20.
European Commission (EC). 2009. “Gender Equality.” Brussels: EC. Website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?langId=en&catId=418, accessed 1 September 2009.
______. 2007. Special Eurobarometer 271: Europeans and Nuclear Safety. Brussels: EC. 
Eyzaguirre, J. 2007. “Climate Change and Canada: An Untapped Opportunity to Advance Gender Equality?” 
Women and Environments International Magazine 74/75: 18-20
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2001. “Project Cycle Management: Technical 
Guide: Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis Programme (SEAGA).” Rome: FAO.
Finucane, M. L., et al. 2000. “Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The `White Male’ Effect.” Health, Risk and Society 
2(2): 159-172.
GenderCC. Forthcoming. “Toolkit for Decision-Makers.” Berlin: GenderCC.
______ . 2009. UNFCCC Conferences and Meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Berlin: GenderCC. Website: www.
gendercc.net/policy/conferences.html, accessed 1 September 2009.
Gender and Disaster Network (GDN). 2009. “Gender Equality in Disasters: Six Principles for Engendered Relief 
and Reconstruction.” Website: www.gdnonline.org, last accessed 5 October 2009.
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). 2001. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
International Center for Research on Women (ICRW). 2005.  Property Ownership for Women Enriches, Empowers and 
Protects: Towards Achieving the Third Millennium Development Goal to Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women. 
Washington, D. C.: ICRW.
Jaggar, K. 2008. “The Race and Gender Wealth Gap.” Race, Power and the Environment 15(1). Website: http://
urbanhabitat.org/node/2815, accessed 1 September 2009.
Kiljunen, P. 2008. “Finnish Energy Attitudes 2008.” Research Report. No. 15. Helsinki: Finnish Energy Industries. 
Website: www.energia.fi /en/publications/fi nnish%20energy%20attitudes%202008.html, accessed 12 September 
2009.
LeasePlan. 2008. Hintergrundtext LeasePlan Studie Auto & Umwelt. LeasePlan Deutschland GmbH. Website: 
http://www.leaseplan.de/fi leadmin/template/main/fi les/2008-07-14_Hintergrund.rtf, last accessed 23 
October 2009.
LIFE and GenderCC. 2009. “Gender Mainstreaming and Beyond: 5 Steps Towards Gender-sensitive Long-term 
Cooperation.” Submission by LIFE e.V. and GenderCC – Women for Climate Justice to the AWG-LCA. 
Website: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/ngo/140.pdf, accessed 1 September 2009.
Neelormi, S. 2009. “Briefi ng Paper: Bangladesh.” Unpublished strategy paper prepared for GenderCC – Women 
for Climate Justice.
Neumayer, E., et al. 2007. “The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters: The Impact of Catastrophic Events on the 
Gender Gap in Life Expectancy, 1981-2002.” Final version of unpublished paper. London.
PARLINE. 2009. PARLINE Database on National Parliaments for Lower and Upper Houses. Website: www.ipu.
org/parline, accessed 1 September 2009.
Pirard, P., et al. 2005. “Summary of the Mortality Impact Assessment of the 2003 Heat Wave in France.” Euro 
Surveillance 10(7): 153-156.
163GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Samoa Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. 2005. “National Adaptation Programme of Action.” 
Apia: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Government of Samoa.
Spitzner, M., et al. 2007. “Urban Mobility and Gender: Promoting the Regional Public Transport System in the 
Greater Jakarta Area.” KfW Entwicklungsbank Position Paper. Berlin: KfW Entwicklungsbank.
Statistics South Africa. 2001. A Survey of Time Use: How South African Women and Men Spent Their Time. Pretoria: 
Statistics South Africa.
Statistics Sweden. 2008. Women and Men in Sweden: Facts and Figures 2008. Stockholm: Statistics Sweden.
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2009. Jugend und Familie in Europa. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Stilwell, F. J. B., and G. Argyrous (eds.). 2003. Economics as a Social Science: Readings in Political Economy. North 
Melbourne: Pluto Press Australia.
United Nations. 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York: United Nations.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2007. Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World. New York: UNDP.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2009a. “NAPAs Received by the 
Secretariat.” Bonn: UNFCCC. Website: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_
portal/submitted_napas/items/4585.php, accessed 21 August 2009.
______. 2009b. “Revised Negotiating Text” (FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1). Bonn: UNFCC.
______. 2002. 28/CP.7: Guidelines for the Preparation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action. Bonn: UNFCCC
Wissenschaftsladen Bonn. 2007. “Ausbildung und Arbeit für erneuerbare Energien.” Bonn: Wissenschaftsladen 
Bonn.
World Health Organization (WHO). WHO Statistics 2009. Geneva: WHO.
164
Population, Climate
and Health
Sari Kovats
Simon Lloyd
Introduction
Global climate change will have important implications for human population 
health. It is one of the emerging set of global environmental changes that are al-
ready affecting human population health and will increasingly do so in the future 
(ESSP, 2006). Climate change does not exist as a separate, single exposure, but 
consists of a range of exposures that are relevant for human health (McMichael 
et al., 2006). Climate change will exacerbate many of the current important envi-
ronmental determinants of disease. Some climate and weather factors act directly 
and are relatively well understood—such as the health effects of heat waves or the 
physical and mental consequences of fl oods. Other health effects are mediated by 
climate-sensitive biological processes, such as changes in infectious disease trans-
mission or crop yields. Climate is ultimately the determinant of food and water 
availability and the distribution of vector-borne diseases. Climate-related decreases 
in food and water supplies are potentially responsible for the largest future burden 
of disease due to climate change (Campbell-Lendrum and Woodruff, 2006). But 
such impacts are also the most uncertain to foresee because they are contingent on 
future social, economic, political and population factors. 
There is now a wealth of evidence regarding changes in climate and environ-
ment due to anthropogenic climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) published its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, which 
included a global assessment on the impacts of climate change on human health 
(Confalonieri et al., 2007). The conclusion of the health chapter was that:
. . . the health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for 
example, increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and injury due to 
extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; increased diseases 
due to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone related to climate change; and 
the altered spatial distribution of some infectious diseases (IPCC, 2007). 
The scientifi c evidence base it still evolving. Currently, the main evidence for 
the impacts of climate change is based on large-scale modelling of bio-geophysical 
systems. There has been a lack of evidence about the effects on human systems 
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and how population and environmental factors interact to increase the burden 
of disease. 
Evidence for current sensitivities of a population’s health to weather and cli-
mate is based on epidemiological studies. The current state of knowledge on the 
health effects of weather and climate variability from epidemiological studies is 
summarized in Table 10.1. There is a need to infer the potential health effects from 
current and past climate variability in order to account for the greater spatial and 
temporal scales appropriate to climate change. Such analogue studies are useful 
for investigating the impact of larger-scale climate effects on health by looking 
at past climate events, such as droughts. An example is the demonstrated effects 
of the global climate phenomenon the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) on 
malaria (Kovats et al., 2003). 
For assessing the future impacts of climate change, a range of health-impact 
models need to be developed for specifi c diseases (e.g., malaria) and environmental 
exposures (e.g., heat waves). Health impact assessments of climate change should 
incorporate the environmental, social and human dimensions (Ebi, et al., 2005; 
Parry et al., 2007). Projections of future impacts should also include a consider-
ation of multiple exposures on specifi c population groups. Many of the antici-
Table 10.1: Current State of Knowledge on the Impacts of Weather 
        on Health Outcomes
Category of health outcome   Known effects of weather and climate variability
Heat stress Deaths from cardio-respiratory disease increase with high and • 
low temperatures;
Heat-related illness and death due to heat waves.• 
Air pollution-related 
mortality and morbidity
Weather affects air pollutant concentrations;• 
Weather affects distribution, seasonality and production of • 
aeroallergens.
Health impacts of weather 
disasters
Floods, landslides and windstorms cause direct effects (deaths • 
and injuries) and indirect effects (infectious disease, loss of 
food supplies, long-term psychological morbidity).
Mosquito-borne diseases, 
tick-borne diseases
(e.g. malaria, dengue)
Higher temperatures reduce the development time of pathogens • 
in vectors and increase potential transmission to humans;
Vector species require specifi c climatic conditions (temperature, • 
humidity) to be suffi ciently abundant to maintain transmission. 
Water-/food-borne diseases Survival of important bacterial pathogens is related to • 
temperature;
Extreme rainfall can affect the transport of disease organisms • 
into the water supply. Outbreaks of water-borne disease have 
been associated with contamination caused by heavy rainfall 
and fl ooding, associated with inadequate sanitation;
Increases in drought conditions may affect water availability • 
and water quality (chemical and microbiological load) due to 
extreme low fl ows.
Source: Adapted from: Kovats and Akhtar, 2008.
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pated effects of climate change will not be disease-specifi c, but address broader de-
terminants of health that are not readily quantifi ed, such as poverty, displacement 
and access to food or water (Woodward et al., 1998). The literature is still, however, 
heavily biased towards quantitative assessments within prescribed scenarios for 
easily measured (and costed) outcomes (Watkiss and Downing, 2008). 
Figure 10.1: Pathways by which Climate Change may affect 
          Human Health
 Source: McMichael et al., 2003.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the current state of knowledge on the 
potential impacts of climate change on human health. Areas will be identifi ed where 
population factors are an important determinant of the risk posed by climate change 
on health in relation to food, water, extreme weather (including heat waves, fl oods) 
and vector-borne disease. Studies that have looked at migration (or population 
movement) in relation to climate change or human health will not be reviewed.
Food and Malnutrition
Hunger and malnutrition are widespread, and it is anticipated that climate change 
will exacerbate this by further reducing global food security. Presently, there are 
close to one billion people with insuffi cient calorie intake (FAO, 2008), and one 
third of the burden of disease in young children is attributable to malnutrition 
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(Black et al., 2008). Future impacts will depend on the trajectories of a number 
of factors, including the magnitude of climate change, the size of the population, 
their income levels and the environment in which they live, as well as (technologi-
cal) developments in agriculture. 
While climate change is likely to affect crop productivity, food security—and the 
relationship between food and health—is governed by many factors. The key deter-
minants are: availability (the adequacy of food production and supply), stability 
(the consistency of these food supplies over time), accessibility (the accessibility 
of food to the population at large) and utility (the health of those consuming the 
food, and their ability to benefi t from the energy and nutrients in the food they 
consume). Compromising any of these elements could lead to increased levels of 
malnutrition and poor health; future change in mean climate, extreme weather 
events and population size and distribution are likely to impact on each of them. 
However, modelling the elements of food security simultaneously is diffi cult, and, 
to date, no quantitative studies have taken account of all of them. Consequently, 
assessments of future hunger and malnutrition only capture a part of the picture, 
despite the use of specifi c and plausible climate and population scenarios. 
A number of studies have modelled crop productivity (i.e., addressed ‘availabil-
ity’) under various climate and population scenarios (see Parry et al., 2007, for an 
overview), and two recent papers illustrate the potential threat posed to popula-
tions with already high levels of malnutrition. Lobell et al. (2008) used statistical 
models for a range of crops grown in 12 food insecure regions to estimate produc-
tivity in 2030. They found that, in the near future, changes in temperature and 
rainfall are likely to reduce the crop yields of various food sources, particularly in 
South Asia and Southern Africa (Lobell et al., 2008). Battisti and Naylor (2009) 
looked to the end of the 21st century and suggest that, by that time, there is a 90 
per cent probability that growing-season temperature will exceed even the most 
extreme temperatures seen during 1900 to 2006. This could severely reduce crop 
productivity and may place three billion people, most of whom depend on agricul-
ture for their livelihood, at risk. The areas expected to be most affected are tropical 
and sub-tropical Africa and Asia and parts of South, Central and North America 
and the Middle East (Battisti and Naylor, 2009).  
Where food is grown (‘availability’) may not be where it is consumed (‘access’). 
The global trade in food is a determinant of access and relates to cost and the 
ability of populations to purchase food. While climate change is estimated to in-
crease the population at ‘risk of hunger’ due to reduced crop productivity, socio-
economic factors will have a far greater impact. In scenarios in which population 
growth is decreasing and there is strong economic growth, the models suggest 
that hunger could decrease by more than 75 per cent from current levels by 2080 
(Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). In addition—driven almost entirely by socio-
economic factors but contingent on assumptions made within scenarios—the 
region with the greatest number of hungry people is expected to shift from 
South Asia to sub-Saharan Africa by the 2080s. Of course, despite their relative 
importance, development pathways will not occur independently of climate change; 
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increases in wealth, narrowly defi ned, could come at the expense of signifi  cantly 
increased greenhouse gas emissions which would result in greater impacts of 
climate change on food production. 
None of the above studies include impacts of extreme weather events, such as 
droughts, or ‘surprise’ events, such as pest invasions (‘stability’). Hence, the impact 
of climate change, which has the potential to increase both of these, could be rea-
sonably expected to be greater than the models suggest. Furthermore, the effects 
of a lack of food are magnifi ed by other factors such as diarrhoea prevalence (‘util-
ity’). If a population lacks improved water sources and sanitation which result in 
high rates of diarrhoea, there will be more malnutrition associated with a given 
level of food consumption. A multi-country analysis found that approximately a 
quarter of malnutrition in children aged two could be attributed to having had 
fi ve or more episodes of diarrhoea (Checkley et al., 2008). 
Overall, future hunger and malnutrition will be driven by a range of infl uences, 
which will, in turn, be related to both climate and population changes. Other fac-
tors, such as governance that ensures equitable access to food, will be critical. 
Water and Health
Climate is a key determinant of water availability. Surface water availability de-
pends on the timing and volume of precipitation. The current burden of disease 
as a result of inadequate access to improved water sources and sanitation has long 
been recognized, particularly the very high rates of infant mortality in deprived 
urban areas (Kosek et al., 2003). There are clear social and economic reasons for 
the lack of access to improved water at the household level. However, populations 
in both high- and low-income countries have experienced failures in supply due to 
extreme droughts. It is also known that access to water is not equally distributed 
within cities, and any reductions in supply are likely to have a greater impact on 
impoverished populations. 
Climate impact assessments are often conducted at the river catchment level and 
converted to water availability per capita or withdrawal-to-resource ratio. Such in-
dicators are useful to some extent, but they provide no information on the level of 
access to water, the quality of water or any differences between rural or urban areas. 
Climate change is likely to cause a decline in environmental water resource availabil-
ity in certain areas, where water resource management is poor or non-existent. This 
will have a negative impact on water availability at the household level. 
The impact of climate change on water availability is likely to be one of the 
most signifi cant for the health of populations. However, due to the complexity of 
the factors that determine access to clean water (social, political, environmental), 
the impacts on health are not well addressed in the climate impacts literature. Al-
though disease rates can be reduced very cost effectively by improvements in hygiene 
behaviour, such improvements require access to suffi cient quantities of water. 
In one study, interventions to improve water quality failed to deliver a signifi cant 
reduction in diarrhoeal disease in places where water availability was limited 
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(Esrey et al., 1991). As discussed below, heavy rainfall and fl ooding are also impor-
tant issues for environmental health in urban areas (Kovats and Akhtar, 2008). 
Emerging Infectious Disease
Many infectious diseases of animals, humans and plants will be affected by cli-
mate change (Brownlie et al., 2006a), and diseases transmitted by cold-blooded 
vectors will be the most susceptible to climate effects. According to the United 
Kingdom Foresight review, future expectations of infectious disease are based 
on an understanding that the majority of ‘emerging and re-emerging’ human 
infectious diseases originate in animal sources. Since these animals are likely to 
face continued incursions into their natural habitat, trade for meat and exotic 
commodities, as well as their presence as pets, the trend of one or two new hu-
man pathogens identifi ed each year is expected to persist (Brownlie et al., 2006b). 
Climate-change impacts should therefore also be seen in the context of these other 
important drivers of the emergence of infectious disease and the large changes 
that are already occurring. 
The global burden of vector-borne diseases, especially malaria, remains high 
(Thomson et al., 2006). Climate factors affect both malaria-carrying mosquito vec-
tors and malaria parasite development rates. Although the overall impact of climate 
change is uncertain, it is likely to facilitate vector expansion to higher altitudes in 
highland areas surrounded by endemic transmission (Tanser et al., 2003). The East 
African highlands are densely populated and therefore potentially at an increased 
risk of malaria due to climate warming. Malaria epidemics are of particular concern 
as they occur in populations that lack partial or full immunity to the disease and 
thus experience high mortality rates across all age groups (Cox and Abeku, 2007).
 
Examples of evidence for climate effects on other infectious diseases include 
(IRI, 2005):
 
Meningitis:  • Occurrence in the Sahelian dry season is associated with increas-
es in temperature and decreases in humidity and is related to dust. Epidemics 
occur in environmentally suitable districts during the dry season and end 
with the fi rst rains. There is a moderately strong relationship between climate 
and outbreaks of meningitis that is not well understood.
 
Cholera:  • Outbreaks are associated with increases in sea surface temperatures 
(related to ENSO), in addition to poor sanitation and hygiene behaviour. The 
association between climate and cholera outbreaks is strong in the coastal 
regions of Bangladesh. 
 
Rift Valley Fever:  • Epidemics (animal and human) are related to short-term 
increases in rainfall. Cold weather is associated with the end of epidemics. 
Rift Valley Fever is moderately sensitive to climate variability.
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Leishmaniasis:  • is associated with an increase in temperature and rainfall. 
Outbreaks of leishmaniasis show a moderate variability based on climate. 
Although vector-borne diseases are strongly affected by rainfall and tempera-
ture, which can trigger outbreaks, the longer-term impacts on these diseases due 
to climate change is less clear. The effects will depend on the current distribution 
of the disease (many diseases are well within the climate-limits) and the capacity 
of countries to control the infection over the next decades. 
Flooding and Disasters
Flooding and tropical cyclones are the most common ‘natural’ disasters, account-
ing for 40 per cent of the 1,062 recorded disasters between 2004 and 2008. Each 
year, around 120 million people are exposed to tropical cyclones and storm surges, 
which caused an estimated 250,000 deaths between 1980 and 2000 (Nicholls et 
al., 2007). Single events can be devastating: In Bangladesh, tropical cyclones in 
1970 and 1991 caused 300,000 and 140,000 deaths, respectively (Kron, 2005). The 
impact of an event, however, is greatly modifi ed by population vulnerability. For 
example, similar numbers of people are exposed to tropical cyclones in Japan and 
the Philippines each year (22.5 million and 16 million, respectively), but the death 
toll in the Philippines is 17 times higher than that in Japan (UNISDR, 2009). Con-
sidering low-income countries as a group, the relative mortality risk is close to 200 
times higher than in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (UNISDR, 2009). These fi gures highlight the infl uence 
of both climate and population factors on health impacts.  
Future trajectories of the population at risk of fl ooding have been developed using 
a global coastal fl ood model (Nicholls, 2004). The model was run for the climate and 
socio-economic scenarios developed by the IPCC for the Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000). When socio-economic scenarios for a world with 
declining population growth and robust economic development are considered 
without climate change, the numbers at risk of fl ooding increase until the 2020s and 
then decline signifi cantly by the 2080s. The initial increase in numbers at risk is 
driven by the model’s assumptions that coastal populations will grow at twice the rate 
of the whole population and that, while increasing wealth will lead to improved fl ood 
defences, the time it takes to build new coastal defences is approximately 30 years. In 
socio-economic scenarios with high population growth and lower economic growth, 
the numbers at risk of fl ooding continue to rise beyond the 2080s.
When sea level rise due to climate change is included in the model, signifi cant 
additional impacts are not evident until the 2080s, when, depending on the sce-
nario used, between 2 and 50 million additional people are estimated to be at risk. 
The model does not account for the possibility of an increase in the frequency and 
intensity of tropical cyclones and storm surges, which have the potential to greatly 
increase fl ood risk attributable to climate change. Overall, the model suggests that 
the population size, the areas in which they live, their wealth (in terms of ability 
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to build fl ood defences) and the increased risk of fl ooding attributable to climate 
change will all be critical determinants of future fl ood risk.
Heat Waves
An increase in heat waves is one of the most certain impacts of climate change. 
All populations are affected by extremes of temperatures. Epidemiological studies 
have mostly been undertaken in populations in temperate climates, where mortal-
ity is shown to increase in hot and cold weather. Heat mortality risk varies by age 
and with other social and environmental factors (Kovats and Hajat, 2008). The 
majority of European studies have shown that women are more at risk of dying 
in a heat wave. There may be some physiological reasons for an increased risk in 
elderly women (Burse, 1979; Havenith, 2005), but social factors are also important. 
Elderly men are more at risk from heat waves than women in the United States, 
and this was particularly apparent in the Chicago heat wave in 1995 (Semenza et 
al., 1996; Whitman et al., 1997). 
In addition to the ‘natural’ patterns of ageing (or senescence) on homeostatic 
mechanisms, several medical conditions increase vulnerability to heat stress 
(Stafoggia et al., 2006; Schwartz, 2005). Many deaths that are ‘attributed’ to heat 
do not result from heat stroke or are even in persons that exhibit the clinical signs 
of heat stress. It is likely that there are several mechanisms by which a person may 
succumb during a heat wave, as the environmental temperature places extra strain 
on the body. If the exposure to heat is severe enough, even healthy people will 
succumb to heat stroke. 
Climate change is likely to increase the number of heat-related deaths in tem-
perate populations. Less is known about heat effects in tropical or sub-tropical 
regions. A main uncertainty in estimating the future impact of climate change 
on heat-related mortality is the extent to which, even without specifi c adaptation 
strategies, physiological adaptation and factors such as behavioural changes in 
hot weather will reduce impacts in the general population. Physiological accli-
matization to hot environments can occur over a few days, and this can explain 
why the impact of the fi rst heat wave on mortality is often greater than that of 
subsequent heat waves during a single summer. The rate at which infrastructural 
changes will take place is likely to be much slower. Neither the magnitude nor the 
time course of the various modifying factors can be predicted with any confi dence. 
It is clear that preventive measures will be needed to counter the substantial initial 
adverse effects of heat, and long-term changes are required in housing and urban 
infrastructure (Kovats and Koppe, 2005). 
Implications for Adaptation
The implementation of adaptation strategies in relation to health is only just 
beginning. The WHO 61st World Health Assembly 2008, held in Geneva, 19-24 
May 2008, called on Member States for more action on protecting health from 
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the effects climate change (WHO, 2008;  McMichael et al., 2008). Countries are, 
in fact, mandated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) to undertake national assessments of adaptation and vulner-
ability as part of their National Communications. Assessments of adaptation in 
the least-developed countries have been supported by the National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPA) process. Yet health is generally not well addressed 
in these reports. A few countries have undertaken more detailed health impact 
assessments outside the UNFCCC framework, for example, the United Kingdom 
(Department of Health and Health Protection Agency, 2008), Canada (Health 
Canada, 2008) and Portugal (Casimiro and Calheiros, 2002). 
Estimating the potential impacts of climate change on specifi c health outcomes 
and providing information for decision makers is made diffi cult by the complexity 
of the relationships among environment, population and health. Future popula-
tion trends and demographic processes will play more than a modifying role in 
this; they will be key factors in determining which health impacts are seen and 
where. The rate of growth of coastal cities in areas prone to tropical cyclones, and 
the level of protection put in place, could greatly infl uence future mortality. The 
diversity of livelihoods will infl uence the vulnerability of rural populations to mal-
nutrition when drought causes crop failure. Infrastructure, and the distribution 
of access to it, is likely to affect whether the potential for greater spread of diar-
rhoea-causing pathogens in warmer climates leads to increased child mortality. In 
addition, population health itself is not only an outcome, it is also a vulnerability: 
A chronically malnourished population will be particularly susceptible to acute 
food shortages due to extreme weather events.
Protecting and improving human population health requires new research on 
climate-health links, as well as improved methods to guide adaptation strate-
gies. To identify future health threats and the populations likely to be affect-
ed by them, epidemiological methods and modelling strategies—which have 
conventionally focused on less complex risk-outcome structures—need to be 
further developed and, in particular, applied in low-income settings. In order 
for such research to be used to develop policy, it should, where possible, spe-
cifi cally consider the infl uence of socio-economic and demographic factors. It 
is often possible to include these when assessing the past and present. However, 
when considering future impacts, the application of such fi ndings is diffi cult, as 
quantitative descriptions of plausible future socio-economic and demographic 
conditions are generally limited to GDP and to population in terms of numbers 
and age-stratifi cation. 
Means to overcome these limitations include the development of scenarios with 
more detailed quantitative descriptions of plausible future worlds and the modi-
fi cation of methods for assessing the means of adaptation in the face of particular 
health threats. Additionally, methods of assessing and characterizing uncertain-
ties in health assessments need to be further developed and should focus particu-
larly on ensuring that the characterization is useful to policymakers. Given that 
many adaptation strategies have long lead times, it is critical to ensure that the 
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uncertainties inherent in the still developing fi eld of climate-health research do 
not prevent appropriate actions from being taken. 
Climate change is a unique health threat in that it will affect all populations 
and requires consideration of extended time frames. In the near term, many of the 
mechanisms by which health will be affected are known—although the magnitude 
of the impacts and effectiveness of prevention are highly uncertain. There are like-
ly to be many changes that are unanticipated involving ecological shifts or emerg-
ing infections. Under the higher projections of warming (more than 2-3oC above 
pre-industrial climate), the uncertainty is greatly increased (Kovats et al., 2005). 
This rate of change is unprecedented for humans and has unknown implications. 
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Introduction
Perhaps the greatest irony of climate change is that countries that have had the 
least to do with growing emissions are likely to experience the most severe impacts. 
Due to the persistence of carbon in the atmosphere, global warming is inevitable 
in the coming decades under any scenario produced by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and global greenhouse gas emissions will 
continue to increase at least up to the year 2020 (IPCC, 2007). While mitigation is 
critical, there is a growing consensus that helping affected countries and people 
adapt to climate change is also important since the impacts of climate change 
are already being felt and will worsen in the future (IPCC, 2001; Huq et al., 2003; 
AIACC, 2004; UNFCCC, 2007a; UNDP, 2008; FAO, 2008; UNFCCC, 2009). 
While most of the international focus is on mitigation of climate change, in-
cluding through well-publicized international conferences and agreements such 
as the Kyoto Protocol, adaptation as a response to the climate change problem has 
gained importance in the international policy agenda (Reid and Huq, 2007). For 
example, the Bali Action Plan, an addendum to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), recently identifi ed the need for en-
hanced action on adaptation (UNFCCC, 2007a). 
A large share of the population in developing countries is already vulnerable and 
living in marginalized areas that are susceptible to climate variation and extreme 
weather events. Population growth is occurring most rapidly in the developing world, 
increasing the scale of vulnerability to the projected impacts of climate change. In 
2005, the average population density in developing countries was 66 people/km2 com-
pared to 27 people/km2 in developed regions (Jiang and Hardee, 2009). More than 
half (27) of the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are projected to at least double 
their current population by 2050, based on the  most recent population projections 
of the United Nations. Human population growth will increase vulnerability to many 
of the most serious impacts of climate change. Scarcity of food and water, vulnera-
bility to natural disasters and infectious diseases and population displacement are all 
exacerbated by rapid population growth (Jiang and Hardee, 2009; GLCA, 2009).
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Recognizing that LDCs, including developing Small Island States, are among 
the most vulnerable to, and have the least capacity to cope with, extreme weather 
events and the adverse effects of climate change, National Adaptation Programmes 
of Action (NAPAs) were established as part of the Marrakech Accords of the 2001 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP). NAPAs were intended to provide assis-
tance to LDCs in developing plans to address the adverse effects. NAPAs, which 
are supposed to link with national development processes, provide an avenue for 
LDCs to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate 
adaptation needs. 
What is the experience with NAPAs to date? What interventions are being 
included in NAPAs? Are population and reproductive health/family planning 
(RH/FP) addressed in NAPAs, including through projects proposed by countries? 
This chapter begins with a description of the NAPA process and a discussion of 
their development, preparation and fi nancing. It then analyses how population fac-
tors are addressed in NAPAs and the range of adaptation interventions identifi ed 
and prioritized by countries, including RH/FP. The chapter ends with a discussion 
of the challenge of addressing population and RH/FP through the existing NAPA 
process and a discussion of how NAPAs are aligned with national development 
processes. Finally, the chapter makes suggestions for the NAPA process to include 
more integrated programming that links with development strategies. 
Methodology 
The 41 NAPAs that were submitted as of May 2009 were included in the analysis. 
Relevant information on all NAPAs and projects was assembled by the authors into 
an Excel database. Analysis focused on this database and on content of the NAPAs 
and projects. This information was supplemented by a review of the literature on 
NAPAs, adaptation and the relationship between population and climate change. 
Development, Preparation and Financing of NAPAs
Among the 49 eligible LDCs, 41 (85 per cent) have submitted their NAPAs to 
UNFCCC. In addition, three NAPAs are in the fi nal stages of preparation and are 
expected to be completed by the second quarter of 2009. Finally, preparation has 
been initiated in four countries, and the NAPAs are expected to be completed be-
fore the end of 2009. The current status of preparation of the NAPAs is presented 
in Table 11.1. 
According to UNFCCC, the rationale for developing NAPAs rests on the high 
vulnerability and low adaptive capacity of LDCs, many of which count among 
some of the world’s poorest. This demands, in turn, the immediate and urgent 
support for projects that allow for the adaptation to the adverse effects of cli-
mate change. As such, “activities and projects proposed through NAPAs are those 
whose further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later 
stage” (UNFCCC/LEG, 2002, p. 1). Acknowledging that countries need to have 
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national adaptation plans which identify and prioritize not only urgent and im-
mediate needs but also medium- and long-term needs, longer-term national adap-
tation plans are part of the on-going UNFCCC negotiations.1 It was envisaged that 
NAPAs would fi t into the longer-term national plans of adaptation.  
Following NAPA guidelines, countries undertake four steps to develop their 
NAPAs: 1) establish a NAPA organization that should include local communities 
and representatives from various sectors (e.g., agriculture, water, energy, forestry, 
health and tourism); 2) synthesize available information on impacts, coping stra-
tegies, national and sectoral development plans to provide a baseline measure of 
vulnerabilities; 3) identify projects through consultations with stakeholders and 
develop a list of priority projects; and 4) submit the NAPA to UNFCCC. 
An important guiding principle in the preparation of NAPAs is that the process 
ought to be a bottom-up, participatory approach that involves a broad range of 
stakeholder groups and focuses on local communities, considering their current 
vulnerability and urgent adaptation needs (UNFCCC/LEG, 2002). 
Financing is a key component of NAPAs. Although estimates of the funding 
required to assist developing countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change 
vary widely,2 there is general agreement that the cost could be in the range of tens 
of billions of dollars per year. The total indicative estimated cost of implement-
ing the 448 projects prioritized by the 41 NAPAs is over US$800 million,3 yet, 
currently, the NAPAs fund, the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), has 
Table 11.1: Analysis of NAPAs 
Number
Development and Preparation of NAPAs 
Total NAPAs submitted [as of May 2009] 41
NAPAs available in Draft form 1
NAPAs in preparation stage 6
Total number of priority projects identifi ed in NAPAs 448
NAPAs not clearly demonstrating linkages to national development planning 
   processes including Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs)
31
NAPAs’ Coverage of Population and Reproductive Health/Family 
Planning (RH/FP) Issues
NAPAs recognizing ‘rapid population growth’ and linking it to climate change 37
NAPA mentions RH/FP and links it to adaptation strategy 6
NAPA identifi es RH/FP project as part of country’s  priority adaptation strategy 2
Total number of RH/FP projects that have been funded 0
Number of LDCs whose population is projected to at least double by 2050 27
Unmet Need for Family Planning among LDCs Per Cent
Countries with over 20 per cent unmet need for family planning 80
Countries with over 10 per cent unmet need for family planning 90
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mobilized about US$176 million, hence showing a huge disparity between the 
fi nancial needs of NAPAs and the mobilized fi nancial resources. Furthermore, 
there is consensus that resource shortfalls hinder funding of NAPAs and that 
countries are generally underestimating the costs of adaptation (Agrawala and 
Fankhauser, 2008; CCCD, 2009).
How NAPAs Characterize Population as a Factor Related 
to Climate Change
Analysis of NAPAs to explore how they describe population dynamics and climate 
change showed that most NAPAs identify population and health issues as relevant 
for climate change adaptation strategies.
Thirty-seven NAPAs explicitly make linkages between climate change and pop-
ulation and identify rapid population growth as a problem that either aggravates 
the vulnerability or reduces the resilience of populations to deal with the effects 
climate change (Table 11.1). Although the different NAPAs have diverse concerns, 
the effects of rapid population growth have been linked with climate change 
through fi ve factors: food insecurity; natural resource depletion/degradation; 
water resource scarcity; poor human health; and migration and urbanization.4   
Population pressure and food insecurity
Thirty-fi ve NAPAs link high population growth to food insecurity. Population 
pressure contributes to this by increasing a country’s vulnerability to food short-
ages in the event of occurrences such as droughts and fl oods and by increasing 
demand for food and putting additional pressure on the food supply system and 
already diminishing food resources, for example, fi sh stocks, as reported in Ban-
gladesh, Gambia, Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. 
Population pressure is more pronounced in certain areas that are more suscep-
tible to events such as droughts and fl oods. For instance, NAPAs recognize high 
populations residing in low-lying coastal areas (Samoa, Solomon Islands), hilly or 
mountainous areas (Tuvalu) and on scarce arable land (Central Sudan along the 
Nile River, Uganda). 
Population pressure and natural resource depletion/degradation
Natural resource depletion or degradation is a central theme of the NAPAs and 
is often linked to population pressure. Excerpts from selected NAPAs indicate 
that rapid population growth: “results in the imbalance of the already limited 
resources and the threat of climate instability” (Comoros), “is a cause of decline 
in resources base” (Ethiopia), “is partly contributing to unsustainable natural 
resource use” (Gambia), is “linked to environmental resource stress” and “leads to 
excessive fi shing and to structural changes to the shoreline” (Kiribati), has “led 
to ecological imbalances expressed by the deterioration of livelihoods” (Niger), is 
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“an important factor of pressure on the environment” (Haiti), is “placing pressure 
on sensitive environments”(Tuvalu) and “tend[s] to degrade highland ecosystem” 
(Uganda) [emphasis added].
Population pressure is directly linked to deforestation in the NAPAs of Mozam-
bique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands and Uganda. The Uganda NAPA 
goes further in associating high population density with observed biodiversity loss. 
Population pressure and water resource scarcity
Population pressure is deemed to increase the demand for water and further re-
duce its future availability. In Sudan, for example, “unfavorable weather condi-
tions combined with population growth has rendered the Setaite River incapable 
of sustaining the town of Gedarif”. Water scarcity is identifi ed as a common prob-
lem in Tuvalu and is associated with the growth in population and urbanization. 
Vanuatu’s NAPA acknowledges that population growth, particularly in urban 
areas, has already placed pressure on water resources and supply services and that 
climate change is likely to increase demand for water while impacting on both 
the quantity and quality of water resources. Population increases in urban centres 
have put pressure on groundwater, as noted by Zambia’s NAPA.
Population pressure and poor human health
A number of NAPAs link population and climate change to risks to human health. 
Kiribati notes that the spread of waterborne diseases is associated with high popu-
lation density in urban areas. Maldives’ NAPA asserts that “the vulnerability to 
climate change related health risks is further compounded by local characteris-
tics such as the high level of malnutrition in children, accessibility and quality 
of healthcare, high population congestion and low income levels”. In Tuvalu, the 
NAPA contends that “overpopulation” increases pressure on resources and risks 
of waterborne diseases. In Uganda, the NAPA notes, heavy rainfall has led to fl ash 
fl oods and resulted in the outbreak of waterborne diseases such as diarrhoea and 
cholera, while prolonged dry spells have resulted in outbreaks of respiratory dis-
eases. Population pressure increases the country’s vulnerability to these diseases 
and its ability to cope with increased health costs.
Population pressure, migration and urbanization
Eighteen NAPAs link climate change to another major demographic concern, 
migration. Climate change imposes additional burdens on communities already 
facing migratory challenges caused in part by rapid population growth. The mi-
grating populations, either in search of new agricultural lands and pastures or ur-
ban areas, are already economically vulnerable, and this vulnerability is increased 
since, in most cases, the zone that receives them is often already faced with a high 
risk of economic, social and environmental vulnerability. 
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The migration of people and cattle, noted as one of the traditional adaptation 
strategies in Burundi and Niger, is identifi ed as one of the real and potential ad-
verse impacts of climate change. The migration of at least 10 per cent of the popu-
lation and a loss of cultivable lands is an anticipated impact of climate change in 
the Comoros, while, in the United Republic of Tanzania, people living along the 
coast will be forced to migrate, something which may cause social confl icts and 
environmental degradation due to rapid population growth.
In Burkina Faso and Rwanda, people migrating from densely populated regions 
looking for better living conditions in less-populated areas not only increase their 
vulnerability by exposing themselves to a high risk of drought and desertifi cation 
in the recipient areas but also by contributing to further degradation. 
Climate change will have a signifi cant impact on urban settlements, especially in 
the face of increasing population and continual urban migration. Samoa’s NAPA 
notes that poor drainage systems, lack of strategic planning and an increasing urban 
population will only exacerbate the impacts of climate change on urban settlements. 
In Djibouti, the NAPA notes, unfavourable climatic conditions have led to migra-
tion from rural areas to “new urban areas” where previously nomadic populations 
are being forced to settle around water points established by the State. Rapid urban-
ization in Gambia is “paralleled by clearing of forests and woodlands, expansion of 
cultivated area, over-fi shing of particular species and severe coastal erosion”. 
The Solomon Islands’ NAPA asserts that, with an increasing population, waste 
management problems are an issue of increasing concern. In Sao Tome and Principe, 
the relocation of the population at risk of food insecurity and landslides in Malanza, 
Santa Catarina and Sundy was identifi ed as a priority adaptation activity.
In summary, NAPAs are quite thorough in their treatment of the effects of pop-
ulation and climate change, although analyses of demographic factors, includ-
ing age structure and household size, are not adequately addressed. A number 
of researchers have identifi ed analysis of these demographic factors as important 
for understanding the links between population and climate change (Jiang, 1999; 
Jiang and O’Neill, 2004; Liu et al., 2003; Mackellar et al., 1995; Prskawetz et al., 
2004; van Diepen, 2000). 
Given that population is highlighted in most NAPAs, it follows that projects 
to address the effects of rapid population growth are included among priority 
projects. The next section examines which sectors and projects were prioritized in 
the NAPAs.
Sectoral Classifi cation of Submitted NAPA Projects and 
Priority Projects
The total number of priority adaptation projects identifi ed in the 41 NAPAs is 448, 
although the number of such projects varies widely among the countries. Using 
the same classifi cation as UNFCCC (2009), identifi ed projects fall into 12 broad 
categories, as shown in Figure 11.1. Some projects and activities are diffi cult to 
classify into any one sector, therefore UNFCCC includes them in a cross-sectoral 
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category. In the NAPA preparation process, projects are ranked by the stakeholders 
in order of importance, subject to select criteria, including the expected outcomes 
of the projects, for example, mitigating adverse effects of climate change, poverty 
reduction to enhance adaptive capacity, synergy with multilateral environmental 
agreements and cost effectiveness (UNFCCC/LEG, 2002).
Figure 11.1 shows the distribution of projects by sector. Half of the projects fall 
into three sectors: food security, terrestrial ecosystems and water resources. This 
can be explained by the fact that agriculture, livestock, fi sheries and other income-
generating activities rely on terrestrial ecosystems and water resources which are 
important for feeding and sustaining livelihoods for millions of people. The health 
sector accounts for around 7 per cent of the total projects, after food security (21 
per cent), water resources and management (16 per cent), terrestrial ecosystems 
(15 per cent), cross sectoral (9 per cent) and coastal zones and marine ecosystems 
(8 per cent). In addition, in the Solomon Islands and Sudan, two cross-sectoral 
projects have health sector components. The fewest identifi ed priority projects are 
in the tourism, insurance and energy sectors. 
All 41 countries identify the health sector as among the most vulnerable to cli-
mate change. However, less than half of the countries (18) have proposed a single 
project in this sector. In terms of priority project ranking, projects in the health 
sector are generally not ranked among the fi rst fi ve priorities in any of the NAPAs 
(Figure 11.2). Indeed, the ranking of the priority projects follows the same pattern 
as the distribution of the projects by sector. Health sector projects would therefore 
be ranked 6th in terms of priority. 
In an analysis of 14 NAPAs by Osman-Elasha and Downing (2007), a major 
weakness identifi ed during the preparation of NAPAs was the institutional bar-
riers that hindered a free exchange of information, including communication 
problems between central offi ces and regions or provinces. The authors found 
that NAPA coordination teams are mainly found either under the umbrella 
of environment or the meteorology departments and also mostly host/house 
UNFCCC Focal Points. This composition of the teams has implications for the 
content of the NAPAs and may explain the low priority given to health—and by 
extension, RH/FP. 
Reproductive Health/Family Planning and Adaptation 
Strategies in NAPAs
Since most of the NAPAs identify rapid population growth as an integral challenge 
to adapting to climate change, it follows that slowing population growth should be 
a key component in dealing with the effects of climate change. Reduced population 
pressure can ameliorate some of the effects of climate change and/or increase the abil-
ity of countries to adapt. RH/FP has been recognized as one of many strategies that 
can slow population growth and reduce demographic pressure (Ross, 2004; Moreland 
and Talbird, 2006). Yet, as mentioned above, there is limited identifi cation of adapta-
tion projects in the health sector, under which RH/FP broadly falls. In addition, the 
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Figure 11.1: Distribution of NAPA Projects by Sector
identifi ed health-sector projects are not ranked highly among the priority actions, and 
priority actions are more likely to be implemented.
Only six NAPAs, described below, clearly state that slowing of population 
growth or investments in RH/FP should be considered among the country’s 
priority adaptation actions (Table 11.1). These countries include the Comoros, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Kiribati, Uganda and Zambia. Furthermore, among those 
NAPAs that clearly make this case, only Uganda actually proposes a project with 
components of RH/FP among its priority adaptation interventions. Another proj-
ect with RH/FP components is proposed by Sao Tome and Principe, but its NAPA 
Figure 11.2: Priority Ranking of NAPA Projects by Sector
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neither links population pressure to climate change nor to RH/FP. In both Sao 
Tome and Principe’s and Uganda’s NAPAs, RH/FP is integrated with other prior-
ity adaptation interventions. 
Comoros’ NAPA notes that population growth is a source of vulnerability and 
credits family planning programmes for the reduction in the population growth rate. 
Even though the NAPA establishes clearly the linkage between climate change and FP 
policies, the NAPA team fails to identify a priority project with RH/FP programmes.
In Ethiopia, high population growth is identifi ed as one of the causes of vulner-
ability to climate change. During the NAPA process, mainstreaming family plan-
ning into agriculture was proposed in the regional consultative workshops as an 
adaptation strategy. Although the NAPA identifi es mainstreaming of family plan-
ning into agriculture as one of the potential cross-sectoral adaptation options, there 
is no component of RH/FP in any of the proposed priority agricultural projects.
In Gambia, partly as a result of population pressure, the natural environment 
has taken the full brunt of unsustainable use of natural resources, as seen in the 
negative effects on the forest cover, rangelands and aquatic and marine organ-
isms, as the NAPA reports. Taking cognizance of this fact, the NAPA proposes 
the stabilization of rural populations as a strategy for adaptation. However, 
none of the identifi ed priority adaptation actions have RH/FP components or 
other interventions designed to stabilize rural populations.
Kiribati’s NAPA mentions that the country has population policies to encourage 
family planning, although these policies are yet to have a substantive effect. In the 
fi nal ranking of projects, the NAPA team clearly identifi ed family planning as an ad-
aptation strategy. Surprisingly, the identifi ed priority projects did not have a single 
RH/FP project among them, despite the explicit mention. However, the document 
distinguishes between short-term adaptation, focusing on urgent and immediate 
needs (through the NAPA), and long-term strategic planning for adaptation which is 
addressed by an existing project outside the NAPA, the Kiribati Adaptation Project, 
which has “support for population and resettlement” as one of its programmes.
Sao Tome and Principe’s NAPA mentions the vulnerability of its essentially 
young (79 per cent under 35) and predominantly urban population, manifested 
through frequent migration by coastal populations due to an increase in fl oods 
and coastal erosion. However, the NAPA neither acknowledges population pres-
sure nor links it to climate change or to RH/FP. Yet it is one of the few countries 
to identify a project with components of RH/FP. The project, ranked 3rd and titled 
“Communication Action for Behavior Change”, has the objective of informing 
and sensitizing the population to behaviour changes for the prevention of diseases 
related to water, vector transmission and other health problems linked to climate 
change. It specifi cally includes a component on family planning counselling. 
The Uganda NAPA makes a clear link between population and climate change 
and notes the need for family planning. The document identifi es a negative social 
coping strategy, “famine marriage”, where, in times of food crisis, some parents 
distressfully marry off their daughters to secure dowry for survival. This practice 
fuels early marriage, dropping out of school and exposure to sexually transmitted 
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infections and related reproductive health complications. The NAPA team identi-
fi es the “Community Water and Sanitation Project”, which includes slowing pop-
ulation growth through family planning, as part of a scaled-up poverty alleviation 
programme. However, the project profi le does not mention the specifi c interven-
tions in RH/FP, perhaps anticipating that NAPA project activities would link with 
RH/FP services in the country. 
Zambia’s NAPA reiterates the importance of meeting the goals of the Fifth 
National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010, which includes integrated reproduc-
tive health with the objective of reducing the maternal mortality ratio. Despite this 
clear appreciation of the role of RH/FP in the NAPA and the linkage to the national 
development plan, the project team does not propose a project specifi c to RH/FP. 
In summary, as shown in Table 11.1, although population is mentioned as an 
important factor related to climate change in 37 NAPAs, only six explicitly state 
that slowing population growth or meeting an unmet demand for RH/FP should 
be a key priority for their adaptation strategies, and only two NAPAs propose proj-
ects that include RH/FP. Neither of these projects has been funded.
Alignment of NAPAs with the National Development 
Planning Process
Since many of the adaptation needs identifi ed in NAPAs are directly related to de-
velopment issues, the effectiveness of NAPAs could be enhanced by integrating 
them into current development plans, policies and programmes, including Poverty 
Reduc tion Strategies (PRSs). Ensuring that adaptation strategies align with national 
deve lopment processes could link development and climate change agendas. This is 
important since national development plans and strategies provide a framework for 
domestic policies and programmes, as well as for foreign assistance, with the overall 
aim of reducing poverty (Bojo et al., 2004). Theoretically, NAPAs and PRSs should 
embrace common projects that are built upon both short-term adaptation interven-
tions and longer-term development strategies (McGray et al., 2007).
A brief analysis of NAPAs reveals that even though all the documents have a 
section on the linkage of the NAPA with national development plans, the two are, 
in many cases, not well aligned. Two categories have been identifi ed under which 
the NAPAs fall in relation to alignment with national development planning pro-
cesses. The fi rst group, consisting of about 31 countries (76 per cent), has NAPA 
documents which do not clearly demonstrate how they are linked to the national 
development processes. These documents only mention that the NAPA “was cre-
ated on the basis of . . .”, “has established strong linkages with . . .”, or “supports 
. . .” the national development goals and strategies as espoused in the country’s 
development plans without articulating any clear linkages. 
The second category consists of 10 countries (24 per cent) whose documents 
clearly establish the linkages between the NAPA and national development plans, 
complete with detailed analyses of the identifi ed vulnerabilities and proposed 
projects. Some of these contain matrices of analyses showing how the NAPA fi ts 
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into specifi c national development and sectoral development goals and even into 
specifi c programmes and projects (Table 11.1).
Consensus is emerging about the disconnect between NAPAs and PRSs. A re-
cent study commissioned by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) shows that 
mainstreaming adaptation into development agendas has not yet penetrated the 
world of PRSs (Hedger et al., 2008). According to the report, UNFCCC workshops 
have noted that crucially little work has been undertaken to integrate adaptation 
into development plans or existing poverty alleviation agendas. 
A review of 19 PRSs in the 2007/2008 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2007) 
found that,  although most of them cited climate events and weather variability as 
important drivers of poverty and constraints on human development, only four 
countries identifi ed specifi c links between climate change and vulnerability. A sim-
ilar observation was made by UNDP’s Water Governance Facility (WGF) (2009), 
which notes that a major weakness of NAPAs is the lack of clear linkages between 
their content and that of PRSs and other national development strategies.
This disconnect may be due, in part, to the structural differences between deve-
lopment plans and NAPAs, both of which ought to be undertaken in a participa-
tory process, with a multidisciplinary approach and a sustainable development 
perspective. Although the sustainable development approach implies a longer-
term perspective, the guidelines for NAPAs to be “action-oriented” and “set clear 
priorities for urgent and immediate adaptation activities” (UNFCCC/LEG, 2002, 
p. 2) imply a shorter-term perspective. It is important, however, that NAPAs not 
only take into account short-term projects but also recognize the need for a coher-
ent long-term adaptation strategy to which the implementation of the identifi ed 
projects will contribute (WGF, 2007). 
NAPAs are, by defi nition, project-oriented. UNDP fi nds that most NAPAs focus 
entirely on small-scale project-based interventions to be fi nanced or co-fi nanced 
by donors; this has resulted in “an upshot of a project-based response that fails to 
integrate adaptation planning into the development of wider policies for overcom-
ing vulnerability and marginalization” (UNDP, 2007, p. 188). WGF (2009) corrobo-
rates this view by asserting that NAPAs generally focus on projects and are often not 
successful at integrating long-term development objectives. McGray et al. (2007) 
state that the disconnect between NAPAs and the PRSs arises from the fact that the 
latter are prepared by ministries of fi nance or planning, which are often entirely 
disconnected from the environment ministries most closely associated with the 
NAPA process. Osman-Elasha and Downing (2007) suggest viewing NAPAs as pri-
marily important for raising awareness, at least among national stakeholders, and 
placing climate change adaptation on the development agenda.
The Need for an Integrated Approach to Adaptation 
Strategies 
Although a majority of the NAPAs identify rapid population growth as an integral 
key component of vulnerability to climate-change impacts, few choose to priori-
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tize NAPA funds for RH/FP programmes. Faced with multiple competing devel-
opment priorities and climate-change challenges, countries prioritize projects that 
are geared towards the alleviation of  food insecurity and water resource scarcity, 
which are two key problems facing LDCs. Yet, in the LDCs, unmet need for family 
planning, or the percentage of women who want to stop having children or who 
wish to wait at least two years before having another child, is high. Yemen has the 
highest rate (50.9 per cent), and 80 per cent of the countries have over 20 per cent 
unmet need (Table 11.1). Mainstreaming RH/FP into projects designed to address 
food insecurity and water scarcity can help slow population growth and alleviate 
pressure on limited food and water resources.
There is also a likelihood that a majority of stakeholders involved in the prep-
aration of NAPAs, although recognizing the importance of stabilizing popula-
tion growth to better adapt to future climate changes, do not perceive RH/FP 
programmes to be urgent and immediate projects but rather long-term strategic 
planning interventions, perhaps best addressed in national development plans 
and PRSs. It is important to note, however, that population and RH/FP issues 
have not been adequately addressed by PRSs either. According to a World Bank 
review (2007), most of the PRSs recognized population growth as an important 
issue for poverty reduction and included objectives and strategies but failed to 
translate these into specifi c policies or indicators to measure progress over time. 
An unpublished review of 45 PRSs found that while two thirds of them mention 
family planning, less than half include any implementation details (Borda, 2005).
This view is given credence by the Kiribati NAPA, which clearly distinguishes 
between short-term adaptation for urgent and immediate needs (through the 
NAPA) and long-term strategic planning for adaptation (addressed by an existing 
project outside the NAPA, the Kiribati Adaptation Project, which has support for 
population and resettlement as one of its programmes). Even though the NAPA 
guidelines state the importance of aligning projects to long-term sustainable 
development planning, they place greater focus on urgent action, which may 
be construed by NAPA stakeholders to imply short-term rather than long-term 
planning and development. 
Components of health and RH/FP, however, could be integrated into projects 
in other sectors, as has been done in the NAPAs from Sao Tome and Principe and 
Uganda. For example, integrating health into projects that focus on agriculture 
and water resources, which have a higher likelihood of being given a high priority 
for NAPA funding, would improve the chances of RH/FP being implemented. Fur-
thermore, such integrated projects are more likely to meet the needs of vulnerable 
populations, which face risks in all aspects of their lives—food, shelter, livelihoods, 
health, etc., including their voiced desire to stop or space childbearing.
Conclusions and Recommendations
NAPAs are a major mechanism through which adaptation funding is to be provid-
ed to LDCs, which are likely to face the most severe impacts of climate change. This 
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chapter has shown that the NAPA process favours short-term project responses 
to climate change adaptation and that priority tends to be given to single-sector 
projects focusing on food security and water resources. The NAPA process has also 
not been successful in aligning urgent and immediate actions to address vulner-
ability to climate change with existing national development planning processes, 
including PRSs, despite the requirement to do so. Thus, LDCs—and the global 
community—are missing an important opportunity to link meeting immediate 
and short-term adaptation needs with longer-term development issues, including 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), that will also strengthen people’s 
ability to adapt to climate change. 
Furthermore, demand for funding exceeds current available resources for 
NAPAs, indicating that developed countries are not meeting their promises to 
fund adaptation to climate change in the most affected countries.  
Since environmental degradation and climate change have been linked to 
demographic factors, including population growth, slowing the rate of growth 
should be among the strategies implemented through NAPAs—and through 
national development plans. Voluntary RH/FP that respects the rights of indi-
viduals to choose the number and spacing of their children is recognized as one 
of many strategies that can help improve livelihoods and protect the environ-
ment by slowing population growth and reducing population pressure. RH/FP, 
included with investment in girls’ education, economic opportunities and the 
empowerment of women and investments in youth, which are all part of the 
MDGs, can help developing countries speed up their demographic transition 
from high to low fertility, lower mortality rates and will likely help people adapt 
to climate change.
This analysis of NAPAs shows that population pressure is recognized as an is-
sue related to the ability of countries to cope with climate change. Thirty-seven of 
the 41 NAPAs submitted broadly recognize and link rapid population growth to 
challenges the countries face in adapting to climate change. However, these link-
ages are not matched by a proportional response through adaptation projects 
that address population, including access to voluntary RH/FP. Only two coun-
tries among the 41 include RH/FP projects in their NAPAs, and neither of those 
projects has received funding.    
This review leads to fi ve recommendations:
The favouring of single-sector projects within the NAPAs over integrated  •
programmes does not refl ect people’s lives. Strategies for adaptation should 
refl ect a multisectoral approach that recognizes that people do not live in sin-
gle sectors. People deal simultaneously with food, water, livelihoods, health 
and education, among other issues, including reproductive health. Wherev-
er appropriate, projects or programmes funded through NAPAs should be 
integrated across sectors to avoid ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ sectors. 
The focus of NAPAs on short-term projects, rather than on linkages with  •
development strategies that address medium- and longer-term issues, is 
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inadequate. As countries develop longer-term adaptation strategies, a mix 
of short- and longer-term projects that involve participation across develop-
ment sectors is important to ensuring a wide range of adequate responses 
in adapting to climate change that can save lives and, ultimately, strengthen 
livelihoods. 
NAPAs should translate the recognition of population pressure as a factor  •
related to the ability of countries to adapt to climate change into relevant 
project activities. Such projects should include access to RH/FP, in addition 
to other strategies that reduce unwanted fertility, such as girls’ education, 
women’s empowerment and a focus on youth. 
Countries that have already clearly identifi ed RH/FP projects in their NAPAs  •
should expedite their implementation.
Attention to population and integrated strategies should be central and  •
aligned to longer-term national adaptation plans and strategies currently 
being discussed as part of enhanced action for adaptation. 
Notes
Longer-term national adaptation plans are part of the UNFCCC discussions on enhanced action on 1 
adaptation taking place under the “Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action” (AWG-LCA) 
and were featured at its 6th Session held in Bonn, 1-12 June 2009.
The estimated annual costs of adaptation (US$) range from 31 billion (Stern, 2006), 34 billion (The World 2 
Bank, 2006), 55-135 billion by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2007b), 50 billion (Oxfam International, 2007) to 89 billion 
by 2015 (UNDP, 2007). 
The total cost of implementation of all the NAPAs is currently estimated at US$2 billion by Oxfam and the 3 
International Institute for Economic Development (IIED), revised up from the original US$1.6 billion. This 
was based on an extrapolation of the costs of submitted NAPAs.
4 This classifi cation was guided by an unpublished analysis on population and NAPAs by MSI and PSN (2009) 
characterizing population as affecting climate change primarily in three ways: “(1) by acting in tandem with 
climate change to deplete key natural resources, for example through soil erosion and deforestation, (2) by 
causing a signifi cant escalation in demand for resources, such as fresh water and food, that are declining 
in availability due to climate change, and (3) a heightening of human vulnerability to the effects of climate 
change, including by increased pressure on human health and by forcing more people to migrate and settle in 
areas at risk of extreme weather events” (p. 7).
References
Agrawala, S., and S. Fankhauser (eds.). 2008. Economic Aspects of Adaptation to Climate Change: Costs, Benefi ts and 
Policy Instruments. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change (AIACC). 2004. “Science in Support of Adaptation 
to Climate Change: Recommendations for an Adaptation Science Agenda and a Collection of Papers 
Presented at a Side Event of the 10th Session of the UNFCCC COP,” Buenos Aires, Argentina, 7 December 
2004. Website: www.aiaccproject.org/whats_new/Science_and_Adaptation.pdf, accessed 5 May 2009.
Bhuyan, A., M. Borda, and W. Winfrey 2007. Making Family Planning Part of the PRSP Process: A Guide for 
Incorporating Family Planning Programs into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).
190 POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Bojo, J., et al. 2004. “Environment in Poverty Reduction Strategies and Poverty Reduction Support Credits.” 
Working Paper. No. 30890. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Website: www.basel.int/industry/wkshop-
1206/3.%20Additional%20materials/Bojo%20paper%20on%20env%20in%20PRSPs.pdf, accessed 28 March 
2009.
Borda, M. 2005. “How Well Do Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Address Family Planning: An Analysis of 
45 Countries.” Unpublished manuscript. Washington, D.C.: Constella Futures, POLICY Project. Cited in: 
Bhuyan, Borda, and Winfrey, 2007, p. 19.
Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD). 2009. Closing the Gaps: Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries. Final Report. Stockholm, Sweden: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2008. “Adapting to Climate Change.” 
Unasylva No. 231/232, Vol. 60(2009/1-2). Rome: FAO.
Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2009. Progress Report on the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) (GEF/LDCF.SCCF.6/Inf.3). LDCF/SCCF Council Meeting, 22 May 2009. 
Washington, D.C.: GEF.
Global Leadership for Climate Action (GLCA). 2009. Facilitating an International Agreement on Climate Change: 
Adaptation to Climate Change. A Proposal of the GLCA.
Hedger, M., et al. 2008. Desk Review: Evaluation of Adaptation to Climate Change from a Development Perspective. 
London: Institute for Development Studies (IDS), Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Department for 
International Development (DFID). Website: www.esdevaluation.org/images/IDS_Report_on_Evaluating_
Adaptation_for_GE_publication_version.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009.
Huq, S., et al. 2003. “Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs).” 
London: International Institute for Economic Development (IIED).
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). 2001. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jiang, L. 1999. Population and Sustainable Development in China: Population and Household Scenarios for Two Regions. 
Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.
Jiang, L., and K. Hardee. 2009. “How Do Recent Population Trends Matter to Climate Change.” PAI Working 
Paper. No. WP09-1. Washington, D.C.: Population Action International. 
Jiang. L., and B. O’Neill. 2004. “The Energy Transition in Rural China.” International Journal of Global Energy Issues 
21(1/2): 2-26.
Liu, J., et al. 2003. “Effects of Household Dynamics on Resource Consumption and Biodiversity.” Nature 
421(6922): 530-533.
Mackellar, F., et al. 1995. “Population, Households and CO2 Emission.” Population and Development Review 21(4): 
849-865.
Marie Stopes International (MSI) and Population and Sustainability Network (PSN). 2009. Unpublished 
analysis of population in NAPAs. London: MSI.
McGray, H., et al. 2007. Weathering the Storm: Options for Framing Adaptation and Development. Washington, D.C.: 
World Resources Institute. Website: www.wri.org/publication/weathering-the-storm, accessed 12 March 
2009.
Moreland, S., and S. Talbird. 2006. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals: The Contribution of Fulfi lling the 
Unmet Need for Family Planning. Washington, D.C.: Futures Group/Health Policy Initatives/USAID. 
Osman-Elasha, B., and T. Downing. 2007. Lessons Learned in Preparing National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
in Eastern and Southern Africa. Policy analysis report. Oxford, U.K.: European Capacity Building Initiative 
(ECBI). Website: www.eurocapacity.org, accessed 12 March 2009.
191POPULATION AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN NAPAS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
Oxfam International. 2007. “Adapting to Climate Change.” Oxfam Briefi ng Paper. No. 104. Oxford: Oxfam 
International. 
Prskawetz, A., J. Leiwen, and B. C. O’Neill. 2004. “Demographic Composition and Projections of Car Use in 
Austria.” Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2004 1(1): 175-201.
Reid, H., and S. Huq. 2007. “International and National Mechanisms and Politics of Adaptation: An Agenda for 
Reform.” Human Development Report Offi ce Occasional Paper. No. 2007/14. New York: United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). 
Ross, J. 2004. Understanding the Demographic Dividend. Washington, D.C.: Futures Group, POLICY Project.
Stern, N. 2006. The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2007. Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World. New York: UNDP.
United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2009. “NAPA Projects Database.” 
Bonn: UNFCCC. Website: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/napa_
project_database/items/4583.php, accessed 12 June 2009.
______. 2007a. “Bali Action Plan.” Bonn: UNFCCC. Website: http://unfccc.int/fi les/meetings/cop_13/
application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf, accessed 5 May 2009.
______. 2007b. “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change.” Bonn: UNFCCC.
UNFCCC/Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG). 2002. “Annotated Guidelines for the Preparation 
of National Adaptation Programmes of Action.” Bonn: UNFCCC. Website: http://unfccc.int/fi les/
cooperation_and_support/ldc/application/pdf/annguide.pdf, accessed 12 March 2009.
van Diepen, A. 2000. Households and Their Spatial-Energetic Practices: Searching for Sustainable Urban Forms. 
Nederlandse geografi sche studies. No. 266. Groningen, Utrecht: Faculteit der Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen, 
RUG/ Koninklijk.
 
Water Governance Facility (WGF). 2009. Water Adaptation in NAPAs: Freshwater in Climate Adaptation Planning 
and Climate Adaptation in Freshwater Planning: A UNDP Side Publication to WWDR3. Stockholm: WGF. Website: 
www.watergovernance.org/downloads/UNDP_NAPAs_water_adaptation_to_climate_change_20_Jan.pdf, 
accessed 28 March 2009.
The World Bank. 2007. Population Issues in the 21st Century: The Role of the World Bank. Working Paper. No. 40583. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). 2006. “Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development: An 
IEG Evaluation of World Bank’s Assistance for Natural Disasters.” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
192 POPULATION DYNAMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The Use of Population 
Census Data for 
Environmental and 
Climate Change Analysis
José Miguel Guzmán1 
Introduction
Despite their potential uses for environmental studies and climate change analysis, 
censuses have not been suffi ciently exploited as key data sources. This neglect was 
particularly obvious at recent specialized conferences (such as the Conference on 
Climate-Change and Offi cial Statistics held in Oslo, Norway, in April 2008 and the 
International Conference on Climate Change, Development and Offi cial Statistics 
in the Asia-Pacifi c Region, held in Seoul, Korea, in December 2008), where popula-
tion censuses were rarely  mentioned.2 In one of the most important frameworks for 
climate-change adaptation in least-developed countries, the National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action (NAPAs), census data are rarely used. When they are used, it 
is primarily to report the most basic population statistics without further analysis 
of impacts across categories of sex, age or specifi c vulnerabilities.
However, the information required to investigate and analyse the linkages be-
tween environmental changes and the socio-economic and demographic conditions 
of the population have increased signifi cantly in recent years; the increased avail-
ability of census data at a smaller scale can thus make a signifi cant contribution. 
Censuses collect information on all households, which allows for the production 
of statistics for small areas that can then be analysed for specifi c objectives using 
tailored methodologies. The limit for the level of detail depends on the protection 
of the confi dentiality of census data.
The 2010 Census round could become one of the most important sources of data 
for environmental analysis3 and, in particular, will provide additional information 
that can aid in the calculation of emissions and in the identifi cation of those popu-
lations vulnerable to the environmental disasters caused by climate change, thus 
providing an evidence base for both mitigation and adaptation policies. Three main 
challenges need to be addressed: 1) what needs to be done to ensure that relevant 
questions are included in the censuses and that those that are usually included are 
adequate to meet current needs; 2) what needs to be done to ensure that census data 
are collected and processed to facilitate detailed analysis of very small areas (prefer-
ably environmentally homogeneous areas); and 3) what needs to be done to ensure 
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that census data are made available, disseminated, analysed and used for national 
mitigation and adaptation policies.
This chapter will present an overview of the potential uses of census data, pro-
vide examples of the use of census data in particular countries and highlight the 
potential of such data to provide evidence in still unexplored areas. It aims to call 
attention to the need to act now in order to better position environmental statistics 
in censuses, through the inclusion of questions and the development of methods for 
processing and analysing geo-referencing population data. 
The 2010 Round of Censuses
Most of the countries of the world expect to conduct their censuses around 2010. 
In addition to providing data on the characteristics of households and dwellings, 
population and housing censuses will provide information on the size, composition 
and characteristics of the population, as well as on many other areas, such as the 
spatial distribution of population, occupation, education, sex, household composi-
tion and environment, among others. The 2010 Census round will also be the main 
source for updates of current population estimates and projections. 
The potential of population and housing censuses is indisputable. However, their 
use will largely be affected by the availability of the data, the degree of their dissemi-
nation, the extent of the analysis based on the information collected, the quality of 
the data and, most important, the relevance that is given to the census data as key 
inputs for policy design.
In the particular case of environmental analysis, in addition to the areas mentioned 
above, use of the data will depend on the availability of geo-referenced maps as well as 
on having census enumeration areas that are small enough to allow for linking popu-
lation data to environmental-geographic data. It will also depend on the types of ques-
tions included and the categories of responses related to environmental issues. For 
example, to date, gender analysis of climate change issues has been notably lacking.
Limitations exist, inter alia, because censuses are conducted, in the best case, 
every ten years, so the data become outdated the longer the time from the date of 
the most recent census. In addition, the potential use of information derived from 
the inclusion of specifi c questions related to the environment can be limited due to 
the characteristics of the census questionnaire which only allow for the inclusion of 
a selected number of questions and easily identifi able categories.  
The following section provides an analysis of some common questions that are 
included in censuses and that can be used for environment and climate-change stud-
ies (see Tables 12.1 and 12.2).
The Use of Census Data based on the Specifi c 
Questions Included
Most of the information obtained in a census can be useful for climate-change 
analysis. Data on the characteristics of the population (sex, age, household 
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composition, etc.) can be used to determine the pattern and level of emissions 
(see Dalton et al., 2008) and the conditions and assets of a population that can be 
benefi cial for adaptation to climate change. However, there are specifi c questions 
that can be included in the household questionnaire which can provide specifi c 
details about the anthropogenic impact on climate change. The most commonly 
used are listed below, mainly because they are considered to be the basic questions 
in the Principles and Recommendations of the United Nations for Population and 
Housing Censuses (United Nations, 2008). In some cases, other questions are in-
cluded based on the specifi c needs of a country. In the case of Latin America, for 
example, there has been an increase in the number of countries including these 
questions (see Table 12.1).
Table 12.1: Number of Countries that included Selected Questions 
        Related to Environment in Latin America, Census Rounds 
        1980, 1990 and 2000
Question
Number of countries by census round
1980 1990 2000
Energy used for cooking 10 10 13
Access to electricity 11 11 13
Waste Disposal 1 6 10
Source: CELADE.
Questions included:
1. Source of energy for cooking and lighting
Target 9 (Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies 
and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources) of Goal 7 of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Ensure environmental sustainability) 
has, as one of its indicators, the proportion of the population using solid fuels. 
This indicator is important because it provides a link between household solid 
fuel use, indoor air pollution, deforestation, soil erosion and greenhouse gas emis-
sions (United Nations, 2008). Therefore, this information is very relevant from the 
point of view of the mitigation of climate change.
Access to electricity is also a relevant indicator for environmental analysis. The 
need to increase accessibility to and affordability of energy services for the poorest 
populations in developing countries is considered essential in strategies to allevi-
ate poverty and to contribute to social and economic development (IAEA, 2005). 
The environmental impact of sources of energy for cooking and lighting are 
best demonstrated when combined with information on other factors such 
as densities, occupational distribution, land-use and tenure patterns and the 
level of urbanization. The level of pressure on resources can then best be brought 
into focus. 
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Table 12.2: Selected indicators of Sustainable Development that can    
        be Obtained Using Census Data and/or a Combination 
        of Census Data and Other Sources
Issue covered Indicator
Census data that 
can be used to 
calculate this 
indicator
Relevance (extracted from the source 
document)
Sanitation % of 
population 
using an 
improved 
sanitation 
facility 
Type of sanitation 
facilities
Assess sustainable development, 
especially human health.  Accessibility 
to adequate excreta disposal facilities is 
fundamental to decreasing the faecal risk 
and the frequency of associated diseases.
Drinking water % of 
population 
using an 
improved 
water source
Access to drinking 
water
Access to improved water sources is of 
fundamental signifi cance to lowering the 
faecal risk and frequency of associated 
diseases.
Access to energy Share of 
households 
without 
electricity or 
other modern 
energy services. 
Additional: % 
of population 
using solid fuels 
for cooking
Type of energy 
for cooking and 
lighting
Lack of access to modern energy services 
contributes to poverty and deprivation 
and limits economic development. 
Adequate, affordable and reliable energy 
services are necessary to guarantee 
sustainable economic and human 
development.
The use of solid fuels in households is 
a proxy for indoor air pollution, which 
is associated with increased mortality 
from pneumonia and other acute lower 
respiratory diseases among children, 
as well as to increased mortality from 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
and lung cancer (where coal is used) 
among adults.
Living 
conditions
% of urban 
population 
living in slums 
Data on population 
and type of 
materials used for 
roofs, walls and 
ceilings combined 
with other sources
This indicator measures the proportion 
of urban-dwellers living in  inadequate 
housing conditions. It is a key indicator 
for measuring the adequacy of dwellings 
for the basic human need for shelter. 
An increase in this indicator is a sign 
of deteriorating living conditions in 
urban areas.  
Vulnerability to 
natural hazards
% of 
population 
living in hazard-
prone areas
Data on population 
combined with 
other sources, such 
as elevation maps, 
etc.
Measures the level of vulnerability in 
a given country, thus encouraging 
long-term, sustainable risk reduction 
programmes to prevent disasters, 
which are a major threat to national 
development.
Coastal zone % of total 
population 
living in coastal 
areas 
Data on population 
combined with 
other sources, such 
as elevation maps, 
etc.
Quantifi es an important driver of 
coastal ecosystem pressure, and it also 
quantifi es an important component of 
vulnerability to sea level rise and other 
coastal hazards.
 
Source: Based on: United Nations, 2007. 
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2.  Waste disposal
The amount of waste generated, its composition and mode of disposal are im-
portant variables that are relevant for environmental analysis. Censuses usually 
only collect information on the method of waste disposal. Where household waste 
(solid or liquid) is dumped into streets, drains or streams, or burned (therefore 
creating emissions of carbon dioxide), especially in high density areas, the environ-
mental consequences will be greater than in areas where such waste is either com-
posted or collected through an organized sewerage system. But a collection system 
is not enough: It must be joined by a ‘cleaning’ or management system. If it is not, 
other areas (where the waste is disposed without treatment) will be affected.   
This is, therefore, an important component of (local) environmental policies 
aimed at reducing toxicity and the volume of waste generated by the population 
at large, as well as increasing the coverage of households with waste collection and 
helping in the design of appropriate management of waste disposal.4 The data are 
reported by municipal authorities, thus the results refer primarily to urban areas 
and waste collected by municipal trucks. While these components were included in 
Questionnaire 2008 on Environmental Activities by the United Nations Statistics 
Division (UNSD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the 
use of census data for this purpose is not mentioned. However, cross-referencing 
this information with census data would allow for a better measurement of the 
population covered by waste collection services.
3. Access to water and sanitation
Two indicators for monitoring progress of Target 10 of MDG Goal 7 (Halve, by 
2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water 
and basic sanitation) merit consideration. While indicator 30 refers to the propor-
tion of the urban and rural populations with sustainable access to an improved 
water source, indicator 31 asks for an increase in the proportion of the urban and 
rural populations with access to improved sanitation (United Nations, 2008).
A comparison of average household sizes and the average quantity of water 
used per person per day with the availablity of water from the sources stated in the 
census can provide a basis to determine the sustainability of their use over time as 
the population continues to grow. Population and household projections could 
be used to demonstrate the imminence of an environmental crisis caused by the 
increasing need for water for drinking and sanitation. This is a key issue for adap-
tation to climate change.
4.  Other relevant questions at the household level
Some countries may incorporate other questions that can help in identifying vulner-
able groups and in the preparation of plans for adaptation to climate change. These 
may include questions on the type of energy used for heating, the availability of piped 
gas, the type of dwelling, the year of construction, the materials used in the walls, 
fl oors and roof, the availability of cars, trucks and other means of transportation for 
the household, the accessibility of IT, property tenure, location of toilet facilities, etc.
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The use of the results from these questions for environmental and 
climate-change analysis
Despite the relevance of these questions, they are still used rather infrequently 
for the purpose of environmental studies.5 One of the main uses seems to be for 
calculating the indicators for sustainable development that have been defi ned by 
the United Nations Division for Sustainable Development.6 However, as can be 
seen in Table 12.2, those indicators are mainly utilized in identifying vulnerabili-
ties and not necessarily for measuring emissions or, at the least, for characterizing 
subpopulations by their patterns of emissions.   
In order to produce a change in this regard, there is a need for more analysis 
on the limitations as well as on the potential of census data for environmental 
and climate-change analysis. One of the reasons for the non-utilization of these 
data is that the number and types of questions included and the possible op-
tions for responses are limited. For example, the question on energy used for 
cooking does not cover how much energy is consumed or consider why there are 
variations in use between different population groups living in similar environ-
mental settings. In addition, when electricity is used, households do not know 
how this electricity has been produced (hydro, nuclear, fuel combustion, etc.). 
For these reasons, administrative records and household surveys seem to be 
more useful. Until now, surveys have been the most used source for this kind of 
analysis. However, censuses do have some main advantages: They cover the total 
population, including those living in households or collective residences, and they 
provide information on the whole country and allow for estimations for very small 
areas. This last characteristic permits a detailed analysis at the local level, which is 
impossible to do with household surveys. Thus, there is a need for triangulation of 
information from different sources: censuses, household surveys and administra-
tive statistics. The combination of censuses and surveys is probably the better way 
to extract the best of both sources (coverage from censuses and better quality and 
details from surveys).
Finally, these data have also been used for measuring poverty, based on data on 
household’s assets. The poverty indicator can be linked to other indicators, the 
better to express the vulnerability of different population groups.
Use of Census Data in Environmental and 
Climate-change Analysis
Population size and spatial distribution
The use of census data for environmental analysis has its starting point in linking 
population size to geography.7 The Principles and Recommendations for Popula-
tion and Housing Censuses of the United Nations (United Nations, 2008) provide 
a comprehensive overview of the census process, including the suggested ques-
tions to be integrated and the tabulations that need to be produced. In relation to 
environment, it concludes that:
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. . .  Population and housing censuses provide a powerful tool for assessing the 
impact of population on the environment, for example, on drainage basins and 
on water resource management systems. The spatial units for such a study may 
combine a group of local administrative areas. In this situation the availability 
of census databases with mapping capability (see paras. 1.126–1.128) is of great 
importance (United Nations, 2008, p. 241). 
In this regard, the use of census data is related to the ‘resolution’ of the data 
available (the size of the area in relation to its population). In their 2004 paper, 
“The Global Distribution of Population: Evaluating the Gains in Resolution Re-
fi nement”, Balk and Yetman underline the fact that, in recent years, the country-
specifi c average resolution of census data has increased. Signifi cant improvements 
in access to a higher resolution of administrative data include: 1) the opening of 
National Statistical Offi ces (NSOs) and other providers of spatial data, including 
the fact that many NSOs allow for direct access to microdata;8 (2) the beginning of 
awareness of and collaboration among providers of population and spatial data; 
and 3) the increase in capacity to manage, manipulate and process increasingly 
large population and geographic data sets. Alongside these developments, new 
efforts are being made to validate census data quality using satellite information 
systems. These positive changes do not eliminate the diffi culties in comparability 
between censuses and therefore the diffi culties for trend analysis, due to a lack of 
record keeping of census areas at NSOs. 
Linking basic census data, such as population size, to the geographic area 
allows for the calculation of population density, a classic indicator for environ-
mental study, particularly in urban areas. It also allows for the characterization of 
urban settlements: slums, sprawl, concentration and dispersion of the population. 
For adaptation policies, this indicator is still more relevant when it is combined 
with variables such as the type and quality of housing, source of water, energy, 
mode of waste disposal, patterns of occupational distribution and land use and 
tenure. It also helps to defi ne the sustainability of the use of resources in particular 
locations and to highlight both environmental and related social vulnerabilities. 
Unfortunately, in most cases, this is the main and only use of population data for 
environmental analysis. 
In urbanization studies, the indicator of density is one of the most relevant 
and most considered. A study on Chinese and Indian sites, for example, explores 
an alternative way to measure urbanization through density (Long et al., 2001). 
It includes the measurement of density (the percentage of the population living 
above and below a certain level of density and the percentage of occupied land un-
der and above these specifi c densities) using census data for small areas. However, 
this methodology is considered to be more useful for making comparative studies. 
The authors suggest that “. . . the greater detail on the spatial complexity of each 
area measured at similar levels of spatial disaggregation could begin to supply the 
comparative data needed for ecological and other studies across many different 
societies and landscape”.
199THE USE OF POPULATION CENSUS DATA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE ANALY SIS
Demographic dynamics, including household composition
The size and growth of population has been used to prepare the main Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emissions scenarios. However, 
there is a growing consensus that this is a very limited use of the information 
on population dynamics. Some studies (O’Neill et al., 2002; Dalton et al, 2008; 
Pachauri and Jiang, 2008) have shown the relevance of the composition and distri-
bution of the population by sex, age, household structure and spatial distribution 
as key to understanding future changes in emissions.
But the importance of the size and growth of the population for adaptation and 
recovery plans should not be neglected. Specifi c age-sex categories evidently make 
varying demands on their immediate environments as they strive to ensure their live-
lihoods. Adaptation plans therefore need to consider the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of the population that could be affected by climate change. 
Census data can be used in formulating these plans, taking care of the limi-
tations of the data, particularly in regard to household composition, which also 
affects household surveys. De facto censuses can provide biased information on 
household composition, especially in cases of short-term migration. De jure cen-
suses also have their own constraints. These factors need to be considered when 
using census data for this kind of analysis.
Identifi cation of environmentally vulnerable populations
Censuses are an essential source for the identifi cation of populations vulnerable to 
climate change and environmental disasters. This is the case for populations settled 
in coastal lowlands, which are at particular risk, including from rising sea level and 
fl ooding.9 In addition to the geographic location, vulnerability is further exacer bated 
by income and other socio-economic and demographic factors, such as whether 
households are headed by women, men or children. Besides being already at peril 
from environmental change, dense populations in coastal zones can put a further 
burden on coastal ecosystems. Although this analysis seems to be an easy task, it is 
made diffi cult because censuses publish information by administrative areas that 
may not coincide with environmental areas (see Balk and Yetman, 2004). 
In their article, “The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change and Hu-
man Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones”, McGranahan, Balk and Ander-
son (2007) assessed the distribution of human settlements in Low Elevation Coastal 
Zones (LECZs) around the world.10 In order to calculate the population at risk and 
their international distribution in LECZs, the authors integrated spatially constructed 
global databases of population distribution, urban extent and elevation data, overlay-
ing gridded geo graphic data, thus deriving totals of national populations in LECZs.
Linking demographic and socio-economic census data to environmental data
A good example of how census data can be utilized beyond their traditional use 
is presented in the recent publication, “Mapping a Better Future: How Spatial 
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Analysis Can Benefi t Wetlands and Reduce Poverty in Uganda” (2009), by the Wet-
lands Management Department, Ministry of Water and Environment, Uganda, 
and the World Resources Institute. This report provides examples of the develop-
ment of poverty maps for 2002 and 2005, based on estimations combining data 
from their 2002 population and housing census with estimations from the 2002–
2003 and 2005-2006 household surveys, respectively. “The level of detail obtained 
at subcounty permits more meaningful spatial overlays of poverty metrics and 
wetland indicators [and provides] fi rst insights into relationships between poverty, 
wetland status, and use of wetland resources” (p. 4-5).
Migration data
Censuses provide useful information for the measurement of internal migratory 
movements, particularly with regard to movements during the fi ve years prior to 
the census (Rodriguez and Busso, 2009). Some countries have included questions 
with a shorter reference period, thereby obtaining information on rapid changes 
that can be linked to sudden recent environmental changes. The information ob-
tained through the census can thus be used to monitor the changes in spatial 
distribution due to migration.11 When associated with the environmental changes 
mapped through other sources, these trends would be of great value. In this re-
gard, census data on internal and international migration can be used not only 
to measure the impacts on the environment but also as the main instrument to 
identify emerging new patterns of  migration and settlement and land-use pat-
terns in environmentally fragile areas or costal zones. Censuses, by virtue of their 
full coverage, present unique opportunities for analysis that cannot be matched 
by sample surveys.
Census data on spatial distribution could also be useful to identify emerg-
ing patterns of movement of people to new areas due to environmental changes. 
Bordt and Smith (2008) note that census data could be useful in showing 
additional settlement in new locations due to increased agricultural and forestry 
production in areas of currently marginal production.
Censuses can include questions on the reasons for migrating. This presents a 
great opportunity to show how census data on migration are uniquely suited for 
the identifi cation of migration fl ows to and from environmentally fragile areas. In 
this regard, the census, by virtue of its full coverage, presents unique opportunities 
for analysis that also cannot be matched by sample surveys.
The use of census data on climate-change-induced disasters for planning, 
evaluation of impacts and recovery plans
The use of population data in preparing for and responding to natural disasters 
has been widely recognized. The “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building 
the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters” (United Nations, 2005, 
pp. 6-27) underscores the need for a better understanding of the impact of 
201THE USE OF POPULATION CENSUS DATA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE ANALY SIS
hazards and the resulting physical, social, economic and environmental vulner-
abilities, as well as their interactions. This requires the development of risk maps 
and systems of indicators of disaster risk and vulnerability at national and subna-
tional scales. 
In situations of humanitarian response, population data are keys to identi fying 
the population in need of aid and where this population is located (National Acad-
emies, 2007). The availability of geo-referenced and updated population data is an 
essential component of timely emergency response, which requires an important in-
vestment in capacity building. Censuses provide the basic information to determine 
the number and characteristics of the “likely population at risk of natural disasters” 
(p. xi). However, censuses are only conducted every 10 years, at best; therefore, if 
these data are not complemented and updated with other sources (surveys, admin-
istrative records, etc.), their use could be limited. The publication of the National 
Academies emphasizes these issues in the cases of Haiti, Mali and Mozambique.
Recommendations 
1.  What needs to be done to ensure that relevant questions are included in the 
censuses or that those usually included are adequate for current needs?
The process of design of the questionnaire and the plan of analysis of  •
census data must be gender sensitive and involve researchers and policy-
makers working on the mitigation and adaptation plans, in consultation 
with representative stakeholders.
Relevant census questions must eventually be added in order to measure the  •
specifi c vulnerabilities associated with climate changes. In the case of a recent 
environmentally-induced disaster, specifi c questions should be added.
The categories for questions that focus specifi cally on environmental issues  •
can be adapted to the national needs.  These questions can be further focused 
by linking them to sociodemographic variables.
2. What needs to be done to ensure that census data are collected, processed 
and made available to facilitate detailed analysis of very small areas 
(preferably environmentally homogeneous areas)? 
NSOs must commit to making census information available with the highest  •
resolution possible. This will allow for a better defi nition of areas with higher 
vulnerabilities to climate-change-induced events.
NSOs should consider environmental areas in the defi nition of census areas.  •
NSOs should keep records of census areas to allow for inter-census  •
comparisons.
Promotion of collaboration between different ministries and research cen- •
tres, including professionals from different disciplines, ensuring the partici-
pation of gender and social development specialists.
Allow for the use of microlevel data and avoid a blockage of data users’ access  •
to them.
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3.  What needs to be done to ensure that census data are made available, 
disseminated, analysed and used for national mitigation and adaptation 
policies?
Create awareness: Advocate for a more extensive access to data for detailed  •
analysis at the local level.
Make census data useful by disseminating examples of good practices.  •
One of the most important areas of intervention in the implementation of 
these recommendations is capacity building.12 A recommendation from the Inter-
national Conference on Climate Change, Development and Offi cial Statistics in 
the Asia-Pacifi c Region, held in Seoul in December 2008,13 was that “the use of 
Geographic Information Systems and other spatial data infrastructure for the 
spatial analysis of offi cial statistics should be improved and promoted” (Harper, 
2008). This includes holding workshops on the development of spatial frameworks 
Box 12.1: Using Population Data for Measuring the Impact of Disasters: 
      The Case of the ECLAC Handbook for Estimating the 
       Socio-economic and Environmental Effects of Disasters
The Handbook for Estimating the Socio-economic and Environmental Effects of Disasters, 
produced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2003), includes a section on the evaluation of the 
population affected by different kinds of disasters, including those that are 
environmentally induced. It presents a detailed methodology on how and when 
to use population censuses to determine the population that could be affected 
by disasters. Furthermore, the handbook shows the limitation of censuses and/
or the projections derived from them for small areas in cases where censuses 
are outdated and important population mobility has taken place.
The manual provides methodologies on how to use population data, including 
censuses, to make an analysis of the human impacts of a disaster, including: 
1) determination of the population with greater or lesser risk of being affected, 
identifying and defi ning profi les; 2) estimation of the demographic impact of 
the disaster, i.e., population and households likely to be affected by the event; 
3) prevention and planning for action before the event occurs; and 4) gen-
eration of plans for evacuation or assistance during a disaster. Additionally, 
the social characteristics of a population are factors that increase or decrease 
the risk of harm.  The level of education, socio-economic status, age structure 
and gender composition of the population, access to services, family structure, 
among other traits, infl uence the differential impact of the event. 
Source: ECLAC, 2003, elaborated in collaboration with Alejandra Silva, CELADE-CEPAL.
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and the coding systems that have to be established to support these frameworks 
and building on existing census-based workshops to cover their use in the analysis 
of climate change (Harper, 2008).
Notes
1 The author thanks Debora Balk, Bruce Campbell, Sabrina Juran, Samson Lamlenn, George Martine, Ricardo 
Neupert, Gayle Nelson, Diego Palacios and Daniel Schensul of UNFPA, as well as Jorge Rodriguez and 
Alejandra Silva from CELADE, ECLAC, for their inputs and suggestions.
2 The same applies to documents from relevant agencies. See, for example, the presentation of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2008). 
3 The document, “Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies,” 3rd edition 
(United Nations, 2007), presents a list of 50 core indicators, which are part of a larger set of 96 indicators of 
sustainable development.  Around 40 per cent of these indicators can be calculated (partially or totally) using 
census data.  See a detailed list of these indicators in Table 12.2.
4 See: Questionnaire 2008 on Environment Statistics (United Nations Statistics Division). Website: http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/questionnaire2008.htm, last accessed 11 September 2009.
5 An example is the use of census data from Bolivia and Chile to determine the amount of lamps that could be 
used in a household based on the number of rooms and the lighting needed. This information was used to 
derive estimates of mercury disposal using different kinds of lamps (Camilla et al., 2009).
6 In other cases, the use of census data is even more limited. As an example of this, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with other international organizations, elaborated a framework of 
energy indicators. Despite the fact that some of these indicators could be calculated (or triangulated) with 
the information obtained from censuses, there is no mention of the possibility of utilizing the census as a 
credible data source. Among these indicators, the percentage of the population using electricity and using 
biomass could be calculated using census data, allowing for geographically disaggregated estimation.
7 The new Handbook on Geospatial Infrastructure in Support of Census Activities (United Nations, 2009) focuses on 
how the use and application of geospatial technologies and geo-referenced databases are useful tools at all 
stages of the census process.
8 If the microdata are available and geo-referenced, it is much easier to defi ne geographic areas that are 
environmentally homogeneous. See: Balk and Yetman, 2004.
9 These also include those living in slum areas, on steep, eroded slopes, in valleys, in catchment areas, on arid 
lands, etc. All these present varying challenges in terms of the ways they can be affected by climatic changes 
and how they impact on the environment.
10 They estimate that 600 million people, of which 360 million are urban settlers, live in LECZs, accounting for 
10 per cent of the world’s population and 13 per cent of the urban population. LECZs, covering 2 per cent of 
the world’s land area, are defi ned as the contiguous land area up to 100 kilometres from the coast that is less 
than ten metres above sea level. 
11 See: Balk et al, 2009. In their study, “Mapping the Risks of Climate Change in Developing Countries”, 
presented at the Population Association of America meeting in 2009, the authors use migration data from 
the 1991 and 2001 Censuses of India to identify migration fl ows and the fastest growing cities and towns.
12 As mentioned in the conclusions of the work of the Committee on the Effective Use of Data, Methodologies, 
and Technologies to Estimate Subnational Population at Risk (National Research Council of the National 
Academies):
At present, there are relatively few units, especially in developing countries, with suffi cient trained expertise 
in both demography and geospatial tools and technologies. Improvements in training and commitment by 
the national statistical offi ce (NSO) and other staff for each country to include both demographic projection 
methodology in local areas and the use of appropriate spatial administrative units in map form are essential. 
There are a number of mechanisms for building such capacity, the fi rst of which is recognizing the importance 
of the skill sets required for disaster preparedness and response. The second is formalized training. Such training 
programs could be part of overall capacity building and funded by bilateral aid programs, such as USAID, or 
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through broader country capacity-building programs, such as those supported by the World Bank or United 
Nations (National Academies, 2007, p. 151).
13 Organized by the Korea National Statistical Offi ce (KNSO) and the United Nations Statistics Division 
(UNSD).
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Spatial Data with Population Data
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Introduction
An understanding of the impact of global climate change requires knowledge of 
who lives where. Accumulating suffi cient knowledge about the locations and char-
acteristics of the people who will be disproportionately and negatively affected by 
climate change, and, in particular, to identify the most vulnerable groups at risk, is a 
non-trivial undertaking. While data sets on climate patterns and data sets on popu-
lations exist, no single data set provides a complete picture of individuals and the 
communities and environments in which they live, making a comprehensive under-
standing of the impact of climate change on populations diffi cult. A more complete 
understanding can only be achieved by combining data from different sources, a 
practice that is increasingly possible, but still poses many challenges. Some impor-
tant advances have been made: Satellite data are increasingly available, demographic 
data are increasingly spatially rendered and environmental data are increasingly be-
ing collected and produced with interdisciplinary inquiry in mind. 
Data integration between two data sets that share identifying units can be 
straightforward, but data inconsistency within and between places may not be 
trivial. National statistical offi ces collect and report information in many differ-
ent ways (United Nations, 2009), making, for example, a comparison of educa-
tional attainment among the residents of the neighbouring states of Texas, United 
States, and Tamaulipas, Mexico, impossible. This is true despite the fact that the 
United States and Mexico are quite similar in terms of census data collection. The 
complexities increase when defi nitions differ among data sources and even more 
so when there is a need to use data with dissimilar reporting units. The challenges 
that arise when combining population data—whether from censuses or surveys—
with environmental data useful for describing or predicting climate-change haz-
ards—whether derived from satellites or other spatial analyses—is the focus of this 
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chapter. International agencies, national governments and local planners all need 
to prepare for climate change, and, in order to understand its potential impact on 
population, data must be organized and analysed in a spatial framework. This is 
true regardless of whether people live in cities or villages, though emphasis in this 
chapter will be given to the challenges of urban area analysis.
Climate modelling and physical geography help identify where climate-change-
induced hazards are likely to occur, but in order to assess the resulting risks, hu-
man settlements and activities must be located in relation to these hazards.  For 
example, it is essential to know to what extent people live in areas where coastal 
fl ooding and extreme weather events are expected to worsen and to what extent 
agricultural production is located in areas where water availability is expected to 
decline. In order to reduce risks resulting from climate change, it is most impor-
tant that this spatially integrated information be available and put to use locally, 
as the impacts of climate change will be borne on particular localities.  However, 
because of the global nature of climate and the likelihood that an increasing share 
of impacts of climate change will be felt in Africa, Asia and Latin America, it is also 
crucial to understand these risks globally.
Hazards faced by urban settlements are particularly important, not simply be-
cause urban areas concentrate people and their economic activities, but also because 
future population growth and economic growth are expected to be concentrated in 
these locations. The 2007 revision of World Urbanization Prospects (United Nations, 
2008) projects that during the fi rst half of the 21st century, the world’s urban popu-
lation will grow by about 3.5 billion, while its rural population will decline by about 
0.5 billion. Since the spatial distribution of urban settlements is different from that 
of rural settlements, urbanization will play a role in how the burden of risks associ-
ated with climate change will shift in the future. Most urbanization will occur in 
Africa and Asia, but it is important to know more precisely where this growth will 
occur. Countering the increased population density inherent in urbanization, urban 
areas are also expanding spatially, thus reducing urban density. This phenomenon is 
most advanced in North America’s sprawling suburbs but is also occurring in most 
other parts of the world (Angel et al., 2005). 
This chapter draws heavily on the research of its authors, though it aims to 
comment more generally on the complexities of integrating spatial and non-
spatial data to address dynamic, contemporary concerns. Much more could be 
said by the research and planning community that undertakes this type of inter-
disciplinary data integration.
What is meant by integration of data in a spatial framework? 
The urban and rural population and land at risk of sea level rise has been described 
elsewhere (Chapter 5; McGranahan et al., 2007). Here an example using poverty 
mapping data rather than population data is drawn on to demonstrate that popu-
lation is not the only attribute that can be described in spatial terms. For example, 
one might wish to know the number of poor people living at risk of sea level rise—
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i.e., within a 10-metre rise in elevation that is contiguous to the sea coast (the low 
elevation coastal zone or LECZ)—because the poor are expected to be more vulner-
able to the untoward effects of climate change and the least able to adapt (Hardoy 
and Pandiella, 2009; Hardoy et al., 2001 ). 
Figure 13.1 shows the frequency distribution of poverty among districts (third-
order administrative units) in Viet Nam (Muñiz et al., 2008). Along the x-axis is the 
proportion of each district that is poor (ranging from 0 [no one] to 1 [everyone]). The 
y-axis indicates the percentage of districts that have each level of poverty. These data 
are derived from the World Bank’s Small Area Estimation (SAE) of Poverty (Elbers et 
al., 2003, 2005; Minot, 2000; Minot et al., 2003), and though these units correspond 
to spatial boundaries for the administrative units, they were originally reported in a 
table (not shown). By matching this table of poverty attributes with corresponding 
spatial boundaries, these units can be rendered spatially, as shown in Figure 13.2 
(Muniz et al., 2008). Without the map, it is not possible to recognize the spatial 
pattern of high poverty (shown in red) that is concentrated in central and northern 
Viet Nam. This type of data integration is relatively straightforward since the same 
administrative units are used as reporting units for both the table and the spatial 
boundaries. Even so, this type of integration requires common codes (or names) in 
each data set with which to link attributes (e.g., poverty rate) with spatial informa-
tion. This linking is a simple function in geospatial and other statistical software 
packages, without which this task would be cumbersome and error-prone. 
Additional spatial data integration in Viet Nam not only shows that some units 
are coastal, but also allows the land area and population at risk of seaward haz-
Figure 13.1: Frequency Distribution of Per Cent Poor in 
          Each District, Viet Nam
Note: The coloured lines from green to red indicate country-specifi c quintiles of poverty rates by 
district (third-order administrative unit).
Source: Muñiz et al., 2008.
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ards to be calculated according to a set of systematic characteristics accounting for 
coastal proximity and elevation. Figure 13.3 shows the data layers: poverty level in 
green to orange hues, the LECZ in blue hatching (McGranahan et al., 2007) and the 
urban footprint, derived from satellite imagery of night-time lights (from the Global 
Rural-Urban Mapping Project [GRUMP]), outlined in brown (described below and 
in Balk, 2009).  In this view, the LECZ covers a large portion of the land area, illus-
trating that, in this low-lying delta, it would be a huge underestimate to defi ne the 
Figure 13.2:  Poor in Each District,
 Viet Nam
Note: The shading from green to red represents 
country-specifi c quintiles of poverty rates by district 
(third-order administrative unit), and the extrusion 
represents numbers of poor persons (expressed in 
tens of thousands).
Data source: Minot, 2000.
Figure 13.3: Per Cent Poor, LECZ, and Urban Footprints, Viet Nam
Data sources: Minot, 2000; Muñiz et al., 2008; and McGranahan et al., 2007. 
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vulnerable population as only those residing in districts bordering the sea coast. 
Figure 13.3 also makes it possible to distinguish urban population and land (within 
the GRUMP urban footprints) from the rural (outside the footprints). 
From this integration, it is possible to summarize populations at risk, as in 
Table 13.1 and Figure 13.4. Table 13.1 summarizes three types of exposures: 
persons who live in cities entirely outside the LECZ, persons who live outside the 
LECZ but in cities with some land area in the LECZ and urbanpersons living in the 
LECZ. Vulnerability—here expressed as poverty—is indicated two ways: by the pro-
portion of the exposed population that is poor and by the total number of exposed 
persons who are poor. Though the poverty rates are similar among residents of the 
LECZ and residents of non-LECZ cities, those living in the LECZ outnumber poor 
people living in non-LECZ cities by fi ve to one. Figure 13.4 shows this graphically. 
Only data integration in a spatial framework makes these estimates possible.  
Table 13.1: Estimates of Urban Poor at Risk of Climate Change 
        Coastal Hazards, Viet Nam
% Poor 
Number of 
Poor
Number of 1 km 
cells
Non-LECZ City 26.6 342,030 79
Cities with any land area within the LECZ
LECZ City, Non-LECZ Land 20.30 413,623 36
LECZ City, LECZ Land 28.0 2,112,987 131
Data sources: Minot, 2000; Muniz et al., 2008; McGranahan et al., 2007.
Table 13.2: Comparison of  Spatial and Tabular Approaches to 
        Estimating Urban Population Distribution: 
        Population Density in the Urban Low-elevation 
        Coastal Zone
Country
Average 
Resolution of 
Underlying 
Census Data 
(km)
Distribution 
of Urban 
Areas
Tabular 
(National 
Aggregate) 
Estimates 
Spatially-
derived 
Estimates
Ratio of 
Tabular 
to Spatial 
Estimates
Viet Nam 8 Most in LECZ 4,489 3,317 1.4
Philippines 14
Many in the 
LECZ
13,284 3,636 3.7
Brazil 29
Biggest ones 
in the LECZ
11,523 939 12.3
South Africa 1
Most not in 
the LECZ
92,413 1,463 63.2
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the
184
Most not in 
the LECZ
146,533 102 1,431.2
Data sources: Minot, 2000; Muniz et al., 2008; McGranahan et al., 2007.
Urban LECZ Population ÷ 
Urban LECZ Land
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Figure 13.4: Percent Poor and Number of Poor in Urban Areas, 
         Viet Nam
Data sources: Minot, 2000; Muñiz et al., 2008; McGranahan et al., 2007.
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Data integration challenges in general
Estimates that are derived strictly from national-level aggregates and that do not for-
mally integrate demographic and environmental data using a spatial framework are 
likely to produce highly inaccurate estimates. Neither cities nor persons (regardless 
of whether they are urban or rural residents) are uniformly distributed across na-
tional territories. New analyses have identifi ed some patterns of city and population 
distribution vis-à-vis geographic characteristics. In a global study, McGranahan et al. 
(2007) found that LECZs are disproportionately urban compared to other ecozones 
such as drylands. Further, they found that 75 per cent of all countries have their 
largest city in the LECZ. In Table 13.2, two estimates of population density in urban 
areas in the LECZ are examined for fi ve countries. Estimates based on national-level 
aggregates that are expressed only as tables (tabular estimates) are compared to es-
timates based on overlaid spatial data comprising administrative, night-time lights 
and settlement attribute data (see below and Balk, 2009, for more on GRUMP meth-
odology). The fi ve countries in Table 13.2 vary in the spatial resolution of their cen-
sus data; low numbers indicate many smaller census units. Viet Nam is an example 
of a country with most of its urban areas (and much of its land area) in the LECZ. 
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Scale and Resolution
In order to produce robust urban estimates, data must be spatial and must be of 
suffi cient resolution and scale. Recent efforts have produced basic descriptions 
of the population distribution of urban areas in a spatial framework (Balk, 2009; 
Montgomery and Balk, forthcoming). These efforts are an important departure 
from prior approaches: Population estimates for cities can now be rendered in 
physical space. However, there is currently no spatial database that allows for 
the estimation of changes in urban population and area at a global scale. While 
moderate- and high-resolution data permit change estimation at the scale of a city 
or a handful of cities, much work in methodology, data processing and validation 
remains to be done before a globally consistent, spatial-temporal view of urban 
areas exists (Small, 2005). 
While spatial data are necessary, they may not be suffi cient: The properties of 
the spatial data matter. Especially when evaluating spatially-specifi c urban popu-
lation data with respect to environmental data, resolution must be at a scale that 
is appropriate for urban-area-level analysis; that is, the unit of analysis must be 
fi ne enough to adequately capture variation within and around the urban area. 
Currently, the resolution of most geophysical data—such as the historical climate 
record and future climate predictions, as well as many disaster databases—is much 
coarser than that of the city, preventing meaningful analysis of these geophy-
sical data at the city and sub-city scales. Just like national-level aggregates, coarse 
spatial data misleadingly distribute place-specifi c characteristics over a too-large 
Table 13.3: Resolution of Selected Spatial Data and Size of Average 
        Urban Areas
East-West Arcs
Distance per 
side (km) Area (km2)
at equator
5 degrees Climate models
1 degree 111.32 12,392.1
0.5 degee Rainfall, precipitation models 55.66 3,098.0
Average urban area, 1 million + persons 1,650.0
5 minutes (0.083°) Gridded Populatin of the World (GPW) v1 9.30 86.5
Average urban area, <1 million persons 70.0
2.5 minute 
(0.042°)
GPW v3 4.65 21.6
30 arc-sec 
(0.0083°)
GRUMP, SRTM, Ecozones 0.93 0.9
1 arc-sec 
(0.000278°)
Landsat 0.03 0.0009
Quiksat, Ikonos 0.001 0.000001
Note: Average urban area size is determined by GRUMP for cities in Africa, Asia and South America. 
Distance and area calculated at the equator.
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region. If the true characteristic is variable across the areal unit of analysis (the ‘cell’ 
in geophysical parlance), coarsely resolved data will mask intra-cell variation. 
Table 13.3 shows the resolution of some key environmental data and the average 
size of urban areas in Africa, Asia and South America. Urban localities are much 
smaller than, and would be subsumed by, the cells of many spatial data sources. 
This means that no variation in these environmental data would be observed within 
an urban area, a presumption that is clearly false. High- and moderate-resolution 
satellite imagery can often provide a smaller-celled view into urban areas, but these 
images typically show vegetation and other features rather than climate data. Ap-
propriate use of integrated data critically depends on issues of scale and precision.
Satellite data: More than just a pretty picture? 
Satellite data may be the most objective means by which to systematically iden-
tify urban areas (Potere and Schneider, 2009). At a local or regional scale, these 
data may be used to identify change in built-up area or land use. Inexperienced 
users of satellite imagery must remember that without expertise an image is not 
much more than a pretty picture. It takes considerable knowledge to evaluate, 
interpret and classify satellite data (Small, 2005). With expert evaluation, sat-
ellites can reveal a great deal about vegetation, permanent lights and built-up 
areas, but these data are not ready to use outside of a spatial framework. It usu-
ally takes interdisciplinary teams of researchers to translate satellite data into 
outputs that can be integrated with census-type population data (Small and 
Cohen, 2004). 
Satellite data have some shortcomings. The data never provide the city names, 
identifying codes or statistical reporting concepts (e.g., city proper, urban agglom-
eration) that are commonly attached to population censuses. This may not be an 
important shortcoming when studying a single location, but it is a signifi cant 
limitation when working across many localities or at a regional or global scale. 
Satellite data are costly to process, and many types are prone to cloud cover, which 
obscures the features of interest. Additionally, analysis is more subjective than the 
typical social scientist is used to. 
Satellite data, however, also have unique strengths. Unlike surveys, censuses or 
even administrative boundary data, for which the cost of collection tends to be 
borne by countries, the cost of satellite imagery is borne in large part by the data 
collector. (Sometimes, a portion of that charge is passed on to data users as fees.) 
The data may be supplied by international experts or their space-borne technol-
ogy. This means even countries with limited resources can be studied with high-
quality data. 
Although some satellite data can be a time series, few global studies of inte grated 
data are. In Chapter 5 of this volume, a study is described wherein an integrated 
data set linking satellite-derived urban footprints to names and population values 
is constructed, but it does not have time-varying spatial data for cities. Though 
much has been learned from data integration, those lessons have not resulted in 
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an automated process for continued future integration. Integration of disparate 
data sets is—and should be expected to remain for the foreseeable future—a highly 
labour-intensive enterprise, even with considerable programming aids.  
Demographic data: More than just head counts? 
The global demographic record is built from a variety of data sources: national 
censuses, vital registration data and household survey data. Sometimes censuses 
or even vital registrations are rendered at a fi ne sub-city resolution, but surveys 
typically are not. Survey data tend to be relied on mostly in countries with weak 
census or vital registration systems. How to best piece together these multiple and 
fl uid data types to build a fuller record for city (and sub-city) demographic data at 
a global scale is an open question. 
The demographic record has its own shortcomings (see Montgomery et al., 
2003). There is no globally consistent or systematic set of demographic estimates 
for the world’s cities, except for the most populous cities and those large enough 
to be comprised of standard census reporting units (such as counties or districts). 
For most cities of the world, there are no data on age distribution, fertility, morta-
lity or migration. Even when this type of information is available at the city scale, 
it is rare that it also exists for neighbourhoods within cities (Weeks et al., 2007). In 
some cases, urban estimates exist that are aggregated to the national or fi rst-order 
subnational units, but this record cannot be translated to specifi c cities or even 
classes of cities based on their population size. 
Figure 13.5: Mismatch Example, LECZ and Per Cent Poor, Kenya
Data sources: CIESIN et al., 2008; Ndeng’e, 2003; McGranahan et al., 2007.
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Issues that arise upon integration
The precision and accuracy of the various data layers matter, and small differences 
may be amplifi ed when different data sources are integrated. Figure 13.5 shows how 
small differences in the precision of the administrative boundary-based coast line 
of Kenya (data initially supplied by the Kenyan National Statistical Offi ce [Ndeng’e, 
2003]) and the LECZ layer (from Shuttle-Radar Topography Mission Digital Eleva-
tion data) result in evident gaps between the land (yellow-red hues depicting the 
distribution of poverty) and sea (in blue). White space shows the mismatch. This 
can result in the mischaracterization of the population at risk of coastal fl ooding 
and other seaward hazards. Whether one or both data sources are inaccurate is a 
matter yet to be determined. All data integration is at risk of this type of mismatch. 
Even within countries, different data users might modify boundary data to suit 
their needs. Some agencies wish to include water bodies in jurisdictional boundaries 
while others wish to omit them. Sometimes there is agreement on how to reconcile 
multiple sets of boundaries, but often there is not. 
To study urbanization, the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (see Balk, 2009) 
uses night-time lights satellite data as a proxy for urban areas, combined with popu-
lation settlement data. While night-time lights are the most systematic urban foot-
print, it is evident that, in some locations at least, they are an imperfect proxy for 
urban areas. Lights can be seen where there is no identifi able settlement, and some 
settlements have no corresponding light. Figure 13.6 shows these mismatches. 
GRUMP accepts the latter type of location and estimates a settlement size based on 
other known settlements, but disregards lights without points, as these are believed 
Figure 13.6: Night-time Lights, Nigeria
Data source: CIESIN et al., 2008.
Light with matching 
settlement point 
Settlement point with no  
detectable light 
Light without  
settlement point 
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to be unlikely to be true settlements (e.g., lights produced by oil fl ares in oil-produc-
ing countries are not permanent human settlements). It is, however, possible that 
some lights without points were omitted from the national statistical reporting of 
settlements for other reasons (such as political ones) and that the lights are a means 
for challenging census results. Either way, it is integration that opens up these im-
portant inquiries for each analyst to adjudicate for him- or herself.
Every data integration effort will require some subjective judgement on the 
part of researchers. In addition to the examples above, the authors of this chap-
ter have faced several puzzles. For example, if two settlements are identifi ed with 
near-identical geographic coordinates, and have names that match but for one 
letter, are they the same city or different cities? If a settlement falls outside an ob-
served light, should that settlement be considered part of the same urban area as 
the light, given the spatial measurement error of the lights (about 3km)? Should 
settlements falling within 3km of a light be assigned to the light? (Perhaps a band 
of 3km of the lights on both sides of the light boundary should be treated as less 
sure matches.) If a light appears very near the border of two countries, is the preci-
sion of the country boundary great enough to defi nitively place the light in one 
country? Does a many-to-one match between settlements and urban areas make 
sense if the settlements are meant to represent a relatively large metropolitan area? 
The answer to these dilemmas may depend on the purpose of the study.
Most important, when subjective data integration decisions are made, a transpar-
ent record of these decisions and the reasoning behind them must be kept, and an 
effort must be made to develop a systematic approach for analogous issues. Both of 
these concerns can be addressed by programming the data integration process in 
statistical software such as Stata or SAS. Python is particularly useful for working 
with spatial data, as it can create output easily read by map ma king software such as 
ArcGIS. Careful, well-documented programming is crucial to a study’s repeatability 
and transparency, a point that cannot be made strongly enough.
Conclusions
It is not known precisely where climate change will occur. But to prepare for those 
changes, both climate-change and social-science researchers need to adopt a spa-
tial framework of analysis that is attentive to current and future population con-
centrations in urban areas. The integration of these data is essential to under-
standing the risks that populations face from climate change.
Understanding the construction of integrated data is essential for data users, 
even for those users uninvolved in the integration process. Development and plan-
ning efforts for improvements in urban drainage or sanitation, for example, re-
quire both spatial and population data; so does projecting where migration will 
swell the populations of towns and cities that lie in the path of risk. National 
economic strategists need to be made aware of the implications of locating special 
economic zones in sensitive areas and of promoting coastal development in what 
will become environmentally risky sites. Secondary data users, such as developers 
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and planners, must inform themselves of methodological decisions made in the 
construction of any integrated data sets, because these decisions will impact the 
interpretability—and conclusions—of analyses resulting from these data. 
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Population Data for Climate 
Change Analysis
Hy Dao
Jaap van Woerden
Multiple Data for Climate Mitigation and Adaptation 
Analysis
Climate change analysis covers a myriad of complexities related to defi nition issues 
(e.g., the categorization of urban/rural areas); temporal and spatial scales (global, 
regional, national and community); the measurement of consumption-based ver-
sus supply-based emissions; defi nitions of basic information such as coastlines 
and boundaries; and omissions in the production and dissemination of statistical 
data, among many others. Data on population are at the centre of most of the 
climate-change analysis to be carried out, including climate scenarios, as well as 
of analyses of vulnerability, impacts and adaptation. Population, as both a driver 
and a subject of climate change, is part of the issue, but it is also part of the solu-
tion through actions that societies and individuals can take for mitigation and 
adaptation.
From previous global assessments, it appears that responses to the challenges 
of climate change require the use of multiple sets of data for multiple types of 
analyses of both the mitigation and the adaptation dimensions. Therefore, one 
of the foremost challenges in understanding the linkages between population dy-
namics and climate change lies in identifying, collecting and integrating data on 
multiple thematic, temporal and spatial scales.
A community of researchers is working on the integration of satellite imagery, 
climate modelling and socio-demographic data in order to understand local vul-
nerability in many parts of the world. These efforts, however, are under-funded 
and are being carried out with less than optimal coherence and coordination with-
in the United Nations system to have a holistic global picture.
United Nations support for improved data streams and technical assistance are 
essential for making these connections. United Nations agencies must advocate 
for responses that include the characterization of population trends and support 
the data collection, research and analysis at the global and country levels that are 
necessary to ensure that policy responses are evidence-based. Encouraging and 
supporting the timely release of high-quality census data is also an important role 
for global institutions.
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Access to global data has improved signifi cantly in recent years, mainly 
in response to the development of global integrated environment assessments. 
Several data portals at the United Nations, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
etc. provide very valuable data sets at the country and regional levels. As the 
global picture is becoming clearer, more detailed and local information is now 
required in order to design appropriate concrete mitigation and adaptation 
measures.
This chapter will briefl y review the main data needs already identifi ed in exist-
ing assessment reports before addressing the defi nitional, spatial and temporal 
aspects of population data in a wider setting of climate-change analysis.
Overview of Climate-related Data Issues
Mitigation and adaptation data
The issue of climate change has now moved to the top of the environmental 
policy agenda. The entire United Nations system is committed to supporting 
Member States as an effective, inclusive and credible partner in mitigating and 
adapting to climate change. Thus, mitigation and adaptation to climate change 
have become global priorities. UNEP certainly is no exception to that. With the 
release of the Fourth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) and the Bali Action Plan adopted by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Conference of the Par-
ties 13, UNEP was able to fi nalize its Medium Term Strategy (MTS) with six the-
matic priorities topped by climate change. Several other priority areas are very 
much related to climate change, such as ecosystem management, disasters and 
confl ict, resource effi ciency and environmental governance. Four major themes 
related to climate change were identifi ed: adaptation, mitigation, science and 
communication.
While population is a major driving force of climate change, it receives relatively 
little attention and is often treated as an external factor. There is, however, an up-
stream relationship between population and climate change: More people mean 
more emissions, more production and more consumption. Most rapidly growing 
populations currently have very low per capita greenhouse gas emissions, but per 
capita emissions and populations are increasing rapidly in much of the world, and 
the developing world is becoming a substantial contributor to climate change. 
While industrialized countries have contributed the most to the accumulation of 
emissions in the atmosphere, emissions in the developing world will grow signifi -
cantly faster in coming decades—because of population growth, economic growth, 
a high dependence on fossil fuels and a relatively high energy intensity:1 “[T]the 
effect on global emissions of the decrease in global energy intensity (-33%) during 
1970 to 2004 has been smaller than the combined effect of global income growth 
(77%) and global population growth (69%); both drivers of increasing energy-
related CO2 emissions” (IPCC, 2007).
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Table 14.1: Requirements for Mitigation and Adaptation
Climate-change mitigation data needs
General GHG emission trends (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6);
Population, urban and rural, poverty, migration.
Land-cover and land-use change, land degradation.
Gross domestic product (GDP)/Purchasing power parity (PPP), sector value 
added, household consumption.
Energy Energy use, supply and intensity (by sector), production and use of renewable 
energy (solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, biofuels), nuclear power, natural gas, 
coal, oil, gas. 
Transport Number of hybrid and cleaner diesel vehicles, transport volume by rail/road/
water/air/non-motorized.
Buildings Use of energy-saving bulbs, improved cook stoves, isolation.
Industry Material recycling and substitution rates, heat and power recovery, etc.
Agriculture Afforestation, reforestation, forest management, avoided deforestation, 
harvested wood product management.
Waste 
management 
Landfi ll methane recovery, composting of organic wastes, waste disposal, 
treatment and recycling, waste water treatment. 
Policies Climate policies and measures, carbon prices, emission trading, budgets and 
expenditures for climate policies, meteorological monitoring.
Climate-change adaptation data needs
Water Water availability and droughts in tropics, high latitudes, mid-latitudes and 
semi-arid low latitudes;
Number of people exposed to (increased) water stress.
Ecosystems Number and risk of extinction.
Coastal wetlands, coastal areas.
Coral bleaching.
Species range shifts and wildfi re risk.
Food Productivity of cereals at low-mid-high altitudes;
Local impacts on small holders, subsistence farmers and fi shers.
Coasts Number of people exposed to coastal fl ooding each year.
Damage from fl oods and storms.
Average rate of sea level rise.
Health Changed distribution of some disease vectors;
Burden from malnutrition, diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory and infectious 
diseases.
Morbidity and mortality from heat waves, fl oods and droughts.
Burden on health services (expenditures).
Source:  IPCC, 2007.
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There are also downstream relationships, through the link between poverty 
and vulnerability to the effects of climate change, changes in water supply and 
availability, internal and cross-border migration and potential confl icts and 
disasters. 
In order to assess climate change mitigation and adaptation opportunities, 
and address the interlinkages, a whole range of scientifi c data and indicators are 
needed. The requirements for mitigation and adaptation specifi ed in the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) are presented in Table 14.1 (IPCC, 2007).
Many of the worldwide climate-related data and indicators are collected through 
scientifi c measurements, e.g., temperature, precipitation, radiation and so forth. 
Others are compiled by international agencies on the basis of statistical surveys, 
often using national statistical sources and, more recently, remote sensing data. 
This is the case, for example, for population (United Nations Population Divi-
sion), gross domestic product (United Nations Statistics Division [UNSD] and the 
World Bank), forestry and agriculture (FAO), health (World Health Organization 
[WHO]) and energy (International Energy Agency [IEA]), among others.
But various additional data need to be collected and/or compiled to adequately 
address climate-change adaptation and mitigation issues. The list of these data 
and indicators, for which national statistical offi ces can play a role in regularly 
collecting information, includes:
Air emissions reporting, most notably in developing (‘non-Annex 1’) coun- •
tries, and including underlying energy and activity data;
Data on infrastructure development (roads, etc.) and the amount of building  •
(housing, offi ces, industrial plants, etc.);
Use of renewable energy sources; •
Use of energy-saving technology (bulbs, building insulation, hybrid cars,  •
etc.);
Eco-labelling and use of certifi ed products (such as certifi ed wood); •
Use of emissions trading and climate compensation schemes (including  •
carbon pricing);
Volume data on transport modes (motorized and non-motorized); •
Material recycling and substitution; •
Water use; •
Land/vegetation cover and ecosystem areas (wetlands, coasts); •
Species extinction, migration patterns; •
Harvest and crop production (wheat, maize, rice, etc.); •
Mortality and morbidity (specifi c diseases); •
Number and extent of hydro-meteorological disasters (fl oods, fi res, storms,  •
droughts, heat and cold waves) and the resulting damage;
Budgets and expenditures on health services, disaster prevention and  •
damage repair (recovery).
These data would allow the international community to better assess the causes 
and impacts of, and the responses to, climate change at the global, regional and 
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national levels. Nevertheless, because of the costs and efforts required to acquire 
and update these data, their relevance must be clearly defi ned. From an empirical 
point of view, the spatial and temporal completeness of existing data must be as-
sessed, since many sociodemographic indicators are still incomplete. For instance, 
fi gures on education, poverty and governance are only available for a limited num-
ber of countries, and past data, as well as projections, are diffi cult to obtain. The 
redundancy of data also needs to be evaluated. For instance, it is well known that 
GDP and the Human Development Index are highly correlated. Therefore, the sim-
ple use of the more complete GDP data could be enough (and more effi cient) as a 
proxy for the study of development levels. Some data are easily accessible because 
of well-established and standardized observation processes (economic accounts, 
environmental measurement networks, national statistics), whereas others are 
more diffi cult to acquire because they come from irregular surveys and subjective 
perceptions (e.g., the governance indicators). In parallel to these pragmatic consid-
erations, and more fundamentally, data must fi t into a properly defi ned theoreti-
cal model in order to be fully relevant as indicators for climate-change studies, as 
will be discussed in the next sections.
Framing data and indicators 
Defi nitional problems 
Is GDP a mitigation or adaptation indicator? 
It is not always clear how to categorize data into mitigation, impact or adapta-
tion indicators nor is it clear how to draw the line between these three groups. For 
instance, GDP is listed above as a mitigation variable, but it is neither directly nor 
Figure 14.1: GDP and CO2 Emissions
Linking population with 
economy and GHG emissions:
What is the relation between 
GDP and CO2 emissions?
Will it remain the same in 
the future?
Data source: GEO Data Portal 
http://geodata.grid.unep.ch
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linearly linked to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, in particular to CO2 emissions 
(see Figure 14.1). This relationship is infl uenced by other factors such as the tech-
nology available, the structure of the economy, the level of imports/exports and the 
nature of consumption by households, among others. Furthermore, decoupling 
economic growth and environmental pressure is an explicit objective of some en-
vironmental policies (e.g., the Environmental Strategy of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development [OECD]). The fact that GDP is not the only 
relevant driver of GHG emissions is nothing new, but GDP is still considered a main, 
or at least indirect, driving factor in many climate-change assessments.
On the other hand, GDP can be used to assess the impacts of climate change on 
the economy: Weather-related disasters can destroy livelihoods and infrastructure, 
affect the working population through diseases, thus diminishing the production 
capacities of a territory. Finally, GDP can be seen as a vulnerability proxy since 
weaker economies might have more diffi culties in adapting to climate change and 
to its related effects. Large and diversifi ed economies have more power to absorb 
the shocks of disasters than small and single-sector-based economies.
What is population?
The same questions apply to population as a driver of GHG emissions. The number 
of people as such might not be the main determinant of consumption and emission 
levels. The structure of households (size, age and composition) and their consump-
tion habits may have a strong role (O’Neill et al., 2002). Therefore, additional demo-
graphic variables (along with their projections for the next decades) may be needed, 
at various spatial scales, to properly estimate future emissions patterns.
Population is impacted by climate change, and it will act to adapt. In assessing 
potential impacts, the traditional residential approach to inventorying population 
may not always be the most relevant one. In the course of a normal week or day, peo-
ple are often not at home. They work, travel, shop and engage in leisure activities in 
many different places. Population maps based on census data show a specifi c spatial 
distribution that is representative of certain time periods and population groups 
(e.g., non-active versus active). For risk management, it also necessary to complement 
this view with other data such as those on working and shopping locations, which 
are more appropriate for locating people during the daytime. Figure 14.2 shows the 
difference between employment and residential locations in Geneva in 2000.
In terms of adaptation, additional data on the structure of the population 
might be useful. Median age, age dependency ratio and life expectancy are impor-
tant indicators of vulnerability as well as of the capacity of a territory to react to 
future shocks. Ageing, for example, is occurring in industrialized countries, but 
it might be counterbalanced by an expected higher life expectancy in the next 
decades (Johansson et al., 2002). 
Multi-dimensional approaches 
The preceding remarks underline the importance of placing each indicator into 
context, if not into a structured model. Since the 1970s, studies on the relation-
ships between people and the environment have progressively made use of more 
and more sophisticated models for understanding the nuances of these linkages, 
e.g., in the fi elds of land-cover/land-use change or climate change (de Sherbinin et 
al., 2007). The development of population-environment theories was also made 
possible by the increased availability of data at different temporal and spatial 
scales. These models combine, in an integrated way, knowledge on both the bio-
physical and the socio-economical dimensions of the earth system from multiple 
disciplines. Based on quantitative and qualitative data, the models are subject 
to various levels of uncertainties which have to be expressed. They are abstract 
and simplifi ed views on the states and processes of the real world, which can (and 
should) support information and decision-making. 
One famous example of a simple model is the “I = PAT identity” (impact [I] = 
population [P] x affl uence [A] x technology [T]), introduced in the early 1970s. The 
I = PAT equation was applied in the fi eld of climate change, in particular in the IPCC 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000), for expressing emissions 
(e.g., CO2 emissions) as a function of population, income and energy intensity:
CO2 Emissions = Population x (GDP/Population) x (Energy/GDP) x (CO2 /Energy)
More complex examples include global scenario studies, such as the IPCC 
SRES, the United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment or the Global 
Environmental Outlook (GEO), the ‘fl agship’ report of UNEP. Since its fi rst edition 
in 1997, the GEO has developed an increasingly integrated approach to environ-
mental analysis, making use of indicators and reporting. This has resulted in a 
whole range of global, regional, national, local and thematic reports as well as 
various databases, information and learning tools and other resources. This type 
of environmental assessment is a key vehicle for promoting the interaction be-
tween science processes and the various stages of the policy- and decision-making 
cycle. These studies underpin decision-making by UNEP’s Governing Council, the 
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various Multilateral Environmental Agreements, regional ministerial environ-
mental forums, the private sector and national and local authorities.
The methodology of the GEO Integrated Environmental Assessment (IEA) 
report series is now well established and documented.2 It follows a multi-the-
matic, multi-region and scenario-based approach. It is adapted and applied to 
various spatial scales, from the global to the regional, national and local/urban 
(e.g., GEO-Cities reports). This series of studies is based on the model, “Driv-
ing Forces – Pressures – States – Impacts – Responses” (DPSIR), a framework 
for analysing the interactions between society and the environment. DPSIR, an 
extension of the previous OECD pressure-state-response (PSR) model, enables 
a formal and causal analysis of factors that have an infl uence on the environ-
ment. Although sometimes seen as too mechanistic, the DPSIR framework 
helps to structure data and indicators on various dimensions of environmental 
problems. These data are the foundation of subsequent analyses. Networks of 
partner institutions around the world (namely, the GEO collaborating centres) 
have provided data and interpretations at various levels of analysis. These have 
been disseminated through global and regional GEO Data Portals,3 which have 
found users far beyond the GEO partners.
Policymakers often face a growing list of environmental challenges. Many of 
these are complex: They have a direct or indirect effect on human well-being and 
require an enhanced understanding to support effective response measures and 
actions. Integrated environmental assessment and early warning approaches have 
strengthened the harmonization and the accessibility of reliable environmental data 
and information for improved policymaking at different levels. Data portals have 
considerably facilitated the practical use of data by means of graphs, tables or maps 
or by providing for the downloading of data sets in GIS compatible formats.
Today, there is a greater investment by the international community and gov-
ernments in environmental assessments and early warning information services, 
in terms of both human and fi nancial resources. However, despite the availability 
of considerable information on the state and trends of the global environment, 
there is a lack of adequate and relevant data, and there is a lessened capacity of 
monitoring and data collection systems, especially when detailed, up-to-date and 
complete data are needed at various scales.
Data needs for different scales of analysis
While a vast amount of data and indicators is already available for analysis and 
information purposes, more data of high quality are needed. National statistical 
offi ces can play an important role in collecting new and additional data and—
together with the United Nations and other agencies—in strengthening and 
harmonizing existing surveys and other data collection activities in the area of 
adaptation to and mitigation of climate change.
In order to be scientifi cally credible and policy relevant at the same time—
which do not always go together—it is of critical importance to work with sound, 
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reviewed data, preferably from offi cial records. National statistical offi ces and in-
ternational agencies play an equally important role in collecting and harmonizing 
census data. Additional research and modelling are needed to assist with data har-
monization, analyses of interlinkages and the development of scenarios.
Besides ‘real’ physical climate data, it is important to consolidate and improve 
authoritative data collections and compilations in the socio-economic and natural 
resources realms, using statistical surveys, as well as other sources such as satellite 
imagery—the end goal being to have proper, authoritative data in place to assess 
and address climate change issues adequately at all levels.
In terms of population, the two key variables, of course, are size and distribu-
tion—both to estimate absolute fi gures and to derive per capita data. As already 
stated, changes in distribution and size are as important, i.e., data on mortality, 
fertility, age composition, urbanization and migration. In addition to historical 
data (trends), projections and scenarios are needed to show the potential impacts 
and effects of environmental and other policies.
For both analysis and policy formulation activities, scale matters: “[A]s 
different phenomena take place at different spatial scales, the preferred spatial 
scale depends on the analysis undertaken” (van Vuuren et al., 2007, p. 114). Data 
for large regions or groups of countries are suffi cient for global assessments and 
scenarios such as those developed in the GEO or the SRES studies. Global models, 
however, hide variations between and within countries (for instance, energy 
intensity may vary considerably from one country to another). Thus, national 
data are required for international negotiations or for the implementation 
of environmental conventions. For local activities linked to vulnerability and 
Figure 14.3: Population Data Discrepancies between European and 
         United Nations Data, Spain, 2000-2006
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adaptation to climate change, such as land-planning or sanitation, detailed and 
geo-referenced data are needed because of the spatial variation of determinant 
factors such as land cover/land use, terrain, location of infrastructures and 
access to water, among others.
The following section addresses some of the aspects related to the compara-
bility of information sources as well as to the spatial disaggregation of demo-
graphic data.
Comparing population data sources
Climate change modelling or environmental assessments often face the problem 
of data scarcity. It is also possible that more than one data source is available. This 
is the case for CO2 emissions at the global level (UNFCCC and Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center [CDIAC] country data, for instance, can be found on 
the GEO Data Portal) or for population data when international data sources are 
compared to regional data. In this view, the European Spatial Planning Observa-
tion Network (ESPON) 2013 Database project4 is currently conducting a compat-
ibility study in order to evaluate the compatibility among data from the United 
Nations community (UN Statistical Division, UNEP) and those from the Euro-
pean Union (Eurostat, ESPON).
Preliminary results indicate that some countries show large discrepancies 
among data sources, as seen in the example of Spain where differences increase 
through the time-period 2000-2006 (see Figure 14.3).
In general, observed differences are higher when indicators are further dis-
aggregated: In the example provided for data on age-classes in Belgium in 
2005 (Figure 14.4), a maximum difference of 3.4 per cent is reached by the 
age-class 85+ against only 0.1 per cent for the total population (i.e., the sum of all 
age-classes). In some cases, the discrepancies can be easily explained by differences 
in the defi nition of territorial units (e.g., the inclusion of overseas territories in the 
defi nition of France), but this is sometimes less clear for other cases.
The same observations can be made for demographic projections. In the case 
of total population projections to 2050 for Europe, the main United Nations vari-
ants from World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision (United Nations, 2007) and 
the models from the ESPON project 1.1.4, “The Spatial Effects of Demographic 
Trends and Migration” (Johansson and Rauhut, 2002), depict a wide range of 
scenarios (see Figure 14.5).
All scenarios are modelled using basic demographic variables such as fertility 
and mortality rates and migration. The inclusion (or exclusion) of these variables, 
along with assumptions about their evolution, explain the differences between the 
scenarios.5
Downscaling Population Data and Scenarios
Once data sources are identifi ed and clearly understood in terms of what they 
measure, there may be a need to refi ne the available (generally measured) data by 
means of estimation models, in order to achieve higher spatial resolution. This 
process, known as spatial disaggregation, has been conceptualized and applied 
in different fi elds including biodiversity mapping (estimation of species distribu-
tion), climate modelling and poverty and population mapping. A wide range of 
statistical, physical and deterministic models (or a combination of these) has been 
developed. The next sections focus on demographic data disaggregation models.
Downscaling demographic data: Population data are generally available by 
politico-administrative areal units (countries or sub-national units). The most 
complete data come from censuses. Administrative registers (population, electoral 
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Figure 14.5: Various Population Projections
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Figure 14.4: Age-class Data Discrepancies between European 
         and United Nations Data, Belgium, 2005
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lists, vehicle registrations, tax records) can provide reliable data in some countries. 
These data can also be complemented by surveys, which cover only a sample of the 
phenomenon to be observed.
The politico-administrative type of spatial units is relevant for decision-making 
purposes since they represent the spatial extents of political power. However, they 
are not well suited to environmental studies because ecological phenomena have 
different boundaries, if they have boundaries at all (e.g., temperature, altitude).
Since integrated models and assessments imply the combination of various 
dimensions of the environment, a common spatial reference is needed, the 
simplest one being a regular grid of square cells (a raster grid). To illustrate how 
data by areal units can be transformed into gridded data, four examples are briefl y 
described in Figure 14.6.
The Gridded Population of the World (GPW v3)6 is a global population data 
set at the resolution of 2.5 arc-minutes (5 km at the equator) for every fi ve-year 
interval from 1990 to 2015. Data on more than 400,000 politico-administrative 
units (with fi gures from the two most recent censuses circa 1990 and 2000) have 
been extrapolated to the selected years and rasterized using a simple assumption 
of uniform distribution of population. The main effort has been in the acquisi-
tion of the most detailed source data possible. An extension of this product is the 
model developed by the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP), which 
makes use of ancillary data such as satellite imagery for further distributing pop-
ulation between urban and rural areas at a spatial resolution of 30 arc-seconds 
(1 km at the equator).
Another data set, LandScan,7 provides a global raster grid at a 30 arc-second reso-
lution. The assumptions for the distribution of population aim at representing the 
so-called ambient population, which integrates movements and travel. Night-time 
Figure 14.6: Population Exposure to a Flood, from GPW, GRUMP 
          and LandScan Calculations
Example of population fi gures extracted from three data sources for a single fl ood event 
(in light blue)
   GPW v3, pop.= 484,155               GRUMP, pop.= 445,711           LANDSCAN, pop.= 506,178
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lights imagery, data on elevation, land cover and transportation networks are used 
to estimate population in each cell of the grid. The objective of LandScan is not to 
count people at their place of residence, but rather to provide an estimate of their 
“likely ambient locations integrated over a 24-hour period for typical days, weeks, 
and seasons”.8 The concept of ambient population differs from the residential ap-
proach of GPW. Only the most recent versions of LandScan (2006 and 2007) are 
available because the methodology has changed since the original 1998 modelling.
A third type of model developed at UNEP9 also distributes population in a non-
uniform way, on the basis of an accessibility index calculated by means of data 
on transportation and settlements. The model assumes that population tends to 
locate in the most accessible areas.
Starting from more or less the same demographic data by sub-national units, 
these models result in different pictures of population distribution. Although 
each model has its rationale and validity, the use of one or another has different 
implications. In Figure 14.6, for example, a fl ood event is drawn based on GPW, 
GRUMP and LandScan data. The calculations of the population affected by this 
event show contrasting fi gures, depending on the data source considered.
In any case, the assumptions behind the models should be known and docu-
mented. General evaluation criteria for selecting a downscaling model can never-
theless be proposed: “(1) consistency with existing local data (for the base year); (2) 
consistency with the original source (the scenario data on the much coarser scale); 
(3) transparency; and (4) plausibility of the outcome” (van Vuuren et al., 2007, p. 
115). These criteria are partially met by the GPW/GRUMP and LandScan data 
sets. Local data have been used in the GPW/GRUMP grids since they are derived 
from almost 400,000 base administrative units, against 70,000 for LandScan 2000 
(although several thousand units have been added in subsequent versions of Land-
Scan). The consistency with original data is met by both data sources, since the 
GPW/GRUMP and LandScan methods simply distribute population within each 
original spatial unit. Furthermore, GPW provides additional extrapolated popula-
tion grids that are explicitly adjusted to United Nations’ national scenarios until 
2015. The transparency is very high for the GPW/GRUMP products: Methods and 
data sources have been documented and published. For LandScan, a basic docu-
mentation is available, but demographic data sources are not clearly described, 
and the details of the method were not published. LandScan, however, has evolved 
in such a way that comparisons between the various updates are impossible. 
Finally, the plausibility of the modelled population values depends on the objec-
tive of the users. The GPW grid is based on the assumption of a uniform distribu-
tion of population within each spatial unit, which is in fact very unrealistic. But 
this is counterbalanced by the effort put into collecting the most possibly detailed 
base demographic data. GRUMP, while improving the GPW spatial resolution by 
a factor of fi ve, is also introducing a more precise distribution of population be-
tween urban and rural areas. Both GRUMP and GPW provide an indication of 
the residential population. LandScan, on the other hand, assesses a very different 
concept of ambient population, i.e., the potential presence of population through 
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time at a given place for various reasons (residence, travel, work, leisure, etc.). This 
idea might be relevant, for instance, for risk management purposes.
Downscaling scenarios: Similar to downscaling actual data, demographic 
projections and scenarios have been spatially disaggregated in recent global as-
sessments. For instance, various models for downscaling the IPCC’s Special Re-
port on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) scenarios to the grid level (0.5° x 0.5°) have 
been developed (Gaffi n et al., 2004; Grübler et al., 2007; van Vuuren et al., 2007). 
These models downscaled drivers of climate change: emissions, population and 
GDP. In the most recent of the examples cited (van Vuuren et al., 2007), 17 world 
regions of the SRES scenarios were downscaled to the national and grid-size  levels 
(0.5° resolution, i.e., 55 km at the equator). In order to achieve the grid estimation 
of population, national growth rates for each of the SRES scenarios have been 
linearly applied to each grid cell of the GPW 2000 data which is used as the base 
grid. The gridded GDPs were obtained by multiplying the national GDP per capita 
by the population grids. GHG emissions were only disaggregated at the national 
level by means of the I = PAT model.
For further sub-regional or national studies, fi ner downscaling might be need-
ed in order to reach decision-making relevance at these scales. In particular, emis-
sions should be disaggregated at the grid level, and more data on land-cover/land-
use change incorporated. This is, for instance, the aim of the recently launched 
Figure 14.7: Compilation of Hazard Data, South and Central America 
Source: ISDR, 2009.
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European Union’s Seventh Framework Progamme’s (EU/FP7) Envirogrids10 re-
search project, which will evaluate the impacts of climate change on the quality 
and uses of water in the Black Sea Basin (covering 2,000,000 km2, 24 countries, 
160,000,000 inhabitants.). Climatic and demographic scenarios will be down-
scaled to 25 km and 1 km resolutions, respectively. Land-cover data already avail-
able at medium resolutions (250 m to 1k m) will be projected up to 2030. The 
main challenge in this modelling process is to keep the models as independent as 
possible (e.g., not to use population scenarios for forecasting land-cover changes) 
in order to allow comparisons between the resulting fi gures.
Data Needs for Long-term Analysis of Impacts, 
Vulnerability and Adaptation
Long-term early warning
Previous sections have introduced the complexity of designing and acquiring appro-
priate data from the thematic and spatial points of view. The time dimension is also 
essential when considering the inherent uncertainties of scenarios and projections, 
but also important for establishing mitigation and adaptation policies. Many peo-
ple seem to agree that the hard distinction between short-term disaster response and 
recovery and longer-term planning is not necessarily benefi cial for policymaking.
Most people think of early warning in terms of immediate and short-term 
concerns such as major weather events (hurricanes, cyclones, tornadoes and the 
like), climatic variation (El Niño events or droughts caused by lack of rainfall) or 
geo-physical events such as earthquakes and tidal waves. These immediate and 
often unpredictable events require specifi c measuring, information and advisory 
systems, as implemented or coordinated by specifi c national and international or-
ganizations. These activities are essential for effi cient response and recovery ac-
tions, but the focus of organizations such as UNEP is also on identifying issues 
which take much longer to develop and might better be identifi ed as ‘emerging 
environmental threats’. These may take the form of environmental degradation 
that increases the vulnerability of ecosystems (including humans, often in combi-
nation with socio-economic stresses); cumulative environmental threats where the 
accumulation of pollutants collectively increases the vulnerability of ecosystems; 
environmental threats that have not been perceived as such in the past, but that 
new evidence indicates might be deleterious to ecosystems; or more speculative, 
long-term issues where scientifi c evidence may be inadequate at present but dis-
cussions and assessments have identifi ed as a possible environmental problem. 
Depending on the relative socio-economic vulnerability of a given community, 
these environmental threats can (drastically) alter ecosystem functioning and have 
a major impact on human security and the biodiversity of the planet. The recog-
nition that environment is a key ingredient of development has made the ability 
to provide early warning on longer-term and cumulative environmental threats 
much more important.
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Global assessment of environmental risks
Such long-term linkages between environment and development is central to the 
recently published Global Assessment Report (GAR) (ISDR 2009), a global study 
of intensive and extensive disaster risk in the context of development and climate 
change. It is a very good example of an integrated approach to a subject (disas-
ter risk) that cannot be analysed in one unique dimension. This report links the 
observed or potential losses to the exposure and vulnerability of population and 
assets towards natural hazards. The conceptual framework of global risk model-
ling is a simple equation proposed by the United Nations Disaster Relief Organi-
zation (UNDRO, 1979):
Risk (losses) = hazard x exposition x vulnerability
The most possibly detailed data on losses (human and economic, from the 
EM-DAT11 and DesInventar12 databases) and hazards (including cyclones, droughts, 
fl oods, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides) have been compiled (see Figure 14.7).
The hazard maps have been overlaid on the gridded population (LandScan) and 
GDP data in order to calculate human and economic exposures to each of these 
risks. Finally, a statistical analysis of vulnerability indicators (mainly available 
at the national level) enabled the identifi cation of the main risk factors, such as 
poverty, poor governance, urban population growth, isolation of rural areas and 
ecosystem decline. All these factors need to be addressed in the long term.
One other striking conclusion of the report is that risk and exposure are highly 
concentrated and increasing. Despite the successes attained in vulnerability reduc-
tion (through development), risk is still rising because of the growing exposure of 
people and their assets.
Figure 14.8: Tracking Consumption, Production and Health Impacts
Pollutant emissions and impacts do not occur only at place of consumption
Source: Tracking Environmental Impacts of Consumption (TREI-C), a research project 
@ GRID-Europe.
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Effects of climate change were also related to the observed increase in intensity 
of hydro-meteorological hazards such as cyclones. But the evaluation of the im-
pacts of climate change on hazards is only at an early stage and requires further 
investigation. This is particularly important because more than two thirds of the 
mortality and economic losses from reported disasters (1975-2008) are associated 
with hydro-meteorological hazards. Although a large amount of risk, hazard and 
vulnerability data compiled for the GAR report is already made freely available on 
the internet,13 it is expected that more data will be collected on the various dimen-
sions of risk since “there is a growing international commitment to addressing 
disaster risk, poverty and climate change” (ISDR, 2009, p. 14).
Closing the circle: linking consumers, producers and the impacted population
Risk analysis also shows that drivers of climate change in one place (e.g., emissions 
in industrialized countries) may have impacts in other places (e.g., in poor and vul-
nerable countries). In addition, situations today can lead to future vulnerabilities. 
Environmental assessments have to take into account remote distances and futures, 
which, in fact, is in line with the principles of sustainable development. Examples 
of such approaches can be found in the novel ways environmental and economic 
accounting are being carried out. It is now recognized that classical national (e.g., 
Kyoto protocol emissions accounts) or residence-based accounting (e.g., GDP) 
must be complemented by other allocation schemes in order to properly evaluate 
the impacts of the consumption of goods and services throughout the world. Life-
cycle analyses—as well as multi-directional/multi-sectoral trade fl ow data (such as 
the GTAP databases14)—permit the reallocation of emissions among consumers 
and producers. Such models have so far mainly been applied to regional analyses of 
Figure 14.9: Emissions during the Life-cycle of a T-shirt
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global pollutants such as CO2. They have shown large discrepancies in the carbon 
intensities of production between producing and consuming regions.
The recent TREI-C study15 has included emissions of additional pollutants such 
as fi ne particles or heavy metals and assessed their health impacts in terms of disabil-
ity-adjusted life years (DALYs). Such a model thus integrates life-cycle analysis, mac-
roeconomic data on trade and production, pollutant transfer models (through air 
and water) and epidemiological studies about the effects of pollu tants on health.
The integration of such diverse models is required for tracking the complete 
chain of causality from consumption to fi nal impacts through time, space and 
actors (see Figure 14.8).
The life-cycle analysis provides crucial information about where and when most 
pollutant emissions occur during the lifetime of any given item. In the case of a 
T-shirt, which was carefully examined in the TREI-C study, it was demonstrated 
that the use phase can double CO2 emissions due to the frequent use of washing 
machines and electric dryers (see Figure 14.9).
For such easy-to-track examples, mitigation measures appear immediately: 
Consumers have to wash less and/or producers must design clothes that do not 
smell! Unfortunately, other types of goods such as electronic appliances are made 
of a complex mix of components produced in many parts of the world. The life-
cycle analysis of such products would require more data which may be available in 
the future, as the interest in such new types of accounting will grow in the context 
of international environmental negotiations.
Conclusions
The following general conclusions can be drawn from the examples of data anal-
ysis and applications that have been presented in this chapter, as well as from 
the need for more attention to population issues related to the environment and 
climate change:
1.  The role of population data for climate change analysis can be strength-
ened and linked to the reorganization within the IPCC and the lack of 
coverage of population issues in the current debate. 
Population dynamics are at the centre of the climate change issue, yet they re-
ceive little attention. The general debate focuses more on the economic and 
technological aspects. However, there is undoubtedly a strong interest by the 
international and scientifi c communities in better integrating population in the 
analysis and properly assessing the population-related causes and impacts of 
climate change. More and better population data in terms of contents, scale, 
quality and time coverage are needed in order to undertake more relevant and 
rigorous scientifi c assessments that can have a signifi cant infl uence on the po-
litical and societal debates. 
With the reorganization of the analysis and assessment activities for the IPCC 
Fifth Assessment, population and socio-economic scenarios are no longer at the 
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Figure 14.10: Approaches for the Development of IPCC 
           Global Scenarios
Source: Modifi ed from Moss et al. 2008. 
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base of all subsequent sequential analyses (see Figure 14.10), as was the case in the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment. With the newly adopted parallel approach (Moss et al., 
2008), population and socio-economic scenarios are now directly linked to the 
three other components, and therefore the need for improved population data is 
even greater.
2.  There is a need for broader consultation and discussion around the needs 
for data collection and analysis.
Generally speaking, there is a clear need for better identifi cation and expression 
of data needs for addressing climate change and population dynamics. Due to the 
complexity and interlinkages of these issues, conceptual and formal models must 
be further developed, taking into account the availability of data. 
The methods for data creation and estimation must be made more explicit, 
and they must be made more understandable to a wider audience. In particular, 
the distinction between observed and modelled data must be clarifi ed, in order 
to address issues of uncertainties attached to some data, such as projections. The 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) provides a good example of how to present 
synthesized methodologies and evaluation of uncertainties.
In order to support such global assessments with relevant socio-economic 
data (including data on adaptation and mitigation), improved international 
cooperation is necessary. Data is costly to acquire and maintain; priorities must 
be set; redundancy and overlap in the collection and dissemination of data must 
be avoided where possible.
Nevertheless, variety and discrepancies in data sources, in particular between in-
ternational and local scales, will always be observed. Acknowledging and explain-
ing these differences is necessary, i.e., identifying the reasons for such variability, 
whether this is linked to defi nitions of the observation or measurement units or to 
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measurement techniques. Coordination will not necessarily or always lead to the 
consensus and effi ciency, for example, of appropriate and unique data sources in 
each thematic domain (demography, vulnerability, adaptation, etc.). Similar data 
may seem redundant but still have their own rationales for existence. For instance, 
data sets on transportation networks are sometimes acquired and analysed sev-
eral times by many different actors in the same territory (public administrations, 
private companies, specifi c projects, etc.) due to specifi c information needs, differ-
ent levels of application or various copyright issues.
In this respect, participation in evaluation processes and trust-building between 
stakeholders in climate-change assessment activities is important in order to vali-
date the data provided.
3. Quantitative data analysis needs to be integrated with evaluations of 
governance and other qualitative assessments.
When attempting to integrate heterogeneous actors and ways of measuring real-
ity, it is necessary to compare and evaluate numeric data and formal models with 
other types of more qualitative knowledge, including expert opinion, common sense 
and indigenous information. There are conceptual and practical reasons to consider 
subjective evaluations (e.g., governance indicators, perception of risk by local ac-
tors). Many agencies have relevant data to bring to the debate, and it can certainly 
be more effi cient to integrate them early in the assessment process, rather than to be 
confronted with opposition and rejection once the fi gures are published.
4. There are excellent opportunities for strengthening the role of the United 
Nations in moving the population-climate agenda forward.
In the broader participatory and catalysing aspects of data management, the 
United Nations can play an instrumental role by fostering and coordinating data 
collections at global, regional and national levels, as well as by improving the co-
herence, quality and accessibility of population data for a greater knowledge of 
the complex problems at stake. All this, with the ultimate goals of improving the 
science base for sound decision-making and taking sustainable actions.
Notes
  1 According to IPCC (2007), in 2000, UNFCCC Annex I countries (industrialized countries) had 0.683 of kg 
C02-equivalent emissions per US$ of GDPPPP against 1.055 for developing countries.
  2 See: UNEP, 2007.
  3 See: UNEP, n.d., Geodatas.
  4 See website: www.espon.eu/, last accessed 2 October 2009.
  5 The ESPON scenarios A (no immigration) and B3 (with high immigration for a constant age-dependency 
ratio) are unrealistic but illustrate the problems of immigration and fi nancing retirement systems.
  6 See: SEDAC/CIESIN, n.d.
  7 See: Landscan, n.d.
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  8 See the documentation on the LandScan website: www.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/, last accessed 7 October 2009.
  9 See website: http://na.unep.net/globalpop/africa/, last accessed 8 October 2009.
10 See website: www.envirogrids.net/, last accessed 2 October 2009.
11 See Emergency Events Database website: www.emdat.be/, last accessed 3 October 2009.
12 See website of: Corporacíon OSSO, Valle, Colombia: www.desinventar.org/, last accessed 1 October 2009.
13 See: UNEP, n.d., Preview.
14 See: Purdue University, n.d.
15 See: International Academies Network, n.d.
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